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Abstract 
 
This PhD comparatively analyzes and explains the institutional structure, functioning and 
transformational dynamics of the Bulgarian and Greek housing systems, also considering 
the wider geopolitical context. Despite their historically differentiated backgrounds, the two 
countries are selected due to several structural similarities in their housing systems. 
Likewise, neither is easy to fit into the socialist and southern European groupings, and both 
are experiencing radical transformational pressures and severe systemic shocks as a result 
of socio-political and financial turbulences. Despite the academic interest, housing research 
in both countries has been relatively 'introverted', mainly confined to describing socio-
political ‘idiosyncrasies’ and applying 'typologies'. An elaborate comparative study of the 
two countries is practically inexistent, while the increasing transformational dynamics in 
the Bulgarian and Greek housing systems remain insufficiently discussed. Thus, the 
available literature lacks outreaching comparative perspective and has trouble being 
incorporated in wider studies.  
By employing an institutionally embedded mixed-methods approach the research assesses 
similarities whilst respecting differences, avoiding dogmatic adherence to typologies. 
Primary data was collected through qualitative in-depth interviews with housing experts 
and households in Bulgaria and Greece. The EU-SILC and national statistical agencies 
databases have been the main source of secondary quantitative data. Officially published 
reports and newspaper articles provided complementary secondary qualitative and 
quantitative data of relevance. The thesis shows that the Bulgarian and Greek housing 
systems are since circa the 1990s gradually moving away from de-commodified and 
towards pre-commodified forms. Established institutional interfaces are now being 
challenged, stressed under the weight of strong socio-financial restructuring forces and 
persisting societal housing precepts. Comparing the two countries with each other and with 
their wider groupings, allows for improved inclusion in southeastern European housing 
systems. Consequently, the latter can be better incorporated in broader comparative housing 
studies. This research overall contributes to the wider ongoing discussion about housing 
system transformation in southeastern European countries under transition. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction  
 
1.1   Research Background and Rationale 
Housing has been recently and gradually re-placed on a more central position regarding 
socio-political and financial developments in various countries worldwide. On a European 
level interest in housing systems has not been developed and kept on an equal level. That 
being said, it is reasonable to expect variation in the focus on housing issues given the fact 
that systems differ from one country to another. Countries like the UK, France, Sweden and 
Germany have a longer, more persistent output in terms of research and eventual impact on 
housing policy. Such countries have strong housing policy legacies and social housing 
schemes, while their scientific output is widely promoted. Conversely, other countries 
remain relatively more or less underrepresented on an international level and often 
considered having a dimmer focus on housing. This is mostly related to a problematic link 
between housing research and policy-making, as well as low-outreaching academic output.  
However, it would be unfair to assume underrepresented housing systems have no relevant 
research. In reality almost all countries in Europe have professionals and academics 
dedicated to the study of their national housing system. It is true that most of the research 
done never leaves or escapes the 'confines' of the national context. By doing so, such 
studies - however thorough and scientifically sound they may be - lack comparability and 
therefore significantly lose relevance. In turn, international interest in such national housing 
systems per se often remains 'anaemic', and are usually included in grouped comparative 
studies, where national idiosyncratic colouring is lost for the sake of seeking 'universally' 
applicable theories. Bulgaria and Greece are such cases. The former gaining some attention 
only the last ten years, and mostly as part of the former Eastern Bloc (Warsaw Pact). 
Despite being a satellite state of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria followed a tailor-cut Socialist 
path post-War and since 1990. However, this differentiation is often downplayed. This also 
expands to its housing system which is not very much alike the rest of the Eastern Bloc 
countries. Likewise, Greece has indisputably been discussed as a de facto part of the 
Southern European group along Italy, Spain and Portugal. This has been mostly been based 
on geographical and political division often victim to some 'gratifying' simplicity. More 
often, as a means to claim multi-country applicability of theories and patterns. In housing 
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studies, many countries have been 'made' to fit such theories and patterns, nonetheless 
carried away by a procrustean esprit du temps. 
The tendency to treat Southern European – and Post-Socialist for that matter – countries as 
uniform entities regarding to housing, is mainly linked to an urge to classify them and 
complete the 'solid' western European typologies. While common elements do exist, 
fixation on uniformity misses the true notion and value of comparative housing research. 
This also appears to be relevant with housing being more resistant to changes due the effect 
of international forces – compared to other policy sectors like pensions for example. This is 
the precise element that necessitates the focus on inter-country and intra-group very 
differences. However, not every study dogmatically seeks to create or improve some 'ideal-
type'. The lack of sufficient and reliable data is in many cases to blame for generalizations 
made neglecting idiosyncratic systemic components. 
Certainly not without obstacles, housing theory kept advancing through the years, while 
policy-making and implementation things are admittedly lagging behind. This is partially 
understandable as research is usually preceding any practical application, but in housing 
research this is especially valid and amplified. One of the main reasons is the inherent 
inflexibility of housing policy pathways due to path-dependency and complex – often 
unclear or hard to analyze – interconnections with a multitude of relevant or others, 
seemingly irrelevant, policy fields (income protection, health care, pension schemes etc.). 
In many cases, housing is often conceived as belonging within the boundaries of urban 
planning, when it actually is a common place of many disciplines and departments of the 
state-market-family complex mechanism. In other cases, may be inexistent, blurred and lost 
within the state bureaucracy or even set by default.  
In fact, the case with Southern Europe is not so much about the lack of studies, which 
without being extended or even sufficient, are somehow present. The issue here is this bi-
dimensional approach on housing policies and outcomes within the state-market-family 
triangle. Those analyses having avoided the pitfall of trying to apply western welfare and 
housing system theories in Southern Europe and attempting to consider idiosyncratic 
elements and complications (ind. Allen et al. 2004; Allen, 2006; Arbaci, 2006) tend to 
neglect the dynamic temporal transformation parameter in such systems where institutional 
inertia is exceptionally strong due to the existence of the idiosyncratic elements 
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(familialism, political clientelism, shadow economy etc.) they nevertheless recognize. So, 
this leads to a kind of “era snapshot” of the examined housing system which is presented or 
implied as generally stable in time, setting a deterministic tone in the analysis and perhaps 
rendering any further study meaningless. Thus, if indeed people and systems are deemed 
unchanged, then housing outcomes can be precisely calculated and forecast. However, this 
is rarely the case and even the most elaborate analyses would risk if attempting to predict 
housing outcomes. Moreover, homogeneity cannot be easily presumed as the deeper one 
delves into housing systemic evolution and structure, the more differences they find. 
The post-2008 era has been most interesting for housing studies, not least as a result of the 
global financial crisis which hit each country on various levels and in different ways. Neo-
liberal forms have been exposed to their own weaknesses and the 'free' market - in most 
cases not free at all - has been questioned on its presumed capacity to self-regulate. Social 
security in all its forms - including housing - return at the forefront. After almost fifteen 
years of weakening around the globe, the welfare state became relevant again within an 
ongoing debate on the evolution of the welfare modernity. Given these circumstances of 
'doubt', old approaches are more easily challenged. For example, it is now more acceptable 
to assess cases which may seem incomparable. This is for example the case of Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS group) which are increasingly studied in a 
comparative context (Becker, 2013; RICS, 2014). 
Within an increasing number of individual European countries housing has re-emerged as 
an issue. Affordability and increased housing costs, multi-generational cohabitation, 
overcrowding, vacant units, radical drop in housing construction are only some of the 
issues raising concern (Connolly, 2015). Consequent socio-spatial, financial and political 
impacts are becoming increasingly important. National policies may have to be adapted or 
even re-invented, while housing may start being discussed on a European supranational 
level. EU enlargements have somehow boosted the academic interest on eastern European 
countries' systems, but not specifically regarding housing. 
These last points have been some of the main reasons supporting the rationale behind this 
PhD. Furthermore, this PhD Research can be justified based on a number of theoretical, 
statistical, and empirical observations. Firstly, Southeastern European housing systems 
have been mostly approached in a dominantly descriptive manner, instead of analyzing and 
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explaining systemic structures and idiosyncrasies. More than that, the temporal dimension 
of these systems’ evolution has been significantly downplayed by housing researchers. 
Secondly, southeastern European housing systems still are underrepresented in housing 
studies. This is to a large extent due to a notable lack of updated and sufficient quantitative 
and qualitative data. Weak academic tradition and an 'abstract' policy, which could form the 
subject of rigid research, hindered the maturity of housing studies in the wider area. 
Thirdly, housing policies in the region has been mostly regarded as something distinct, 
rather than the intersection of numerous policy sectors and institutions. In many cases there 
is a claimed ‘absence’ of housing policy in ‘traditional’ terms. Fourthly, the selected 
countries (Bulgaria and Greece) present pronounced differences in their socio-political 
historical background, along with significant similarities like ‘weak states’, immature 
market institutions, and housing familialism. Fifthly, post-2000 national political and 
financial contexts in the region have started affecting the respective housing systems to a 
very significant degree. Hence, their evolution cannot keep relying on laissez-faire 
mechanisms. Moreover, as shown later in the thesis, housing constitutes an integral and 
crucial part of the 'Social Contract'. Increased housing costs are seriously affecting the 
'social' and 'welfare' colouring of homeownership in Bulgaria and Greece, and linked to 
socio-political instability. In the customized Bulgarian socialism, 'personal property' and 
homeownership became tools of early post-War mass proletarization, and symbol of the 
Socialist housing policy (Ivanova, 2015). In Greece, the state chose to offer favourable 
financial and regulative framework for the family to self-provide housing through the close 
cooperation of the market, leading to the dominance of homeownership since early post-
War. Homeownership soon became the common element of the whole nation and different 
social classes, being differentiated by the floor (Bulgaria) or the price and location of the 
house (Greece). Today, this 'Social Contract' is challenged as a result of international and 
national political and financial dynamics, like the tendency towards weaker welfare states 
and less decommodified housing.  
 
1.2   Commonly discussed housing issues in Bulgaria and Greece 
Focusing on the current standing of the Bulgarian and Greek housing systems cannot be 
more than just a snapshot, linking the past with the immediate future developments. 
Therefore, I have chosen to use internet based newspaper articles for this sub-section, 
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which can offer the reader some insight on the most pronounced issues of today. It is 
acknowledged that this may do less justice to underlying issues and mechanisms, which are 
however thoroughly examined throughout the thesis. Likewise, the effect of the financial 
crisis is more dominant when focusing on the present and this is especially true for Greece. 
Whatever the distortion this may bring, it remains a central factor with its own weighing. 
Starting with Bulgaria, current issues regard mostly the physical condition of the housing 
units and the related financial problems (World Bank, 2017). The majority of the Legacy 
housing estates presents serious technical shortcomings and degradation, directly impacting 
housing costs and living conditions of the residents. Most owners are of low wages 
struggling to keep up with increasing maintenance costs draining financial resources and 
hindering the much necessary upgrade (Habitat for Humanity GB in 2017). Rising energy 
poverty is directly linked to housing conditions and resource drain, and related to the non-
fully-liberalized and poorly regulated energy sector
1
. Overall poor housing conditions are 
hindering the improvement and thriving of Bulgarian people’s lives (Churalska, 2017). 
In Greece, the radically increased property taxation has overburdened housing costs and 
household financial resources. Higher taxation has also led to radical increase in inheritance 
waiver rates (Vourgana, 2017), and consequent wealth loss and weakening of housing 
familialism. Furthermore, forthcoming readjustments of the legislative framework slowly 
but steadily remove strong-till-recently statutory protections against primary residence, 
mostly through expansion and modernization of auctioning mechanisms (Siamakis, 2013). 
As a result, housing prices are expected to drop further (Kanellis, 2017a), leading to further 
decrease in housing enclosed wealth (Souki, 2017). Through still incomparable to Bulgaria, 
energy poverty is radically rising as an issue (Vatavali & Chatzikonstantinou, 2016). 
Currently, access to (better) housing is a common problem in both countries (World Bank, 
2017). In Bulgaria the post-EU rise in housing prices has remained unpaired with a 
respective increase in income, therefore excluding households from the housing market 
(Habitat for Humanity GB in 2017). Homelessness, still far lower in comparison with many 
other countries, is slowly expanding with its consequences becoming more pronounced. In 
Bulgaria this mostly regards the Roma population, left without support or integration 
schemes post-1990 (Giannangeli, 2013). In Greece the phenomenon of housing precarity is 
                                                 
1
 http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/02/bulgarias-electricity-prices [Accessed 19 March 2017] 
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gradually expanding (Sotirchou, 2016). Overall, both countries are characterized by, higher 
than EU-average homeownership rates, marginalized rental sectors, weak to inexistent 
social housing sectors
2
, and mistrust towards the public sector (Brunwasser, 2006; Popov, 
2011). Despite significantly reduced due to GFC effects, capital enclosed in housing assets 
approximates 1.5 times the Bulgarian (Harizanova, 2014) and 3-to-4 times the Greek 
(Koukakis, 2016) GDP respectively. 
 
1.3   Academic Contribution 
In this thesis, there is a number of things done differently, contributing to housing studies 
literature. Perhaps the most important is the attempted balance between comparative and 
case study in-detail analysis, working on a macroscopic and microscopic level respectively. 
A large number of comparative housing studies focus on numerous countries which 
inevitably leads to partial loss of national characteristics in order to make such comparisons 
viable. This is also done for the sake of widely generalizable conclusions and results. While 
certainly welcome if achieved, general applicability of conclusions and results is not the 
priority in this thesis. More than that, differences are highlighted and respected for their 
value, allowing common elements and transcending patterns to be clearly shown. The 
selection and juxtaposition of countries with such different socio-political backgrounds is 
not to be taken lightly and therefore is often avoided. Bulgaria and Greece are a priori 
classified as belonging to distinct and clearly defined country groups and housing systems. 
The former is considered directly linked to its former Eastern Bloc membership and 
therefore identified with the Socialist past. The latter follows or is identified with the 
Southern European classification characteristics. As shown in this thesis, in fact both 
countries differ to a significant degree from their supposed respective cohorts. For this 
reason I do not discuss them as part of the eastern and Southern European groups, where 
unless absolutely necessary. Through such an approach this research offers an alternative 
reading and perspective. Overall, this thesis stays away from any kind of West vs. East or 
rather Capitalism vs. Socialism debate. On the contrary, many elements are shared and 
transcending ideological and geographical borders. These are of special interest and given 
the attention due.  
                                                 
2
 http://www.housingeurope.eu/resource-94/social-housing-in-europe [accessed 19 March 2017] 
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Likewise, this research adopts a mixed qualitative and quantitative approach, analyzed in 
detail in Chapter 4. Admittedly, there is a heavy focus on the former and for a good reason. 
Both countries have been lacking such an attempt to listen and record people's views on 
housing matters. Even though lack of literature is not the case for each country separately, 
no such qualitative comparative approach has been attempted. The two countries are 
usually included in their wider groups analyses and are often left under-explored, while the 
voices of the people is not considered, mostly due to practical research limitations. By 
adopting a combined multi-theory approach this research avoids being restricted to policy-
inclined or outcome-inclined analyses, which is often the case. Unlike many studies, 
socioeconomic aspects are given proper weight and properly incorporated. 
As DeWilde (2015a, p.5) noted, on an international scale housing research is often 
expended on describing and exploring systems and mechanisms, rather than analyzing and 
explain; therefore, lacking actual comparative value. With this in mind, at the core of this 
research is the scope of deconstructing and then explaining housing systemic mechanisms. 
For example, there is special focus on matters such as policy path-dependency and 
institutional inertia. There has been no attempt at reinventing the wheel when not 
necessary, but rather optimizing its practical applicability and usefulness. For example 
theories like welfare regimes are not to be extended or modified. Such an attempt escapes 
the scope of this research and may even be out of place in general. What is done is the 
refinement of its application in the examined housing systems of Bulgaria and Greece. The 
same applies to most milestone theories reviewed in the first literature review Chapters.  
By no means is the goal about comparing the incomparable. In reality no housing system 
can be point-to-point be compared to another. Any attempt to do so will mostly bear no 
credible fruit. The reader will eventually see that specific points in the thesis could not be 
compared, juxtaposed, combined or in any other way put side-by-side, and thus have been 
left to offer their own colouring to the research. This is the pronounced case with the 
building stock physical attributes in terms e.g. of its architectural form. It would be naive to 
compare the Bulgarian with the Greek housing stock on such a basis. What has certainly 
been done is discussing and analyzing the ideological and policy background which led and 
still affects these forms, focusing on the composing elements within.  
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This research aims at a holistic comparative analysis of Housing Policy, Systems and 
Outcomes, focusing on the two selected countries. This aim is meaningful per se, offering 
the opportunity to expand on a rather limited, outdated and in many instances biased 
(overemphasizing some aspects while downplaying or ignoring others), body of literature. 
In addition to the aforementioned, the relevance of this research lies at the ability to 
highlight underlying housing system mechanics in these two countries experiencing 
tremendous systemic shocks and transformations during the last fifteen years at least. 
Unveiling such mechanisms and their operation can drive change towards a better path 
considering the housing system potential, societal aspirations and policy making and 
implementation complexities.  
 
1.5   Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2 is the first part of the general theory literature review drawing from a multitude 
of theories like Welfare Regimes, Corporatism, and Varieties of Capitalism 
Chapter 3 goes in depth regarding Homeownership theories focusing on its pervasive role, 
various trade-offs, different meanings and dynamics 
Chapters 4 focuses on the adopted Research Methodology in accordance to the set research 
Aim, Objectives, Questions and Hypotheses  
Chapter 5 highlights the evolutionary path and socio-political background until the modern 
era. Theories visited in Chapters 2 and 3 are assess given the Bulgarian and Greek context 
Chapter 6 is dedicated to the Qualitative and Quantitative presentation and analysis of the 
data gathered with a view to future and changing trends 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis, bringing all relevant elements together in a comprehensive 
and coherent manner  
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Chapter 2 - From Welfare Regimes to Housing Realities 
 
2.1   Introduction: A Matter of approach? 
When analyzing housing issues, one cannot escape the need to discuss welfare regimes 
theory. The reader will recognize I have avoided an exhaustive discussion on welfare 
regimes, which would inevitably stray far off the scope of this research.  This classification 
can be now considered a bit outdated, limited in scope and out of context as it is tied to a 
past era characterized by different power structures and ideologies. However, it still 
provides a somehow clear starting point. Welfare regimes are gradually examined regarding 
their connection with housing systems and outcomes. Even though differences between 
various country systems render any effort to definitively clarify any linkage between 
housing systems and welfare regimes extremely precarious, the link is there. For example, 
according to Delfani et al. (2014) when considering welfare regimes as process through 
which state affects reallocation (redistribution) of life chances for individuals and social 
classes, housing policy is central to welfare provision. The exact type of link between 
housing regimes and welfare regimes still remains elusive, which seems related to the fact 
the former are hard to quantify (DeWilde, 2015a). 
Inversely considered, housing is central to welfare structures, socio-political realities and 
financial realities (Stephens et al., 2015b). At the same time housing systems are 
themselves influenced by a variety of factors, related or translated to different 
configurations within the state-market-household triangle. Despite being sure about the 
existence of links between welfare and housing their nature and intermediate joints with 
numerous aspects of the social, political and financial life, are hardly uncontested and 
indubitable. Recognizing the complexity of housing issues and the need to go beyond 
single-sided readings, a multi-approach has been adopted in this research. Recent trends in 
housing theory promote a holistic approach trying to avoid the pitfalls of exclusively 
focusing either on full theoretical or empirical data analysis. Starting from the - more than 
extensively - discussed welfare regimes theory, I gradually move towards housing systems 
theories. Next, after analyzing various theories on housing regimes and systems, I discuss 
the different approaches regarding the welfare and housing linkages. Kemeny dichotomous 
(rental) housing system typology - later expanded to wider 'housing regimes' - and the 
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‘trade-off’ thesis are in no way free of critique but semantic and analyzed in detail. Either 
as a ‘wobbly pillar’ or a ‘cornerstone’, housing seems to be a necessary element of the 
welfare state. Therefore, a distinct part is dedicated to housing’s unique characteristics and 
weird positioning with regard to the welfare state influence sphere. Housing policy trends 
close this sub-section before moving on to alternative perspective approaches. 
Assessing housing from a market-oriented perspective, I critically assess the Varieties of 
Residential Capitalism, as an expansion of Varieties of Capitalism doctrine. Despite 
necessary refinements, this approach off offers a much needed reading of the financial 
factors affecting housing systems formation. Embedded in Varieties of Capitalism theory, 
Institutional dynamics analysis helps shed a light on the underlying interactions within the 
state-market-family triangle. This does not only provide a better understanding on how 
housing systems are formed, but also the particularities of institutional and therefore 
systemic change of systems under transformation. Lastly, Corporatism doctrine is discusses 
on its application on housing highlighting the politics perspective, especially regarding 
market and state interaction. Housing corporatism explains actor-driven institutional change 
in housing systems and interaction between different kind of actors. The chapter then 
concludes with a discussion on the search for a rigid housing typology, and its implications. 
 
2.2   Welfare Regimes, Systems and States 
Welfare regimes regard power structures. Esping-Andersen’s classification was based on 
decommodification of labour, social stratification and state-market mix (Allen, 2006; 
O’Neill, 2008; Stephens at al. 2010). Different regimes are produced through a social and 
institutional process due to inter-class alliances and conflicts producing distinct and 
divergent configurations of intertwined state-economy, legal organization and institutional 
structures (Ronald, 2007; Lennartz, 2011). The linked institutional arrangements of the 
market-state-family triangle are key to welfare policies protecting individuals against 
market risks (Hulse, 2003; Draxler & Van Vliet, 2010). However, each country chooses 
from an array of market or decommodification tactics to cope with personal risks, or a 
combination of them (Draxler & Van Vliet, 2010). Decommodification allows individuals 
or families to retain an acceptable standard of living independently of market effects (ibid.). 
Arbaci (2008) refers to welfare regimes as arrangements targeting redistribution and 
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selected areas of decommodification leading to specific types of universal transfers or 
residual benefits allocated horizontally and vertically.  
Allen (2006) argues that welfare regime typology seems more appropriate for large-scale 
comparative studies among countries. Welfare systems fit to smaller-scale analyses, 
entering and widening the scope and investigation of inter-dependent institutions and their 
complexes’ structure which explains institutional forms, reforms and overall modus 
operandi. The original Esping-Andersen welfare regimes typology is not sufficient in 
catching the details and therefore not recommended for analyses between a small number 
of countries presenting similarities in their housing systems. 
The three original Esping-Andersen ideal-types were later expanded by the inclusion of the 
Mediterranean and Post-socialist welfare regimes, while Kemeny (2001; 2006), limited it 
by considering Socialdemocratic Regime as variation of the Conservative-Corporatist one. 
Lennartz (2011) argued that ideal-types are more of a typology based on empirical study 
(also Hulse, 2003), omitting housing whatsoever. Consolidating relevant literature 
(Dewilde & De Keulenaer, 2003; Hoekstra, 2003/2005; Allen, 2006; Kemeny, 2006; 
Ronald, 2007; Arbaci, 2007/2008; Aidukaite, 2009; Ferreira, 2009; Stephens et al. 2010; 
Lennartz, 2011; Stephens & Van Steen, 2011; Petmesidou, 2013), gives a clear picture of 
this typology. In Liberal-Residualist welfare regime capital interests and markets prevail, in 
within a low state interference and deregulation and low state interventionism context. With 
privatized welfare services, state aid is reserved for the extremely poor (safety net, means-
tested), while people in need are left outside the system. In such a commodified welfare 
environment exposure to market and employment risks is high. In a Conservative-
Corporatist regime power and interest struggle between capital and labour forces is on 
more or less equal terms, reaching an equilibrium. State intervention is active providing 
segmented welfare services, but income redistribution is minimal as class hierarchy is 
preserved being the starting point of welfare policies. Family and non-profit institutions 
have an enhanced role, mainly as an welfare systemic shock impact absorbers like of 
unemployment. Decommodification is medium but relatively high and social rights follow 
class and status. Conservative forces are kept at bay or divided in the Socialdemocratic-
Universalistic welfare regime, allowing working-class interests to prevail by allying with 
various interest groups. Welfare services are highly decommodified through strong state 
interventionism also ensuring a high level of quality and population coverage. Dependence 
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on family resources is unnecessary and therefore extremely low. Somehow mixing of the 
liberal and corporatist elements the Mediterranean-Rudimentary regime is notably 
different. State presence is limited and welfare services provision is of insufficient quality 
and coverage (underdeveloped and residual), with extreme prejudice towards safeguarding 
and enhancing pension schemes. Family is the dominant welfare provider leading to 
intergenerational dependence and prevalence of familialist mentality over statism and 
market trust. Extended informal employment sector is overly exposed while formal one is 
heavily regulated and protected. Income redistribution is highly selective passing through 
clientelistic-nepotistic channels and generally limited. Unstable employment impact is high 
while health care maintains a universalist character. Lastly, the Post-Socialist regime lies 
somewhere between the western corporatist and Mediterranean regimes. Dependence on 
family resources is significantly high, especially post-1990. Nevertheless, social policy is 
largely identified and linked to the Soviet past, with widespread low-level social security. 
Arbaci (2007), tried to link welfare regimes to construction sectors’ composition and 
production. In the Latin Rim there is a relatively small-scale production and construction 
firms are fragmented and stratified covering low, middle and high income families’ housing 
demand, according to class-status differential preservation tactics. In Liberal Regime large 
constructors dominate a highly speculative development and investment market. In Social-
democratic Regimes where land is publicly owned, big companies are supervised by non-
profit developers (non-speculative) from which they are kept separated. In Corporatist 
Regimes a fragmented building industry has an output of middle-scale production and gains 
are more speculative than Social-democratic but less than in Liberal Regimes. 
Regimes and Systems are often used interchangeably but are not one and the same. 
Regimes characterize specific socio-political and economic configurations leading to the 
development of respective Systems (Stephens, 2016). Welfare Systems regard tax system, 
social security and labour-to-market interactions which determines levels and distribution 
of incomes, with their functioning defining different welfare regimes (Stephens et al. 2010; 
Stephens & Van Steen, 2011). Their role is crucial regarding the regulation of income 
distribution and poverty. As welfare systems stem from welfare regimes, there is an 
assumption on having similar or reinforcing distributional effects (Ronald, 2007; Stephens 
& Van Steen, 2011). Lennartz (2011) refers to welfare systems as sets of individual welfare 
programs some of which should not be expected to fit the extended Esping-Andersen 
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typology. This differentiation does not signify another welfare regime but a variation to the 
existing ones. Allen (2006) refers to welfare systems as structures of wider social 
institutions responsible for providing welfare to households or individuals within the 
family-state-market triangle. Welfare systems refer to certain properties where welfare 
regimes are about power structures (Stephens & Van Steen, 2011). Kemeny (2011) 
discusses welfare regimes (independent variable) as constellations of power configurations 
creating different welfare systems (dependent variable) which are the outcomes one can 
describe. Newly analyzed welfare system types are not new welfare regimes unless new 
kinds of power relations are established. For Doling & Elsinga (2013) welfare systems 
rearrange payment of welfare services over the life course, smoothing the financial burden. 
Welfare systems are dependent on the welfare regime in force. 
Forcing specific country systems to fit the Esping-Andersen ideal-typical welfare regimes, 
will inevitably disregard their unique characteristics (Allen, 2006). Reprocessing the 
Esping-Andersen typology by introducing two more levels of decommodification (very low 
and very high) offers a more appropriate classification of actually existing welfare states 
and systems. The majority of existing welfare states are positioned somewhere between the 
ideal-typical welfare regimes (ibid). Lennartz (2011) notes that in Esping-Andersen’s work 
welfare state is defined through the decommodification-stratification-state/market/family 
mix trio and welfare state regimes are specific forms of welfare regimes. For Malpass 
(2004) welfare state is more of a policy stance rather than a set of public services. 
Housing regimes have been defined as ideological power constellations which affect the 
interaction between state, market and family regarding housing provision, allocation and 
consumption (DeWilde, 2015a). Different housing regimes lead to respective housing 
policies and consequent  housing outcomes. These housing outcomes can be used to 
evaluate housing regimes, Policies and ideological power constellations (ibid.). Stephens et 
al. (2015b), highlight that power structures affecting housing regimes may be in flux, 
contrasting Kemeny and Esping-Andersen relatively 'fixed' and resistant to external forces. 
For Hegedus & Szemzo (2015) housing regimes are defined according to combinations of 
taxation, housing subsidies and social housing schemes. 
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2.3   Housing Systems 
Admittedly, the original welfare regimes thesis was not about housing (Stephens et al. 
2010; Lennartz, 2011; Griggs & Kemp, 2012) and anything regarding this matter was 
unclear (Allen, 2006; Hoekstra, 2003). Despite the controversy, the Esping-Andersen 
typology offered a somehow clear – albeit ideal – picture of welfare regimes. It was this 
clarity that led many housing researchers to take it as a starting point. Efforts to fill the 
knowledge gap either tried to adapt the Esping-Andersen typology to housing or to create 
new one (Stephens et al. 2010). Starting from there, the most careful approaches take into 
consideration different housing systems’ specificities without presupposing the welfare 
regime and housing system one-to-one link (Lennartz, 2011). It has been recognized for 
some time now that welfare regimes and housing systems are connected (ibid.) in a 
relationship that works both ways (Kemeny, 2005; Malpass, 2008; Stephens et al. 2010) 
but the type of this connection is still debatable. With the direct link of welfare regimes and 
housing systems not being as popular as an indirect one, the specificalities and levels of the 
latter have lately become an issue per se, mainly regarding the quantity, quality and type of 
intermediary linkages. Housing systems can be understood as the combined effect of 
housing market operation and housing policy interventions (Stephens et al. 2010) 
producing distinct distributional patterns (Stephens & Van Steen, 2011).  
During the years housing has been theoretically and empirically analyzed, there has been a 
significant attempt to establish some direct link between the Esping-Andersen classification 
and housing systems mostly trying to fit the latter in the original ideal-types. Based on 
Barlow & Duncan (cit. 1994) Liberal systems channel welfare provision mainly through 
homeownership while the social housing sector remains stigmatized. Inversely, in 
Socialdemocratic systems high quality social rental housing is dominant within a 
collectivist ideology. Housing policy has a troubleshooting function in Conservative-
Corporatist systems with the private initiative heavily encouraged. Lastly, in Rudimentary 
systems an overly absent state welfare provision - including housing - forces the expansion 
of familialist self-provision of housing, often with speculative intentions (as discussed in 
Dewilde & De Keulenaer, 2003; Ronald, 2007) 
Reserved to the Dutch system, Hoekstra’s (2003) analysis moved to applying a modified 
welfare-state regime model to housing (Dewilde & De Keulenaer, 2003; Lennartz, 2011). 
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His qualitative analysis differentiates itself from the quantitative Esping-Andersen study 
but the focusing on processes and not outcomes underlines a knowledge gap (Stephens et 
al. 2010; Stephens, 2011). Hoekstra ‘translated’ Esping-Andersen’s indicators into housing 
terms. Decommodification was linked to price moderation and housing subsidies, 
Stratification to social housing allocation eligibility criteria, and Provision mix as regulator 
of the former two. Enhanced subsidization and strong regulation were tied to the 
Socialdemocratic welfare regime and inversely for the Liberal one. Social housing 
allocation would be needs-based in the former, while market should be the main provider in 
parallel to a residual social rented sector reserved for the deeply poor in the latter. Hoekstra 
analysis presumed simple links like e.g. between subsidized or limited profit housing and 
labour decommodification. However, reality is more complex, affected by numerous 
factors, leading to a variety of outcomes. For example, lower housing costs may offer 
employers an alibi to drop wages and the state a tool to ensure social peace (Allen, 2006). 
Kemeny’s (2001, 2006) Unitary/Dualist rental market systems constitutes the most 
significant attempt to create a housing systems’ typology (Stephens et al. 2010). In 
Dualist/Individualist systems (non-corporatist structures) homeownership is the dominant 
tenure, being directly and indirectly institutionally promoted. The private rental sector 
remains unregulated but clearly protected from the social rented one which is kept small 
and reserved for disadvantaged people. In Unitary/Collectivist systems (corporatist 
structures) state intervenes and supports all tenure types on equal terms. The private rental 
sector is regulated and competing with an extended, developed and widely accessible social 
rented one in the open market. Also, Homeownership rates are comparatively lower (also 
discussed in Arbaci, 2007; Ronald, 2007; Lennartz, 2011; Norris & Stephens, 2014). The 
approach is still dominant in housing analyses despite controversy regarding the 
interpretation of the evidence and its casual application. Hoekstra (2009 cf.) tried to test the 
Kemeny typology through certain criteria like percentage of owner-occupation and its 
quality comparing to the social sector. Kemeny thesis has been verified but with a strong 
reservation on the reliability of data used (Stephens et al. 2010).  
Focusing on outcomes, Stephens (2008) presented a categorization of social housing 
systems according to function. As an 'Ambulance Service’ social housing sector is small in 
relation to elevated levels of poverty and income inequality, weak social security and tight 
means-tested allocation for the extremely disadvantaged. Eligibility is valid as long as the 
16 
 
problem remains and rise on income may throw people outside the protection system. As a 
‘Safety Net’ housing and relevant benefits ensure that the remaining income excluding 
housing expenses does not fall below a set level, allocation is prioritized based on needs 
targeting high poverty. In the ‘Wider Affordability Function’ large social housing sectors 
synergize with in-work benefits, and allocation is based on broad eligibility criteria, 
contributing to reduced income inequality. Stephens et al. (2015b) note that housing 
regimes require stable power structures in order to be formed, although housing welfare 
regimes will be formed by default like in the post-socialist countries case. 
Stephens et al. (2010) argued on the combined effect of welfare regimes and housing policy 
in housing outcomes (quality) and affordability levels (cost).  Housing systems and policies 
function within a framework the parameters of which are set by the welfare regime. 
Housing systems is not possible to be developed outside or independent of the respective 
welfare regimes but this does not mean that countries belonging to the same Regime will 
deterministically develop exactly the same housing systems and policy. USA and UK 
belonging to the liberal welfare regime are characterized by high income poverty but the 
housing policy in the former offers ‘ambulance service’ where in the latter a ‘safety net’. 
Nevertheless, it would be extremely difficult for the social rented sector to function in a 
‘broader affordability’ fashion and drift to the almost opposite direction of the welfare 
regime. The link between welfare regimes and housing systems is probable but in no case 
certain. Where housing systems influence welfare outcomes - to some extend - 
independently, they have a balancing role and effect as a – partial – countermeasure (ibid; 
Stephens & Van Steen, 2011). In other cases the housing system is copying the welfare 
system and reproducing relevant patterns (ibid.). This is the case with Southern European 
countries. Such a relationship is not so predetermined in all groups. In the Central and 
Eastern Europe some countries followed the western Corporatist pattern of rent-controlled 
sectors, while others made homeownership the dominant tenure like Romania and Bulgaria 
(Stephens et al. 2010 on Allen, 2006). 
Stephens & Fitzpatrick (2007) note that housing systems are often expected to replicate 
welfare regime patterns but the relationship is far more complex. Housing systems may 
reinforce welfare regime outcomes but they can also counter them. For Stephens et al. 
(2015b) tenure and housing finance reflect the role of the state and market as sources of 
housing welfare. Stephens (2016) concludes that even though housing systems may or may 
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not so much reflect their respective welfare systems. Therefore starting from Esping-
Andersen's analysis to diagnose housing systems may prove insufficient or even 
misleading. That said, Esping-Andersen used the state-family-market triangle allowing 
better geographical adaptation (ibid.). Regarding the Kemeny approach, Stephens (2016) 
notes that when reading housing systems from there outcomes special attention is required 
given the fact that available EU-SILC data refer to multiple countries with often greatly 
varying living and housing standards and societal norms. 
Welfare Regimes Welfare Systems 
Ideal-types referring to power structures 
affecting reallocation of life-chances. 
Suggested for macroscopic comparative 
research of larger number of countries with 
distinctive differences 
Not always corresponding to WRs due to 
variations, WSs reallocate payment for 
welfare services over the life-course. 
Suggested for studies of systems with small 
differences and/or similarities 
Housing Regimes Housing Systems 
Regard ideological power structures 
affecting housing provision, allocation and 
consumption through the State-Market-
Family triangle. Linked to WRs but findings 
on the true nature of the connection remain 
debatable 
Operate within the framework set by 
Welfare Regimes. Same WRs may lead to 
different HSs, and HSs may copy WS. 
Housing Systems are formed under Market 
and Housing Policy forces. Inversely, HSs 
affect Welfare Regimes 
Housing Policy Housing Outcomes 
Regard specific sets of measures affecting 
affordability, tenure structure, housing 
provision, etc. 
Relate to the combined effect of Welfare 
Regimes and Housing Policy 
 
 
2.4   Uniqueness of Housing 
Despite its crucial role, housing has been avoided in the mainstream welfare debate mainly 
due to serious issues regarding the measurement of its effects in different welfare systems 
(2001; Dewilde & De Keulenaer, 2003; Ronald, 2007; Ronald & Doling, 2010) but also 
due to its unique characteristics and positioning (Kemeny, 2001/2006). One of the most 
unique characteristics of housing is its composition as a discipline. Housing issues require 
analyses and approaches stemming from a multitude of other disciplines like political 
science and sociology (Dewilde & De Keulenaer, 2003; Stephens & Van Steen, 2011). 
Additionally, housing interacts with the wider welfare and labour market and is interlinked 
to the legal system (tenure, property rights) and mortgage finance complex (Stephens, 
Table 1.1 - From Welfare Regimes to Housing Outcomes (source: author) 
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2011). That means that studies focusing on one or another – or even a few – indicators and 
features will just not suffice. So, for example housing is related to income (levels, 
redistribution etc.) but this will be far from enough to explain complex processes and 
outcomes. Indeed, processes have received far more attention than outcomes thus creating 
serious issues in integrating housing in welfare system literature. Under this mentality, the 
impact of housing to the welfare systems and its distributional effects are insufficiently 
understood (Stephens & Van Steen, 2011). 
Another important characteristic has to do with housing having a ‘double identity’ both as a 
tradable capital asset or investment good (dwelling) linked to the purchase market and a 
tradable service-consumption good (accommodation) linked to the rental market (Fahey & 
Norris, 2011; Stephens, 2011; Griggs & Kemp, 2012). Omitting to consider this duality 
leads to downplaying the direct and/or indirect influence, intervention and role of the state 
(Fahey & Norris, 2011). Housing is simultaneously a private (individual market) 
commodity and a public good requiring state intervention, and it is a sector involving a 
significant number of hidden expenditures. As an asset housing can be commodified while 
as a service familialised (ibid). 
Housing is not only embedded in societal structures like Kemeny suggested but also to the 
wider national and historical context. Stephens (2011), discusses on the path-dependency of 
housing. Previous policies, capital investments, mentalities and expectancies strongly affect 
present and probably future outcomes even in cases where they are not still active 
(Stephens & Van Steen, 2011). Dewilde & De Keulenaer (2003) agree with housing policy 
being tied to a path-dependent evolution - that may had started due to consciously chosen 
reason or accidentally - adding that the more deadlocked a system becomes the more 
difficult its further development becomes. Bengtsson (2009a) characterizes housing as 
strongly path-dependent and slow to change. Paths chosen in the past due to apparent 
legitimacy, efficiency and/or power make hard to seek and follow paths left behind. Despite 
all this housing path-dependency has been neglected in many instances. 
For Stephens (2011) the distinctive element of housing has to do with its positioning within 
a wider socio-economic configuration and being focused by public policy in various ways 
(‘System Embedded Approach’). Stephens (2011) expands on the sociologist term of 
‘embeddedness’ (Granovetter, 1985) so as to include housing. Under such a prism housing-
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related behaviours and mentalities are strongly affected by social network interactions. This 
approach can be used when assessing housing familialism for example and its 
reinforcement from one generation to another. This also explains why housing choices may 
seem distant to investment and overall financial considerations. Under constant pressure, 
housing markets will eventually will more or less attune to sociological forces which has 
for example been the case in Bulgaria and Greece. 
Housing is directly related to durable assets with strong and long-lasting impact on the built 
environment also. These assets are pinned to a certain location (leading to heterogeneity) 
and intertwined with various area effects (externalities). Furthermore, the impact of policies 
focusing on the built environment will take some time to manifest (Hoekstra, 2003; 
Bengtsson, 2009a; Stephens, 2011). Likewise, due to its nature housing conditions and 
outcomes (tenure structures) need persistent investment/expenditure in order to 
significantly change (Norris & Domanski, 2009). 
Stephens et al. (2010) showed the link of housing and the housing system with a variety of 
outcomes not only from the sphere of welfare but from the wider socio-economic spectrum. 
Homelessness, inter-regional mobility, inter- and intra-tenure polarization, housing and 
income poverty, were some of the outcomes examined. Housing policies are the amalgam 
of different public and private actors (Stephens, 2011) in the state-market-household 
triangle (Allen, 2006; Norris & Domanski, 2009). Such policies are hard to identify as they 
are not – clearly – implemented by the bureaucratic mechanism. Even in cases where only 
certain public actors are involved, identifying housing policies still remains an issue. 
Hoekstra (2003) refers to the fiscal schemes regarding owners being a decision of the 
Finance department without involving others, but still remaining unclear whether these 
policies are subsidies or not. Moreover, fiscal schemes belong to a wider taxation system.  
When compared to other household expenses, housing is the single largest item which 
clearly makes it a risk in cases of income hardship (Kemeny, 2001; Griggs & Kemp, 2012). 
Moreover, housing property taxation is whole influencing factor by itself. Taxes on 
imputed rents, land values, capital gains, property values and transactions affect housing 
prices volatility, not alone, but in conjunction with other volatility-affecting factors. Of 
course carefully planned housing taxations schemes can counter (extreme) fluctuations in 
housing demand and supply (Haffner & Oxley, 2011). 
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While the special characteristics of housing (assets, policies, impacts) that should be taken 
into consideration are numerous, doing so will increase the possibilities to reach a 
rewarding result in the comparative housing research (Stephens, 2011). 
 
2.5   Housing: The 'wobbly' welfare pillar 
Integrating housing in the welfare state literature has been a challenging task as their 
connections is evidently a pretty complex issue (Malpass, 2004). One of the most semantic 
characterizations of housing as a welfare sector is that of the ‘wobbly pillar’ as expressed 
by Torgersen (1987), and later extensively discussed. Housing has rarely been strongly or 
dominantly provided by state mechanisms unlike other welfare pillars like health care and 
pensions. Private initiative and spending along with market mechanisms have historically 
undertook housing provision. Secondly, and consequently decommodification of housing 
has remained weak in most country systems. Through extensive privatizations latest 
decades saw the shrinking of social housing sectors even in systems where it has been 
historically and systemically stronger, mitigating the risk to the private sector (Harloe, 
2005; Kemeny, 2001/2006; Malpass, 2004/2008; Roland, 2007; Norris & Domanski, 2009; 
Fahey & Norris, 2011; Stephens et al. 2010; Stephens, 2011; McKee, 2012). 
Regarding private consumption, housing has become the ‘cornerstone’ of household 
welfare due to its capital value (Malpass, 2008), especially the case for the elderly and their 
well-being. Ronald & Doling (2010) note that housing functions both as public and a 
private good and wealth source. Malpass (2004; 2008) analyses the UK system discussing 
on the presenting the ‘wobbly pillar’ and ‘cornerstone’ approaches as both valid for 
explaining (past) welfare-to-housing links. Following his rationale, housing has become 
central ('cornerstone') in boosting economic growth in the modern open-market context, 
being turned into an private matter and a means to personal wealth accumulations, mainly 
though homeownership. On the other hand, social housing has become residual ('wobbly') 
and stigmatized with socioeconomic failure within a consumerist society. Not all elements 
can be used to describe every cross-system and within-systems variation regarding for 
example the situation in social housing or the reasons, processes and outcomes of 
homeownership, in different countries. What these points do is to provide a supportive 
framework for the ‘Cornerstone’ approach. Malpass (2008) recognized these two 
21 
 
approaches may not be sufficient to explain contemporary complex configurations. On 
whether housing can or should carry the burden of being a welfare ‘Cornerstone’, Malpass 
stays sceptical. The welfare capacity of housing seems to be finite and volatile mainly due 
to financial risks regarding housing as a tradable asset. Plus, exclusion and wealth 
inequality issues persist, like for example large parts of the population not having access to 
homeownership. Viability of such an welfare approach seems highly precarious. 
Housing has been considered standing on the borderline of the welfare state’s influence 
sphere and rarely seen as one of its explicit obligations (Harloe, 1995; Kemeny, 2001; 
Malpass, 2004/2008; Dewilde & De Keulenaer, 2003; Fahey & Norris, 2011). Its inclusion 
as an irreplaceable welfare pillar - albeit 'wobbly' - is strongly supported (Kemeny, 2001; 
Malpass, 2004; Stephens & Van Steen, 2011; Stephens, 2011). At the same time, 
comparing housing to the other welfare pillars is far from a good choice due to its unique 
characteristics and positioning within the welfare state system (Fahey & Norris, 2011). In 
some systems housing remains a central issue requiring state’s protection as it a productive 
sector of the economy (comprehensive/institutional housing policies), and in others no 
more than a residual state responsibility focusing only on those excluded from the housing 
market (Ronald, 2007). According to Kemeny (2006) the unique positioning between state 
and the market is what makes housing so interesting and one of the optimal discipline to 
examine power-structures. It is the same standing which makes housing a common ground 
where a number of different actors and interests interact, something not happening so 
intensely in other welfare sectors. While other welfare sectors show similar or clustered 
cross-country patterns housing with its unstable and floating nature and behaviour may be 
the key to understand welfare state differences (Kemeny, 2001).  
Regardless of welfare, state’s intervention and impact in the housing system (market and 
policy) is multifaceted and varying from one era to another. Therefore, an appropriate 
combined approach is needed to understand relevant processes and outcomes (Fahey & 
Norris, 2011; Stephens, 2011). Areas of state intervention relating to housing include the 
capital markets and the housing provision sectors. State interventionism can be 
characterized as direct or indirect and comes in various forms ranging from regulatory 
moderation framework i.e. building standards, tenant protection and rent control; to 
financial moderation i.e. tax reliefs/breaks and wider state-promoted credit flow policies 
targeting housing system formation. The former regards housing as accommodation, while 
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the latter also affects housing as tradable asset tenure (Doherty, 2004; Fahey & Norris, 
2011). Indirect interventions require minimum to practically zero public spending, do not 
interrupt market operation while averting its dominance, and link to covert wealth transfer. 
The ways in which state intervenes go far beyond direct subsidies and are hard to track, 
measure and compare cross-country. Most categorization of systems according to state 
intervention do not take into account the totality, correlation and interaction of sub-systems 
and sub-policies but stick to direct public subsidizing and social housing provision (Fahey 
& Norris, 2011). Norris & Domanski (2009) refer to housing input as state’s direct 
(spending) or indirect (housing policy regimes) presence, and outcomes as the tenure 
structures produced. They note these two elements contribute to focusing on cross-country 
systemic similarities and differences but without saying much for the people’s actual 
housing experiences. 
Housing is expected to remain in need of state support within a wider socio-economic and 
welfare context (McKee, 2012). Public policy deeply affects housing markets and outcomes 
(Doherty, 2004; Van Gent, 2010) while lessened (social) policy is tied to social exclusion 
issues (Dewilde & De Keulenaer, 2003). Nevertheless, assuming the existence of a 
universal housing to welfare state causal relationship is rather farfetched without including 
interactions with the wider institutional and political contexts (Van Gent, 2010). 
 
2.6   Housing Policy Regimes: Convergence vs. Divergence 
Divergence approach in housing theories which is today considered today by default as 
evident is actually the product of an evolutionary path originally departing from 
Convergence models (Kemeny, 2001; Stephens et al. 2010). Norris & Stephens (2014) 
contribute towards a clear summary of these approaches. Convergence Approaches 
characterized by the semantic analyses of Donnison and Harloe (also Arbaci and Lennartz, 
2011 discussing Hoesktra, 2003) assumed future convergence towards uniform housing 
regimes (comprehensive and residual respectively). Donnison distinguished three housing 
policy regimes in industrialized societies: the Residual/Social Regime of wealthy countries 
with strong public support of those disadvantaged; the Comprehensive Regime where 
strong state support attempts to cover housing needs of the wider –population, as a means 
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to socioeconomic growth; and the Embryonic Regime with an underdeveloped rural profile 
and minimum market intervention. Donnison’s implicit convergence lies in the theorization 
that these regimes are stages from which eventually all countries will pass, evolving from 
the Embryonic to the Comprehensive Regime (Norris & Stephens 2014, p. 2). Harloe 
(1995) linked tenure patterns to dominant capitalist requirements focusing on private 
market characteristics of housing (Hoekstra, 2003). Dominating private rental sector was 
linked to laissez-faire market, large-scale social housing to Fordism, and high rates of 
homeownership combined with ‘safety net’ social hosing to declining social housing. Later 
works also including the Post-socialist countries reflect convergence approaches, like the 
analysis of the East European Housing Model in which countries of the region fit,  although 
variably in time and space, during the era of centrally controlled, planned and owned social 
housing. After a transition period the Residual model was supposed to prevail also under 
the pressure of globalization (highly mobile capital) and state deregulatory forces. 
On the Divergence path, Kemeny (2001, 2006) contribution has been highly influential, 
classifying countries according to their housing policy, leading to a dichotomous typology 
of Dualist and Unitary housing systems. Kemeny’s thesis is not just about the typology 
(description) though. There is a constant effort to explain the reasons these types emerged 
and link this to the welfare state. Housing is a strong influential factor structuring societies 
and welfare states. He linked high homeownership rates to the famous “trade-off” theory 
and related to privatist-individualist societal ideologies. Inversely, rented dominated 
collectivist societies link to extended welfare states (Lennartz, 2011). For Kemeny, 
differences in housing are the outcome of specifically chosen ‘political tenure strategies’ 
linked to ideological and cultural elements (individualism and collectivism). Through his 
work housing has been positioned as central to welfare state formation, having impact on 
people’s everyday life (Kemeny, 2011; Lennartz, 2011), urban forms, welfare and housing 
consumption, and being important to understand various social patterns (Ronald, 2007). 
Re-establishing Kemeny classification, Stephens & Van Steen (2011) note that: In unitary 
rental housing market a unified rental sector is being created through the completion of a 
cost rental sector exploiting cost falls due to housing debt maturation, with the market 
rental one. The unified sector offers competitive rents as an alternative to Home-ownership. 
In a dual rental housing market maturation concerns the government or previous tenants 
acquiring the dwelling in a discount price from the public sector. In such a command 
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economy social rented sector is for the poor and is kept separated from the private rented 
one. Rental market is not a competitive alternative to owner-occupation which remains a 
tenure of choice. Some comparative housing studies (e.g. Norris & Fahey, 2014) departed 
from the not-about-housing Esping-Andersen (power structure) typology. Following a 
divergence perspective gradually expanded the literature by adding inter-country 
idiosyncratic elements, highlighting differences and similarities especially regarding 
homeownership. For Southern European systems, Allen (2006) identified high 
homeownership through extended self-provision, absence of state versus extended family 
support, intergenerational transfer of assets and co-habitation. In East-Asia expansion of 
homeownership passed through indirect state support policies and a very discretionary 
direct public spending. Apart from homeownership, Hoekstra (2005) traced similarities 
between the East-Asia countries and the Southern European welfare regimes in late 
industrialization and persistent familialist systems. In Ireland and Norway welfare state and 
housing policy supported homeownership as a means to property acquisition rather than 
income redistribution, mainly due to agrarian unrest and not because of some urban labour 
movement (Norris & Fahey, 2011; 2014). Adopting the divergence approach in no case 
does signify inability to group countries. Based on sets of shared characteristics countries 
can be clustered in different regime types (Stephens & Fitzpatrick, 2007).  
 
2.7   Market Perspectives: Varieties of Residential Capitalism 
The Varieties of Capitalism literature has its bases on the semantic work of Hall & Soskice 
(2001), with a large number of scholars contributing to the debate (indic. Becker, 2013; 
Callaghan, 2007; Crouch, 2005; Deeg, 2007; Fioretos, 2010; Hall & Gingerich, 2004; Hall 
& Thelen, 2009; Hay, 2010; Jackson & Deeg, 2008/2012; Rhodes, 2005; Schwartz & 
Seabrooke, 2008; Schwartz, 2010/2012a,b). The VoC literature started from a relatively 
limited scope and focus on firms as major nation-wide economic actors, largely discussing 
the institutional complementarities theory and establishing the dualist typology of the 
Liberal and Coordinated Markets Economies (LMEs and CMEs). Firms were set as the 
focal point and analyzed on their attitude and decision making in correlation with the 
distinctive institutional structures of the nation in which they were based and operating, in 
order to tackle with a series of inter-firm issues. Due to the differences among nations' 
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institutional structures, answers to emerging issues are also differentiated, shaping various 
national economic institutions and respective relationships (also Lauder et al. 2008). 
Azmanova (2012) argues that the VoC and Welfare Regimes both are taxonomies trying to 
effectively describe the established compromises between capitalism and democracy after 
the World War II (Welfare Capitalism). The VoC tries to describe how different actors 
operate inside an economic environment leading to the LME, CME and the intermediate 
Mixed Market Economy (MME) typologies. Mixed Market Economy is often used to 
characterize Southern European countries (Hall, 2001; Azmanova, 2012) with elements of 
systemic resistance and challenging path to institutional reform (Rhodes, 2005). Welfare 
regimes deal with variations in the quality and quantity of social benefits provided leading 
to a Liberal, Conservative and Social democratic taxonomy. Apart from praise, the initial 
VoC doctrine has received massive criticism (see Lane & Wood, 2009; Morgan, 2009; 
Gertler, 2010; Jackson & Deed, 2012; Becker, 2013), mainly due to its dualism and static 
approach based on ideal-typical models. However, an extensive discussion on the VoC 
criticism largely escapes our scope. Today the doctrine is still expanding to many directions 
in order to fill the theoretical gaps, cover more cases - especially the contested and/or 
transitional ones, and explain institutional changes over time and space, among others. 
Expanding and adapting the classic Varieties of Capitalism doctrine to the Residential 
context, Schwartz & Seabrooke (2008) offer a different reading on the welfare – housing 
link, where financial elements like the mortgage debt are equally considered (Stephens & 
Van Steen, 2011) along with tenure patterns and especially owner-occupation. Housing is 
(re)positioned as central in the countries’ Varieties of Capitalism, but also interconnected 
with the overall economy (housing prices, interest rates, wealth distribution etc.), politics 
and policies, social peace and stability. For complicated systems severely affected by 
societal perceptions, preferences and aspirations on housing, the Varieties of Residential 
Capitalism approach is helpful in providing explanation of processes and outcomes.  
According to the VoRC analysis housing of any form is regarded as a welfare element in 
many societies with profound repercussions in many levels. Any malfunction or 
insufficiency of the housing systems has deep socio-political and financial impact. 
However, due to its tradability as an asset, housing remains a unique welfare resource. In 
some societal contexts it may be considered foremost as a core social right in need of state 
and civil society protection, while in others mostly as a means to wealth accumulation. In 
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most countries residential property is the core type or often regards a single asset of 
households or individuals. Paired with relevant housing costs, it has a considerable impact 
on household budget, which of course varies from one country system to another and from 
one era to the next. 
Especially regarding homeownership, there is a notable 'trade-off'. High homeownership 
rates are inversely linked to an extended and quality welfare state. In systems where the 
welfare state is weak or limited, investing in housing and seeking homeownership seems 
the rational choice. However, this route may lead people to financial over-exposure, mainly 
through extensive mortgage borrowing. Regarding housing costs it is interesting that the 
total life-cost for renters and homeowners is not significantly different. The biggest 
difference is in the distribution of this cost. For renters housing cost is split in a more 
balanced manner, incrementally (ideally) evolving according to their income potential over-
time. Homeowners on the other hand feel the cost pressure stacked upfront. Large amounts 
of payment are needed in the early life of young households/individuals where their income 
capacity is significantly lower. Such vulnerability deterministically drives them in cash 
income-seeking and forcing them to not accept higher taxation for welfare services. Renters 
are not bound to such compromise. This 'trade-off' along with related financial risks render 
housing debt a key factor not only to household budgets, but also to the country financial 
system as a whole. Neoliberal forces tend to enhance homeownership as a consumable asset 
which in turn increases speculative investment, exposure to mortgage debt inflation and 
consequently housing bubbles (also Schwartz, 2010; 2012). Furthermore, systems with high 
homeownership heavily dependent on family resources and self-provision are more prone 
to housing prices booms and busts with a deeper financial and welfare impact on 
households. In such systems residential property is subject to intergenerational transfers 
reproducing systemic inequalities creating a systemic insider-outsider dichotomy.  
On a political level electorate orientation are significantly affected by housing policy 
trends. People will tend to favour policies and political parties protecting the right to quality 
and affordable housing. This regards either the access and/or safeguarding owned housing 
property or social welfare housing. Voting preferences evidently affect the evolutionary 
path of the welfare state as a whole. Overall, dominantly homeownership societies will be 
more prone to respective partisan politics, heavily impacting institutional reforms attempts. 
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Different VoRC stem from citizens perceptions about housing and a welfare trade-off. In 
some countries housing in neither a pure welfare form nor an investment tool but rather a 
varied mixed perception prevails. Referring to Kemeny, homeownership is not considered a 
result of an increased income per capita but rather a socio-political choice. According to 
Castles' critique on Esping-Andersen and Kemeny, homeownership is strongly linked to 
resistance against welfare tax-payment and spending. If there is a broad change in mentality 
about housing, a strong political conflict is to be expected. According to VoRC, ideas on 
residential property can be manipulated by political and economic elites. 
In their analysis Schwartz & Seabrooke (2008) used two indicators to classify systems, 
mortgage debt to GDP ratio and homeownership rates. The former indicates exposure to 
national and global financial forces, while the latter links to the size of social rental sector 
and overall commodification of housing; and consequently independence to global capital 
markets. However, Stephens et al. (2015b) proposed a more elaborate approach adding two 
additional indicators, rates of owner-occupation and house prices trends in long-term. From 
these additions, the former incorporates the much necessary distinction between ownership 
and owner-occupation. The second one gives a picture of the housing market fluctuation. 
The totality of the four indicators gives an outlook on the housing assets’ liquidity. In order 
to determine familialism Stephens et al. (2015b) seek the percentage of households with 
extended families, number of children residing in the same house, adult children in the 
same house and percentage of single elderly residing with others, as necessary indicators. 
 
Classification of Residential Capitalism 
According to Schwartz & Seabrooke (2008) VoRC analysis four models emerge, each one 
mirroring the respective link between housing, mainly homeownership policies, state 
interventionism, and welfare state - along with any 'trade-off'. Low homeownership and 
Mortgage-to-GDP rates in a Statist-developmentalist VoRC systems housing (not 
homeownership) is a social right, market is lowly segmented, property tax income is low 
and social rental sector is controlled by private organizations. In Corporatist systems 
housing (not homeownership) is also regarded as a social right, but within a heavily 
segmented market where owners compete renters’ interests, and stays detached from family 
support. Property tax returns are low as owner-occupation rates are low while mortgage-to-
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GDP ratios are high. Intergenerational equity issues exclude outsiders from entering the 
housing system, also due to re-pricing from previous landlords climbing up the housing 
market ladder. In a Liberal Market system high homeownership and mortgage-to-GDP 
rates make housing (as investment assets) highly commodified. Market is heavily 
segmented with owner competing renters interests. Property tax revenue is high and market 
mechanisms are the sole means to access housing. Again, outsiders are left out of the 
system due to intergenerational equity transfers and pricing. Lastly, in familialist systems 
with high owner-occupation and low mortgage-to-GDP rates, housing is non-commodified 
but neither decommodified. Houses are a family social good, but housing is not considered 
a social right. Access to housing is mostly off-market and property tax returns are low. 
According to regulation regarding mortgage lending like interest rates, different market 
types behave variably. In a liberal market mortgages will be allowed to circulate in the 
open market allowing for higher and longer-term debts as risks can be mitigated if needed. 
In such systems mortgage-to-GDP ratios will be higher or trending upwards. In systems 
where such options are limited due to regulation and/or market functioning, mortgage 
lending will be limited with higher interests and upfront payments, shorter in duration, and 
more restricted rolling the risk over to borrowers. Familialist and State-Developmentalist 
systems most possibly show limited mortgage lending. Limited bank lending transfers 
housing welfare burden to the family, significantly restricting consumption. Schwartz & 
Seabrooke (2008) highlighted the issue with fitting housing systems to welfare regimes 
under such a financial prism, as levels of limitation vary even within the same group-type.  
It is important to note that in systems with low homeownership, renters should not be 
automatically considered more protected from market pressures. Depending on the housing 
system configuration renters may be 'trapped' or at least lowly mobile within the market 
due to limited resources and consequently choices. Strong social rented sectors seem to 
provide protection to renters to a certain degree. State subsidization of public residential 
property has repeatedly been linked to de-incentivize housing market development and 
maturity; reproducing housing system imbalances in the state-family-market triangle. 
Mortgage borrowing level and access mode is a significant factor to consider upward 
housing market mobility. Mode of access to mature housing mortgage loan markets also 
has an impact on family strategies. In systems where lending is based on total family 
income women employment will be forced higher creating stronger need for a sturdier 
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welfare state as in-house welfare services cannot be possibly covered otherwise. Where the 
bank lending is stringent pressure on family resources will most likely lead to extended 
cohabitation. 
 
2.8   Institutional Dynamics 
One of the most interesting elements in the VoC and VoRC doctrines is their commonality 
regarding systemic functioning. Indeed, both are based on a thorough institutional focus. 
Institutions and their interactions do matter regardless of them being legitimate or not, 
officially established or otherwise. One of the basic elements of the Varieties of Capitalism 
doctrine is the importance of institutions and more specifically their complementarity. 
Institutional complementarity is important for national comparative advantages and the 
overall success of the national economic system. Accordingly, each different VoRC has its 
own set of institutions linking homeownership and the welfare state and state intervention 
on housing as a whole. 
Institutions are social forms of organization that lead to and establish certain repeated 
behaviours due to custom, tradition or legal regulations. Family, religion, legal system, 
school, corporate-governance systems, industrial relations, partisan politics, elections only 
some examples of institutions. Their formation is the outcome of socio-political processes 
and compromises related to power distribution between involved actors and their 
interaction (Jackson & Deeg, 2012). Institutions are about power structures and the rules, 
prevalent social interactions, and formal and informal human-created constructs for 
behaviour constrain i.e. laws, societal norms and perceptions (Pinto & Pereira, 2013). Bruff 
(2011) argues that institutions are the outcome of an historical evolutionary path of 
accumulating common perceptions regarding the functioning of capitalism. Pinto & Pereira 
(2013) contest that institutions and their performance do matter. However, such a debate is 
better accepted in less developed countries than in 'mature' economies. Every actor is 
deemed conscious about the rules and the ways of the game, assuming autonomous social 
interactions (ibid., p.760). However, this cannot be presumed to be true - or equally valid - 
for every system. Partisan politics, weak financial influence, misinformation or even 
systemic corruption, may render some actors de facto excluded from the bargaining 
process. Institutions' power lies in the capacity to affect actors' lives directly and/or 
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indirectly, liberating or (further) constraining them. Institutions constitute basic elements of 
socio-economic relation and not solely restriction. Hall & Gingerich (2004) noted that some 
actors may gain comparatively higher returns against other groups, due to favourable 
institutional interaction. 
Analysing interaction and performance, Institutional Complementarity is defined as the 
state of two institutions in which the presence of the one increases the efficiency of the 
other (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hall, 2001; Deeg, 2007; Lauder et al. 2008; Hall & Thelen, 
2009; Watson, 2010). IC is considered to be an important element of national economy's 
stability, efficiency and coherence (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Jackson & Deeg, 2012), with, 
capitalism typologies being based on complementarity (Deeg, 2007). Institutional 
combinations create structures which affect how capitalist economies evolve socio-
economically over time and over space (Gertler, 2010). Welfare systems can be understood 
also through the IC theory as the combined total of interlinked and complementing 
institutions. In welfare regimes terms different institutional formations exist even between 
countries of the same group (Höpner & Schäfer, 2010; 2012).  
Complementarity doctrine has expanded to various institutional spheres and levels, while 
additional elaborate forms have been discussed. Supplementarity regards the effect of one 
institution covering the insufficiency of another, safeguarding actors' interests. One such an 
example is family self-provision of housing welfare within respective systems. Synergy 
describes the joint operation of institutions leading to reinforcing effects of compatible 
incentive structures (Deeg, 2007; Lane & Wood, 2009). Different from complementarity is 
coherence where institutions have identical principles that may lead relating actors to 
interact without deterministically linking to better performance. Thus, institutional 
coherence may or may not lead to, and is not prerequisite for complementarity. Common 
historical paths may drive actors to choose similar institutions as a solution to different 
socio-political issues (ibid). Institutional compatibility is irrelevant to complementarity or 
coherence but related only to systemic stability. The final element of institutional 
interaction is clustering where institutions are grouped and compared according to the case 
at hand. Clustering may be tied to complementarity but not deterministically, as such 
institutional clusters may as well be inefficient (Deeg 2007, p.613). 
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In housing systems institutional interaction is especially important, as it provides another 
explanatory reading on why systems followed different evolutionary paths between 
countries 'classified' as belonging to the same group. Institutional interaction takes into 
serious account national societal preferences and political power bargaining. Secondly, 
institutional interaction sheds a light on the reasons systemic change may be met with 
significant resistance from multiple actors, heavily impacting policy implementation. 
 
2.8.1   Institutional Change and Inertia 
According to Hall & Soskice (2003) the Varieties of Capitalism doctrine is the basis to 
understanding institutional change and interest shift. Institutional changes have been 
categorized as Reformist when government-led or promoted by coalitionist politics, 
Defectionist when major actors withdraw from key institutions or regress to pre-existing 
institutional rules, and Reinterpretationist  when major actors incrementally change views 
re-interpreting rules without defecting or dismantling former institutional structures (Hall & 
Thelen, 2009; Gertler, 2010). Political economy is presented as an institutional 'ecosystem' 
where different actors have their strategies conditioned by numerous institutions. Change is 
about multilateral adjustment (ibid). In order to understand and analyze institutional change 
effectively one has to take into consideration Forces and Vectors of change, institutional 
Inertia and systemic Impedance. Their combination determines the initialization and 
completion, as well as the success (direction) and nature (substitution, transformation or 
reinforcement) of institutional change. Change can be triggered due to a number of reasons, 
and happen either more or less radically or come as natural outcome of an incremental 
institutional evolution. Forces of change can be Internal (intra-national) or External 
(supranational) according to their source and nature, or mixed. Internal forces can be 
related to societal and capitalist shifts, as institutions are argued to be based on them rather 
than the opposite (Bruff, 2011). Moreover, Hall & Thelen (2009) comment that acceptable 
cultural behaviour and action is not necessarily, always or fully determined by institutions. 
Civic demand and incentive for reform are also powerful forces of change (Schrank, 2009). 
Not all actors enjoy complementarity equally, so institutional change may as well reflect 
differentiated actor interests and their eventual prevalence, related to certain policy choices 
(Deeg, 2007). According to Crouch et al. (2009) theory on institutional durability, it can be 
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inversely argued that weakening actor group-interests constitutes the first step to change 
mostly through defectionist institutional 'erosion' trends (Hall & Thelen, 2009). Actors as 
well as institutions can be vectors of change. Various interest groups may function in a 
detached, interlinked, complementary or conflicting fashion. The state is an example of 
omnipresent institution operating also as an actor with its own - dependent or independent - 
agenda, according to context.  
Complementarities may lead to institutional change, with a hard-to-establish causal link 
however. Deeg (2007) argues that institutional complementarity weakens with time, 
creating a window for intervening forces to act. Similarly Rhodes' (2005) notes that 
institutional relations gradually turn dysfunctional eventually generating institutional 
change, countering the classic Varieties of Capitalism doctrine wanting complementarities 
become perpetually stronger. Institutional change can be the outcome of incremental 
transformation due to experimentation (Hall & Thelen, 2009). 
Another important issue is the changes happening in other political economy spheres. Hall 
& Gingerich (2004) underline that various policy spheres and respective institutions are 
more or less interconnected and interacting, something which is often underplayed in policy 
decisions. Institutional change may very well be the result of a wider institutional shift. 
Systemic changes in one policy sphere may impact on other institutions in a domino-type 
fashion (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hall & Thelen, 2009).  
External pressures for change operate on and from a supra-national level. Such pressures 
are mainly political and financial in nature, like EU integration and the impact of the global 
financial crisis respectively. Such forces are filtered through national systems and affecting 
them in a multitude of ways. Apart from that, societal interaction on a global scale slowly 
affects national institutional structures and configurations. 
Inertia is being used to describe the institutional inherent or acquired resistance to change. 
Such an element is extremely important to evaluate changing patterns as well as possible 
outcome of undergoing changes, always in relation to impeding forces. Deeply rooted 
institutions seem to resist shifts and changes. Even when shift is imminent and perhaps 
inevitable, acquired historical, customary momentum along with weak political will, may 
delay institutional change. Structurally, some systems like coordinated-market economies 
favour institutional inertia (Hall & Soskice, 2003). 
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Strong institutions relate to socio-political and financial complementarity and efficiency, 
rewarding outcomes for dominant actors, national comparative advantage, and persisting 
support due to tradition, historical, customary, political and financial reasons (Hall & 
Soskice, 2003/2007; Schmidt & Hersh, 2006; Callaghan, 2007; Deeg, 2007; Crouch et al., 
2009; Hall & Thelen, 2009; Lane & Wood, 2009; Carney, 2010). These elements are basic 
to the institutions' temporal transcendence and their inertia to change. In turn, these 
characteristics function as factors further supporting and reinforcing institutional inertia. 
Institutional stability is related to maintaining the balance between various group-interests 
which are shaped according to a multitude of factors (Hall & Thelen, 2009). The more and 
better institutions provide for the key actor-interests, the more resistant it becomes to 
change, defection or abolishment (Crouch et al., 2009). However, Deeg (2007) underlines 
the need for empirical verification of institutional complementarity existence and strength, 
before using it to assess changing trends. The aforementioned inertia factors at the same 
time impede institutional change in case it seems to jeopardize their integrity (Hall & 
Soskice, 2003). Impeding forces may be the cause of individual or joint action of interested 
parties, through or outside institutions, to intercept, control or moderate institutional 
reforming processes. 
 
2.8.2   Path Dependency 
Policy path-dependency constitutes basic element in an increasing number of housing 
studies (e.g. DeWilde, 2015a; Lux & Sunega, 2010/2014; Stephens et al. 2015b). Path-
dependency is based on the concept that past forms (policies, institutions, norms etc.) lead 
to certain routes either by 'forcing' specific paths or by rendering unattractive or even 
practically inapplicable any radical divergence (Bengtsson, 2009a). There seems to be 
widely agreed that past decisions significantly affect present and future policies in housing. 
Historical evolution of institutions and related path-dependency can help understand policy 
choices and housing provision outcomes (Bengtsson, 2014). Apart from policy, Stephens et 
al. (2015b) saw this path-dependent 'transformation' of the post-socialist systems, and self-
build as housing welfare post-1990. Lux & Sunega (2014) argue that post-1990 
privatization of housing stock was in reality a path-dependent post-socialist policy to 
transform quasi-ownership of the socialist era into full legal homeownership.  
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The element of path-dependency and institutional inertia is particularly strong in welfare 
regimes in many country cases (Hulse, 2003) but such an assumption/presumption should 
not be made prima facie (Draxler & Van Vliet, 2010). An example of potential divergence 
from path-dependencies is the group of transitional New member states of the central and 
eastern Europe undergoing a rapid reform phase trying to diverge from their 
Socialist/Communist paths (ibid). Hulse (2003) also underlines the original Esping-
Andersen typology overemphasizing path-dependency which stands insufficient to explain 
actor-initiated changes. Bengtsson (2014) points out that path-dependency analysis has to 
go beyond formal institutions, including their impact on an ideational level (p. 687). 
Informal societal perceptions on the meaning of homeownership for example, often become 
institutionalized, and are thus harder to change than formal institutions (ibid.), and even 
tenure patterns. Consolidation of such perception may accompany or develop regardless 
various formal policies. It would be rational to assume that in 'weak' states path-
dependency will appear more consolidated and even somehow 'binding'. 'Weak' states will 
tend to have a larger number of self-formed institutions - often let to operated in laissez-
faire manner - and thus harder to affect through state mechanisms. Apart from an often 
meagre political will for change, lack of resources further hinders any attempt to modify 
norms. This is for example the case with systems where family undertook the burden to 
cover housing needs through self-help strategies. 
 
2.9   Politics in Perspective: Corporatism in Housing 
Last decade saw the somehow hesitant re-emergence of Corporatism theory analysis, after 
almost twenty years of declining academic interest. This relatively recent re-emergence 
seems especially interesting as the Corporatism doctrine has surpassed its original 
analytical confines becoming more flexible and adaptable to different theoretical spheres. 
Torpe (2014, p.205) underlined that Corporatism, considered as 'negotiating Democracy', 
regards various policy areas. Corporatism perspective can now be used as an additional tool 
for locating and analyzing relevant dynamic institutional particularities instead of fixed 
system totalities, and respective interaction with and between actors. For housing such an 
approach can be exceptionally useful in capturing systemic specificities, within and among 
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countries. It has been repeatedly supported that housing system preferences and mentalities 
can strongly differentiate from the official national financial system.  
Corporatism can be defined as the system where key decisions on political and economic 
issues are reached through a public-private sector bargaining and inter-counselling 
(Lindvall & Sebring, 2005). Organized interests partake in institutionalized forms 
(Rydgren, 2005) and power is divided between the central government and involved 
institutions (Pelinka, 1999). The link between housing and Corporatism may seem distant 
at first, but Jim Kemeny stated "I think it is misleading to talk about ‘housing theory’ as 
though there is a special theory specifically designed for housing. Rather, there are general 
theories that can be applied to housing and that can link housing to other dimensions of 
society" (Allen, 2005; p. 100). Corporatism theoretical approach offers an interesting 
reading on how and why housing actors interact and moreover how this interaction affects 
housing system institutional change. Lindvall & Sebring (2005) argued that the recently 
increased interest in Corporatism in policy-making and consensus can be attributed to the 
extensive need for mechanisms ensuring agreements and coordination in policy reforms 
within mature welfare systems, across various policy areas and actors with their respective 
group-interests. Torpe (2014) noted that corporatist networks positively affect social trust 
and the sense of equality. this seems especially important for housing, as systemic shifts 
may and often should be the result of multi-partite bargaining, to be optimized and 
stabilized. Bengtsson (2014) supports that combined studied of housing and Corporatism 
will soon grow, as the result of numerous national and international actors entering the 
housing policy and provision bargaining process. 
Based on Molina & Rhodes (2002) analysis, neo-corporatism expands the doctrine relating 
to the need for and existence of institutional agreements through multi-partite bargaining, to 
ensure socio-political stability and policy legitimacy, especially in financially turbulent 
periods. They underline the importance of involved actors as the defining factor of neo-
corporatism evolution. In Corporatist modernity the state holds an active but fluctuating 
role as a moderator, initiator or observer in multi-partite bargaining. Its varying 
involvement links to non-state parties strength and the fluctuating need to retain power 
balance between bargaining actors, avoiding asymmetries. As Corporatist structures shift, 
they lead to changes in bargaining processes. Public dialogue functions as an effective 
catalyst in most cases. In modern Corporatism political ideology orientation is far less or 
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even hardly important, comparing to policy social and financial efficiency on micro and 
macro-level, and representation during and in policy-making. Social pacts concern wider 
institutional reforms and change than in the past, adding to flexibility. As the number of 
issues bargained increases, agreement between interested parties becomes gradually easier 
to achieve. Compromise in one sector can be balanced or mitigated through an agreement 
on another bargained issue, rendering trade-offs likely to become implementable policies. 
Countries in long-lasting or temporary systemic deadlock may seek a solution through 
corporatist bargaining. Even where corporatist organizational structures are missing, 
repeating incremental evolution through public dialogue can lead to institutional 
restructuring. With higher chance of multiple institutional restructuring cycles, Molina & 
Rhodes (2002) see more flexibility and potential in such Corporatist modernity than in 
traditionally established Corporatisms like in Austria and Sweden. Attempting socially 
widely accepted and legitimized mix of policies with high financial viability, not only aims 
but also processes are being negotiated through extended public-private dialogue.  
Modern Corporatism focuses more on policy making (dynamic detailed) rather than 
representation (static and generic), and 'political exchanges'. Political exchanges happen 
within various institutional environments, are relatively unbound to regulatory context and 
involve numerous evolving networks. Actors may bargain such non-financial transactions 
in autonomous, organized or collective manner. As shifting behavioural norms affect 
political exchange, new institutions may emerge (Molina & Rhodes, 2002). This also the 
case in weak institutional contexts and 'lean' Corporatisms. Actors’ interaction may not 
always lead to positive evolution if their exchanging intensity weakens and/or Corporatism 
moves from stability to inflexibility as an ever-evolving mechanism. The number of asocial 
partners involved (quantity), the number of policy areas interlinked in the public-private 
dialogue (horizontal quality) and the actors' influence on policy from design to 
implementation (vertical quality) determine the degree of integration (ibid;  Bache, 2010). 
Molina & Rhodes (2002) are not especially interested in labelling systems as Corporatist, 
but in understanding fluctuation of systems and sub-systems according to degree of 
integration and political exchange, as well as the dynamic evolution of corporatist 
governance affecting institutional frameworks and their varying embeddedness. Less 
formalized and harder to predict Corporatist modernity revolves around public-private 
dialogue of networks. Actors and structure should be analyzed as networks, their rationale 
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according to underpinning processes, and their development related to evolving integration 
and change of political exchange (Molina & Rhodes, 2002). 
In social partnerships different actors from the public and private of the socio-political and 
financial spheres volunteer and join together with the scope of overcoming societal 
problems and achieve common goals through the utilization of their unique resources and 
abilities. Many governments now put forward social partnerships to resolve complex public 
issues but also to promote development and improvement. Moreover, EU institutions opt 
for social partnership as a good practice along the lines of national corporatism (Eising, 
2008). Social partnerships can be: Community SPs (bottom-up, localized), Enacted SPs 
(externally sponsored, localized) or Directed (government sponsorship). Each type goes 
with different intensities of partnership conflicts
3
 (Seddon et al. 2004). 
Through - the democratically necessary - lobbying, some interest groups will be better 
represented and have more chances to promote their agenda, seriously distorting the 
balance of equally effective participation (Naurin & Boräng, 2012). Different interests 
groups are expected to keep exerting political pressures -for example via parliamentary 
lobbying - by any means available even if it is not through corporatist structures 
(Rommetvedt et al. 2013). From Culpepper's analysis (2007) it is understood that while 
corporatist institutions show significant adjustment capacity, institutional change should 
not be expected to happen without some kind of clash between interest groups. Such a 
process is irrelevant of the country's size and finances. 
Thorhallsson & Kattel (2013) conclude that small countries lacking corporatist structures 
are more vulnerable to financial crises and volatility, in some cases leading to a 
simplification of polity. For small countries it may prove easier to establish a strong and 
successful corporatism/social partnership system  mainly due to a more limited number of 
involved partners (actors, institutions) allowing for a more incorporating and deeply 
consensual process. Under-organized economies can deal with their economic issues 
through social actors' coordination based on proper institutional frameworks (Royo, 2002). 
Bache (2010; Bache et al. 2011) focuses on the link between a compound polity and strong 
corporatism. 'Polity' is described by Schmidt (2007, p. 9) as the ways substantive policies 
and interactions between political and economic players are shaped by the political 
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 Roles, interests or regimes 
38 
 
institutional context, in order to explain state action. Simple Polity refers to single-authority 
statist systems of majoritarian representation and Compound Polity to multi-authority, 
power-dispersed and corporatist systems of federal representation and regionalized 
institutional structures 
Finally, Anthonsen et al. (2010) underline the effect of strong/close links between political 
parties and trade unions. They go against classic belief that such a tie is important for 
strong and effective corporatism.  It is argued that such links create a polarized political 
environment where unions will be tempted to exert pressure on parties instead of 
bargaining with other actors, thus undermining corporatism itself (ibid, p. 118). In cases 
where the same parties rule the political scene for a prolonged period of time, these effects 
prove stronger. It can be supported that any kind of strong political party - actor link creates 
liability for political pressure undermining corporatism and support for relevant institutions. 
A weaker party-actor tie may indeed promote corporatism.  
 
Housing Corporatism 
For Kemeny (2006) housing is uniquely based on both markets and the state, making it a 
common place where different interests meet and often clash. Therefore, it constitutes an 
interesting sector to examine issues of power balance in welfare. Corporatist Regimes 
emerge through the power struggle of different interest groups towards a compromise 
solution with varying advantages of the involved blocs. Within a Corporatist system a 
varied tenure profile more or less reflects the existing actors and their bargaining strength, 
as each groups will tend to defend its interests. Actor diversity is often supported by and 
related to partisan politics. State-led promotion of homeownership can be seen as an 
attempt to welfare reform by shifting balances within the state-market-family triangle. 
Housing is a major regulator and driver of market-side solutions. Imposing an increased 
welfare burden on housing can be related to departure from income protection and 
reduction in publics spending (Van Gent, 2009). Acquisition of housing assets can be 
promoted as a replacement to welfare services, while owners more or less consciously 
assume accompanying financial risks. Even more, housing and relevant reforms may 
constitute government tool for welfare reform (ibid, p. 736).                                           
39 
 
Kemeny (2006) concluded that following strong right-wing hegemony is linked to limited 
non-profit sector, centrally-planned command economy, and extended profit rental market. 
Homeownership is an alternative to profit rental market which in many cases links to sub-
par housing. Capital-led Corporatism relates to limited non-profit sector of weak impact; 
Power-balanced Corporatism has profit and non-profit sectors on equal terms with the 
latter significantly moderating the open rental market; and Labour-led Corporatism links to 
dominant non-profit sectors. However, with empirical data indicating only Netherlands 
supported this case; it has been incorporated to the power-balance type. Kemeny analysis 
on welfare regimes does not see a difference between Social-Democratic and Labour-led 
Corporatist regimes, as both are Left-wing hegemonic coalitions. What is also interesting is 
his classification of welfare sector regimes, supporting that each welfare sector is 
characterized by different power balances between various involved interests. Where some 
actors may be strong in one welfare sector they may in parallel be weak in another in 
promoting their interests. Cross-country and over-time variation of interests produce varied 
types of sectoral welfare regimes like in housing. 
 
2.10   Searching for one 'true' typology 
Despite the connection of certain types of welfare regimes and specific parts of housing 
systems (Hoekstra, 2003; Hulse, 2003), Lennartz (2011) suggests that attempts to directly 
link welfare states and housing systems better be avoided as it is rather problematic. 
Concluding on welfare state typologies – a complex combination of many sectors – based 
only on observations of housing systems is not scientifically justified and carries many 
risks. Conversely, jumping from welfare regimes to housing systems is equally risky. 
Moreover, welfare states research focuses on national/state level processes where the 
housing systems analysis seeks those functioning on a micro/policy-sector one. The inter-
connection is true but their inter-dependence not at all absolute (ibid). Returning to the 
issue of applying the fixed empirical typology of welfare regimes to housing, this may be 
futile as it was not intended for or based upon empirical study of housing markets and 
policies (Harloe, 1995; Hulse, 2003; Lennartz, 2011). Stephens (2016) argues that adapting 
typologies without understanding their functioning, risks rendering adaptations of low 
practical value. The persistence on establishing a direct link between the ideal-typical 
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welfare regimes and the housing system may lead to neglecting whole group of countries 
(e.g. Post-Socialist CEE) or details which differentiate one country from another even 
within the same grouping. Instead of a direct-link and clean-cut typology seeking, Lennartz 
(2011) proposed the adoption of an ad hoc approach where welfare regime comparison is 
based on a sector-to-sector and policy-to-policy juxtaposition (i.e. housing, health care, 
education etc). He considers the pension system a good example as it links welfare regimes 
and housing through the aspect of asset-based provision.  
Stephens (2011) through the development of ‘System Embedded Approach’ supports that 
while a policy-related comparative research is particularly useful, something more is 
required. Such approach goes far beyond a limited juxtaposition analysis but in order to do 
that it needs to be embedded in a wider system. Housing policies exist and operate within 
housing systems which intertwine with wider socio-economic structures. Housing policy 
has to be examined in dynamic with institutions and the market, and the housing system in 
its interaction with wider socio-economic institutions like the Labour-market. Doling & 
Horsewood (2005) note that ‘…there may be much more to housing issues than housing 
alone, so might also be more to them than housing and welfare provision alone’ (p. 83), 
somehow expressing a similar concern. Malpass (2004) noted that when looking into the 
welfare state operation on housing, the governmental mentality regarding its interaction 
with the market, the non-profit and the public sector itself should be assessed as a whole. 
Kemeny (2001; 2005) also concluded that housing should not be examined in isolation but 
always be linked to wider policy areas, welfare sectors and relevant issues. 
Kemeny (2006) classification of Dualist and Integrated systems discussed has received 
some criticism. Firstly, the dichotomous typology of Kemeny seems somehow static, 
artificial and suggestive downplaying or ignoring recent changing trends in integrated 
rental markets with often significant cross-country variation, like social housing 
privatization. Secondly, whole country-groups and systems are insufficiently or not at all 
covered in this theoretical framework, like the Post-Socialist, Southern European, and East-
Asian countries. Thirdly, by focusing on processes instead of outcomes it does not to set the 
link between housing and welfare systems, but vaguely indicating its validity. Lastly, 
Unitary systems are uniformly indentified with social market economies, while Dualist 
ones with command- economy patterns (comb. Lit. O’Neill, 2008; Stephens et al. 2010; 
Lennartz, 2011). Despite his housing systems typology, Kemeny (2001) suggests not being 
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absorbed in creating typologies (descriptive) but focus on explanatory theories of power on 
why certain housing systems appear in on group of countries and not another. This is the 
only way housing will permanently enter welfare analysis. Kemeny (2005) inversely links 
welfare state and homeownership with the well known ‘trade-off’ theory, which will be 
analyzed in the following chapter.  
The serious issue with pursuing an omnipotent housing system typology either starting 
from the welfare regime basis or from an empirical housing observation is that we may 
miss precious details. Even if a direct link could be or eventually is somehow established as 
uncontested, the internal processes linking indirectly housing with a number of other 
welfare elements are liable to be neglected. Considering housing’s complexity as a 
discipline and its numerous repercussions on a social, political and economic level – let 
alone welfare per se – we can easily imagine the loss of such an ‘obsession’. 
 
2.11   Discussion 
Welfare and Housing Policy 
Reducing public expenditure for housing may often be the easier way compared to the 
demanding processes of an institutional reform regarding e.g. tenure mix (Bengtsson, 
2009a), therefore seem more appealing in terms of policy-making. Institutional inertia, 
‘weak state’, entrenched or opposing interest groups, low policy-making capacity and 
lacking national finance resources are a few of the reasons hindering institutional reform 
and change (Stephens et al. 2010).  Housing policy instruments and/or Tenure alone and in 
isolation will not suffice. One needs to understand housing systems shaped by public and 
private actors/institutions and within which policy operates and interacts. So, Tenure for 
example even if it is the same among different systems will have distinct characteristics due 
to country-specific links with legal rights/obligations and social meanings, aspirations and 
repercussions. Housing systems are themselves embedded in wider socio-economic 
configurations
4
 (Stephens, 2011). Regarding rhetoric about the right to decent housing, 
solely as a principle, is too vague. Institutionalization of such declarations needs to be 
accompanied by concrete institutional frameworks, which in no case should be presumed. 
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 e.g. nature and levels of housing allowances, subsidies etc. 
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Therefore, in many national systems and laws the right to housing stays distant to the actual 
policy-making. For some however, even as a sole principle it suffices to oblige the state 
towards housing provision as it is closely linked to numerous other social rights explicitly 
protected and promoted on a national and international level. Social rights remain open to 
debate, contextually defined and varying from one era to another. State administration 
discretion is necessary to promote them and be codified like civil and political rights, 
especially in times of acute inequalities and crisis (Goodchild, 2003). 
 
Welfare State, Regimes and Housing 
Welfare regimes typology cannot be applied directly to housing and even indirectly there 
are issues as it is now deemed outdated, fixed and limited in scope as a framework. 
Searching for direct links and/or omnipotent typologies is bound to sacrifice the benefits of 
a more elaborate approach. Housing can exert independent influence on welfare outcomes 
by being disruptive of income level and housing consumption linkage. Asset-rich but 
income-poor households and high rates of homeownership free of mortgage/debt are in 
many systems a more or less politically conscious counterweight to insufficient pension 
schemes and even a general welfare services provision. Properly allocated social rental 
housing can also serve towards this goal. Likewise, housing allowances could be useful to 
break the link but their role as social or housing policy is debatable (Stephens et al. 2010). 
Welfare systems with heavy reliance on family resources for housing provision are 
extremely vulnerable to macro and micro-economical volatility. Even more, if the family 
resources are anchored to rent-seeking and public sector employment will experience 
turbulence as public cuts policies are expanding in the EU and are more severe in countries 
like southern Europe, stressed under financial and sovereign debt crises. Homeownership 
seems hardly able to support most or all of welfare services provision. That being said, 
housing is and will remain formally or informally a pillar of the welfare state, even if it is a 
‘wobbly’ one. In fact this fluctuation may actually serve as flexibility and a ‘shock-
absorber’ in times of crisis allowing the welfare state to siphon resources in other pillars 
(education, health care etc.). However, housing will have to be restored as a steady pillar 
once things get back on track, meaning that housing should remain within the welfare state 
influence sphere one way or another. 
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One should keep in mind that housing moves within the state-market-household triangle 
signifying the need for all three to contribute. Despite the flexibility allowing housing 
systems and policies to move within the triangle and according to times and needs, mono- 
or bi-polarization is bound to have seriously negative or adverse socio-political and 
financial effects (demographics, poverty, family types, housing consumption, real 
economy, socio-political upheaval, public health issues, built environment deterioration 
etc.). Times have changed and housing is no longer based on past structures, whatever they 
were. Flexible employment, global markets volatility and deregulation, welfare state 
retrenchment are only few of the elements comprising the post-modern socio-political and 
financial canvas. One of the things remaining stable is the universal need for secure 
housing as ensured accommodation. State’s role towards achieving this goal is necessary 
and probably unavoidable with no way signifying that the form of state intervention will or 
is to remain unvarying. 
Housing is linked to serious socio-political issues like citizenship and social justice but 
probably need a political science approach. Political science may also shed a light on socio-
political dilemmas, power games, opportunism and path-dependence clarifying why proper 
housing programmes are not implemented through policy-making (Bengtsson, 2009b). 
Societal and political ideologies indeed influence housing mentalities without however 
determining them. In other words societal aspiration regarding housing is neither the 
beginning nor the end of the housing provision and tenure system but rather a link on a 
chain fed by policy (state), market potential and society reaction, and subject as a whole to 
international pressures and trends. Different chain link are constantly interacting leading to 
dynamic configurations changing with time but also liable to path-dependency. Therefore, 
ideologies linked also to idiosyncratic elements cannot be argued to be stable in time or 
space. For example owning a house either as investment or for self-use may become a 
strong societal goal also affecting geopolitically neighbouring countries and regions. This 
by no means signify that either aspect (capital or service) will be – equally or even at all - 
profitable on all countries. Moreover, the path to acquisition will be passing from different 
systems and will have varied outcomes on every affected sector (income, consumption, 
welfare etc.). Lastly, this trend should not be expected to remain the same from an era to 
another. What seem prevalent over time are citizens’ needs to be sufficiently protected by 
the welfare state and have the accommodation aspect of housing ensured either within or 
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outside the welfare state. Modes, levels, means and other elements of the sort can be 
fluctuating over time and space as long as welfare provision and housing remain within 
certain societal tolerance regarding quality and security. 
 
Institutional Change and Corporatism in 'Weak States' 
On institutional change, the 'weak state' will have serious issues kick-starting institutional 
reform without strong pressures either from a supra-national or an internal-national level. 
Debates on institutional reform structured on 'novel' ideas and perception may build-up and 
become central in political life but on a practical implementation level an extremely strong 
push may be needed to overcome the rooted institutional inertia. Reforms and attempts to 
rationalize institutions will often be examined in isolation disregarding intra-institutional 
correlation, interaction and equilibrium. Such attempts will face coordinated and persistent 
opposition especially if they go against the specific society's accepted norms. 
Institutional inertia will be related and linked to path-dependency deadlocks, high returns to 
socio-political elite actors and 'common perceptions' about what is acceptable and norm
5
. 
From an IC aspect however there will be a notable gap that may constitute an opportunity 
for a well-timed combined attack on systemic malaises. Some institutional 
complementarities may be present in a regional or sectoral level but in a way further 
highlighting national socio-economic inequalities as they will not be based on a social 
justice and equity logic but rather on a clientelistic/nepotism one. From a Varieties of 
Residential Capitalism approach, characteristics of 'weak states' like clientelism, partisan 
politics, statelessness, immature market, lack of political will, and underground economy - 
usually labelled as 'idiosyncratic' - are considered as distinctive institutional structures. 
Thus, they are examined regarding their complementarity, incoherence and incompatibility. 
This dynamic perspective offers a better chance to locate reform opportunities through 
incremental institutional refinement, also considering temporal and spatial variations. 
Covert institutional interactions and configurations can be expected to follow different 
paths compared to overt ones. Due to the way the system evolved throughout the years in 
Bulgaria and Greece, housing can be mostly deemed the result of covert – or at least not 
fully overt – institutional interfaces. In the absence of structured and consistent housing 
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policy, a large number of institutional actors came into play. Local planning authorities, 
welfare departments, constructors, bankers, realtors, the family etc. were forced to serve 
housing needs at all costs. At the same time they were de facto allowed to interact within a 
framework of loose official monitoring. For example the construction of housing involved 
an overt institutional interaction between the contractor, the client and the planning 
authorities, to say the least. At the same time it involved covert institutional interactions 
regarding the sourcing of money. This may be the consequence of covert institutional 
functioning in different sectors i.e. undeclared employment, permissive bank lending etc. 
one of the main issues of covert institutional interfaces is their unpredictability and lack of 
assessment. Admittedly this informality allowed for a circumstantial flexibility which 
indeed delivered some solutions, albeit in a fragmented fashion. However, the ability to 
externally affect and try optimizing such covert interfaces became and still is practically 
impossible, posing a real challenge policy-wise. Institutional inertia and even path-
dependency in ‘weak states’ are heavily linked to political unwillingness or failure in 
incentivizing the transformation of covert institutions and their configurations to overt ones. 
Heavily dependent on institutional structuring, Corporatism is tied to institutional changes 
related to ideas, path-dependency, clash of interests and power etc. Another interesting 
outcome is that corporatism can serve specific needs like housing policy and respective 
bargaining, even if it is not on a national level, it can be debated on its sub-national and/or 
supranational level. Of course this requires a relevant successful adaptation process. 
According to Corporatism theory, the state retains its central role in all aspects including 
housing, but always interacting with interested parties. Even in cases where the state 
withdraws, this may be a targeted act in order to ensure its legitimacy and stability while 
preserving its power. Moreover, housing can be included in wider Corporatist bargaining as 
a counterweight to compromises in other policy areas. Within this framework various 
housing-related actors may negotiate better terms and solutions to housing issues. 
Corporatism supports the incremental institutional change as optimal in systems of 
underdeveloped or fragmented corporatist systems. While small countries have better 
chances in establishing well-functioning Corporatist structures, extreme state 
interventionism will deter its development. 
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2.12   Closing Remarks 
Several theoretical issues become evident through the combined analysis of the literature 
review in this chapter, which relate to this research and have to be considered. Housing 
topics are undeniably complex, requiring special attention and diligence regarding the 
adopted approach. This is one of the main reasons why housing theories do not always 
explain or translate to realities and almost never perfectly. Housing outcomes are often used 
to draw elements which form theories. A pitfall here is that such theorization may very well 
be valid for a specific set of countries and timeframe (e.g. certain socio-political era). 
However, if the countries used are academically attractive for whatever reason, extracted 
theories soon become staple theoretical frameworks applied to less examined countries. 
Milestone theories like those reviewed in this chapter shine when used as a benchmark 
against which country-cases can be examined. This has a twofold advantage. On the one 
hand varying theoretical colourings are revealed or refined, regarding specific housing 
system characteristics and operation. On other hand, whatever tools proposed by such 
theories can be tested and improved, so they gain validity in future research. For example, 
housing indicators may be used in different country-cases considering contextual socio-
political and financial when examined and interpreted. Homeownership rates are perhaps 
the most striking example of this. 
What is clear is the lack of comparative literature between Bulgaria and Greece. It is true 
that country-to-country comparisons are not particularly attractive in housing studies, and 
especially when belonging to different groupings. Even more when whole housing systems 
are examined, rather than specific aspects like e.g. the performance of rental sectors. 
Without doubt, inclusion of numerous cases makes easier to form clusters and therefore 
suggest towards some kind of typology. This research refrains from presuming and 
attaching to typologies and classifications, but in no case disregarding or underestimating 
the useful lessons they may carry. Not aiming to prove, modify any kind of typology, or 
create a new one, allows the country-specific housing system colourings to be preserved, 
and not smoothened out pursuing generalization. The reader will recognize that point-to-
point comparison goes beyond locating similarities and differences, to decoding and 
understanding the underlying mechanisms. While most studies recognize that institutions 
do matter and affect housing systems, they are usually exhausted in describing rather than 
seeking to analyze and explain underpinning processes. 
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Another literature issue relates to the non-holistic research approach. This is reflected on 
the lack of hands-on sociological housing research in the two countries. As the reader will 
notice, in Chapter 5 there is some significant body of literature regarding each country as 
the product of a limited - albeit diligent - group of academics. However, this is mostly 
based on theorization extracted and therefore dependent on the description or at best 
interpretation of the housing systems historical evolution. Hands-on research on 
contemporary state of sociological housing trends is not the norm in these countries, and 
housing studies typically remain attached to quantitative data. Downplaying current 
sociological trends does not allow expanding the discussion to wider and deeper issues of 
systemic (re)structuring. Both Bulgaria and Greece are experiencing a systemic shock that 
quickly affected their housing system and is still testing it. Consequently, analyses focused 
on housing economics and financing has risen during the GFC era, which was to be 
expected. This was also due to an overall increasing interest on 'weak states' and their 
economies. While financial factors are indeed important to housing, are not the only ones to 
consider and often not dominant. This research adopts a holistic multi-approach allowing 
for a balanced consideration of social, political, architectural and financial factors. 
Furthermore, contemporary comparative housing studies have to go outside the 'confines' of 
traditional country groupings to assess the impact of international forces on national 
housing systems. The GFC did not affect every country and consequently its housing 
system in the same way or at the same level. However, it revealed and certainly gave 
numerous reasons to analyze the nature of underpinning mechanics and their functioning. 
Albeit variably, but always positioned in relation to the state-market-family triangle, 
housing is subject to a multitude of forces which never function independently. Keeping 
this in mind, the next chapter expands and analyzes in-depth homeownership issues as 
central to housing theory and the cases examined in detail for this research.  
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Chapter 3 - Homeownership: One term, multiple readings 
 
3.1   Introduction: homeownership expanded 
This chapter is exclusively dedicated to literature related to homeownership. This is mostly 
due to the importance of homeownership for the country cases examined in the thesis. It 
basically relates to the need for a clear understanding of the various and complex aspects 
and identities of homeownership, along with their far-reaching implications like the effect 
on Social Contracts. The latter is especially relevant to Bulgaria and Greece which are in 
most housing studies implicitly or explicitly defined, grouped and characterized according 
to their owner-occupation rates. Homeownership seems imperative in understanding 
welfare and housing systems especially in countries with insignificant or inexistent social 
(rental) housing sector and strong familialist structures. Whatever the system assessed, 
tenure is key to comparative housing research (Stephens, 2011). 
Homeownership seems to be one of the central issues in the new-age welfare modernity and 
relevant ‘Social Pacts’ affecting socio-political outcomes and social relations - with their 
various meanings over time and space (Bengtsson, 2009a; Stephens, 2011). While 
homeownership has slowly dominated the European housing scene (e.g. Boelhouwer et al. 
2005) - even in countries where it has not been overarching historically - its causes, 
outcomes and historical paths, encompassing welfare and housing systems strongly vary 
between and within country groups. This has a lot to do with housing having a ‘double 
identity’ both as consumption good and an investment. Doling & Elsinga (2013) refer to 
Europe as a 'Union of Homeowners' (p.7), acknowledging variations in rates and definitions 
across countries and different eras. However its nature is also subject to transformations. 
Ronald et al. (2015) for example highlight a shift away from broadly-distributed property-
ownership as socioeconomic shock-absorber, towards an increasing property-based profit-
seeking in the UK. Overall, the 'social' character of homeownership seems to have been 
prevalent mostly pre-1990. This has been verified for countries like Ireland (DeWilde, 
2015a), Greece (Maloutas, 2008), or even whole systems like the post-socialist countries 
(Lux & Sunega, 2014). 
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In the modern era homeownership is often carrier of social inequalities from one generation 
to another (Elsinga & Hoekstra, 2015; Stephens et al. 2015a), discriminating between 
'insiders' and 'outsiders' of the system. Accessing homeownership has become increasingly 
less affordable for new entrants leading to an over-dependence on family resources (ibid.). 
Different modes of accessing homeownership bear different weighting on affordability. 
DeWilde (2015a) concludes that access to outright homeownership is central in accessing 
affordable housing, which is however not necessarily appropriate. For some systems like in 
southern Europe, accessing housing means accessing homeownership (e.g. Maloutas, 2008) 
regardless of the existing rental sector. Despite growing concerns regarding 'rational' 
evaluation of homeownership advantages over renting, socio-political trends seem to more 
or less favour the former. Regardless of financial downsides, Lux & Sunega (2014) argue 
that from societal perspective homeownership might be the rational choice. Covering 
psychological needs and offering certainty in a world in flux, homeownership preference 
will persist. Furthermore, the ontological weighting of homeownership on an individual and 
micro-family level has started gaining increasing research interest (Easthope et al. 2015). 
Overall, homeownership in contemporary times seems mostly boosted due its social 
momentum, and usually compared to unattractive or even problematic rental sectors, rather 
than its financial and welfare attractiveness. Doling & Elsinga (2013) for example note that 
renting-related policies affect homeownership more than policies seeking to reinforce the 
latter. Various studies discuss the financial risks related to homeownership, either relate to 
mortgage-loans or outright homeownership. Regarding housing welfare, homeownership 
seems to be contextually used as one of the excuses for the retrenchment of state-supported 
provision. Boelhouwer et al. (2005) argue that if homeownership-related state-expenditure 
is included in calculations, a different reading on welfare state comparison may prove to be 
the case. 'Underdeveloped' welfare states may be actually on par with western systems. 
Policies favouring the growth or protection of homeownership have proved to offer better 
political benefits (Boelhouwer et al. 2005) or help avoid political costs. Regarding 
homeownership and civic participation, there is no clear proof of correlation between 
stronger political participation of homeowners compared to tenants (e.g. Bloze & Skak, 
2015 for Denmark). Directly or indirectly protecting homeownership constitutes in many 
systems a tacit term of the Social Contract, which is central in ensuring civic normality. 
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Any analysis should take into consideration that observed patterns vary between countries 
in their intensity and mode, while some may not even be equally valid. Even when patterns 
are valid, their difference in structure and formation paths, will render comparison 
precarious without proper processing. For example, Stephens et al. (2015b) highlight that 
outright homeownership is not the same when resulting from post-1990 privatizations and 
when stemming from familialist mechanisms.  
 
3.2   Analyzing meanings 
In a significant number of studies, homeownership tenure has been focused as a welfare 
provision vehicle in different national or group contexts (Allen, 2006; Ronald, 2007; 
Malpass, 2008; Van Gent, 2010). As analyzed earlier, housing has a double identity both as 
an investment good (dwelling) and as a service (accommodation). This characteristic along 
with the rise of homeownership rates in many countries, some of which had a prevailing 
rented sector, and in some cases accompanied by state provision retrenchment, has drawn 
the interest of researchers (ind. Ronald, 2007). Additional importance is attributed 
considering the fact the currently, rising and mass homeownership seems to be the single 
common development element one can get in an otherwise varied housing policy and 
outcomes international context (Fahey & Norris, 2011). In other systems and countries 
homeownership was dominant anyway and therefore a central to analyzing them. In any 
way, tenure appears to be key in comparative housing research (Kemeny, 2005; Stephens, 
2011). Especially regarding the capital aspect of housing, it should be examined within the 
state-market bi-pole, while the service aspect should be assessed positioned within the 
state-market-household triangle (Fahey & Norris, 2011). 
As a policy tool, boosting or safeguarding homeownership can be used as countermeasure-
lever to welfare provision restructuring and reform (Malpass, 2008; Van Gent, 2010; 
Stephens & Van Steen, 2011;) while ensuring socio-political stability (Malpass, 2008; 
Fahey & Norris, 2011) as public spending on welfare is being reduced (Malpass, 
2004/2008; Fahey & Norris, 2011; McKee, 2012) consequently reshaping the state-market-
household triangle balances (Van Gent, 2010). From a Market perspective, homeownership 
may function as a means to investment and wealth accumulation (Fahey & Norris, 2011), 
older age housing-cost reduction (Kemeny, 2005; Stephens & Van Steen, 2011) while 
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ensuring a minimum standard of living for the elderly (Doling & Horsewood, 2005; Van 
Gent, 2010; McKee, 2012). Housing is often the basis of asset-based welfare system based 
on market and not on the state (Van Gent, 2010). 
Homeownership is central in household strategies as a means to ensure self-provision of 
housing welfare. This regards housing as accommodation service for the family, especially 
in systems where the state has withdrawn from housing welfare provision, and market 
seems insufficient to exclusively make up for it (Stephens et al. 2010; Fahey & Norris, 
2011; McKee, 2012). Homeownership in many national contexts functions as a kind of 
social security (Fahey & Norris, 2011), often being the 'container' of other welfare services 
provision like child-care, home-based health care for the elderly, homeschooling etc. 
McKee (2012) argued that along with other influencing factors, homeownership-seeking 
'bounds' young people to parental homes 'delaying' their independency eventually leading 
to frustration. Norris & Domanski (2009) underline that extreme or sole reliance on family-
based homeownership provision leads to poor housing outcomes, and financial overburden 
of Households. In sociological civic terms homeownership is the badge of 'good' and 
'successful' citizenship (Van Gent, 2010; McKee, 2012), and perhaps an answer to 
increasing capitalist housing consumerism (Malpass, 2008). Also, in systems where the 
rental sector is stigmatized by societal perceptions and related to on property misuse, 
homeownership will most likely be boosted as a better alternative (Fahey & Norris, 2011). 
Some of these functions may coexist in the same system. For example, homeownership can 
be the key asset to assed-based familialist welfare self-provision (Ronald, 2007; Ronald & 
Doling, 2010). Moreover, those existing in one system may not exist at all in another. Thus, 
each system has its own identity regarding the functions homeownership perform. In any 
case, the service function (accommodation) can be said to constitute a basic element in 
every system. Roland (2007) argues on the expected variety in homeownership types and 
effects due to varied contexts as a result of unique historical housing paths, systems and 
configurations, socio-political cultures and ideologies. Thus, a universal homeownership 
model is unrealistic. Stephens (2011) observes differentiation in home owner-occupation 
not only in space (cross-country) but also in time (within the same country and/or system 
grouping).  
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Searching the exact nature of the housing and welfare links has been a long-lasting central 
topic of housing studies. Within this challenging, complex and inter-disciplinary context, 
homeownership draws extensive attention, and especially regarding its connection with the 
welfare self-provision. This focus is true on a worldwide scale and even more pronounced 
in housing systems with traditionally significant social housing sectors and respective 
policies. 
 
3.3   Homeownership promotion and provision 
Promotion and provision of housing in the form of homeownership takes place within and 
depends on the state-market-household/family triangle and how the three poles interact. Of 
course the weight can fall on two or even one of the poles creating polarization (family or 
market). Thus, state-family, state-market, market-family or single-pole promotion and 
provision may exist – at least on a theoretical level. Depending on the impact of the triangle 
poles and different housing system configurations, housing provision will be closer to the 
family or market poles. Usually state will have some role - even a minimum one - while full 
state responsibility for homeownership in modern era is deemed unrealistic as it will 
suggest building and/or giving away housing for free. State’s involvement comes in 
different direct (spending) or indirect (regulatory, managing, tax-related) modes directly 
targeting housing or collateral affecting factors like income or other welfare sectors in order 
to allow more household spending on housing. Additionally market may be incentivized to 
maintain sufficient homeownership-related credit flow through state-backed guarantees 
(Fahey & Norris, 2011). 
Family-driven homeownership is achieved through forms of self-provision or even self-
build utilizing the extended familial network resources siphoned to asset-acquisition. 
Inheritance is another way for new families to become Homeowners or even parental 
donation-grant, though the latter almost always implies some welfare service trade for those 
giving their home (parents), like elderly in-house health-care. In some systems like in 
Southeastern Europe, family is – almost exclusively – overburdened with homeownership 
self-provision; a responsibility related to numerous social and financial issues. While the 
household economy is crucial to the family-state-market triangle (Fahey & Norris, 2011) 
any system relying on a single pole is bound to sub-par housing outcomes. In any case 
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bipolar scheme including the family and another pole is likely to produce poor housing 
regarding quality and affordability (Norris & Domanski, 2009). 
Promotion of homeownership may not be about a retreat of the welfare state but as an 
active and conscious policy turn towards a tenure which seemingly offers accommodation 
detached from market volatility and insecurity. More or less targeted policies – even not 
exclusively on housing – affect peripheral variables like heating cost allowances, property 
taxation etc. Having an impact on housing systems and homeownership, reinforcing such a 
point of view. Of course another reading would be the governments trying to drastically 
reduce expenditure and pass on the risk to homeowners (Fahey & Norris, 2011). In no case 
are these two explanations excluding one another. It is very well possible for some 
governments to ‘benefit’ from cost reduction and risk transfer while actively promote an 
indirect policy state interventionism with reduced collateral expenditure which will cover 
multiple sectors and needs and therefore will be less expensive on the overall budget. Such 
a combination is possible due to the multi-function of housing allowing for the fulfilment 
of personal aspirations. Citizens are burdened with the relevant risks but their 
personal/family goals are promised to be satisfied. In some countries state mechanism 
idleness and a more or less voluntary absence from housing provision can be seen or at 
least rhetorically argued as an ‘active’ behaviour allowing for families to go on with self-
provision in an unobstructed manner. Such an alternative (tacit) ‘Social Contract’ – if one 
supposes that people actually opt for carrying housing and other welfare risks instead of 
sufficient welfare state provision – requires various kinds of ‘cohesive’ socio-political 
forces like shadow/underground economy, rent seeking and clientelism.  
 
3.4   Homeownership-based Welfare 
Owning a dwelling is basic in asset-based welfare, although it may not be restricted to 
single assets, or solely to residential property. The link between homeownership and 
welfare is possible due to residential assets having the potential to cover both 
accommodation and investment needs. As a service, owned housing is intended for 
personal or family use throughout life. Financial acquisition burdens overload early stages 
of life, becoming lower as the owner ages and the mortgage debt is gradually being repaid, 
reaching low housing cost at older ages. Even when acquiring housing through mortgage 
54 
 
loan is seen as an investment, it is to be enjoyed rather than sold. The investment aspect of 
housing is about selling a debt-free asset releasing enclosed equity, either for accessing 
welfare through the market, or any other significant reason (comb. Lit. Kemeny, 2005; 
Malpass, 2008; Doling & Roland, 2010; Van Gent, 2010; Stephens & Van Steen, 2011; 
McKee, 2012). Self-provision of welfare services through the use of owned assets, is a key 
theory of modern housing studies. Housing assets have become the topic of discussing 
regarding their capacity to support older age welfare needs by unlocking their enclosed 
equity. During the last decades, the gradually increasing – albeit contextual – withdrawal of 
various welfare states, further boosted the debate. ‘Asset-based welfare’ and ‘welfare trade-
off’ theories endure as one main doctrine analyzed and used in attempting to establish a 
solid connection between owner-occupancy and welfare self-provision. Such theories 
appear having limited theoretical and empirical value in housing systems historically 
characterized by high homeownership rates and meagre social housing sectors. Southern 
and Southeastern European regions are typical cases of such a reality.  
The overall asset-based welfare concept is based on the assumption that owned housing 
assets dispose enclosed equity which can be released and used for welfare needs within 
weakening welfare states (Kemeny, 2005; Malpass, 2008; Stephens & Van Steen, 2011; 
Ronald at al., 2015). Starting from the Anglo-Saxon systems this is being expansively 
discussed for a number of countries (also Malpass, 2008; Ronald & Doling, 2010).  
Discussion normally concerned complementing insufficient pension schemes, also because 
mortgaged homeownership becomes debt-free and thus sellable at an older age (Stamso, 
2009; Delfani et al., 2014).  The asset-based welfare is almost always referring to housing-
based welfare, as owner-occupied houses are the dominant asset involved (Elsinga & 
Hoekstra, 2015). While initially focusing on covering pension welfare needs, discussion 
gradually expanded on wider welfare service provision (Delfani et al. 2014). 
Almost for a decade pre-crisis housing prices boomed fuelling the discussion to 
unprecedented levels, as equity enclosed in housing assets was considered easily liquefiable 
(Ronald et al., 2015). While housing prices along with housing investment perspectives 
have been destabilized since the global financial crisis, persistent pressure on welfare states 
has sustained the research on housing assets potential as a main, alternative or 
complementary welfare financial resource. Ronald et al. (2015) claim that it was this 
pursuit of asset-based welfare responsible for the eventual housing value bust during the 
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GFC (also Ronald & Doling, 2012). Focusing on Hungary, Hegedus & Szemzo (2015) 
noted that housing always had its role as a savings’ back-up scheme and a reserve – 
including secondary houses, which has not been significantly affected by the GFC.  
Stephens et al. (2015a) noted that asset-based welfare seeking helps moving towards an 
individualization of social security risks (also Elsinga & Hoekstra, 2015) and over-exposure 
of households, rather than some kind of viable alternative to social security. Overall, asset-
based welfare theory is mainly related to neo-liberal approaches and shrinking or limited 
social rental sectors (Elsinga & Hoekstra, 2015). Homeownership-based welfare is 
expected to accommodate rise of privatist paths where bulk property rights concentrate on 
few landlords, instead of Collectivist ones allowing for wealth redistribution (Fahey & 
Norris, 2011). Moreover, intergenerational conflict may rise between asset-rich elderly and 
younger people having restricted or no access to homeownership (McKee, 2012). Being 
socially and financially risky, homeownership-based welfare is deemed weak on its 
capacity as substitute of state welfare, or even a 'safety net' (Elsinga & Hoekstra, 2015; 
Stephens et al. 2015a). Despite attention raised by researchers, homeownership-based 
welfare is deemed to have functioned – at least partially – as an 'excuse' for various welfare 
states’ retrenchment and public spending cuts (Schwartz & Seabrooke, 2008; McKee, 2012; 
Ronald at al., 2015). Overall, homeownership has been positioned as central in welfare 
state restructuring and reform (Malpass, 2008; Van Gent, 2010; Stephens & Van Steen, 
2011) while ensuring socio-political stability (Malpass, 2008; Fahey & Norris, 2011).  
When discussing homeownership-based welfare, there is a number of key assumptions to 
be considered: 
 Homeowners will be willing to trade-down for a smaller or older dwellings 
 Owned housing assets can be easily and promptly liquidated 
 Housing assets hold significant equity making such an action reasonable and not a 
waste of precious and often irreplaceable resources 
 Poorer population can accumulate assets and improve their standing 
 People have the necessary knowledge to function within such a mechanism (low-risk) 
Undoubtedly, the aforementioned assumptions directly raise some concerns. Firstly, people 
may be resistant or even unwilling to sell, remortgage, over-mortgage or trade-down their 
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house (Malpass, 2008), for psychological and cultural reasons. Secondly, practical 
hindrances like housing market stagnation and negative equity may render such a use 
inapplicable (Malpass,2008; Roland, 2007). Thirdly, asset-embedded equity is not ensured 
and probably insufficient as old-age welfare. Thus, it can at best be complementary to 
pension schemes. Fourthly, homeownership may reflect and enhance inequalities generated 
elsewhere even passing them to next generations (Malpass, 2004/2008; Van Gent, 2010; 
Stephens & Van Steen, 2011). Lastly, Fahey & Norris (2011) underlined the fact that 
underused - larger than needed primary or secondary - dwellings lead to capital profit loss, 
most intense in systems where external pressures like taxation had been weak. This is 
directly linked to poor asset management skills required for an effective asset-based welfare 
system. 
Even if achievable, sole reliance on homeownership-based welfare in absence of other 
'safety net' severely exposes people to housing market risks (Malpass, 2008; Roland, 2007) 
and especially in times of financial crisis (Ronald & Doling, 2010). Owners often become 
'entrapped' due to a combination of negative equity, extended mortgage debt and potential 
employment or income hardship (Malpass, 2008). Fahey & Norris (2011) underline the 
long period of time between acquisition and debt-repayment needed to render the owned 
asset economically efficient due to housing expenses drop. Malpass (2008) argues that 
assed-embedded equity is limited to old-age, but not ensured until then and will probably 
prove insufficient. Therefore, it cannot be more than a complement to traditional welfare 
services system, like pension schemes. Using enclosed equity will possibly lead to resource 
exhaustion, depriving next generations’ access to homeownership (McKee, 2012). This is 
especially problematic in systems where the rental sector is underdeveloped and/or 
marginal. 
Focusing on the connection between housing and pension schemes, Delfani et al. (2014) 
classified following three types of risk-pooling: 'Precommodified family-based'  risk-
pooling mainly regarding access to outright homeownership to at least partially cover 
welfare needs. Here, housing is not considered an investment although it may be sold and 
bought through the market. 'Commodified Market-based' where access to homeownership 
is linked to early-age mortgage debt. Financial risks are higher for lower incomes and debt-
free ownership comes later in life. 'Decommodified State-Corporatist'  when regulation of 
homeownership and rental sector limit exposure to market risks. Rental sector is significant 
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and viable alternative to a risk-related homeownership. They concluded that basis for 
debate on asset-based welfare is valid only in commodified systems. 
According to Doling & Elsinga (2013) asset-based welfare seems to require conscious 
planning and decision towards such an end. Acquiring more housing assets, does not 
automatically prove the validity of such investment perspective, as it may be destined to 
other family or individual aspirations. Focusing on the UK, Ronald et al. 2015 noted that 
asset-based equity even when released is most likely to cover other needs instead of 
welfare. Inversely considered, liquidation of housing assets - even secondary - to cover 
welfare needs due to financial hardship or state welfare weakening, would not qualify for 
such self-welfare strategy. 
Asset-enclosed equity is crucial in understanding the financial weight of homeownership in 
household budgets and housing strategies. Having an accurate estimate of housing wealth is 
important for many reasons. For example, and regardless of any theoretical debate, asset-
based welfare is very much reliant on the actual value of owned home. From a welfare 
perspective, market value levels of housing assets define real opportunities and limitations. 
For example, income in-kind stemming from owned housing might be considered as quasi-
pension, even though it may be hard to calculate (Doling & Elsinga, 2013). Releasing 
enclosed equity seems to be a whole different issue, and should not be taken as granted, 
independently of housing wealth levels. Stephens et al. (2015a) note that equity release 
may be hindered  due to social aspirations (bequest, inheritance etc.) and/or purely financial 
incentives like low housing costs, sufficient pension levels. Various analyses on different 
contexts ended in similar results (ind. Elsinga & Hoekstra, 2015). In southern European 
countries for example, despite high homeownership rates releasing equity is pretty 
challenging (Stamso, 2009), despite it being more than twice their GDP (Doling & Elsinga, 
2013). Financial markets standing strongly affect equity release (Boelhouwer et al. 2005; 
Stamso, 2009), but not unbound to socio aspirations and deep-seated societal norms. 
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3.5   Negotiating ‘Trade-Offs’  
Kemeny studied the relationship between homeownership (tenure) and welfare states 
finding a ‘negative correlation’ between the two. Castles tested Kemeny thesis in 1998 
concluding it to have some validity, and naming it ‘the big trade-off’ between 
homeownership and public welfare. Kemeny later refined his thesis while recognizing some 
of its limitations (2001; 2005). The basic idea behind the ‘trade-off’ thesis is that in society 
with high rates of homeownership there will be an inverse effect on the welfare state 
development resulting in the reduction of the latter. Perhaps the most important reason is 
the households being overburdened with housing expenses at an early stage of life where 
their income and savings are still weak, leading them to a resistant stance against taxation 
increase necessary to fuel the welfare state provisions. So, in his reviewed trade-off thesis 
Kemeny moves from a one-way homeownership to welfare state influence to a two-way 
one. Now not only homeownership mentality affects the welfare state but also changes in 
the latter will affect the former. The basic principles of the Kemeny (2001; 2005) ‘trade-
off’ theory are as follows. 
Firstly, reacting to a weakened or shrinking welfare state people will attempt hedging 
against old-age precarity through various means, including homeownership, thus boosting 
it further. Lifetime savings channelled into mortgage repayment will build-up equity, 
available at a later life phase to be used for welfare self-provision either through selling 
(trade-down) or remortgaging the asset. Especially for pension schemes, as they become 
weaker homeownership will keep rising. However, homeownership is not the only financial 
vehicle that can be used towards this end, but is a reliable depository nevertheless. 
Moreover, this mechanism allows for a radical housing cost drop after the debt is repaid. 
Kemeny sees this pension-reduction homeownership-rise link even on integrated rental 
market systems. 
Secondly, consequent generations will build distrust towards the welfare state, seeking 
homeownership as soon as possible, and resisting to taxation increase which could 
seriously delay entering homeownership status. At younger ages people often deem health-
insurance of lower priority compared to family housing. In parallel, older outright 
homeowners will keep resisting taxation, wanting to minimize housing expenses after years 
of indebtedness. On a sociocultural level, high homeownership and taxation-for-welfare 
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resistance will eventually lead to an individualist mentality, away from Universalist welfare 
provision and supporting taxation. The impact will be evident not only in housing system, 
but also in urban forms, family structures and everyday transactions. Eventually, there will 
be a dichotomy between homeownership and rental-tenure societies (also, Van Gent, 2010). 
Somehow inversely, Politicians may opt to hold back or cut generous pension schemes 
given homeownership-related financial potential for the elderly. 
Linking the ‘trade-off’ thesis with his dualist rental market typology, Kemeny (2001) 
supports that in Dualist rental market systems homeownership rates tend to be higher or 
increase. This is mainly due to a residual social rental market allowing access only to those 
most deprived and a private rental market where unsecured tenure and high rents do not 
make it competitive compared with homeownership expenses. While large social rented 
sectors have been linked to Universalist welfare systems and high homeownership systems 
to Liberal welfare states, rise in homeownership rates in many countries questions the 
clarity of such a connection. 
The ‘trade-off’ thesis has received some serious criticism on its points during the years. 
Firstly, despite rising homeownership rates in various housing systems, a tenure-welfare 
causality seems hard to sustain (Malpass, 2008; Van Gent, 2010). Causality link issues 
were acknowledged by Kemeny, but overlooked for the sake of establishing a relationship. 
Socio-cultural factors have been overemphasized over neglected historical, political and 
financial ones, regarding housing provision (ibid). On the one hand, rise in homeownership 
may also be the result of lacking investment alternatives, or a housing market’s 
comparatively more profitable dynamics (Doling & Horsewood, 2005). On the other hand, 
homeownership’s efficiency compared to renting is debatable being affected by various 
factors (Van Gent, 2010; Soaita & Searle, 2015). 'Trade-off' theory presumes older people 
will deterministically seek to asset-based welfare to compensate weak pension schemes, 
ignoring alternatives like delayed retirement (Doling & Horsewood, 2005). Secondly, It is 
rather extreme to support that all these different countries and systems converge to Liberal 
welfare state system solely based on homeownership. This is even more the case when 
including those countries where homeownership has been historically dominant (Van Gent, 
2010). Homeownership systemic convergence may be as well the effect of globalization 
forces in housing trends (Malpass, 2008). Lastly, despite resistance to taxation expansion, it 
is somehow farfetched to assume voters will easily conform to welfare cuts, as such cases 
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have given significant proof of disapproval. Incremental systemic reform is more probable 
than radical changes, mainly due to related political cost (Van Gent, 2010). Malpass (2008) 
commented that despite its significance, it is hard to accept housing alone has such a strong 
social and welfare impact. Kemeny (2001) also underlined that it should not be assumed 
that people necessarily disregard the welfare state due to homeownership. Lastly, the 
theory’s generalization tendency (despite some limited application in Dualist and Unitary 
systems) and lack of updated data analysis, opened some discussion about its overall 
validity (Doling & Horsewood, 2005). Contemporary housing realities need to be 
approached by multi-factor analyses (ibid., Malpass, 2008). 
Overall searching for some consistent 'trade-off' pattern between countries is very likely to 
bear no fruit (Delfani et al. 2014). For example, Stamso (2009) notes that the 'trade-off' link 
between homeownership and pensions which may be debated in some countries, is not 
valid in Southern Europe. He relates that to the dominant role of the family in housing 
provision, and the problematic equity release in such underdeveloped housing markets. 
Delfani et al. (2014) argue that despite a negative correlation between homeownership rates 
and pension spending, in systems where homeownership is dominantly accessed through 
familialist strategies, there can be no 'trade-off' basis. Family-sourced homeownership is a 
reaction to insufficient housing policies and therefore 'forced' as the only viable solution. 
With not viable freedom of choice housing cannot be considered tradable for welfare, but 
rather family tries to cover such needs. They also attributed this to the consequent 
'intergenerational contract' of inheritance (ibid., p. 670). Doling & Elsinga (2013) 
underline that despite a possible correlation between pension levels and homeownership 
rates in some systems, it should not be determined as causation. They also noted that 
despite what Jim Kemeny' s theory suggests, not all Social-democratic countries have low 
homeownership rates. 
Taking criticism into consideration, the ‘trade-off’ theory may be able to provide some 
answers and explanation of some systems in specific times. Therefore, caution and probing 
are needed when assessing homeownership in relation to welfare state issues and before 
applying the ‘trade-off’ thesis. Pre-crisis, Stamso (2009) observed a link between drop in 
public welfare spending and higher homeownership rates; however this did not always 
seem to be the case. For example, Southern European extended homeownership had not 
been historically accompanied by weak pension schemes. 
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3.6   Defining ‘Social Homeownership’ 
Regardless of tenure structure, access to homeownership has been directly or indirectly 
promoted by state mechanisms in various countries and in varying ways. In cases where 
systemic protection and promoted access to homeownership have either consciously or de 
facto functioned as a means to cover housing needs for the wider population, this can be 
regarded as quasi social housing policy. To better describe this phenomenon and avoid 
confusion with public housing policies, I employ the term ‘Social Homeownership’. In 
terms of housing policy it could be defined as the complex of measures and policies aiming 
at covering housing needs by promoting homeownership. Even though this phenomenon 
can now be deemed as belonging mostly to the past, its repercussions in social and policy 
terms are indeed present. Setting the structural framework and analyzing the defining 
characteristics and parameters of the phenomenon helps understand its underlying 
mechanisms and institutional constructs. The present section is dedicated to this scope. 
Ronald at al. (2015) underline the change of identity in homeownership from a 
socioeconomic shock absorber for large parts of the population to an extremely privatist 
neo-liberal means to over-profit. Focusing on Southern and Southeastern European housing 
systems, Stephens et al. (2015b) highlighted the contextual use of outright homeownership 
as a social protection against income and employment precarity during the years. 
Households’ low mortgage and housing mortgage loan indebtedness allowed for a de-
commodification of housing in terms of separating from income levels and stability. The 
primary and dominant element of ‘social homeownership’ is the low commodification of 
housing as its characteristic as a social good before anything else.  
From a temporal perspective, 'social homeownership' will be characterized by historical 
dominance of outright owner-occupation over a limited and marginal rental sector. 
Historical presence and prevalence of high homeownership rates is the primary factor of 
'social homeownership' system, without implying all systems are the same nevertheless. For 
example, systems may be differentiated according to the way homeownership status has 
been historically achieved. This can be the result of direct state-support on construction 
leading to a kind of Statist Social Homeownership, or bound to family self-promotion 
related to Familialist Social Homeownership. The former would be positioned in the left 
half of the triangle depicted in figure 3.1, but significantly closer to the state pole. The latter 
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would be very close to what is shown in the figure. However, this common element 
differentiates these systems from countries where homeownership has been boosted during 
the last decades as a result of privatizations and social housing reforms.  
The 'social’ aspect of homeownership will be further supported by persistent low levels of 
mortgage loan indebtedness. This characteristic is key factor and at the same time the 
outcome of a decommodified homeownership from older times. As mortgage indebtedness 
can be a vector of financial exposure (Delfani et al., 2014) the opposite can be used as an 
indicator of decommodification, and eventually of social homeownership. DeWilde (2015a) 
noted the significant growth of mortgage debt in Spain and Portugal from 1995 to 2012, 
moving them away from their Mediterranean profile and closer to countries like Belgium 
and France with more traditional mortgage-based homeownership and medium-high state 
support for outright homeownership. 
Also as a result of, but not only due to 'social homeownership' itself, systems will have 
underdeveloped private and social rental housing sectors. Extended long-lasting 
homeownership deprives a system of market incentives to develop a mature private rental 
market, mostly due to deeply-rooted homeownership societal mentalities. For those seeking 
access or to move within the housing market, homeownership will be the primary product 
offered. Admittedly, this does not imply rental sectors are inexistent or insignificant in such 
systems. Variation of rental sector percentages depends on the country examined. However, 
the rental sector will have marginal and certainly temporary character. In most cases 
concerns younger people on the move due to work or studies, or a small percentage of 
population unable to access homeownership. Due to dominant homeownership mentalities 
remaining within the rental sector will be related to some kind of social 'stigmatization' 
although this mode and intensity is system-dependent and varies according to historical 
eras. Following and simultaneously reinforcing such mentalities, official housing policies 
will tend to promote and protect homeownership status as much as possible often 
overlooking the rental sector, further reducing its attractiveness. 
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Figure 3.1 - Positioning 'social homeownership' within the State-Market-Family triangle 
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Likewise, the social rental housing sector will be rudimentary or even inexistent. During 
the years, acute housing needs are expected to have been largely solved through 
homeownership. This mostly regards hedging against social and accommodation risks of 
homelessness, with no much discussion on quality issues. Through familialist routes and 
especially inheritance and parental grants, younger families become homeowners. Older 
family assets were acquired in times where accessing homeownership was comparatively 
more favourable. Purchasing new assets mostly relies on the parents’ financial capacity. 
'Social homeownership' has a clear welfare and social-good identity. This is mainly the case 
regarding primary residence, although secondary houses are expected to enjoy some 
systemic protection against e.g. foreclosures. Despite this, the link between homeownership 
and welfare is fairly complex. On the one hand persistent high-rates of outright 
homeownership allow for a limited housing market development, and only in times where 
national macro-economic growth allows for upward movement of existing homeowners. 
Otherwise, retrenchment to existing family housing and extended cohabitation offer a 
certain hedging against homelessness, with all the respective social repercussions. 
Homeownership-based welfare dynamics are especially weak due to the structure of 'social 
homeownership' systems. Liquidation of assets is often problematic both due to market 
inconsistencies and weakness, as well as societal perception on safeguarding owned assets. 
Housing assets are rarely destined to be sold as a means to access welfare services, and 
only in cases of extreme hardship or emergency. Due to underdeveloped housing and 
mortgage loan markets, selling housing assets is often related to equity loss, especially true 
for older houses. At best, owned assets will provide some amount of money to be partially 
used for purchasing a newer house. 
'Social homeownership' should not be linked to any kind of welfare 'trade-off', at least not 
in a generalistic and deterministic manner. There is no evidence people settle for meagre 
welfare state based on homeownership, even if outright. Nevertheless, public demand for 
an extended welfare state where housing would have a central position, could be eased due 
to extended outright homeownership. Having covered the risk against homelessness, people 
would gradually accept state absence in housing provision and eventually policy. This of 
course, allowed governments to avoid altogether or minimize public expenditure on 
housing avoiding serious social upheaval. In this sense a housing welfare 'trade-off' could 
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be argued, albeit with caveats. Inversely analyzed, weak or precarious welfare state service 
provision within the years, outright 'social homeownership' had been boosted as means to 
avoid homelessness risk. This is especially true in countries where income and employment 
instability did not allow younger people to assume housing expanses, either mortgage-loans 
repayment or rent costs. 
On a socio-political level the importance of 'social homeownership' renders it a basic 'term' 
of respective Social Contracts. Political legitimacy and social stability assume statutory 
homeownership status protection as a given. Housing may be the 'wobbly' or even absent 
pillar of the welfare state in these systems, but homeownership surely is structural element 
of socio-political stability. The right to homeownership is strong and directly related to 
citizenship status and identity. Whatever the mode of its establishment, 'social 
homeownership' is the outcome of conscious political pathways and decisions regarding 
housing policy. Even in cases of lacking or missing housing policy, this is due to certain 
policy orientations to allow or indirectly promote laissez-faire housing system evolution. 
Using ‘social homeownership’ has a number of advantages when applied to certain housing 
systems. On the one hand, it considers historical evolutionary paths, allowing for a better 
positioning in any classification attempt. Through a different reading, milestone theories 
can be filtered and used, even regarding 'atypical' housing systems. One the other hand, 
taking into consideration housing co modifying reforms on a global scale post-2000, it can 
be easily argued that 'social homeownership' is  key consideration in systems where it had 
been historically dominant, and are now in transition or transformation. 
 
3.7   Towards a new Social Contract? 
Based mainly on the ‘trade-off’ theory (Kemeny, 2005) between homeownership and 
extended welfare provision, there has been rhetoric – mostly political – of a post-modern 
lower need of people for a developed welfare state. This has been linked mainly to 
Homeowners/voters resisting extended taxation for welfare services development. Such an 
explanation is too simplistic as people actually resist public cuts apparently leading to an 
oxymoron. Malpass (2008), supports that this is no kind of a paradox but just a mis-analysis 
of the signals. Resisting tax increase due to high debt relating to homeownership is far 
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different to accepting state provision withdrawal concerning welfare services. Despite the 
rhetoric of people not needing so much or so good welfare provision, the real picture is not 
so clear. Regarding the citizens’ stance towards welfare state support, in their recent study 
Roosma et al. (2014) distinguish two dimensions: beliefs of how the welfare state should 
work (‘Should’) and perceptions about its actual performance (‘Is’). Through their analysis 
it has been shown that on an EU level people explicitly support a strong and extended 
welfare state being however extremely critical of its performance and efficiency, quality 
and benefits’ levels issues. These dimensions differentiate from country to country 
according to unique institutional arrangements. Such a rhetoric is likely to cause societal 
upheaval especially regarding the promotion of a new type of ‘Social Contract’ where 
housing asset is key to welfare provision and risks are transferred from the state to the 
individual (Van Gent, 2010; McKee, 2012). Changing housing as a basic element of the 
‘Social Contract’ cannot be based on unilateral state-led decisions. If citizens are not 
willing to review such a ‘contract’ serious opposition should be expected, regardless of 
tenure structure. 
Through their analysis (Roosma et al., 2014) the connection between citizens’ beliefs, 
perceptions and welfare state evolution is of high importance. The general conclusion is 
that a negative perception of the outcomes will lead to pressures for welfare state 
improvement when there is remaining trust in the welfare institutions or the private welfare 
alternatives are out of reach for the average citizen’s financial capacity. In cases of reduced 
trust in institutions people will tend to scorn the welfare state rolling back their support and 
eventually turning towards privatized benefits solutions if the value-for-money ratio is 
competitive and affordable. Inversely, trust in welfare state institutions will lead to an 
increased support from the citizens. Extended and prolonged negative perception of the 
welfare state will offend its legitimacy through direct (doubting performance) or indirect 
(overloading with excessive demands) means. Inversely, positive perception will either lead 
to a reinforced active support of the welfare state or generate a dislike due to financial 
overburden where the welfare services exceed the considered normal-good quality 
This approach may help shed a light on cases where extensive demand for effective welfare 
state coexists parallel to tax evasion seeking. The deeply shaken trust in the state’s 
institutions (including welfare) creates and concretizes a feeling of a ‘lost cause’ and 
‘money going down a bottomless barrel’. Nevertheless, this has hardly to do with the need 
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and desire for an effective welfare state. However in complicated cases-countries where 
there is a chasm between the citizens’ desires and actual behaviours it may be useful to 
distinguish between ideological/needs-driven and survival-driven ones.  
 
3.7.1   Housing Familialism 
The effect of family networks in households' access to housing has been widely recognized, 
albeit with varying forms. Delfani et al. (2014) for example argued that family-based 
housing combined with dominant outright homeownership lead to precommodified housing 
which at least partially covers housing and welfare needs. While housing assets are sold 
and bought through the market, it is hardly seen as an investment. In such systems, family 
strategies more or less limit dependency on the market regarding access to housing (also 
Fahey & Norris, 2011; DeWilde, 2015a). In southern Europe where familialism is strong, 
the need for accessing housing-related mortgage loans has remained limited (Earley, 2004). 
Where housing provision is strongly dependent on family strategies, welfare policies 
supporting the family may indirectly affect the housing system (Stamso, 2009). Maloutas 
(2004) also noted the distortion and opacity in the market-state commodification degree, 
caused by family strategies regarding housing provision. While housing is kept within the 
family line and kept off the market, the rental sector may become marginalized (e.g. 
Mulder & Billari, 2010). Of course this will require historical persistence of such trends. 
Family resources can be used as means to access homeownership through various 
mechanisms. Discussing on the UK, Ronald et al. (2015) noted the increased reliance on 
family support as a result of the global financial crisis, due to mortgage lending becoming 
less easy to obtain. Inversely considered, housing assets will become a family matter in 
countries where employment and overall financial precarity render it a kind of financial or 
welfare backup (e.g. Hegedus & Szemzo, 2015).  
When familialist strategies are allowed to operate towards providing member with housing 
and ensuring access to homeownership, they also function as a solidifying actor of the 
'Social Contract' implying that even if the state does not suffice, family will be left 
unobstructed to self-provide housing which will ne later protected by legislative or informal 
institutional framework. During the post-2008 global financial crisis era, family resources 
in southern Europe have started showing clear signs of weakening dynamics. This can not 
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only be attributed to drop in family incomes, but also a modernization of mentalities 
regarding elements of familialism like prolonged cohabitation. Assuming this trend 
continues, housing will need complementary of substitutive supportive mechanisms. 
 
3.7.2   Taxation of Housing Property 
Favourable homeownership-related taxation has during past decades - albeit varying in 
form - has been used as a kind of subsidy seriously affecting tenure structure and housing 
regimes (Delfani et al. 2014, Hegedus & Szemzo, 2015). Maloutas (2008) goes even deeper 
reporting the effect of favourable taxation to promoting specific types of Greek multi-
dwelling buildings in past decades. There seems to be a delicate relationship between 
taxation and housing, although a direct link does not seem valid. It should not be assumed 
that favourable taxation will deterministically lead to high homeownership rates (Doling & 
Elsinga, 2013). Szemzo (2009) highlights the difficulty in pinpointing indirect subsidies 
linked to homeownership tax expenditures like mortgage-interest exemption-deduction. 
Such schemes eventually favour high-income homeowners over lower-income renters. 
Delfani et al. (2014) note that tax breaks as means to boost homeownership may indeed 
increase households' exposure to mortgage loan debt. 
Taxation of asset-based wealth is increasingly seen as an effective means to increase public 
revenue, while also moderating inequalities (Iara, 2015). However, there is a widespread 
acceptance of significant implementation issues which need to take into serious account 
national sociocultural idiosyncrasies (ibid.). Leishman et al. (2014) underline the need to 
focus on the total household income when defining housing-related property tax, as it 
regards wealth which is often 'unearned' in practice. They propose a hybrid of property and 
income tax, acknowledging that designing and implementing it may prove particularly 
challenging. Focusing solely on capital asset value has limited effect on income 
redistribution and is extremely risky to implement in cases of serious housing market 
swings. This is the for example the case in Greece where value estimates are still based on 
objective values which are no longer aligned to significantly lower market values 
(TENLAW, 2012-2015). 
In countries and housing systems where homeownership has strong 'social good' colouring, 
taxation imposed on primary residence has become a sensitive issue (e.g. Haffner & 
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Winter, 2014 for Belgium). For example, Siatitsa (2013) discusses on the burdening effect 
of significantly increased property taxation in Greece amidst the crisis, as resource for 
public revenue. This shift, along with cutting-off homeownership subsidization indicates a 
change in the Greek housing system - albeit more or less forced. 
Resistance to housing-related taxation increase is related to high political cost and subject 
to path-dependency, as it is socially unfavoured (Haffner & Winter, 2014). This is 
especially the case where there is lacklustre transparency and distrust towards the state 
regarding the redistribution effect of such an increase (ibid., Stephens et al. 2015a). 
According to Kemeny-Castles 'trade-off' theory analysis, households accessing 
homeownership through a mortgage loan will tend to resist taxation fuelling the welfare 
state (Stephens et al. 2015a). This becomes bigger issue in homeownership-inclined 
societies. 
Property-related taxation directly affects housing costs. In systems with historically high 
outright homeownership rates, low housing-asset taxation can be seen as means to unlink 
housing from employment status, and due to familialism also from the market (financial 
institutions, constructors etc.). By keeping housing costs to a minimum a kind-of housing 
decommodification had been established for many decades. While the aforementioned 
mainly regard recurrent taxation imposed on property, one should not neglect the effects of 
purchase taxation, and especially on accessing homeownership for first time buyers.  
Therefore, it is safe to assume that significant changes in housing-related taxation patterns 
will sooner or later cause shifts in housing regimes. Hegedus & Szemzo (2015) consider 
taxation on of the composing elements of housing regimes, along with subsidies and social 
housing. In systems where favourable taxation has historically been used to promote 
homeownership or kept low to protect its decommodification, it certainly constitutes an 
indirect support of the respective 'Social Contracts'. Persistent change in housing property 
taxation will inevitable force shifts in housing systems and are likely to provoke socio-
political upheaval. 
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3.8   Defending Homeownership? 
After having examined the various functions it would be useful to try answering the 
question of why homeownership is preferred. Even more, why in some systems it is the 
tenure of choice? Answering that becomes more interesting as homeownership is related in 
almost all systems – although in a varied degree – with significant risks.  Homeownership 
serves the manifold purpose of accommodation risk avoidance, non-investment social and 
civic  aspirations and  investment perspectives. On the one hand people will try to avoid 
social risks stemming from poor housing and eliminate the chance for homelessness 
(extreme housing outcome). On the other hand there are aspirations – either related to 
housing as an investment vehicle or linked to personal goals reflected on or served by 
housing as a non-tradable asset. Clapham (2002) states that housing is “a means to an end 
rather than an end in itself” (p. 60). Non-investment objectives include quality 
accommodation for personal and family security and enjoyment, social/class status 
indicator and anything of the sort. Investment objectives include income-rent generation, 
mode of capital savings instead of 'wasted' rent payment, speculative gains from housing 
prices fluctuation, and future welfare emergency back-up. Manturuk et al. (2012) based on 
a USA focused study, concluded that despite Homeowners and renters experience almost 
the same levels of financial hardship, the former feel less psychologically stressed and more 
financial secured. 
It should be noted that any aspect is not restrictive of another but may coexist. For example 
housing asset-generated income may be consequently stored in bank savings for future 
welfare needs. Likewise, an asset bought may involve speculation for future profit and be 
utilized until the time to be sold and traded-up. Another example would be the purchase and 
use of an asset to cover accommodation or other personal goals while functioning as a 
back-up in case of need. One should keep in mind the distinction between homeownership 
and owner-occupation. While the former can be either referring to asset-based welfare 
and/or investment, or to the accommodation function of housing, the latter clearly links to 
the accommodation-led benefits. This is a distinction not often made in relevant studies 
where the two terms are used interchangeably for any meaning. 
In some systems homeownership may not even be a ‘free’ choice but a result of lacking 
viable alternatives. Where the social rented sector is residual or inexistent, the private 
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rented sector of poor quality and/or high rents, and the welfare state weak security seeking 
through housing asset acquisition may seem and be a one-way road. Moreover, in some 
systems heritage leads to an ‘obligatory’ homeownership as the acquired assets may not be 
able to be used for their equity due to low demand or disposed off because of 
societal/tradition ‘rules’. This is usually combined with weak social and/or uncompetitive 
private rental sectors. 
Fahey & Norris (2011) say that the ‘wobbly pillar’ label clearly downplays the capital-
aspect of housing. They support this by underlining that housing is the only major capital-
based service of the welfare state people can acquire on their own without having or the 
need of special skills and knowledge. Self-provision (purchase) removes service 
(accommodation) aspect away from the market (self-provided through the ‘imputed’ rent). 
The capital aspect of housing is affected variably by state policies but not controlled by it. 
Thus, housing as capital is commodified but as accommodation ‘familialised’. Moreover, 
homeownership incorporates owner and user benefits in a tenure more efficient than renting 
(various issues) regarding accommodation as homeowners are the best tenants and 
landlords they can get for themselves. Of course whether housing acquisition really does 
not require special knowledge is debatable as poor asset selection may lead to loss or waste 
of precious and even irreplaceable resources. Additionally, considering every Home-owner 
as an efficient one regarding his asset seems rather generalist and deterministic disregarding 
poor maintenance and depreciation due to negligence or income hardship, and other issues 
like inappropriate neighbour mentality. 
 
3.9   Further Comments 
Housing’s double identity (financial asset and accommodation service) is significant but 
not always relevant to welfare. In cases where the household owns just the asset of their 
residence the capital asset function of housing is doubtful. People will tend to avoid 
trading-down, remortgaging or over-mortgaging their home for either practical (smaller 
house, financial hardship, insufficient capital gains from the transaction) or sentimental 
reasons. Except the cases where the acquired or inherited house is far larger than needed, in 
good standing (marketable) and within a functioning national and regional market, primary 
residence can hardly be the solution to welfare state absence. Secondary housing 
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(countryside, leisure etc.) or homeownership but not self-occupation is a whole other issue 
however where the capital asset aspect of houses can truly shine either as a wealth 
accumulation strategy or a supplementary welfare resource. 
Promotion of homeownership by the state may be seen as a substitute – even if a partial one 
– of social housing due to its horizontal distributional effects, despite its weak vertical ones 
(Fahey & Norris, 2011). However, housing can be neither the end nor the departure point of 
welfare provision. Further discussing on this issue homeownership nature – regarding 
acquisition, welfare links and impacts (social, political, financial) – will differ from system 
to system. It is a whole other thing referring to debt-free homeownership based on 
inheritance or familialist self-provision or self-build, and homeownership based on market 
mechanisms of mortgage debt undertaken early in life and carried on. Burdens, risks and 
benefits exist in all cases but are distributed differently in the household/individual lifetime 
and even press variably different aspects of its activity. For example mortgaged/debt-tied 
housing assets will make need for full-time and undisrupted employment imperative 
affecting not only employment requirements but also societal orientations regarding job-
seeking. In any case however, apart from housing-specific policies (direct or indirect), 
peripheral policies (income, general taxation, social security etc.) will deeply affect housing 
outcomes which in turn become causal elements of next generations housing system. 
 
3.10   Closing Remarks 
Elaborating on homeownership in this chapter, it has become evident that it is more than 
just rates and tenure structures. It is worth noting that there is still no universal consensus 
on the threshold over which homeownership rates are considered high. This is mostly 
defined per study and usually according to the cases compared. The level of owner-
occupation by itself tells nothing about the socio-political paths that led to it. Neither does 
it hint at the underlying mechanics supporting or hindering its further expansion. For 
example, homeownership can be the outcome of deliberate and structured  housing policy, 
or formed as a reaction to the lack of it. If temporally persisting, homeownership becomes 
institutionalized and a basic element of socio-political bargaining and pressure. Thus, it 
turns into a catalyst of systemic housing transformations. 
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Likewise, one cannot safely discuss on the link between owner-occupation and welfare 
without considering levels of mortgage lending on a national level. The rates of outright 
homeownership are one of the key elements affecting the differentiation between housing 
systems. At the same time it is related and directly affects housing dynamics in each 
country.  
Homeownership seriously Affects collective family realities and everyday lives of its 
members. In countries with weak rental sectors and rudimentary housing policy, this goes 
to the extreme. Housing of the family remains constantly a central preoccupation in the 
pursuit of housing welfare self-provision. 
The aforementioned conclusions are of special importance to country-cases like Bulgaria 
and Greece, where high owner-occupation has historically been the case. This means that 
relevant theories should not be employed without seriously considering contextual 
idiosyncrasies. This is the case of asset-based welfare which is canonically used referring to 
selling-off owned housing to cover for pension needs. In Southeastern European context 
this can be expanded and translated to include wider welfare services like health care, or 
even acquisition of housing for younger family members. Among the main points discussed 
in the previous chapter was about the shortcomings of making country-cases somehow fit 
pre-established theories or those valid in different contexts. In this Chapter it was made 
clear that neither should irrationally force theories to the point of transformation, in order to 
find application and validity in specific cases.  
Such considerations remained central throughout the design and implementation of this 
research, as shown further in the thesis. 
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Chapter 4 - Research Methodology 
 
4.1   Research Aim, Objectives, Questions and Hypotheses 
 
[...] ἀλλ᾿ οὗτος μὲν οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα,οὐδὲ οἴομαι. 
Plato, ‘The Apology of Socrates’ (21) 
 
The perhaps most famous of the quotes attributed to Socrates, suggests that wisdom lies in 
knowing and acknowledging, what one does not fully know. That certainly includes 
whatever may seem self-explanatory or evident. Embarking on this PhD research such a 
suggestion proved extremely useful in a number of occasions, and during the project as a 
whole. Housing issues and especially regarding established systems and manières, like 
institutionalized homeownership, are often bound to theorization liable to research 
prejudice. The latter relates to knowledge subject to tenacity i.e. accepted due to convenient 
and pre-set assumptions (Beins & McCarthy, 2012 p.7). As an overall perspective, this 
researched used mixed Qualitative and Quantitative methods, while the data analysis and 
interpretation of findings have a strong qualitative colouring due to the scope of the PhD.  
The Aim of this PhD Research is to analyze and explain how housing welfare
6
 is created or 
inhibited by the associated ‘idiosyncratic’ institutional structures within ‘southern’ and 
'southeastern' European housing regimes. Through qualitative and quantitative research, 
and using Bulgaria and Greece as case studies, the thesis seeks to contribute to the housing 
and welfare regime literature that has thus far had only limited reach into such countries. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 housing welfare can be better outlined through the philosophical theory of 'utilitarianism'. Applied in housing, strategies 
adopted and outcomes produced will be judged on covering needs in the best possible way. Moreover, decisions and paths taken 
will be considered as good or bad according to their eventual outcomes. Paths taken will be even more justified and reinforced 
when producing satisfactory outcomes for the majority of people concerned   (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-
history) 
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For the selected case-studies of Bulgaria and Greece, the Research Objectives were to: 
1. Assess absolute (compared to EU) and relative (to GDP) “under-performance” or 
“over-performance” of housing systems, in terms of housing outcomes  
2. Present evidence on State-Market-Family triangle interactions, shifts and 
transformations regarding housing welfare  
3. Establish how the institutional particularities in these two countries (such as 
clientelistic & familialist networks, homeownership, secondary houses) are linked 
to housing welfare 
4. Explain the state’s role in housing policy by employing the Esping-Andersen 
Welfare Regimes, Housing Corporatism and Varieties of Capitalism frameworks 
(multi-faceted approach) 
 
Research Questions  
1. What is the level and distribution of housing welfare in Bulgaria and Greece? 
2. What are the sources of housing welfare? 
3. What are the types and function of institutional interaction mechanisms in the State-
Market-Family triangle, in relation to housing welfare structuring? 
4. What are the key-drivers of the Bulgarian and Greek housing systems and the possible 
reform paths? 
 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis A: Bulgarian and Greek Residential Capitalism types are poor fit with the 
existing classification - typology 
 Asset-based welfare cannot operate effectively in a context of stagnant housing markets,  
deteriorated stocks, inflexible legal frameworks, and slowly-adapting and path-
dependent policies 
 These ‘Familialist Residential Capitalisms’ will move towards an amalgam mixing 
extreme Capitalist with Statist elements 
76 
 
Hypothesis B: Housing Policy path-dependency is an especially influential factor in both 
countries 
 Policy reforms will face opposition through institutional inertia and actors’ resistance to 
change 
 Clientelistic mentalities will - gradually - weaken due to shrinking shadow economy and 
financial resources, thus making room for reform opportunities 
 A consensus, including multi-party agreement, will be required in order for the 
necessary reforms to be implemented 
 The state will remain key-player in housing system reforms, especially as a regulator of 
interests 
In this section I present the theoretical consideration regarding the research methodology 
strategy, and the steps followed to serve research questions, objectives and hypotheses. 
Before concluding the section, I present specific issues encountered while conducting this 
research and the ways they were dealt with, along with relevant limitations. 
 
4.2   Research Approach and Design 
4.2.1   Theoretical Framework 
There are many ways to define a research, according to its processing, aspirations, 
measurement, and time perspective, among others. Due to the nature of its central topic 
(comparative housing policy and system) and to serve its pre-set objectives this PhD 
research had to adopt a multi-type approach. The part of the research examining past 
housing paths and evolution, along with past and present preferences, mentalities etc. is ex 
post facto descriptive in nature, as Kothari (2004, p.3)  and Beins & McCarthy (2012) 
describe. At the same time, it is also analytical, when critically evaluating data collected 
(ibid). Applying Beins & McCarthy (2012) framework this research moves beyond 
description (even though some of it is necessary), to focusing on explanation and 
proceeding to predict housing behaviours within the transforming socio-political context of 
the two selected countries. From a time perspective, the research is cross-sectional as the 
data gathering is set in specific point in time (Sekaran, 2003; Beins & McCarthy, 2012), 
despite the fact questions asked also regard past experiences and family housing histories. 
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The latter links to elements of historical (Kothari, 2004) and archival (Beins & McCarthy, 
2012) research. Cross-sectional design allows for group-comparisons and national 
assessments (Creswell, 2012). Examining multiple cases is common in cross-sectional 
design (Bryman, 2012 p.59). 
Based on the classification in Babbie (2012), this research has been exploratory in that it 
tries to revisit and better understand phenomena already been described - more or less 
sufficiently - but from a different and more detailed-extensive perspective. It is also 
descriptive especially regarding the ethnographic comparative perspective and historical 
evolution of the two housing systems. Being explanatory offers an insight into the reason 
that led to specific housing outcomes and relevant cultural mentalities. Explanations given 
are dominantly ideographic i.e. based on detailed understanding of causes and effects for 
the specific cases studies (Bulgaria and Greece). When all factors leading to a certain 
phenomenon have been considered, and not having one makes the consequence uncertain, 
the analysis may be deemed complete (ibid. p.96). Babbie (2012) highlights the need to be 
careful when opinions come from people experiencing the phenomenon under study as their 
answers may be underestimated by the researcher. People living the phenomenon have 
more direct contact with it even though their opinions may differ. What is common in 
differing opinions has to be important (ibid. p. 96). Moreover, idiographic explanation is 
especially aided by comparison between similar situation in different places and times. 
On arriving to some meaningful conclusions and recommendations based on the data 
gathered, this research adopts both inductive and deductive reasoning (Sekaran, 2003). 
Deduction regards forming hypotheses based on theory and then using data to verify or 
reject them to revised theory. Induction is about the impact of data gathered to theory that 
triggered the research (Bryman, 2012 p.24). Combination of reasoning is especially 
necessary in social research where theories and observation alternate in cycles. For 
example, one part of data gathered during this research are needed in addressing 
hypotheses, but another part used to refine established theories. Creswell (2012) notes that 
qualitative research is more inductive and quantitative rather deductive (also Bryman, 
2012). Regarding its aspirations, and given the fact, that some kind of generalization is 
sought, this PhD research is of the fundamental kind, although also applied in its attempt to 
propose solutions on various housing issues (Kothari, 2004). Being also a conclusion-
oriented this research allowed for flexibility in research design (ibid). 
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From an ontological perspective and focusing on housing policy issues, this research adopts 
a Constructionism perspective. Housing mentalities are strongly affected by social 
constructs and perceptions, which often cannot be properly or sufficiently explained by 
'outsiders'. Social phenomena are in constant flux and subject to reshaping forces. The 
research can only grasp certain aspects of social reality i.e. its own construction, rather than 
some universally fixed one (Bryman, 2012 p.33). In epistemology, Critical Realism 
recognizes that as long as something has an impact, it is very much real. Therefore, social 
constructs and prejudices can be studied as normal (Babbie, 2012 p. 42; Bryman, 2012). 
This has been especially useful in focusing on and assessing housing mentalities. 
One of the most significant challenges in this research was to examine theories and 
knowledge, so deeply rooted and widely accepted that would qualify for what Beins & 
McCarthy (2012) call a priori method. Wide consensus and reasonable arguments make 
such knowledge somehow, indisputable. The major issue here is that what may be the 'fact' 
at one point in time, may not be so at another. indeed, changed in how people view things 
will be mostly achievable through gradual efforts towards objective research (ibid, p.8). 
 
Ethnographic elements 
Due to its scope and main concept (housing) this research has strong ethnographic 
elements, although differing from pure Ethnography. Significant part of the thesis focuses 
on understanding, analyzing and interpreting cultural elements, beliefs and patterns 
(Creswell, 2012 p.462). Participants examined (excluding the housing experts perhaps) 
share certain cultural beliefs and behaviours regarding housing, as verified by literature and 
data analysis. The case study method utilized in data collection had been related to 
ethnographic aspirations
7
. Themes central to this research like homeownership, have a clear 
cultural aspect, often dominant. Semi-structured interviews used for primary data collection 
are a common tool used in ethnography (ibid. p.471). In accordance to Critical Realism 
claims, Ethnomethodology in qualitative field research argues that people create and 
structure their realities through everyday actions (Babbie, 2012 p.314). 
 
                                                 
7
 also Bryman, 2012 p.67 
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4.2.2   Research Design 
Research design regards the practical structuring of the research to be conducted. The aim 
is to maximize useful data collection while minimizing time and money resources outlay. 
Research design defines proper data sources, collection and analysis strategies, and within a 
specific time and budget framework (Kothari, 2004). Decisions about the location, type, 
aim, nature, sample, and measurement tools and data analysis of the study are all made 
during this phase (Sekaran, 2003). As the interviews with people from both countries also 
require them to tell their stories around family housing strategies and history, research 
design has also been partly narrative (Creswell, 2012 p.502) even though reporting those 
stories had not been the scope.  
The mixed methods design implemented in this research is what Creswell (2012, p.541 & 
p.544) describes as 'embedded design'. Such mix allows access to the strengths of both 
qualitative and quantitative data (Bryman, 2012 p.633). Research methods in the thesis 
largely consist of primary Qualitative data supplemented by secondary statistical 
data/indicators, mostly used to better explain concepts or cover issues not covered by the 
qualitative research. Collection and overview of the latter started almost from the beginning 
of the research, and far earlier than the qualitative data collection phase. Quantitative data 
initially contributed to refine and optimize the qualitative study in both countries, and later 
in better explaining qualitative data outcomes. Primary data collection had been based on 
qualitative in-depth interviews, while secondary data used are comparative statistics. 
Combining the two methods helps better understand housing which is both tied to its 
symbolic and its practical aspect, thus needing multi-perspective readings. This 
combination also offered a chance to better triangulate results, cover research gaps of one 
method through the other, answer different research questions, improve credibility and 
utility of findings, and combine different views offering a better explanation of results 
(Bryman, 2012 p.633). Creswell (2012) argues that analyzing the data collected through a 
mixed methods research design can be pretty challenging. For the embedded design used in 
this research, quantitative and qualitative data had been separately analyzed and had their 
results compared afterwards (p.551). Table 4.1 shows the key topics to cover, set according 
to research questions, objectives and hypotheses. Figure 4.1 shows the Research Design 
and the relevant procedure followed. 
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Quantitative Qualitative 
 
 Tenure Structure: Homeownership levels 
and modes, rental sector size, social housing 
size 
 
 Stock Profile: volume, age, size, occupancy 
 
 Housing Cost: Housing cost burden, payment 
arrears, residential property taxation 
 
 Housing Finance: mortgage to GDP ratios, 
mortgage levels, state expenditure on 
housing, family transfers 
 
 Housing Market: price indices, transaction 
volumes, construction activity 
 
 Social Considerations: overcrowding, 
housing deprivation, mobility, cohabitation, 
satisfaction and opinion on housing 
conditions 
 
 Housing Experiences: transition phases, 
kind of issues encountered, retrospective 
self-evaluation 
 
 Housing Strategies: modes of access to 
Homeownership, manoeuvring within 
the rental sector, acquiring and retaining 
assets, familialist transfers for housing 
 
 Housing Mentalities: significance and 
utility of Homeownership, opinions on 
renting as primary choice or an 
alternative, anticipated drawbacks per 
tenure 
 
 Housing Policy mentalities:  opinions on 
housing policy effectiveness, 
expectations on Social Housing, 
anticipated help from state or non-state 
institutions, lobbying dynamics 
Table 4.1 - Key Topics considered in the Research Design 
81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 - Research Design Chart 
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4.3 About Case Study Selection 
Case study method refers to the in-depth qualitative analysis of a specific unit, paying 
attention to every detail
8
. Then, based on from case data generalizations are made (Sekaran, 
2003; Kothari, 2004). Case study method is fit for sociological research as it allows 
capturing behavioural patterns, experiences, motivations, historical paths, social trends and 
changes. Among other advantages, case study method improves researcher's skill (ibid). 
Some limitations of case study method include comparability issues, researcher's and 
respondent's subjectivity, precarious generalization, extended time and money 
requirements, and assumptions made (ibid). Beins & McCarthy (2012, p.89) also 
highlighted the attention needed when generalizing based on case studies (also Bryman, 
2012 p.70). 
Qualitative case study method regards both countries selected and analyzed, and the groups 
selected in each country. Even though selection of interviewees cannot be clearly 
considered as case study, it was based on collective case selection in order to examine the 
issue through various case studies (here participants). According to Bryman (2012, p.70) 
case studies can be classified as exemplifying i.e. offer the chance to examine them as 
expressing wider cases, and also focus on crucial social processes. On a country level, case 
study selection was instrumental i.e. to focus in the national housing systems and policies 
(Creswell, 2012 p.466).  
In this PhD research case study is explicit on a country level. That is, countries and their 
housing systems are important to the research, through ideographic approach (Bryman, 
2012 p.68-69). At the same time, when comparing Bulgarian with Greek people responses 
design is cross-sectional as interview responses from people have their own significant 
weight. The latter is identified with nomothetic design and the effort to generalize results 
(Bryman, 2012 p.97). Bryman (2012) argues that a research can have both case study and 
cross-sectional elements. 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Also Bryman, 2012 
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Case studies - Bulgaria and Greece 
The justification for the selection of these countries is based on the following two reasons. 
Neither are easy to fit into the socialist and southern European grouping, and both are 
experiencing radical transformational pressures as a result of sociopolitical and financial 
turbulence i.e. fall of Communism (Bulgaria) and the severe impact of the GFC (Greece). 
The former is a very interesting research case for housing theory. Even though a former 
socialist country, Bulgaria followed a notably divergent housing system evolutionary path 
compared to other former Socialist countries. One of the main elements was the early 
dominance of homeownership since the early years of the Socialist regime. This has also 
been affected by the fact that Bulgaria followed Socialist path, rather than a Communist 
one, even though often labelled as such. On selecting the latter, research findings later 
verified the preliminary indications that Greece has a unique housing system evolutionary 
path, certain elements of which significantly differentiate it from the wider Southeastern 
housing system grouping. Having repeatedly characterized as homeownership societies, it 
was intriguing to examine the housing system of these two neighbouring countries. This 
regarded not only their evolutionary path, but also its current implications and 
transformation trends. Housing policy in both countries has remained extremely dormant 
until recently, while housing issues are still being discussed within a limited circle of 
experts. This is bound to change sooner or later as the GFC triggered wider transformation 
processes in their respective housing systems, albeit for different reasons - as thoroughly 
analyzed in the following chapter. The two-country approach allowed comparing the two 
case studies in an open-ended manner while not under-examining them, which is a risk 
when having multiple cases at hand (Bryman, 2012 p.75). In this PhD research cross-
cultural comparative design was implemented by examining the same issues with the same 
instruments in both countries, with one of the goals being their comparison, in order to 
understand their national context and focus on similarities and differences (ibid. p.72). 
Apart from Sofia and Athens (the capital cities), Burgas and Larissa had been chosen due to 
their demographic and geographic significance. Burgas combines strong tourist and 
industry sectors, while Larissa has its urban character embedded within a strong rural 
context and agricultural industry. Having a significantly different profile compared to the 
Capitals, I considered them as a good choice to verify whether housing mentalities and 
strategies are influenced by location. 
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4.4   Data Collection 
On primary data collection measurement, this research has been qualitative in its approach. 
That is, mainly based on subjective interpretation of data regarding opinions, feelings, 
mentalities etc. (Kothari, 2004). Nevertheless, significant part of the thesis is concerned 
with the available statistical data describing the housing systems and their outcomes, from 
various perspectives. This has a double goal. On the one hand to juxtapose the statistical 
'reality' with people's experiences. On the other hand it gives a comparative overview of the 
cases studies in relation to their smaller (group) or wider context (EU). Qualitative research 
is bound to subjectivity and bias of the researcher (Creswell, 2012). Mixed research 
methods offer a better change to better understand and explain phenomena, combining the 
best of the two approaches (Creswell, 2012). For this PhD qualitative data have been given 
priority, over quantitative analysis which draws from secondary data. 
 
4.4.1  Literature Review 
Literature reviews regards the thorough assessment of available published and unpublished 
secondary sources or information (Sekaran, 2003). Beins & McCarthy (2012) suggest that 
literature review is a highly selective process (also Creswell, 2012), due to volume and 
quality concerns. Literature review may actually an ongoing process throughout the 
research (Bryman, 2012 p.100). This has been the case for this PhD thesis, although 
intensity significantly varied from one phase to another. Literature review ensures no 
important information will be ignored. Without setting a theoretical framework, data sought 
may not sufficiently cover the issue researched. Moreover, through proper literature review 
the researcher can avoid resource loss from doing research already conducted. Validity and 
Reliability of research methods are significantly affected by literature review (Sekaran, 
2003). Through such a procedure, the research will be able to, eventually, create knowledge 
(Beins & McCarthy, 2012). Creswell (2012) highlights that in qualitative research literature 
review mainly functions as the means to focus on the central phenomenon and the need to 
be researched - here housing - rather than define questions to be examined. Literature 
review should not dictate the direction of the study. Data are being collected in order to 
gain knowledge from the participants. (ibid). 
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4.4.2    Primary Data Collection - Interviews 
Primary qualitative data have been mostly based on semi-structured (focused) interviews 
with housing specialists (e.g. academics, economists) and people of various age-groups. 
Qualitative interviews allow for an in-depth understanding of attitudes, behaviours and 
social processes (Babbie, 2012 p. 334). On the downside, any statistical descriptions are 
weak if possible at all, and generalizations precarious. Kothari (2004) argues that personal 
interviews offer more flexibility and control over the volume and quality of the information 
sought, with some downside nevertheless. This method is time-consuming and often 
expensive, open to biases on both sides, exaggerated responses, and systematic errors. It 
may also deter participation of people like politicians, officials etc. Sekaran (2003, p.228-
229) ends up in similar conclusions. 
The interviews with Bulgarian and Greek households and housing experts have been an 
extremely useful instrument without which it would not be able to answer most of the 
Research questions. For RQ2, interviews reveal the true sources of housing welfare i.e. 
family, banking sectors, public bodies etc. Moreover, they showed the nature, mix and 
impact of these sources. This includes for example the channelling of undeclared income in 
housing construction and using consumer loans for housing. For RQ3, interviews highlight 
the interaction of the family with the construction and banking sector in the pursuit of 
suitable and affordable housing. They also highlighter attitudes and expectations regarding 
the intervention of the state in housing affairs. Lastly, for RQ4, interviews show the nature 
and intensity of various social forces affecting housing reforms like e.g. tax aversion.  
 
Topic Guide Questions  
The in-depth semi-structured interviews with the thirteen housing experts and the forty-five 
citizens (heads of families) had been based on a set of open-ended questions and respective 
probe questions forming a topic guide to serve the discussion. The topic guide was only 
available to the researcher. The citizens had no prior knowledge of the questions except the 
overall topic of the PhD research, while housing experts received a stripped down pro-
forma based on the topic guide. Semi-structured interviews are often facilitated by a Topic 
or Interview guide, while the interviewee is free to answer as they see fit (Bryman, 2012 
p.471). Qualitative interviews were selected instead of unstructured ones, as it would 
86 
 
enable cross-case comparison. Moreover, some specific issues had to be covered (ibid, 
p.472). The topic guide was structured to maintain a flow from one topic to another. Initial 
questions were formed on the basis of their capacity to provide information for answering 
the research questions. Probe questions were used as a means to clarify responses and 
expand the discussion (Creswell, 2012). Overall, during the interviews various types of 
questions have been used from introductory and follow-up questions, and moving on to 
specifying, direct, structuring questions. Their number and type varied from one interview 
to another according to the context, by listening and reacting to what was being said 
(Bryman, 2012).  
Open-ended questions and semi-structured interviews allow for the respondent to express 
himself freely within an overall flexible discussion with the interviewer (Beins & 
McCarthy, 2012; Bryman, 2012). For that reason, field research is better accommodated by 
less-structured qualitative interviews (Babbie, 2012 p.327).On the downside, as Babbie 
(2012) notes that open-ended questions - a dominant element of in-depth interviews - need 
proper coding to be analyzed, and are thus subject to researcher interpretation bias. Beins & 
McCarthy (2012) also note that open-ended questions make coding, organizing and 
summarizing open-ended responses may prove rather challenging. The semi-structured 
form of the interview guide ensured all the important topics would be asked and therefore 
be more comparable from one interviewee to another and cross-country. Keeping an open-
stance through general questions, allowed to learn from the participants rather than the 
researcher seeking certain things to learn (Creswell, 2012).  Open-ended questions are 
rarely of one type and vary in openness (Bryman, 2012 p.479). I have used 'initial' 
questions to get the conversation going, 'intermediate' questions to trigger elaborating on 
the initial answers and follow-up, and 'ending' questions as the discussion matured. 
For this research, interview questions (including probes) had focused in past and present 
experiences, behaviour and opinion on housing matters. By focusing on key points in time 
related to individual and household housing experiences, it had been able to avoid memory 
distortions. Beins & McCarthy (2012) note that when respondents are asked to recall rare 
incidents, rather than routine elements, memory errors tend to decrease (p.266). Overall, 
questions to participants have been kept clear, open, respectful, positive, relevant and non-
suggestive (Bryman, 2012).  
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Selection and Recruitment of Participants (non-experts) 
Sample design had been formed as a combination of judgement and stratified sampling 
(Sekaran, 2003 p.277; Kothari, 2004 p. 15; Beins & McCarthy, 2012 p.100). Purposive or 
Judgement sampling is non-probabilistic and regards selection of specific participants by 
the researcher, according to their characteristics and the purpose of the research (Babbie, 
2012 p.201; Bryman, 2012 p.418). Issues with judgment sampling mostly regard 
generalization of results, but in cases it is the only option available (Sekaran, 2003). 
Sekaran (2003) argues that when comparing two cultures the sample size will be two (p. 
134) regardless of the number of sub-units examined. In such case the unit of analysis is the 
country. The number of participants and interviews was set based on estimation for the 
anticipated saturation, which initially expected around the 15th interview, while keeping it 
practical in terms of data volume and analysis (Bryman, 2012 p.425). A better description 
of the sampling used in this research can be given using the method presented in Creswell 
(2012) as 'purposeful sampling' (p.206). Participants and sites-cities had been selected due 
to the volume of information that could be obtained. The key advantage is the potential to 
better understand processes and behaviours, even though generalizations are generally 
questioned. More specifically 'purposeful sampling' was partially 'Typical Sampling' and 
partially 'Concept Sampling' (ibid. p.207). The former allowed for a description of the 
situation to those being unfamiliar with it, while the latter helped explore various 
pronounced concepts on housing in the two countries. Regarding the selection of people 
according to the age of the family, this intended to capture different opinions and their 
variation. Serving this purpose, the selection of sample cases based on specific differing 
traits is described in Creswell (2012, p.207) as 'maximal variation sampling'. Due to 
financial and political instability (systemic Crises, imposed capital controls, institutional 
mistrust) recruiting participants through conventional channels like newspapers, social 
media etc. had been estimated as potentially ineffective, time-consuming and uncertain. 
This was especially the case regarding recruitment of participants of the specified profile, 
as there were no effective means to ensure their eligibility. To counter these obstacles two 
European Society for Opinion and Market Research
9
 certified recruitment agencies had 
been employed. Their involvement was strictly limited to recruitment according to profile 
requirements I set, and arranging the time and venue of the interviews. Participants had 
                                                 
9
 ESOMAR - https://www.esomar.org/ 
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minimum to none former experience participating in in-depth qualitative interviews, and 
especially regarding housing. All eligible citizen participants received compensation (in 
cash) for their participation. Babbie (2012, p. 280) argues that cash incentives increase 
participation, with no negative effects whatsoever. Selected participants had been informed 
on the purpose of the research and the genuine interest in understanding their views, 
strategies, aspirations etc. about housing. This was communicated both by the recruitment 
agency and me at the day of the interviews. Such steps, support trust-building between the 
respondent and the interviewer (Babbie, 2012 p. 325). Likewise, they were explained that 
recordings aimed at permitting accurate analysis of their words and no kind of profiling or 
archiving. This was especially important in both countries, were mistrust against 
institutions (including research projects) is considerably high. 
 
Conducting the Interviews 
According to literature research and after consulting/verifying with the aforementioned 
recruitment agencies, it has been decided that the interviews would take place in a neutral 
environment (most of them took place in separated rooms within the agencies), unless the 
participants were not feeling comfortable accepting me to their house. Venues selected 
allowed for proper recording and a safe and quiet environment. All interviews with 
Bulgarian people were conducted through the mediation of two experienced professional 
interpreters living in Bulgaria. Interviewees communicated with the interpreter in their 
native language, so to avoid language affecting how interviewees reply (Beins & 
McCarthy, 2012 p.263). The interpreter then responded back to me in English (Sofia) or in 
Greek (Burgas). Interpreters were informed about and prepared on the requirements of the 
Topic Guide and the interviews as a whole. Apart from their unquestionable necessity 
(language barrier), their knowledge of and familiarity with the Bulgarian reality proved 
invaluable during the interviews. They also made sure questions were understood as 
intended in the native language. Intermediation of the local interpreters significantly helped 
establish rapport with the Bulgarian citizens and removing shyness or mistrust on the spot. 
Sekaran (2003 p.395) underlined the possible issue of people feeling shy towards 
foreigners. This is similar to what Beins & McCarthy (2012, p.144) described as "biosocial 
effect”, where the characteristics of the researcher like age, nationality etc. affecting how 
interviewees respond and behave. While all interviewees had been informed and accepted 
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being recorded, some of them seem to have been somehow been affected by this and 
remained restrained or uninspired (Bryman, 2012 p.483). Interviews varied in their quantity 
and quality of information, as well as their duration (ibid.). The duration varied from 
roughly half an hour to more than seventy minutes. Table 4.2 summarizes the key details. 
For the Bulgarian Housing Expert interviews I used Skype video-call to overcome 
accessibility/availability issues, while Greek Housing Experts Interviews were conducted at 
their office. No issues encountered whatsoever. Four Greek housing experts declined or did 
not verify participation after receiving the pro-forma, most probably due to the effect of 
personal interview requirements as described by Kothari regarding high-profile 
interviewees being inaccessible (2004, p.99). 
 
Lastly, saturation is considered reached as the volume of additional information notably 
drops. Creswell (2012, p.251) marks saturation as the point when no new themes emerge, 
and no detail for the existing themes is added. That said, what defines whether saturation 
has been reached is fairly vague and subjective. Although a definitive number cannot be 
set, 12 to 20 interviews have been loosely considered as a volume of reference. Saturation 
point is very much dependent on the topic examined and the homogeneity of the 
                                                 
10
 Six Bulgarian and seven Greek Housing Experts. But an additional four Bulgarian Experts proposed and sent their opinions in 
writing, raising the total number of Bulgarian Experts contributing to ten 
11
 The five Bulgarian participants missing, did not show up the day of the interviews 
Participants Period Interviews Conducted Duration of Recordings 
Housing Experts   27/02 - 19/10/2015 13 out of 13 scheduled
10
 ~ 17 hours & 54 min. 
Greek People 2
nd
 - 16
th
 June 2015    25 out of 25 scheduled ~ 19 hours & 14 min. 
Bulgarian People   5
th
 - 11
th
 July 2015 20 out of 25 scheduled
11
 ~ 17 hours & 1 min. 
 
Bulgarian People Greek People 
Group Codes Sofia Burgas Athens Larissa  
A1 (New HH, Working Class)  2 1 5      2  
B1 (Mature HH, Working Class) 2 2 3      3  
C1 (New HH, Middle Class) 3 2 3      1  
D1 (Mature HH, Middle Class) 2 1 2      1  
E1 (Pensioner HH) 3 2 3      2  
Purposeful Sampling Criteria 
Young Households, Working Class Households of less or more than 5 years of common 
life; Pensioner Households i.e. at least one member 
being pensioner; Social Class according to 
combined Income and Occupation criteria adjusted 
to national standards 
Mature Households, Working Class 
Young Households, Middle Class 
Mature Households, Middle Class 
Pensioner HH 
Table 4.2 - Interview Phase Details 
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respondents (Bryman, 2012 p.426). During research design, saturation had been anticipated 
around the 20th interview. According to the data analysis, saturation was reached around 
the 12th to 15th interview depending on the sub-topic discussed.  
 
4.4.3   Photo-shooting and Observation 
Taking photos of legacy housing stock in Bulgaria and 'Workers Housing Organization' 
stock in Greece have been mostly used as complements in the field work data gathering 
(Bryman, 2012 p.457). For photo-shooting locales please refer to Appendix II, Pictures 1-4. 
 
4.4.4   Secondary Data 
Secondary data refer to data already collected and analyzed, and readily available (Sekaran, 
2003; Kothari, 2004). Official reports and studies, newspaper articles, processed statistical 
data fall within this category. Secondary data used so as to serve the purpose of the research 
(adequate), while paying attention to the source (reliable). Secondary data often the 
opportunity of a longitudinal flavour in otherwise cross-sectional studies. Bryman (2012, 
p.325) argues that official statistics can be used as 'unobtrusive measure' i.e. limiting the 
risk of the researcher affecting responses. In few interviews I discerned signs of reactivity 
i.e. some participants were influenced due to knowing they were participating in a research. 
By selecting high quality sources of secondary data, the researcher can limit the issue of not 
having control over the quality of the data (Bryman, 2012 p.316). For the secondary data 
required during this research Eurostat (EU-SILC)
12
, ELSTAT
13
 and NSI
14
 have been used 
as sources of reliable statistical data. The statistical data analysis helps compare numerical 
realities with realities experienced. From a time perspective statistical data used were cross-
sectional, with a limited longitudinal flavour. Special interest is given to the data of the last 
six years (2008-2014), due to significant socioeconomic and political changes. Official 
documents and reports have also been as sources of data not available elsewhere, and often 
as a means to triangulation of data. Newspaper articles used in the introductory chapter 
showed some of the ways housing issues are communicated to the wider public, and 
compared to interview findings and statistical data available. 
                                                 
12 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-and-living-conditions/data/database 
13 http://www.statistics.gr/en/home 
14 http://nsi.bg/en 
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EU-SILC record in a standardized way multiple indicators on a wide array of topics, among 
which is housing. 'Statistics on income, social inclusion and living conditions cover 
objective and subjective aspects of these themes in both monetary and non-monetary terms 
for both households and individuals' (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-and-living-
conditions/overview). As the 'EU reference source for comparative statistics on income 
distribution and social inclusion' (ibid.), EU-SILC includes the EU-27 along with five 
additional countries. The minimum effective sample size is as follows: 
 Households Persons aged 16 or over 
interviewed 
Cross-Sectional Longitudinal Cross-sectional Longitudinal 
Bulgaria 4500 3500 10000 7500 
Greece 4750 3500 10000 7250 
EU-27 130750 98250 272900 203850 
Source:http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1012329/4462345/EU-SILC-sample-size.pdf/1d70e0a7-5761-4adf-8ecb-e464d253b845 
 
 
4.5   Data Analysis 
4.5.1   Primary Data Analysis 
Bryman (2012, p. 13) argues that data analysis is the process of reducing gathered data to 
allow for interpretation, otherwise impossible. Transcribing audio recordings is a time-
consuming process (Creswell, 2012). Due to the nature (open-ended) of the questions and 
the total number of interviews conducted (13 with housing experts and 45 with Bulgarian 
and Greek people), I ended up with a considerable volume or recordings to be analyzed 
(more than 54 hours of recorded material in total). This phenomenon is not uncommon in 
this kind of semi-structured research (Bryman, 2012). To counter this, an alternative 
approach has been adopted, similar to what discussed in Bryman (2012, p. 486). Interviews 
had been listened to three times each, and only the most interesting and information-rich 
section were included in the research report. After the first two passes-listening to get the 
general feeling of the recordings, the first interviews were being transcribed in the language 
recorded in extensive detail, excluding only the most irrelevant information like 
introductions and farewells. At the same time dominant themes were being noted and 
aggregated in parallel. Significant deviations from 'norms' (contrary evidence) were given 
extra attention and noted. As interviews started repeating information (overlapping) 
reaching saturation, transcription became more selective with the most outstanding parts 
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being transcribed, including significantly different phrasing of similar opinions. Selective 
transcription relies on the researcher's judgment but significantly reduced volume of 
transcripts. While, interview parts useful for researches with different scope may be 
missing (Bucholtz, 2007; Davidson, 2009) lack of selection can actually be deemed non-
scientific when producing impractical transcripts (Davidson, 2009; Duranti, 2006). 
Transcripts were then printed and analyzed by hand providing themes for the research 
report in a manner similar to what is described in Creswell (2012, p.237). When uncertain I 
re-listened interviews to ensure no information loss. Process of coding and aggregating data 
into - interrelating here - themes is inductive (Creswell, 2012). Transcripts had been coded 
(from open to axial and then selective coding) on a sentence or paragraph level according to 
interview at hand. This is often the case in qualitative analysis, and may vary in size 
(Babbie, 2012 p.410; Bryman, 2012p.569). Initial coding had been refined through re-reads 
of the transcripts and gradually forming sections in terms of theoretical topics. For a coding 
example refer to Figure 4.2 at the end of the Chapter. Bryman (2012, p.578) discusses this 
as 'Thematic Analysis' of qualitative data i.e. structured thematic units formed by repeating 
data patterns, consolidated into wider topics. I have used adapted thematic analysis to the 
needs of my research setting key themes and subthemes based on repetitions and 
similarities or differences. I kept themes as much juxtaposed to the topic guide questions as 
possible. Bryman (2012, p.624) underlines that when using thematic analysis it is often the 
product of an underlying quantification. This had been the case in my research, as themes 
were formed according to repetition of certain words, phrases, and their interlinked 
meanings. Partial 'quasi-quantification' had also been the issue in the interview data 
analysis section related to the use of words like 'most', 'some', 'often' and the like (ibid.). 
Regarding the transcribed quotes entering the data analysis, they have been subject to 
translation. Regarding the Bulgarian interviews with people, the interpreter transferred 
people's words through consecutive interpretation from Bulgarian to English (in Sofia) or to 
Greek (in Burgas). Selected quotes from the selected transcribed recordings were processed 
or translated in English and prepared to enter the data analysis section. The same was the 
case with Greek people recordings leading to a final translation from Greek into English. 
The central concern was to present the reader with a readable set of quotes presenting the 
original ideas of the participants, paying special attention to meanings and content. 
Translation has been kept as close as possible to the original spoken words, only being 
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optimized when readability was at risk. I made every effort not to affect content and style 
of spoken words. During the first listening of the interview recordings, non-verbal 
components had been considered as irrelevant and, but few exceptions, have been omitted. 
Interview recording analysis and section transcription was carried out by myself, and 
started soon after the first interviews had been successfully conducted (Bryman, 2012 
p.484). Regardless of time and effort required, this allowed to get the 'feeling' of the data 
and better identify themes and codes (ibid., 486). Triangulation  of findings employed 
evidence from different participants and combination of different data (Creswell, 2012). 
The former was mainly the case in Bulgaria where I had no personal experience of the 
housing system during Socialism. Descriptions from different people allowed verification 
of the pattern formed. This had later been juxtaposed with the literature review findings. 
 
4.5.2   Secondary Data Analysis 
Analyzing existing statistics can be used at least as a supplementary  source (Babbie, 2012 
p.354). Interview findings are often compared or combined with statistical findings, as a 
historical or contextual basis (ibid). Statistics can also cover whole countries, offering an 
overview which is very often not the case with qualitative field interviews. At the same 
time this can be a shortcoming as aggregate statistics on behaviours of wide groups or often 
do not reflect individuals (Babbie, 2012 p.356). For this research statistics regarding 
behaviours have been not been used. When using existing data there is a limitation to what 
is available, reducing validity as what we want to know may not be sufficiently - or at all - 
covered. Logical reasoning is often used to counter this shortcoming, along with replicating 
measurement from different perspectives (Babbie, 2012 p. 357). Lastly, reliability of 
existing statistics - however official - may be questionable. The research often does not 
know the quality of the measurements and accuracy of the report. Knowing these 
shortcomings is significant in reducing their impact (Babbie, 2012 p.357). The analysis of  
secondary data had been mostly quantitative while some findings had to be discussed also 
in qualitative terms. From a time perspective analysis is mostly cross-sectional, while some 
parts have a limited quasi-longitudinal flavour subject of course to the data availability.  
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4.6   Research Ethics 
Anonymity and Confidentiality - As a part of ethical research, all interviewees have been 
guaranteed and protected by confidentiality and anonymity. No one outside this project had 
access to participants' information. Non-sensitive personal data had been collected to co-
verify eligibility with sampling requirements, and in case of a post-interview contact need. 
During recruitment phase, participants had been informed on the scope and topic of the 
research, the intention to record the interviews and the personal data to be asked, if they 
were deemed eligible and decided to participate. At the day of the interviews respondents 
were informed about their right to withdraw at any time, with no consequence whatsoever. 
Apart from this, the consent form also included my identity and the topic of the research, of 
which the respondents had already been informed. Personal data have been scheduled to be 
destroyed after the successful submission of this PhD thesis. No sensitive personal data 
have been collected whatsoever, either directly or indirectly (political or religious beliefs, 
sexual orientation etc.). For in-thesis transcripts quoted, I made sure interviewees could be 
identified with and by specific quotes. The rest of the data are presented in aggregate 
thematic structure and processed by me.  
Ethics and Data Protection - Heriot-Watt University School of the Energy, Geoscience, 
Infrastructure and Society research ethical guidelines have been followed as required. 
Ethical approval for the research project had been submitted and approved before the 
interviewing phase. As an additional optional measure, personal data and recordings of 
Greek interviewees are protected by the department for the protection of personal data 
(www.dpa.gr) on which I submitted a notification of research and commitment to destroy 
data post-submission of the thesis. The same had been sought for Bulgaria, but it proved 
practically unviable. I also contacted the Bulgarian commission for personal data protection 
(www.cpdp.bg/en) early on, without success. Following communication with housing 
experts led to no definitive conclusion on any valid relevant statutory obligation. Above all, 
I made sure personal data collected and interview recording were kept safe until destroyed. 
All relevant info had been stored digitally encrypted. 
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4.7   Research Challenges Encountered 
Language Barrier in Bulgaria 
With me being a non-Bulgarian speaker, interviews in Bulgaria were subject to direct or 
indirect translation effect. Interviews with Bulgarian housing experts were conducted in 
English. Even though I and most interviewees have no trouble communicating on a 
proficient level, English is not a first language. Therefore, direct self-translation of 
meanings, opinions, ideas, concepts etc. had been unavoidable. To counter this, housing 
experts had been sent a simplified version of the topic guide i.e. the general thematic 
questions without the probe questions (pro-forma). This allowed them to structure their 
thoughts so properly as to be expressed in English in the best possible way. Knowing 
beforehand the generic content of the interview had not been evaluated as a drawback given 
the fact that housing experts have professional experience on housing topics and more or 
less formed opinions. Moreover, it had not been a goal of the interviews to extract opinions 
through surprise. Interview content analysis and cross-checking with literature review 
showed no deviation between their recorded opinions and their published work.  
Interviews with Bulgarian citizens (heads of households) were conducted in their native 
language, with the intermediation of a professional interpreter per city. Interviews were 
subject to indirect or double translation effect. I directly asked questions in Greek (in 
Burgas) and in English (Sofia), with the interpreter translating them in Bulgarian (native 
language). Respondents communicated directly with the interpreter in Bulgarian, and their 
responses were interpreted in Greek (Burgas) and English (Sofia). Thorough preparation 
and discussion with the interpreters, along with their professional experience, ensured high 
level of fidelity when making the questions. However, translation of participants replies 
may have been subject to partial interpretation effect.  Lengthy explanatory discussions 
with the interpreters before and after the interviews, clarified ambiguities. Nevertheless, it 
cannot be affirmed with absolute certainty no information was lost in translation. 
 
Financial Crisis Distortions 
The Greek financial crisis (government debt) was triggered by the aftermath of global 
financial crisis around 2008-2009, was still ongoing at the time this thesis was being 
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written.  Bulgaria was also affected by the GFC effects, albeit to a lesser degree. Overall, 
the impact of the crisis on the macro-economy and consequently on household budgets, was 
severe given not only its intensity but also its duration. As a result, statistical data during 
this period had to be analyzed and discussed with caution. Moreover, predictions regarding 
the future evolution of the housing system are deemed fairly precarious. Therefore, overall 
attention is given to indications and trends, rather than trying to safely interpret numbers 
and graphs.  
 
Geographic Coverage 
Interviews and photo-shooting in Bulgaria and Greece, took place in four cities due to 
resource limitations. Even though geographically significant, selected cities cannot be 
automatically considered as representing their respective country as a whole. Regardless of 
generalization risks, preliminary indications did not highlight this as crucial shortcoming. 
differentiation was not expected to be significantly affected by location. However, this has 
been taken into serious consideration in every step of research design and data analysis. 
 
4.8   Research Limitations 
Validity and Reliability 
Validity regards the potency of the tool utilized (interviews here) to capture what they are 
supposed to and not something else. Reliability regards repeatability of the measurement 
and variation of the results (Babbie, 2012 p.334; Bryman, 2012 p.46), otherwise called 
consistency (Sekaran, 2003; Kothari, 2004). Beins & McCarthy (2012) argue that the 
research should be scientific by being replicable and verifiable. Bryman (2012 p.390-394) 
discuses on the reliability and Validity in qualitative research. External Reliability 
requirement can be satisfied by making explicit and clear processes followed. Internal 
Validity is strong in Qualitative research linking theories developed with observations 
made. However, External Validity i.e. generalization of results, is often an issue. 
Field research and interviewing offers greater validity as the researcher is able to grasp the 
'feeling' of the conversation and subtle messages, otherwise hard to capture through 
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questionnaires or surveys (Babbie, 2012 p.335).  Reliability on the other hand, may prove 
to be an issue, as one cannot fully eliminate the researcher’s impact on the interviewees 
(ibid, p.336). Being aware of this issue, I have avoided personal judgments as much as 
possible throughout the research and data analysis. Babbie (2012, p.336) argues that adding 
comparative perspective may moderate such risk. This research has been based on 
comparative analysis also on an international level. 
During the design phase, special attention was given so as for the interview guide and the 
organization of the interviews to serve content validity i.e. adequate coverage; criterion-
related validity i.e. relevance, objectivity, reliability and availability; and construct validity 
i.e. predicted correlation with key theories, acknowledging though that some parts had to 
rely on judgment (Sekaran,2003 p.206; Kothari, 2004 p.74). The input of judges is 
invaluable regarding content validity of qualitative measuring instruments (ibid). 
Reliability can be argued to be less easily demonstrated in qualitative in-depth interviews. 
However, it can be optimized by standardizing conditions (stability) and low inter-group 
variation (equivalence), as Kothari (2004) argues. This had been achieved by posing 
exactly the same questions in all participants in both countries. Questions had been 
translated verbatim. Most of the interviews took place on neutral ground i.e. the recruitment 
agency's room, with no external intervention or disruption. Lastly, recruitment of 
participants had been based on criteria specifically set and which I personally later verified. 
Reliability requirement is sufficiently covered in cross-sectional research provided the 
researcher is clear on procedures followed in recruiting participants, collecting and 
analyzing data (Bryman, 2012 p.60). Internal validity is weak in cross-sectional research 
due to issues in establishing causation rather than just associations (Bryman, 2012 p.60). 
External validity is strengthened through random selection of participants (ibid). 
 
Generalization of conclusions 
As general rule, one should be extremely careful when and not to generalize. Regarding the 
number of interviews with housing experts, there has been a noteworthy difference between 
the two countries. Despite initial willingness, certain Greek experts cancelled their 
participation after reading the pro-forma. Most housing experts have been selected and 
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contacted mostly based on their academic research work significance, and some of them 
were introduced by peers. Claiming that  every housing expert has and could be contacted, 
would be inaccurate. Saturation reached ensured opinions on key-themes was captured.  
Beins & McCarthy (2012) underline the fact that covariance is prerequisite and alone does 
not suffice to establish causation (p. 131); temporal precedence and internal validity are 
also required. The latter regards the necessity to exclude any other variables. In housing 
studies causation is usually hard to claim due to the inter-disciplinary nature of the field. 
Despite the number of qualitative interviews conducted with citizens and the fact that 
saturation had been reached as anticipated, representativeness should be approached with 
attention. Each household had its own, often unique and unrecorded, strategies for covering 
housing needs. That being said, overall mentalities and opinions have been evaluated as 
satisfactorily recorded. 
Significant part of the interviews with people had been based on recalling key events in 
time, giving a quasi-longitudinal character to the research. Beins & McCarthy (2012) 
underline the memory-related distortions in such a case, and thus the issues in identifying 
causal links between variables. Overall, given the scope and design of this research it can 
be claimed that the results have a quasi-national character.  
 
Comparative Juxtaposition  
When comparing different country paradigms there is always the danger of seeing what one 
wants to see. The existence of similarities, however identical, between two country systems 
does not automatically group them together. For example homeownership which has been 
verified quantitatively and qualitatively as dominant in both countries, is similar at some 
aspects and very different at others. Historical prevalence of the tenure for example, is true 
for both cases. However, the way this had built up and its transformation phases vary. 
Moreover, building and urban design patterns significantly differ. It is always necessary to 
pre-define the perspective and approach adopted for which the comparative analysis is 
destined. Comparing groups or countries is often tied to implicit compulsion to establish 
patterns having universally validity regardless of culture. This is respective to what Beins & 
McCarthy (2012) discussed as "etic" research findings or absolutism orientation (p.340). 
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This PhD has remained as unbound as possible to such 'commitment' acknowledging some 
phenomena may present similar aspects in different countries. Striking example is 
homeownership which presents similarities on a macro-scale e.g. tenure structure, but also 
has significant differences in its comprising elements like urban forms. It is always useful 
to remember that as paradigms persist through time, they become reinforced (Babbie, 
2012), and therefore may seem self-explanatory or evidently proven. Lastly, when using 
quantitative datasets like EU-SILC, one should keep in mind their limitations. Despite 
usefulness in terms of comparability and standardization of measuring, there is an inherent 
weakness in capturing distinctive systemic features and variations. This is mainly due to 
indicators design aggregating sub-indicators which have value on their own. Also, 
definitions like housing costs and tenure may not apply to every system in the same way  
(DeWilde, 2015b). 
 
Closing Remarks 
In this chapter I have presented the overall research strategy adopted and design structured 
and followed, and relevant noteworthy challenges both in conducting the research, and 
analyzing findings. Before moving on to Chapter 5 which goes into the detail of the two 
case studies and their theoretical background, Table 4.3 summarizes key points of the 
research methodology. Lastly, Table 4.4 shows the overall research timeframe. 
Research Approach 
Ex Post Facto, Ethnographic, 
Exploratory, Explanatory, Ideographic, 
Cross-sectional, Conclusion-oriented 
Ontological orientation Constructionism 
Epistemological orientation Critical Realism 
Research Design  
Cross-Sectional, Embedded Mixed-
methods (Qualitative-Quantitative) 
Interviews Qualitative in-depth, Semi-structured 
Sampling Purposeful / Judgment-based 
Case Studies selection Countries (Instrumental) & People (Exemplifying) 
Issues Considered  
Generalization of results (External Validity), data 
interpretation, subjectivity, language interpretation 
 
 
 
Table 4.3 - Research Methodology Key-points 
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Figure 4.2 - Codification example of People Interviews transcripts (Source: author) 
“[Interpreter] She generally thinks that 
society’s opinion for such a man (long-term 
or permanent Renter) will be that ‘yes, he 
has not succeeded’ or that ‘he has failed’, 
overall. Her opinion is that this is a 
personal choice and that the man believed 
that he wants to live this way.”  (Bulgarian 
Female, Group D1, 06/07/2015) 
 
“[Interpreter] She said that probably here in 
Bulgaria it’s kind of a psychological motive. 
She says that “for me, it’s safer to be in my 
own place” [...]she said ‘for example I do 
not have a problem to rent an apartment 
when I live abroad. If I live abroad and not 
in Bulgaria I will rent an apartment without 
any psychological barrier for me.’ [...]” 
(Bulgarian Female, Group B1, 11/07/2015) 
 
Coding: Renting as social and personal 
'failure' 
Wider implications: Tenure as social 
stigma 
Coding:  societal context affecting personal 
choices on Tenure 
Wider implications: No real freedom of 
choice on Tenure   
Conceptual Junction: Homeownership eventually 
'forced' as the only socially acceptable choice 
“[…] That is how we learned it. Our house 
is the first we can get; that will be left with 
us forever; that will be left to our children. 
We value it as something sacred, like family; 
that’s also what our house being our own is 
[…]” (Greek Male, Group A2, 04/06/2015) 
 
Coding: Housing and Family  
Wider implications: ties between family 
Homeownership 
"[Interpreter] she says that in the Bulgarian 
mentality it is very strongly implanted that 
the person should give a house to his 
children, so he has to have a house to give 
to the children" (Bulgarian Female, Group 
E1, 09/07/2015) 
 
Conceptual Junction: Homeownership 
reinforcing and reinforced by Familialist mentality 
Homeownership rendered prerequisite for social and family success 
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Chapter 5 - Case Studies Selected: Bulgaria and Greece 
 
5.1   Introduction 
This chapter is dedicated to Bulgarian and Greek housing system and welfare, and is 
directly linked and therefore necessary to fully address the research questions. The level 
and distribution of housing welfare (RQ1)  in past eras are not easy to assess directly due to 
lack of statistical data. Information documented in academic work from various sources 
allows to gain some insight on the status and evolution of housing welfare, linking it to the 
modern era. Moreover, relating to RQ2 the sources of housing welfare unveil, along with 
their evolutionary paths and transformations. This is for example the shift from strong state 
provision of housing in early post-War Bulgaria until its total retrenchment by c. 1985. 
Likewise the historical institutionalization of housing familialism in pre-1990s Greece. The 
historical retrospective offers a thorough understanding of institutional interactions and 
dynamics within the state-market-family tri-pole (for RQ3). This is for example the gradual 
shift from self-building to housing self-promotion in the 1990s, as a result of the 
construction and banking sector involvement in the process. Research Question 4 requires 
an elaborate understanding of the social and political systemic elements still active today, 
along with the reasons of their persistence. This could not be possible without the historical 
insight of this chapter. 
From a Research Methodology perspective, even though including certain statistical 
references this chapter offers a rather qualitative reading on past socio-political paths 
regarding housing systems and their evolution. Quantitative issues discussed like housing 
finance are ex post facto discussed and therefore often containing some kind of subjective 
interpretation. The historical retrospective exploration revolves around the search for 
ideographic explanations. Through the literature discussed in this chapter, the research 
gains a longitudinal flavour in the research. 
The reader will recognize I have adopted a different approach for each country. Bulgaria is 
being initially analyzed within its wider socio-political context and housing system 
grouping, while Greece is being focused per se. This is of course related to the two 
countries’ different profile and evolutionary paths. As a former Socialist country, Bulgaria 
103 
 
is usually considered along with its 'cohorts', disregarding its distinguishing characteristics. 
This also due to the fact literature review on Bulgaria is small when compared to the rest of 
the Central and Eastern European countries. To avoid this pitfall, I have chosen to analyze 
only these elements that can be deemed common legacy and shared - therefore interesting - 
gradually moving on to Bulgaria itself. Greece on the contrary, has a comparatively larger 
body of literature to consider, even though the vast majority of it is in Greek and largely left 
without update. In international studies and reports, Greece is usually examined along with 
its southern European 'cohorts'. Again, this often misses the special colouring of the Greek 
housing system, within an overall non-homogeneous grouping. Therefore mentions to the 
wider Southern European groups are made with care and in order to serve as reference 
when necessary and useful. The reader will be able to distinguish a different conceptual 
evolution. I argue that the Bulgarian housing system evolved differently and away from a 
common Communist starting point. Greece formed a housing system with significant 
differentiation from the Southern European group since the early post-War years. Hence, 
even though both countries are positioned in respect to their group, the kind of underlying 
comparison is very much different. 
The last part of this chapter is dedicated to some key characteristics of 'weak' states. 
'Weakness' and 'stateness' issues mainly regard the capacity of the wider official state to 
plan, communicate and implement institutional changes and reforms. The body of theory 
assessed is considered relevant to and examined for both countries as their housing system 
is in considerable need of institutional realignment. 
 
5.2   Bulgarian Housing Welfare within its Context 
5.2.1   Wider Post-Socialist Welfare trends 
Post-socialist states do not present convergence trends towards some ideal-type western 
welfare regime or actual welfare state as was initially believed. The transition to capitalism 
has been deeply influenced (path-dependency) by the pervasive communist past with some 
of the existing institutional structures subject to reconfiguration (Kovacs, 2002; Draxler & 
Van Vliet, 2010; Stephens et al., 2015b). There is significant intra-group differentiation 
with each state showing a different nature of mixed pre-communist (Bismarkian), post-
communist (market-led) and Communist (universalist/corporatist) structural elements 
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(Draxler & Van Vliet, 2010; Aidukaite, 2009). Draxler & Van Vliet (2010) question 
whether the EU new member states constitute a distinct welfare regime or should be place 
somewhere in the middle-spectrum of existing welfare regime types. According to their 
research (hierarchical cluster analysis) EU new member states and Mediterranean group are 
close in social policy terms but regarding socio-political orientation the latter are closer to 
the old member-states.  
Kovacs (2002), argued that despite being 'shrunk' compared to Socialist times, the 
'Communist welfare state' still holds as a 'safety net', and also more generous compared to 
some western welfare systems. This of course regards certain sectors, and Housing is 
generally not the case. Describing the post-socialist Central and Eastern European welfare 
systems, Aidukaite (2009) notes that the state is responsible for protecting people against 
social risks. However, achieving a better standard of living relies solely on family and 
market mechanisms. Welfare risks have been to a significant degree transferred to the 
family, which can be with or without some state support (Stephens et al., 2015b). Aidukaite 
(2009) continues that welfare reform and formation is filtered through bureaucratic 
processes, and subject to global forces and systemic actors interactions. Civil society which 
could affect welfare reform is still weak in CEE area. 
Other non-housing welfare sectors (benefits, social assistance and family policies) 
demonstrate strong variations, except some largely similar evolution of pension schemes. 
Pension sector goes against path-dependency by being affected by internal and external 
restructuring forces. Moreover, it is a policy tool discrete from others, as outcomes are 
direct and imminent, and therefore radical reforms are promoted with priority. In other 
complex policy sectors like housing governments tend to search for optimally mixed 
policies inserting or retaining past Socialist elements (Draxler & Van Vliet, 2010). During 
the transition and modern post-socialist era there was a significant drop in welfare state 
performance also due to the economy’s adjustment to countries’ real capacities (Kovacs, 
2002; Aidukaite, 2009). After the austerity period Central and Eastern European countries 
are expected to develop a socio-political and financial framework where liberal and 
communitarian forces will be clashing - also on an ideological basis (Aidukaite, 2009) - and 
compromising leading to multifaceted agreements. Attempted reforms that western EU 
partners could deem as extreme, will face opposition due to the communist social legacy, 
transformation challenges, a new statist-conservatism and EU integration pressures. 
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Changes should be made with prudence, coordination and patience to evade social upheaval 
in these newly formed sensitive democracies especially amid the GFC, privatizations, and 
EU requirement pressures (Kovacs, 2002). 
Stephens et al. (2015b) argue that the Post-Socialist housing welfare regimes ('by default') 
are experiencing a ‘transformation’ rather than ‘transition’ (convergence) phase. The post-
socialist countries do not present the necessary prerequisites to support the formation of 
housing welfare regimes and clear attributed roles in the state-market-family triangle which 
offers welfare. Settled power structures and collective ideologies are missing. Power 
structures are basic to the Esping-Andersen welfare regimes while collective ideologies 
(privatism and collectivism) gave birth to Kemeny Unitary and Dualist rental market 
systems. The fact that these two approaches led to similar outcomes is an indication of 
western democracies more or less mirroring supporting societal ideologies expressed 
through elections. They continue proposing that post-socialist complexity needs a 
combination of power structure and ideology approaches to be properly explained. Both 
approaches are not internally stable but in a constant flux and also affected by outside 
factors which change with time. For example, Soviet influence has been gradually replaced 
by EU assistance. While Power and Ideology connect they are not always on the same page 
and may as well diverge. Moreover, Power and Ideology are prone to path-dependency as 
they are filtered through pre-existing institutional frameworks and therefore a softening of 
the convergence is more likely to happen without excluding divergence. Post-socialist 
housing welfare systems (by default) operate under a special mix of state legacy welfare, 
high inter-generational support and anti-state welfare (Stephens et al., 2015b). They 
characterize post-socialist countries as ‘Unitary’ systems altering Kemeny typology a bit by 
substituting social and private rental market with private rental market and homeownership 
as the two parts. Greece could be also included in this altered ‘Unitary’ system. 
Remaining sceptical, Hegedus & Teller (2005a) mention an older categorization of Estonia, 
Romania and Slovakia to the Residualist/Homeownership model, Poland and Czech 
Republic to the Dualist/Rental model. There, Bulgaria remains as an 'outlier' (p. 206) due 
to high Home-ownership rates before the transition. Some CEE welfare regimes are a mix 
of other Regimes’ elements. For example Hungary has characteristics of Liberal and 
Rudimentary Regimes bringing it close to how some SE systems tend to evolve, with more 
burdened families and a residual safety net social security (ibid). 
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Kovacs (2002) argues that neither CEE nor Western European countries have welfare 
regime homogeneity among or within them. However, some general trends are common, 
like privatizations, public sector retrenchment, decreased state intervention and developing 
voluntary sectors. CEE and Western Europe harmonization is not to be expected. 
Furthermore, if the CEE truly seeks to reproduce the US capitalist model this will lead them 
to greater incompatibility with the EU not due to their ex-communist elements but due to 
extreme US capitalism. Kovacs (2002) adds that following blindly or copying the rest of 
Europe will lead to unfortunate outcomes in the CEE. These countries have already lagged 
in following European social models and when they catch up it is possible that these 
models will have become obsolete. Moreover, a mindless application of fixed systems and 
mechanisms is bound to failure due to different timing phases and specificity of each 
national context. Lux & Sunega (2014) argue that past western social policies cannot be 
applied whatsoever. 
 
5.2.2   Housing Welfare during Socialism 
Social protection policies were especially elaborate during Socialism, equally to western 
European systems (Aidukaite, 2009). In a heavily state-dominated system of production, 
consumption and allocation with centrally-planned economy, housing was almost 
exclusively about the social right to shelter, and housing as a commodity was clearly 
disregarded if not countered (Norris & Domanski, 2009; Mandic, 2010). Housing was 
generally less significant than industrialization, often leading to housing shortages (Mandic, 
2010) and consequently to primitive informal markets like self-build. State-owned and 
managed stock was eventually left insufficiently maintained and non-upgraded (Stephens et 
al., 2015b). Overall, the Universalist welfare provision system offered low-to-medium 
quality level services. In such a system, eliminated homelessness and unemployment 
rendered individualist social risk burden unnecessary and furthermore absurd in an 
egalitarian ideology context. Canonically public policy was supportive of mass social 
rented housing provision, but it was not always allocated according to need. 
Homeownership was present but subject to heavy limitations in size, number of units per 
person etc., but few exceptions  (Norris & Domanski, 2009; Mandic, 2010). Stephens et al. 
(2015b), note that the absolutely state-dominated welfare provision was also used as a tool 
of social control.  
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Generally speaking, in Socialist housing systems renters had elevated rights and often more 
than Homeowners, while the rental stock of higher profile and quality was reserved for the 
political and social elite (Mandic, 2010; Soaita, 2013; Stephens et al., 2015b). It should be 
noted here that not all countries developed rental sectors in the same manner. Bulgaria and 
Romania for example had extended and dominant homeownership profile and a limited 
public rental sector during Socialism. 
Under Socialism, housing had an extremely limited role as a welfare means, since the 
Universalist welfare provision system rendered it meaningless. As a result housing market 
remained severely underdeveloped, and asset acquisition was heavily controlled by state 
institutions (Mandic, 2010). Norris & Domanski (2009) fit the Eastern European Housing 
Markets
15
 into the dualist system with poor housing standards due to housing system 
inefficiency (central planning, locked state budget, insufficient and unequal supply non-
aligned to people's true needs).  
In the Socialist Regime, tenure was not indicative of the housing system operation. Tenants 
in the rental sector enjoyed enhanced privileges as they had many property rights owners 
had like the right to inherit, change and sell. Additionally in Bulgaria the owner-occupied 
sector property rights were under state control (Hegedus & Teller, 2005a). Differences in 
the Eastern European housing systems evolution has been attributed to different 
institutional settings transmitting state control and the varied way each state reacted to 
cracks and shocks in the system. However, the overall social perception regarding housing 
was distinct from the one in Western Europe (ibid). 
Access to homeownership took place through various mechanisms like inheritance, self-
help construction - especially in countries with abundance of building materials, land and 
informal economy - and cooperatives. However thriving, homeownership never assumed its 
identity as 'private property' during Socialism, mainly due to heavy state control of the 
housing system (Mandic, 2010). Secondary housing in the countryside allowed families’ 
access to housing assets they could benefitting from. On a limited scale material gains were 
extracted through reselling, renting or exchanging them for resources. So housing had a 
limited role as welfare resource allowing to improve the quality of life and occasionally the 
material standing of households (ibid).  
                                                 
15
 Term set by Hegedus & Tosics (1996) as an ideal-type (Hegedus & Teller, 2005b) 
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Focusing on the Czech Republic, Lux & Sunega (2010; 2014) underline the fact housing 
provision was key promise of the socialist regime, which through state control 
decommodified housing until 1990. They also note the 'social housing' term was inexistent 
in the socialist context as housing needs were set by elite specialists and covered by the 
central state, with no outside intervention.  
Despite the common perception of a uniform state-managed system responsible for housing 
production in former communist states, many of them saw this production as a result of 
personal transactions, self-building and hard-currency deals (Lowe, 2003a; 2003b). In 
Bulgaria the state would proceed on creating building shells (low-amenity flats) in order to 
increase quantity leaving the owners to complete the internal part of the properties for 
themselves and through interaction with the housing market (self-building, do-it-yourself 
etc.). Bulgaria is full of mass produced housing (estates) of the communist-era.  
 
 
5.2.3   Post-Socialist housing Evolution 
Numerous researchers have contributed in decoding the welfare and housing mosaic in the 
post-socialist countries. In the present sub-section theoretical key-points are summarized 
and clustered together. Where not cited otherwise, points made are a common place and 
similar in multiple studies, mainly those of Lowe, 2003a, 2003b; Buckley & Tsenkova 
2001, 2003; Hegedus & Tosics, 1998; Tosics & Hegedus, 2003; Roberts, 2003; Elbers & 
Tsenkova, 2003; Hegedus & Struyk, 2005; Hirt, 2005; Tsygankov, 2007; Norris & 
Domanski, 2009; Tsenkova 2007, 2009a, 2009b, 2012; Csizmady, 2011; Smigiel & Brade, 
2011; Mandic & Cirman, 2012; Sýkora & Bouzarovski, 2012. For this sub-section (6.2.3) 
only paragraphs starting and ending with the ~ symbol refer to the aggregate of the 
aforementioned authors, regardless of the additional references linked to specific 
arguments. 
In the post-socialist political environment shift in housing policy and consequently to 
housing systems, was central to serve democratization needs. Mass and rapid privatization 
of housing assets was one of the means to reach and develop housing markets (Gruis et al. 
2009; Lux & Sunega, 2014). Even in countries where housing privatization was not 
significant like Bulgaria, changes in property rights and market regulation led to housing 
system transformation - albeit not in tenure composition. During the transition phase a 
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number of deep and radical changes took place regarding affecting both the welfare state 
and the housing system of post-Communist countries. Perhaps the most crucial element 
during the first years of transition was the evident power and institutional vacuum during 
the first period (Stephens et al., 2015b). On a welfare level,  Collectivist structure and 
ideology gave way to Individualist provision, exposing society to a number of risks like 
unemployment, weaker pension schemes. Social security safety nets were late to be 
established (Mandic, 2010). 
Regarding housing, massive privatizations in a 'give-away' fashion along with restitution of 
property taken by the state during Communism, drove homeownership rates to 
unprecedented heights. Countries like Bulgaria with already extended homeownership 
during Socialism became 'super-homeownership' states (Norris & Domanski, 2009; 
Mandic, 2010; Fahey & Norris, 2011). The state rolled back its housing services and 
withdrew from the provision of new units, to unburden the state budget (Mandic, 2010). 
Mandic (ibid.) highlights that privatizations and restitutions led to massive wealth 
redistribution, but in unequal manner, with many citizens becoming disproportionally rich. 
This system became popular and to a significant degree kick-started the post-socialist 
capitalist mechanisms passing through privately-owned housing property. Personal wealth 
became the central social value and housing started to assume an increasing significance as 
an investment asset (ibid). Privatizations - along with restitutions in some countries - was a 
way to enrich people - albeit unequally - but also a socially acceptable means for the state 
to get rid of housing responsibilities. 
The transitional post-communist era saw CEE countries following different reforming and 
restructuring paths of their public policy mechanisms and institutional configurations 
(Aidukaite, 2009), also leading to new societal realities and meanings for housing. Housing 
however followed a path with many similarities (Mandic, 2010). Homeownership is a 
crucial and dominant – varying though – element in the Central and Eastern European 
context and in some countries (South-Eastern European) rates exceed even the Southern 
European group (Mandic, 2010). Drawing from Hungarian context, Hegedus & Szemzo 
(2015) noted the exposure to mortgage loans post-2000 turned into a financial liability 
during the global financial crisis. Even its investment dynamic has been challenged, 
housing persists as inter-generational fail-safe backup, central to households strategies. 
Nevertheless, accurately estimating asset value is often problematic.  
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On the positive side extended homeownership may be able to provide some access to 
enclosed wealth and serve as a welfare resource to counter an insufficient welfare system. 
However, younger people are now unable to access homeownership and rely on familialist 
resources, which may not suffice as wealth reallocation post-1990 was uneven. While some 
owners became enriched, for many others this shift was unprofitable and overburdened 
them with housing maintenance and upgrade costs. This was even more the case with 
housing constructed during Socialism (Mandic, 2010).  
Stephens et al. (2015b) underline the fact that the state is the ultimate welfare source 
leaving a 'state legacy welfare' behind, in the form of outright (debt-free) homeownership. 
In the post-Socialist era housing welfare gap needs to be filled through familialist structures 
and mechanisms like inter-generational transfers and self-help housing. Post-Socialist 
homeownership pretty much reproduced Socialist-era inequalities. Extended outright 
owner-occupation deters the development of mature housing markets (ibid). Stephens et al. 
(2015a) argue that outright low-cost homeownership functioned as a hedge against income 
precarity in the wider south-eastern context, by moderating its impact on housing quality. 
Housing assets’ potential as welfare (re)source renders them of gradually higher importance 
in a Post-socialist region presenting similar pressures with the Western European countries 
in terms of demographics (ageing) and a retreating public sector. Nevertheless, housing is 
intertwined in a multifaceted complex depending on societal and cultural unique context in 
each country. Apart from the embedded capital to use as welfare, housing can be the carrier 
of other kinds of welfare which depend on specific social circumstances in the Post-
socialist countries (Mandic, 2010). Housing still plays a crucial role not only on welfare but 
also in socio-political and financial realities (Stephens et al., 2015b). 
In Post-Socialist countries privatization, restitution and self-help housing distorted the link 
between income levels and tenure type and quality. The ability for households to store, 
maintain and use the housing-embedded wealth is under question and in no way ensured. 
The potential has to be examined in relation to asset quality and quantity along with overall 
income capacity to cover up for the maintenance costs. Intra-group differences can be 
observed with the CEE sub-group being in better condition than the NEE and SEE ones 
(Mandic, 2010). 
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Housing Stock and Market Issues  
~ Originally, construction quality of housing during Socialism was of poor standard. the 
majority of people today are housed within these high-rise housing blocks, having to deal 
with all relevant issues of quality like maintenance and upgrade, size etc. Due to financial 
hardship, people are unable to properly maintain their owned assets eventually leading to 
their depreciation (add. Mandic, 2010). The private rented sector is in most cases 
underdeveloped  and the rental market immature, mostly consisting of incidental-landlords 
as a source of emergency income, rather than institutions or companies (add. Lowe, 2003). 
Newly-built units are fairly expensive to the average citizen leading to extended vacancies. 
At the same time the private construction sector attempting to emerge in a very segmented 
fashion post-1990 but failed to grow mainly by failing to secure proper financing (add. 
Pichler-Milanovich, 2001). This further hindered the renewal of the housing stock as well 
as the upgrade of the Socialist stock (add. Hegedus & Tosics, 1998). ~ 
~ Housing finance at both an individual and institutional level is problematic. Families have 
little confidence or access to means unlocking their property's financial potential or use it to 
move up the market improving their living conditions (Buckley & Tsenkova, 2001). An 
additional reason for that is the communist system inherited these countries with a number 
of problems not only regarding the physical state of the assets, but also income difficulties 
(Tsenkova, 2007; Mandic & Cirman, 2012) and corruption legacy (Lovell, 2005; 
Spendzharova & Vachudova, 2012). In generally underdeveloped housing and land finance 
markets, affordable and properly regulated mortgage market is absent, affecting and being 
affected by the low paying capacity of the population (Stephens, 2005b; Tsenkova, 2007). ~ 
 
Housing management responsibilities along with asset stock were transferred to local 
authorities (decentralization) however with extremely lacking resources for maintenance 
and with no legal obligation to maintenance and manage of these assets whatsoever (Tosics 
and Hegedus, 2003; Elbers & Tsenkova, 2003). Local authorities are now craving for 
solutions in order to get this liability of their backs mainly turning their eyes on foreign 
capital investment (Sýkora & Bouzarovski, 2012) in many cases without paying any special 
attention to the projects proposed (e.g. gated-disconnected communities in urban areas) and 
their wider consequences (Csizmady, 2011; Smigiel & Brade, 2011; Sýkora & 
Bouzarovski, 2012). The mass produced housing (estates) of the communist-era (Mandic & 
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Cirman, 2012) pose as a serious socioeconomic challenge. Bringing this stock up-to-date is 
in some cases extremely difficult if not impossible from a financial perspective.  
Expanded illegal/informal housing (e.g. self-help) has also to do with high construction tax 
burdens and insufficient financing (Tosics & Hegedus, 2003). There are now ongoing 
efforts to gradually legalize illegal housing while in parallel upgrade the statutory 
development regulation used to regularize and upgrade them (Tsenkova 2009b, 2012). The 
informal settlements in most cases came as a solution to insufficient urban affordable 
housing for the poor despite the urban planning and management problems. In tourist 
regions usually this does not concern covering basic housing needs, but second homes used 
for recreation, and is often linked to speculative investment (ibid). Infrastructure problems 
remain strong in these areas. Significant number of people are abandoning poor 
underdeveloped mainly rural areas leaving behind a surplus of badly maintained housing 
stock with lacking surrounding infrastructure (Elbers & Tsenkova, 2003; Mandic & 
Cirman, 2012). There is a general contradiction between the lagging countryside with its 
underdeveloped infrastructure and the promoted urban areas (Mykhnenko & Turok, 2008). 
However, during the last years a de-urbanization has been noted in the Eastern European 
cities with major inner-city deterioration effects (Mykhnenko & Turok, 2008; Csizmady, 
2011; Smigiel & Brade, 2011; Sýkora & Bouzarovski, 2012) mainly concerning poor areas.  
 
Post-Socialist Housing Policy and Affordability 
~ Affordability of the post-socialist housing units is a central issue in the wider area. 
Housing expenses rise as Socialist housing becomes older, while incomes are not rising 
adequately enough to cover the cost. Of course there are differences between countries of 
the Eastern group, but overall affordability is dropping as utility costs and property taxes 
gradually rise since the withdrawal of the state in housing welfare (add. Mandic, 2010). 
Affordability is an even bigger issue in urban areas (add. Pichler-Milanovich, 2001; 
Tsenkova 2009b, 2012). ~ 
Homeownership is being further boosted also as the counter-effect of failing social housing 
policies. Lux & Sunega (2014) analyzed the phenomenon attributing it mainly to the 
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‘privatization trap’, ‘decentralization paradox’, informal economy16 and a strong socialist 
legacy in housing policies, among others
17
. 'Privatization trap' has to do with the fact of 
social housing being built and immediately privatized due to socio-political pressure. 
'Decentralization trap' regards transferring housing responsibilities from the central state to 
local authorities, while the latter are financially and politically weak to tackle such issues. 
~ As a key observation, housing policy post-1990 has been widely neglected, with the state 
evidently disregarding structured and consistent policy-making in the housing sector. 
Various kinds of financial turbulence in post-socialist countries led to public expenditure 
cuts for housing. Housing functioned as a socio-political 'shock-absorber' during the 
transition years, which however has been overlooked by numerous governments. Housing 
subsidies have serious issues of efficiency (targeting) and accountability (opaque forms), 
failing to balance with increasing maintenance costs (add. Buckley & Tsenkova, 2001; 
Tosics & Hegedus, 2003). Modern housing policy fails to consider structural and 
contextual systemic particularities of each country (Tsenkova, 2003; Tsygankov, 2007), 
operating experimentally and being remedial in form, rather than forward-planning. In this 
new framework policy-making is subject to public and private sector influences. ~ 
Apart from chaotic mass-privatizations and state withdrawal from housing, there was also 
no effort to support the development of proper culture and mechanisms, able to serve a 
liquid housing market (Stephens et al., 2015b). National housing policies are weak, poorly 
planned and lead by the old state-dominated regime actors (Elbers & Tsenkova, 2003; 
Bojkov, 2004; Smigiel & Brade, 2011; Sýkora & Bouzarovski, 2012). The communist 
system has left its mark on the planning, political and administrative system (Tsenkova, 
2007). The old - still present - extremely centralized-technocratic approach of the 
communist era now appears unable to tackle with contemporary urban planning and social 
issues where a different number of public, civic and private players-actors (Hirt, 2005). The 
treading on admittedly limited, socialist paths is directed by the will and need to have a 
socially peaceful manifold transition era (Sýkora & Bouzarovski, 2012). Apart from that, 
neo-liberal laissez-faire market practices are seen as the solution. Aidukaite (2009) locates 
and ‘ideological conflict’ between (partisan) leftist politics trying to hold back right-wing 
ones pressuring for public expenses reduction in the new CEE welfare states (also Careja & 
                                                 
16
 Shadow economy makes social and housing needs estimates doubtful being based on declared incomes 
17
 Lack of public finance resources and failure of not-for-profit schemes 
114 
 
Emmenegger, 2009). Continuing on a power-resource approach he notes that CEE parties 
are more fragmented then their western European counterparts with their political 
(ideology) boundaries blurred (ibid). Especially the left post-communist parties have failed 
to gain ground despite their acquired momentum in resources from the communist era, 
having to do with their identification with the ‘sinful’ past and the consequent lacking trust. 
All post-communist newly formed parties hardly made social policy central to their agendas 
(Aidukaite, 2009). 
 
5.3   Evolution of the Bulgarian Housing System 
5.3.1   Housing System during Socialism 
Even during Socialism homeownership became the dominant housing tenure (Hirt & 
Stanilov, 2007; Haffner & Elsinga, 2015), proving Bulgaria had a different housing system 
(UNECE, 2005). Most mass-housing estate flats were built-to-sell between 1960 and 1989 
through state organization, to accommodate rapid industrialization and rural to urban 
migration (UNECE, 2005; TenLaw, Bulgaria). By 1970 the Socialist financial system had 
severe issues in providing decent affordable housing, which led to a partial controlled 
liberalization of the market. This gave room to private sector to make  arrangements for 
their own housing needs, albeit under strict state control (Illieva, 2003; Hirt & Stanilov, 
2007). At the same time the development of the private rental sector was countered through 
bureaucratic restrictions. Homeownership rates went over 80% from 1960 to 1980 (Hirt, 
2012), while overall financial reforms started before 1989 in Bulgaria (Lux & Sunega, 
2010). 
Local authorities were responsible for the allocation of state-constructed housing, which 
was however characterized by extended waiting lists due to slow production rates. Citizens 
had no choice regarding the size, quality and location of the allocated dwelling (Tsenkova, 
2009c). Apart from self-help housing which remained a legitimate mode, state-constructed 
mass-housing panel blocks were of initially low quality. Along with an allocation system 
favouring overcrowding especially in urban areas, housing quality soon became a matter of 
social dissatisfaction (ibid., Hirt & Stanilov, 2007; Hirt, 2012). Tsenkova (2009c) argues 
that the low effectiveness of the Socialist state, along with restriction of the private sector 
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forces households towards alternative methods of housing provision through familialism 
and self-help which eventually raised housing costs. 
Hegedus & Teller (2005a) argue that despite high homeownership rates during Socialism, 
property rights in Bulgaria were centrally controlled and limited, therefore without 
significant difference in practice. Tsenkova (2009c) notes that despite privately owned land 
on which self-help housing was constructed, market restrictions rendered land value 
effectively inexistent. If and when prices where attributed this was defined by the state 
regardless of location, available services etc. (ibid.). 
Apart from a commitment to provide decent housing, Socialist Regime used housing as a 
form of wage supplement, and often as a political reward for the elite (Tsenkova, 2009c; 
TenLaw, Bulgaria). Housing was of major importance in terms of political and financial 
routing (ibid.). The Socialist Regime managed to largely cover housing needs in terms of 
quantity, rendering most people debt-free homeowners. Following Delfani et al. (2014), 
combined outright homeownership along with the regulative protection of tenants, pre-1990 
housing can be argued having become almost completely decommodified. 
 
5.3.2   Housing System post-1990 
Housing policy in the post-Socialist era has been marked by its pronounced absence 
(Tsenkova, 2009c), with some hesitant steps during the last decade. Post-1990 small-scale 
private construction sector emerged significantly fragmented, while the housing 
construction severely dropped post-Socialism (Tsenkova, 2009c). With the radical 
retrenchment of the state from housing policy, and the liberalization of the market, housing 
became gradually commodified (Tsenkova & Polanska, 2014). At the same time the poor 
condition of the stock and failure to establish regulative framework regarding the 
maintenance of the mass-housing estates, led to a gradual loss of the market value of the 
socialist-era housing assets (Tsenkova, 2008). Currently there is an ongoing debate 
regarding the percentage of the socialist housing stock worth keeping and upgrading. In 
Sofia this regards less than half of the stock, although opinions differ between interest 
groups (Dandolova, 2014). In terms of housing sufficiency and availability, stock volume 
numbers cannot be considered automatically reliable. Tsenkova (2009c) underlines the fact 
of including holiday, secondary and substandard homes without distinction, making 
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estimation of effective housing availability debatable. Tsenkova (ibid.) analysis indicates 
that vacant houses cannot be included in housing availability estimates as often referring to 
assets unsuitable as permanent residence or in rural areas of low demand. The overall issue 
of housing vacancies is crucial as almost one third of the stock is uninhabited (TenLaw, 
Bulgaria; World Bank, 2017), and also related to strong outward migration trends and 
rapidly shrinking demographics. Applying Delfani et al. (2014) analysis, Bulgarian housing 
can be argued as 'precommodified' with familialist housing strategies, dominant outright 
homeownership and low investment aspirations. 
Despite a common socialist legacy, housing systems in the post-socialist cluster are not one 
and the same. Tsenkova (2009c) expects housing policies and systems in the area to diverge 
both from the Socialist cluster as well as the western housing systems. Albeit the common 
element of strict central planning of social and economic development during Socialism, 
different institutional configurations and combination of state and market forces within 
each country, created a distinct housing system (ibid.). For example in Socialist Bulgaria, 
strict rental controls kept prices affordable but forced the creation of undeclared rental 
market (TenLaw, Bulgaria). Such structures still affect policy-making and market 
functioning in the area due to path-dependency (Hirt, 2005; Tsenkova, 2009c). 
Contrasting to the absent housing policy, there is a very present housing stock legacy from 
the Socialist past. Almost half of the housing stock in Sofia regards high-rise multi-family 
panel housing of high densities (Tsenkova, 2007 to 2008). More than two thirds of the 
Sofia population resides in Socialist housing estates (Hirt & Stanilov, 2007). Most 
pronounced issues regard the poor condition and age of the socialist housing blocks, along 
with overcrowding issues (TenLaw, Bulgaria).  
The socialist legacy of large housing estates is not only visually imposing affecting urban 
forms, but strongly affects the evolution of the housing system and transformations of the 
society (Dandolova, 2014).  Extended inter-generational cohabitation and overcrowding 
during Socialism, led to long-lasting societal trends which transcended the post-socialist 
transition phase, like familialism. Under the burden of lacking housing policy, 
underdeveloped financial and housing markets and with severe stock quality issues, the 
post-1990 family undertook the responsibility to provide its members with housing, 
hopefully adequate. 
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Privatizations in Bulgaria post-1990 were insignificant as the public-owned stock was 
extremely limited (Hirt, 2012). Likewise restitution of residential assets was extremely 
limited; less than 0.5% of the total housing stock was restituted by end-1994, and most of it 
was public-owned (UNECE, 1996). This element along with high rates of homeownership 
pre-1990 and large stock of second homes, indicate Bulgarian housing system differed from 
the wider eastern European cluster (Hegedus & Teller, 2005b; UNECE, 2005). Tsenkova 
(2009c) notes Bulgaria started diverging from the socialist housing model since 1970. 
As Bulgaria had no stock to privatize post-1989 (Hegedus & Teller, 2005b), what happened 
was a 'reinterpretation of tenure' (ibid, p. 26), where homeownership (along with the 
family) became the shock absorber of post-1990 socio-political conflicts, within a shrinking 
welfare state (Hegedus & Teller, 2005a). Despite the large number of housing units in SEE 
countries this did not contribute significantly in the transition as their volume was 
inconsistent with the size and relevant needs of the households, leading to overcrowding 
issues (Tosics & Hegedus, 2003). Today, outright homeownership prevails as mortgage 
loan exposure and the rental sector remain extremely limited. Although housing costs have 
significantly increased and their payment mostly relies on employment stability and wages 
levels, familialist transfer of outright owned housing units, somehow protects housing from 
full market exposure. Of course this comes at a cost as cohabitation is high and related to 
serious socio-financial repercussions. In Bulgaria housing shortage does not appear to be 
the prevailing issue, but this may also be more due to demographic degradation, than 
anything else. Unfit homeownership housing levels in CEE are close to those in SE with 
SEE sub-group being in a far worse condition (add. Mandic, 2010).  
Housing market in Bulgaria has been developed in an unstable and segmented manner 
regarding its performance. Perplexed and opaque systemic configurations and non-
modernized administrative functioning, along with political and financial instability weaken 
investor confidence (Buckley & Tsenkova, 2003; Tosics & Hegedus, 2003; Sýkora & 
Bouzarovski, 2012). During the post-socialist years the state failed to promote private 
financing by establishing mature legal and financial structures (Buckley & Tsenkova, 
2001). Direct cuts on housing subsidies in Bulgaria lead to housing construction crisis with 
the state withdrawing and the private sector remaining weak due to financing issues and 
additional infrastructure cost burden imposed by the state (Elbers & Tsenkova, 2003; 
Tsenkova, 2007; Sendi, 2011). 
118 
 
5.3.3   Residential Capitalism and institutional configuration 
Bulgaria is a new EU member-state and still considered as under transition from a Socialist 
past. Jackson & Deeg (2012) argue that capitalism in Central and Eastern European 
countries is something new and so it is difficult to fit on the existing typologies (also 
Crouch et al. 2009; Psychogios et al. 2013). They are defined as Dependent Market 
Economies and their evolutions is characterized by Foreign Direct Investment and Multi-
National Companies (MNCs) seeking cheap-labour. Myant & Drahokoupil (2012) make a 
distinction of CEE capitalisms as: FDI - based, Peripheral, Oligarchic, Statist, 
Remittance/aid-based (also Becker, 2013). Schmidt (2007) talks about a hybrid market type 
in Eastern Europe somewhere along the CME/LME
18
 extremes. Farkas (2011) positions 
Bulgaria in the Baltic states sub-group of the new member states' cluster. Bulgaria is being 
presented as having the following characteristics among others; dominant FDI to make up 
for weak internal capital, income inequalities, strong state control, administrative burdens, 
low taxation, issues with market openness, underdeveloped financial market, flexible 
labour market and low social protection. Myant & Drahokoupil (2012) ended up to similar 
conclusions. Ost (2000) included Bulgaria within the Eastern European cluster, by being 
characterized by 'illusory Corporatism' where the new (in form) but otherwise old systemic 
elite networks, marginalize the labour force through process of typical tripartite
19
 
bargaining, without concluding to any binding agreements whatsoever. This way neo-
liberalism is established by being socio-politically legitimized, while weakening labour 
force voice. According to Schwartz and Seabrooke (2008) analysis VoRC Bulgaria fits the 
familial-type profile with high rates of homeownership, owner-occupation and ~ 60.75% 
negative deviation from the EU-27 mortgage debt to GDP ratio (Hypostat, 2013).  
 
Institutional particularities 
As a Post-Soviet/ex-communist country Bulgaria is characterized by an amalgam of 
persisting organizations attached to older ways and modern ones following westernized 
approaches (Psychogios et al. 2013). Different political and socio-economical spheres 
present differentiated composition and structure. Serious inequality, clientelism & 
corruption issues combined with the GFC burden and the transitional phase, severely 
                                                 
18
 Coordinated-market Economies and Liberal-market Economies 
19
 Between the state, trade unions and employers 
119 
 
obstructs Bulgarian institutional reforming (Farkas, 2010; Grimalda et al. 2010). 
Multinational Companies have a strong presence bearing westernized ways likely to affect 
the Bulgarian context regarding institutional change while being affected by it in an effort 
to adapt to the national mentality (Psychogios, 2013). According to Morgan's (2009) 
typology, while not exactly fitting somewhere, Bulgaria presents some characteristics of the 
Developmental and Liberal state. More specifically, partisan protective politics, dichotomy 
between the 'old ways' and the 'modern' ones outline the former. In parallel, flexible labour 
market links to the latter. Multinational Companies as an important and strongly present 
player will affect institutions but probably towards divergence. 
 
5.4   Greek Housing Welfare within its Context 
5.4.1   Welfare Regime and State 
During the years, many authors verified the distinct character of Southern European group 
of countries (ind. Allen, 2004; Bonvalet et al. 2009; Fahey & Norris, 2011). On the Esping-
Andersen welfare regimes typology SE countries constitute and fit in the Mediterranean 
Regime. Regarding their housing systems SE countries strongly differ due to varied 
historical evolutionary paths, institutional configurations, meanings, objectives and 
regarding the welfare system and state, when compared to wider groupings. Intra-group 
variations are observed despite some strong common elements. High homeownership – 
often a strong characteristic linked to SE systems – is also present in other European 
countries. In some of them like the Southeastern European groups even higher rates can be 
observed, with however a significant differentiation regarding the historical path, provision 
methods and overall housing system formation.  
Regressive taxation, imbalanced structural development, biased (high public) pension 
schemes boost against non-pension transfers, high shadow/underground economy, 
clientelism – all typical characteristics of the Southern European profile – are present 
(Petmesidou, 2013). Attempting to classify SE welfare regimes it could be argued that 
income maintenance falls closer to the Conservative-corporatist type, while lacking the 
respective level of labour decommodification. The latter is strongly affected by the clash of 
conservative and liberal forces. Housing welfare regimes in SE are a different story though, 
with the four countries forming a distinct group (Allen, 2006). Recent changes under the 
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GFC and SE countries sovereign debts have pushed things toward privatization of public 
organizations and health care, and weakening of pension schemes, moving the welfare 
regime towards liberal, with the form and scale of the ‘Safety net’ still being contested and 
negotiated. It is true that the still ongoing Greek sovereign debt crisis has altered the socio-
political and financial landscape. This was mainly due to a radical cut in public expenses 
and an austerity-driven state mechanism reconfiguration. Missing the previous decades' 
financial resources rent-seeking and clientelistic practices/arrangements cannot be fuelled, 
leaving public and private actors in a new bargaining environment where state resources 
have a far smaller role and cease being an incentive. Moreover, family/household finances 
have for many years been based on public (secure) sector employment anchoring. At least 
one family member had to be in the public sector to ensure a level of security in family’s 
welfare. With the new developments and a drastically reduced public sector where older 
public servants are sacked and young people have no chance of entering, the old ‘Social 
Contract’ is critically unstable. Changes in ‘terms’ will lead to new demands, negotiations 
and coalitions. A strong example is the tolerance for public sector opacity as a key element 
of the old ‘self-sustaining’ system which is now seriously targeted. Support for a strong 
welfare state persists and egalitarian ideology clearly prevails despite the perception of an 
actually imbalanced society (Fereira, 2009). Even more, citizens’ demand for welfare 
provision are now rising (Petmesidou, 2013) leading a ‘weak’ Greek state baffled and 
overloaded. 
The role of the family in welfare provision (housing, health care, child care, financial aid, 
food etc.) is still dominant as the socio-economical conditions have not allowed any 
changes. What has changed is the financial capacity of existing families (extended network) 
to support young members and the subsequent hesitance and drop in new families’ 
formation. A new cadre of combined high youth unemployment, immature financial 
markets, ‘weak states’, social insecurity, increased real estate property taxation etc. is 
bound to deeply affect new and existing families resources, formation and overall welfare 
capacity. These new developments are expected to have dire effects on new families. 
Young people having the ‘benefit’ of parental aid will be bound for an extended period to 
the parental home obliged to give up on their dreams and personal aspirations. Those 
without the means to parental aid will be left social excluded (Gkartzios, 2013). 
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Homeownership constitutes a key element in family-led welfare self-provision both as an 
investment but most significantly as a service (accommodation). Moreover, the house is a 
hub of family-provided welfare (elderly and child care, financial aid, food etc.). according 
to Hoekstra (2005) homeownership in Greece and the rest of the SE truly yields to the 
‘trade-off’ thesis (Hoekstra, 2005) albeit with serious doubts and debatable arguments on 
the voluntary nature of this situation. In SE the family-owned house is central to state-
market-family mixed welfare provision. Family self-provision of welfare through assets is 
highly exposed and hit but financial crises (Roland & Doling, 2010). Supporting housing 
and/or family policies were at best weak even before the GFC despite the family being the 
main welfare pole (Petmesidou, 2013). 
State’s social support was restricted to homeownership promotion in a mostly passive 
fashion while a social rented sector has never been present or supported. Social housing and 
policy are generally weakly financed by the SE states (Gibb, 2002). In Greece, The recently 
abolished Organization of Workers Home was the sole provider of housing with resources 
built by through workers income contribution. Homeownership was passed to beneficiaries 
through favourable repayment options and terms. State’s role was limited to providing the 
regulatory framework for these people along with a highly segmented and therefore 
doubted taxation policy. Even recently delivered housing units – while being of high 
standards – lack basic infrastructure support clearly demonstrating state negligence. For 
self-provision of housing state role was characterized by segmented favourable taxation, 
non-implementation of regulation for illegal/informal housing and general tolerance for 
shadow economy. This was a part of a wider socio-political philosophy that served its 
clientelistic purposes stemming from but also nurturing a socio-political ideology in 
vicious-cycle fashion where home ownership-occupation was a basic element – if not a 
prerequisite. Canonically, establishing a home through house-ownership is something 
sacred for the Greek society and therefore is not strange that any attempts to financially or 
otherwise offend such a property face serious opposition.  
Ronald (2007) says that in familialist societies where family has the first – if not the only – 
role an individualistic ideology may be apparent but not true, and solely based on market 
and individual consumption in housing. In fact a collectivist societal orientation may be 
observed. Ronald’s study considered East-Asia but this point can be made also for Greece 
and supported by the increased demand for a wider welfare state mentioned earlier. 
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Considering welfare state weakness in SE countries, homeownership is in fact a reasonable 
choice also for future risk-avoidance. However, housing market volatile nature seriously 
exposes families to financial hardship in absence of a welfare safety net in times of 
housing-property market bust (Ronald, 2007; Malpass, 2008). Under these considerations it 
is deeply debatable whether homeownership is a result of societal aspirations leading to a 
voluntary ‘trade-off’ or the result of social ‘survival’ instincts due to an historically weak 
and untrustworthy welfare state. 
Allen (2006) notes that homeownership was also a result of an agricultural collapse and 
subsequent non industrialization-led urbanization where people carried rural home-
ownership habits/traditions. This should not be regarded as a tacit acceptance of a ‘trade-
off’ between homeownership and a developed welfare state. It can be understood as an 
existing homeownership momentum not having a viable (rental) alternative and trying to 
adapt to the an open and unplanned urban landscape. Welfare state aspirations were 
‘quenched’ through clientelistic and rent-seeking ‘gifts’ leading to an unsustainable socio-
political and eventually financial dead-end. Petmesidou (2013) notes the current financial 
crisis constitutes an historical turning point for the Greek and Southern European social 
welfare. However, a Universalist welfare system can hardly be expected as the neo-liberal 
forces combined with heavy austerity measures and an incapacitated middle-class, which 
could theoretically press towards such a direction, seem to dominate the political and 
financial scene. This is similar in the rest of Southern Europe  (Arbaci, 2008). 
 
5.4.2   Housing Market, Finance and Provision 
Considering housing market, capital flow is weak and generally underdeveloped with most 
of the burden falling on the shoulders of families/households to secure the financial 
resources for housing acquisition
20
.  Self-build, intra-family support and 
inheritance/heritage are central to new families securing the much needed Home-
ownership. Mortgages are limited in size and number. In the Southern European context 
investment (capital) and service (accommodation) functions are familialised due to the 
mortgage market insufficiency and a group of socially non-supportive governments (Norris 
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 Late urbanization, little housing stock damage during the WWII, agrarian/home-owner past, aversion for ‘communist’ routes, 
late or no industrialization, agrarian-driven urbanization among other led to a minimal need for Social rented sector and a 
different historical path from Northern Europe (Allen, 2006) 
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& Domanski, 2009; Fahey & Norris, 2011). Market investment expansion in some SE 
countries has exerted a shrinking force on family-led housing solutions. Nevertheless, 
Greece along with Italy does not follow this trend for the moment (Norris & Domanski, 
2009). 
Regarding housing as an investment tool (capital) situation in Greece is a bit confusing as 
the distinction between housing as a service (accommodation) and as a wealth 
accumulation vehicle is a bit blurred. Many households/families – especially in past 
decades – opted for investing in their own house primarily to secure accommodation but 
also as a money saving tool. This was also and especially the case with shadow economy 
profits being siphoned to – mainly informal/illegal – housing. With time housing assets 
become more and more inflexible as capital due to many reasons. Sentimental ties with 
patrimony, problems in disposing of or normalizing informal housing, housing market 
volatility and uneven demand, General mentality of residential immobility are some of the 
named reasons. In reality housing assets – even secondary ones – have ended up being part 
of a wide asset-rich income-poor property serving mainly accommodation needs including 
leisure ones. Despite the fact that until recently housing has been considered a property 
element not-to-be-touched unless it was for a serious welfare issue or a trade-up, the 
situation has started to gradually change. Heavy direct and indirect real estate taxation, 
rolling back of Home-ownership tax and other benefits, income hardship and an unfriendly 
urban built environment have affected widespread home-ownership perspectives of the 
Greeks. Most people have now started looking for ways to release their assets’ equity 
entering a more business-like mentality. Now lost investment opportunities and unused 
(housing) assets are conceived as an income loss rather than ‘a possible backup’. 
Nevertheless, it is hard to say whether this change of heart will eventually pay-off as for the 
time being real estate sector in Greece is in a deep slumber and those liquidating are subject 
to significant loss compared to the past inflated asset prices. The past situation is in 
agreement with Fahey & Norris’ (2011) view on home-ownership inefficiencies linked to 
asset underuse (larger secondary/tertiary), leading to asset-rich and income-poor 
households losing potential profit. Van Gent’s (2010) study on Spain has demonstrated the 
family asset-based welfare limits regarding housing market profit and conflicts with an 
inclusionary social policy based on accessibility and affordability. 
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5.4.3   Tenure Structure and Housing Conditions 
Home-ownership is the dominant tenure in Southern Europe and is not expected to change 
as once countries have gone down this path it is hard to turn back (Doling & Horsewood, 
2005). In Greece social rented sector is almost non-existent and the private rented sector is 
considered to be a residual and temporary solution. Owned-houses’ spatial dispersion is 
almost equally divided between detached single-family houses and apartments. The vast 
majority of the former are owned rather than rented in South European countries. In 
contrast to the rest of EU in Greece, Portugal, Spain and Belgium the condition of the 
apartments is better than those in single-family detached houses (Hoesktra, 2005). This may 
be a result of high ownership of apartments and consequent better maintenance. Size does 
not significantly differ between the two unlike the rest of EU where single-family houses 
are larger. Moving from there, user housing condition satisfaction is higher in apartment-
users. The avoidance of detached housing can be attributed to a number of other factors like 
underdevelopment of the rural areas regarding employment, networks, infrastructure 
welfare etc. (Hoekstra, 2005). However, Hoekstra’s statistical data are somewhat old. Back 
then he wondered whether South European recent sub-urbanization will lead to preference 
for detached single-family dwellings, also pondering on lagging urbanization and 
industrialization factors Donnison in his convergence theories had presented (section 2.6). 
Well, the now recent changes surely support a high expectance for counter-urbanization. 
May the reasons not fit the Donnison convergence theory and may such a convergence 
never come regarding de-urbanization, but GFC and the Greek sovereign debt crisis have 
kick-started a counter-urbanization wave which is expected to grow (Gkartzios, 2013). 
As the Greek urban areas are heavily hit by unemployment and general market 
deterioration under the non-protection of a ‘weak/ghost’ welfare state, people are expected 
to flee the metropolitan areas and search alternatives in the periphery and rural areas. This 
is supported by the extended family network links to the rural/suburban areas and the 
family-led welfare possibilities they carry (Gkartzios, 2013). Moreover, the existence of 
secondary or even tertiary housing owned in these areas
21
 - as an asset going to waste - 
make such a decision easier or in some cases motivated it as housing costs are now far 
elevated and income radically reduced or inexistent. Such a movement may be slowed 
down by the Greek housing market recession rending the equity release of the urban assets 
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far more difficult and unprofitable. In no case should this counter-urbanization movement 
be considered an outcome of a wide-spread pro-rural mentality shift or necessarily a 
voluntary choice whatsoever. Often it is not even related to a return in an agricultural way 
of life (Gkartzios, 2013). It is more the result of seeking for a viable socio-economical 
adaptation to the new-age requirements have a lot to do with potential opportunities away 
from the city and a clear insufficiency of the current welfare state services which are also 
expected to decrease or weaken. Gkartzios (2013) concludes that such a trend should be 
examined as a significant one in the familialist South European context. 
Norris & Domanski (2009) note that the housing outcomes in Greece, UK and some of the 
EU new member states are below the expected quality given the proportion of GDP going 
to public spending
22
. Public spending is mix of direct involvement or subsidies to third 
parties for provision and costs for construction and building standards regulations. In the 
eastern European housing market and SE groups, countries fitting the Dualist model 
outcomes regarding tenants are low (Norris & Domanski, 2009). However, Greece does not 
fit this model as social rental sector is practically inexistent.  
Meagre social housing sectors in Southern Europe (Hoekstra, 2005) hinder any effort to 
improve housing conditions. State private rent control drives things to a worse direction as 
landlords are tempted to run-down their assets rather than maintaining or even improving 
them (Norris & Domanski, 2009). In general, the South European social sector is linked to 
social exclusion and socio-spatially stigmatized as a result of dominant home owner-
occupation also linked to wider socio-spatial segregation and exclusion issues. The rental 
system in SE follows fits the Dualist model with residualised social rented sector – where 
existent – and promoted home-ownership (Arbaci, 2008). Allen (2006) attributed the 
rudimentary or inexistent social rented sector in SE to the lack of a Fordist phase in these 
countries’ evolutionary paths along with the capacity of the extended family within the 
wider welfare system able to promote owner-occupation by gathering and siphoning 
resources to such a cause. While Fordism is not necessarily leading to social rented sector 
development, its absence or underdevelopments seems to be tightly tied to a meagre social 
housing sector. Overall, the rental sector in Greece seems more of a temporary solution 
mainly for young mobile people, and certainly not lifetime tenure. Like in the rest of SE the 
private rented sector is underdeveloped (Arbaci, 2008).  
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5.5   Evolution of the Greek Housing System 
5.5.1   Ideological Basis and Evolution 
According to the Greek Constitution (Art. 21, Par. 4) acquisition of residence for those 
being without or insufficiently housed, constitutes object of special care for the state. There 
are other countries were the state is declared responsible for covering housing needs but 
this is not identified with acquisition of housing. For example the Spanish Constitution 
declares that all Spanish people have right to enjoy a decent and adequate housing, the 
conditions and norms for which the public authorities are responsible to promote 
(Constitución Española, Articulo 47). Likewise, the Portuguese Constitution in article 65 
(Artigo 65) establishes the right to housing to housing of adequate dimensions (dimensão 
adequada). In this case state responsibilities are declared in far more detail and are 
therefore binding (Art. 65, par. 2-5). In the case of Greece, Sapounakis (2013) notes that 
there has been no policy to serve such a strong promise. Therefore, this vague declaration 
can hardly be considered something more than a ‘constitutional wish’, lacking legal basis 
(TENLAW, Greece). Nevertheless, such specific constitutional provision has certainly 
affected the Greek housing policy and system, over the years. 
Workers' Housing Organization (OEK) was the sole institution to consistently provide its 
beneficiaries with housing. OEK was abolished in 2012 as result of the Greek financial 
crisis, after more than 60 years of service. That said housing provided was not 'social' or 
'public'  housing in the classic term, as it regarded  beneficiaries with verified employment, 
rather than poor homeless people. TenLaw report (Greece) refers to 'people's housing' as a 
more suitable term, as 'public' or 'social' housing are not even known terms in the Greek 
legal system. Apart from its comparatively limited volume of directly constructed housing 
units, OEK provided subsidized loans to acquire, build or repair primary residences, and 
rent allowances. Regardless of its targeting, OEK could be at best labelled as a 'quasi-
public' organization, as its funding came directly from employers and employees financial 
contributions, rather than public funds. The abolishment of OEK made clear that housing 
policy is uncoupled with the Greek welfare state and housing not prioritized in social 
expenditure (TenLaw, Greece). Due to lack of structured housing policy EU-wide policies 
are hard to influence the Greek housing system (ibid.). 
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Homeownership has historically been the dominant tenure in Greece, differing from the 
southern European cluster where homeownership rose as a result of shift in relevant 
housing policies, and gradual reduction of the rental sector (Maloutas et al., 2006; 
DeWilde, 2015a). Greek urbanization was the result of intense rural-to-urban migration 
which was however not related to industrialization post-War (Maloutas, 2004). Family 
functioned for many decades as catalyst in such urbanization and provision of housing, with 
the state being withdrawn allowing households to form their own housing strategy. This 
allowed a kind-of self-regulation and the housing system covering acute housing needs 
post-War en large, with close to zero public expenditure on housing, within an overall 
limited welfare state (Maloutas et al. 2006). More than that, housing construction greatly 
contributed to financial growth of the Greek state after World War II. This was one of the 
reasons the Greek state let housing irregularities unchecked, along with the fact that plots 
were legally owned and not squatting (Sapounakis, 2013). Family was major player in 
housing provision post-War as well as hedge against a weak welfare state. Long-lasting 
tolerance towards housing illegalities and informalities for the sake of covering housing 
needs, made people de facto ‘accomplices’ of such a system, consequently fuelling 
individualistic mentalities (Maloutas, 2003; Maloutas et al. 2006). 
Historically high homeownership rates functioned as a quantitative indicator or housing 
sufficiency and an excuse for the state to keep on being inactive (Sapounakis, 2013). Greek 
state never developed structured housing policy over the years, which led and allowed a de 
facto housing system and policy to be developed (TenLaw, Greece). During the Greek 
housing system evolution the rental sector never grew significantly so as to have some 
notable impact. Even though it cannot be deemed as marginal, in terms of percentages, the 
rental sector historically had a limited role as transitional tenure for those outside 
homeownership, or groups like students and mobile employees. The rental sector has not 
been promoted as an attractive alternative in an otherwise homeownership-inclined society. 
On the other hand there is no clear indication tenant protection has been historically weak. 
In a fairly recent OECD (2011) comparative report Greece ranked mid-tier in rent control 
and top-tier in tenant-landlord regulation in the private market. Due to lack of social 
housing, renting was highly commodified as directly dependent on income and 
employment stability, which have historically proved precarious in Greece. 
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5.5.2   Modern Trends 
Delfani et al. (2014) classified Greece as having a combination of precommodified housing 
with decommodified pension system. Precommodified housing is characterized by 
immature mortgage markets, familialist housing provision, weak investment perspectives 
and overarching outright homeownership. Following up on their analysis and considering 
current trends in severely increasing housing costs, it can be argued that Greek housing 
system is moving away from pre-commodification and towards an increasingly 
commodified state. This is mainly the result of heavy taxation pushing large part of the 
stock into the market at low prices, while dependence on employment to cover for high 
housing costs is gradually rising. Maloutas (2008) underlines the gradual dominance of the 
market over self-help housing, and commodification of housing since 1970 due to income-
based lending schemes. Vatavali & Siatitsa (2013), note that housing is now unaffordable 
compared to past decades, as a result of gradual commercialization of housing production. 
Today family still remains central in household housing strategies but stronger in lower 
social strata, with some signs of mode and level distortion  in upper incomes (Maloutas et 
al. 2006; Maloutas, 2008). In the Greek family-based system of social arrangements and its 
effects on housing and welfare self-provision, residential mobility remains limited 
(Maloutas, 2004), even among renters (Maloutas, 2008). Papatheodorou (2009) argues that 
the Greek state has historically accommodated familialist self-regulation especially as a 
means to make up for an insufficient welfare state (also Maloutas, 2008).  
Familialist housing provision and self-building were major factors related to the limited 
role of mortgage lending pre-1995 (Maloutas et al. 2006). Earley (2004) notes that in the 
Greek culture familialist mentalities like dowry echoed strongly until recently, and have 
kept the need for extended mortgage lending low. Mortgage lending remained limited until 
1995 when it started growing slowly coming to an abrupt halt due to the global financial 
crisis hitting the Greek market around 2008. During the 1994-2001 housing prices rose 
(Boelhouwer et al. 2005), which cannot be in the long-term attributed to expansion of 
mortgage lending, without considering other macroeconomic variables. Even though a 
inter-dependence can be argued, no causality link can be established between the two 
(Brissimis & Vlassopoulos, 2009; ECB, 2009). The Greek housing market has plunged 
since 2008 as an effect of the financial crisis hitting a system with oversupply of housing 
units. 
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Major issues with the Greek housing system relate to affordability of housing for existing 
homeowners, access for first-time buyers and (lack of) national housing policy, also 
regarding renters. Housing costs have significantly increased during the last decade in 
Greece and especially amidst the financial crisis. This does not solely concern mortgaged 
homeowners who - are not the majority, but also outright homeowners. All homeowners 
have been significantly burdened by radical increase in recurrent property taxation very 
much affecting owned housing assets. Apart from that taxation on property transactions 
have been comparatively high since before the financial crisis, making access to housing 
harder for first time buyers (Earley, 2004; ECB, 2009; OECD, 2011; Mitrakos & 
Akatzilotou, 2012), but also residential mobility (OECD, 2011). Assessing the link between 
homeownership and fertility, Mulder & Billari (2010) classified Greece as belonging to the 
'difficult homeownership regime', with hindered access to the housing market. Typical 
characteristics of this typology include high homeownership, high transaction costs, 'forced' 
housing familialism, low access to mortgage lending, and marginal rental sector. Stock 
quality and maintenance issues do not appear to be a pronounced issue, although 
generalization of such a statement would miss micro-level variations and particularities. 
Admittedly, lack of social mass-housing stock from previous eras has spared the urban 
landscape from phenomena of physical asset degradation. 
 
5.5.3   Greek VoRC and Institutional configuration 
According to Schwartz & Seabrooke's (2008) VoRC typology Greece falls within the 
familialism model with high rates of home-ownership, owner-occupation and deviation 
from the mortgage debt to GDP ratio EU average (Hypostat, 2013). Extended family's role 
remains extremely strong in housing provision and intergenerational asset transfer, despite 
the GFC severely affecting familial resources. Homeownership has always been considered 
a social right with the rented sector being limited and underdeveloped. Tax resistance is 
strong and the foreclosure liability of primary housing is and will remain a persistent socio-
political issue. 
As housing is a welfare state substitute, a large part of the population turned to mortgage 
lending, especially those anchored to - until recently - 'secure public sector' employment. 
Banks seemed rather willing to provide mortgage loans especially to those having a steady 
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public sector income, in very high Debt to Income ratio based on the residential assets' 
values. This situation created some kind of housing bubbles with residential properties' 
market values surpassing their actual value. The financial crisis - among others - saw this 
quasi-bubble busting leaving people with assets now severely depreciated and many of 
them not even covering for the remainder of the loan. 
 
Institutional Particularities 
Rhodes (2005) analysis indicates that when institutional reform is proven difficult, this may 
lead to opportunities for wider compromises and agreements as a result of less/weaker 
polarization between socio-economic coalitions. Towards a similar direction Wolfram & 
Torstner (2009) note that small countries may actually more easily become adaptable, 
learning, trust-building and cooperation opportunities. Regardless, this will have to be 
backed up by an appropriate institutional framework. 
The Greek institutional system presents some issues regarding complementarities and 
general policy implementation. Under the EU integration and in combination with the GFC 
effects on institutional inertia change is incrementally taking place but more in an 
institutional layering fashion rather than radical change. Psychogios et al. (2013) expect 
that under the GFC pressures the Greek institutional system will follow a distinct path. 
The state’s heavily protective stance has been used as an alternative to structuring an 
effective welfare mechanism. Higher import-export tariffs, burdening labour laws etc. were 
considered easier to implement and gather necessary revenue for the state rather than a 
more active policy through direct taxation and or welfare state provisions. In general, a 
'passive'-protective--regulatory-low cost approach was promoted in the place of an 
'aggressive'-proactive-costly one. Such a stance is a lot responsible for keep the market 
underdeveloped favouring tax evasion and underground economy. 
Zambarloukou (2006) expects stronger and wider resistance to institutional change where 
institutional 'ways of doing things' are accepted and supported by the society. This fits the 
institutional inertia theory analyzed in Chapter 2. Triantidis (2013) concludes that 
clientelism in some political and socio-economic spheres is so deeply rooted that turns out 
to be authoritarian. Citizens with the will to denounce or avoid clientelistic practices may in 
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practice not having an alternative choice in doing things otherwise, or the resources to 
follow another path as the dominant party monopolizes them. It should be noted that Greek 
society’s perceptions and mentality are gradually changing accelerated by the GFC socio-
economic and political complications. Past solutions seem to have failed and so the path-
dependency is incrementally approaching a breaking point (Zambarloukou, 2006). This 
may indicate we are entering a new discursive era on institutional evolution. 
 
5.6   Housing Systems in 'Weak' States  
5.6.1   Theoretical framework 
When discussing housing systems and the role of the state, one should consider any 
relevant 'weak' state theory. This is especially true for the Southern and Eastern European 
countries, affecting the way housing systems were formed and their expected evolution. As 
a kind of rough definition, we could argue that 'weak' is a state bearing two basic 
incapacities. Firstly, an exogenous incapacity to become a strong player on an international 
level by living up to the expectations, modernizing its methods and staying strong under the 
pressure of external challenges on every level (political, supra-macroeconomic, cultural). 
Secondly, an endogenous one to build and retain a strong, thick, modern and autonomous 
state mechanism through constant introspection and self-critique, rendering it resistant to 
clientelism or other kinds of manipulative pressure.  
The 'weak' state appears unable to form passive protection strategies and in parallel be 
active and especially pro-active. Lacking the necessary internal supportive structures and 
under the simultaneous top-down (exogenous) and bottom-up (endogenous) pressures of 
interest groups, it gradually loosens its control over some socio-economical fields, 
eventually being de facto substituted by other actors. Housing in Southern Europe has 
mainly been developed within a withdrawn 'weak' state regarding housing provision and 
necessary policy-making, especially in its second incapacity ('withdrawal'). Allen (2006) 
expands this to the overall welfare state being subject to manipulation ('squeezed'). The 
latter has to do with the unwillingness - due to hesitation, fear or intention - to reform and 
raise the necessary power to resist pressures (Sotiropoulos, 2004). Additionally an exposed 
state mechanism will hardly manage to equally and universally cover housing needs when 
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it fails to identify those truly in need of support according to their true income. This is also 
related also underground economy, and persistent anti-tax evasion scheming. 
Generally speaking, a state's true independency lies in its capacity to build or restore its 
stateness on its own with minimum or zero - if possible - external intervention. This self-
building of the state helps solve legitimacy doubt issues with the citizens (Fukuyama, 
2005). Fukuyama's theory can be translated and related to the double deficit of stateness in 
Greece and Bulgaria, and the state's power weakening. The reliance on supranational 
intervention (EU, IMF etc.) is tied to loss of sovereignty and to ambiguous results. This 
reliance - albeit further promoted due to the financial crisis - is a direct result of deeper and 
long-term structural deficiencies and a repeated failure to reform the state mechanisms. 
Møller & Skaaning's (2011) analysis further reinforces and expands Allen's (et al. 2004; 
2006) theory of double deficit of stateness. Indeed, the state's incapacity to hold the rule of 
law strong (clientelism, nepotism, patronage etc.) strong and secure/provide equal social 
rights signifies a strong deficit. Inability to strengthen and thicken stateness leads to 
dependence on internal interest groups if policies and/or social rights provision are left 
totally or mainly to them. For example, in Greek housing system, family -and its extended 
network- has been left to cope with housing needs and problems along with a series of other 
actors
23
 (illegal/informal constructors, corrupt or clientelistic public servants etc). However, 
such a short-term "easy" solution left the state exposed and weak to reform and adapt 
mainly due to the following reason. Inability to cover welfare needs lead to intentional state 
tolerance and this is perceived as a kind of "clientelism" based on the following conception: 
"Instead of state aid, tolerance is informally offered. Thus tolerance de facto becomes the 
Aid". More 'freedom' to act is somehow buying the governments political time in exchange 
for citizens' tolerance of an inefficient state mechanism. Tolerance could not be levied in 
retrospect as it would shake this tacit social contract and create socio-political upheaval 
Clientelism, an important catalyst of the 'weak' state, favours some over others thus 
promoting fragmented, non-rational, unsustainable policies. Extremely complex (often 
imperfect) and discretionary administrative systems and legislation reinforce and help 
establish clientelistic practices (Lovell, 2005; Papadoulis, 2006; Michas, 2011), which in 
turn affect policy-making. An example of inability to conceive, realise and implement 
                                                 
23
 See 'Public Action' theory analyzed later on this chapter 
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proper town-planning policies is the existence of extended areas of illegal housing in South 
Eastern Europe (Allen et al. 2004; Allen, 2006). In the same sense horizontal organization 
of interests is severely hindered rendering formation and implementation of town planning 
policies troublesome (ibid; Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002; Sotiropoulos, 2007). 
Extended housing needs during periods of intensified urbanization were met through cheap 
land acquisition for housing self-development without any significant pressure on 
meaningful and timely contribution to urban development costs and with the aid of 
formal/legal and/or informal/illegal practices (Allen et al. 2004; Minetos, Polyzos & 
Sdrollias, 2007; Anastassiadis & Tsoukala, 2009). This has been seen as an indirect way to 
housing affordability (Potsiou & Ioannidis, 2006; Minetos, Polyzos & Sdrollias, 2007) 
through a loose system allowing for the households to have a greater control over their 
resources. While covering the minimum housing needs was the main reason behind the 
boost of informal housing, the trend still stays strong despite the initial reason no longer 
being the case, due to poor monitoring, insufficient housing market development and 
corruption-clientelism among other reasons (Polyzos & Minetos, 2009). Informal housing 
has been transformed from a necessity solution to a speculation act away from peri-urban 
areas and close to leisure areas of environmental and/or touristic value. Nevertheless the 
phenomenon is not uniform all over the country and there is a difference between informal 
housing of low-income families spread chaotically everywhere and of those seeking 
speculative gains from secondary-leisure housing in coastal areas (ibid). Informal 
settlements came as a result of absent housing policy-also in non-urban secondary housing 
areas, lack of affordable housing financing,  poor and outdated public administration, 
insufficient spatial planning, complex and outdated legislation and bureaucracy, weak state 
initiative, speculative construction (Potsiou & Ioannidis, 2006). During periods of intense 
urbanization housing provision practically happened without the state's presence and 
contribution and outside the mainstream underdeveloped housing market (Potsiou & 
Ioannidis, 2006; Minetos, Polyzos & Sdrollias, 2007; Anastassiadis & Tsoukala, 2009; 
Polyzos & Minetos, 2009). Formal/informal and legal/illegal self-promotion and 
interlocking networks of non-state actors (families, small owners, small builders) were 
called to cover the housing needs (Allen et al. 2004; Allen, 2006). As people migrating to 
urban and peri-urban areas were mostly from an agricultural background they brought with 
them and applied respective self-promoting housing methods. Another factor which 
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affected the creation and intensification of such semi or non-marketised housing systems is 
the strong link of the urban migrants to the construction industry as their first job. The 
above were sealed by a weak land control, planning and construction state mechanism. 
Underground economy is by-product and reinforcing factor of the 'weak' state, boosting 
investment trends in housing. This has been especially true during past decades as a means 
to secure earned shadow income. Housing has historically been produced in a market 
working largely with undeclared income money. So, home-ownership is relevant to income 
redistribution over the life-cycle and with the black market's operation (Allen et al., 2004; 
Allen, 2006). Another basic issue is the housing finance system which was left behind and 
is still severely lagging. The informal routes followed to self-provision of housing gave no 
serious reason for the banking system to adjust and offer financing solutions, especially 
with the lack of interest from the state to set things on a formal route at some point in time. 
On the other hand, families got used to this somehow flexible system and outbalanced the 
lack of financing otherwise (e.g. mobilizing network resources through solidarity). 
The way the construction industry followed was strongly affected by the self-provision of 
housing along with its particularities. A large number of small often unregister/black 
market firms or legitimate firms with major black market building activities have thrived 
through this system. The underground style of development forced to seek maximizing the 
profits from every single piece of land than create healthy building businesses based on 
productivity and large-scale projects. 
The land control approach followed for covering housing needs in Southern Europe seems 
a somehow laissez-faire system leaving the family (and its networks) to deal with such 
issues thus pushing it to act accordingly. The promotion of such an approach was realized 
through formal indirect influence via decisions of action (tax and urban development costs 
exemptions), or inaction (overlooking land regulations, loosening controls etc.); and 
informally via clientelistic practices. This lead to the existence and development of the 
family as a housing production actor along with the state and the market (Mandic & 
Cirman, 2012; Allen et al., 2004; Allen, 2006). Their path however was not always 
converging but parallel. Family strategies had in many cases nothing or little to do with 
state policies thus existing and growing on a totally different level. 
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On a theoretical level, 'Public Action' approach focuses on assessing the state's role under a 
different prism. The existing theories and concepts about state's role in housing are 
unsatisfactorily covering comparative studies' goals. The state has been seen as a manager 
of conflicting interests, overall promoter of society's welfare, subject to capitalism 
development, corrector of market's imperfections, product of political ideologies and 
cultural norms (Allen et al., 2004; Ball & Harloe 1992; Kemeny 1995; King 1996). 
Considering the state and the market as static and ignoring the institutions enabling their in-
between relationships and interactions leads to un-based generalizations. 'Public Action' 
concept considers the 'civil society-family-market' triangle as more appropriate to 
categorize, analyze and compare states. 
Bulgarian state functioning presents some serious challenges including political instability, 
clientelistic elements, laissez-faire planning disregarding national idiosyncrasies, lacklustre 
efficiency and improvement, tax evasion (Buckley & Tsenkova, 2003; Tsenkova, 2003; 
Tsygankov, 2007; Kopecky & Spirova, 2011; Sýkora & Bouzarovski, 2012; Basora, 2013). 
From a bottom-up perspective a comparatively weak civil society (Hirt, 2005; Csizmady, 
2011; Smigiel & Brade, 2011), tax evasion mentality (Pichler-Milanovich, 2001; Tsenkova, 
2007), government and law distrust (Torgler, 2012) do not promote the improvement of the 
'weak' state. 
 
5.7   Conclusion 
Bulgaria and Greece stand as interesting cases within their country-groups regarding the 
configuration of their housing systems. Bulgaria can be deemed as having had a common 
starting point with other countries of the region, focused on the Socialist way of state 
organization. However, Bulgaria started treading on a divergent housing evolutionary path 
notably early, and far earlier than most other socialist countries. Greece on the other hand, 
had no such common socio-political starting point with the rest of the Southern Europe. 
Geographical proximity along with an agrarian past do not suffice as arguments of 
similarity and clustering. 
Focusing on the most important similarities and differences between Bulgaria and Greece, 
as shown in this chapter the following points emerge.  In both countries homeownership 
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rose early post-war as a means to promptly cover for housing welfare needs, but in a 
different way. In Bulgaria it was the result of direct state involvement in housing 
production, and the means to support rapid urbanization needs. In Greece homeownership 
thrived as the result of favourable statutory framework allowing the effective collaboration 
of the family with the construction sector, and the self-regulation of the housing market. 
Homeownership was not linked to industrialization but radical internal migration waves. As 
a result of historical dominance of owner-occupation and the lack of boosting catalysts the 
private rental sector soon gained and retained a marginal role in the housing market, even 
though rates are comparably higher in Greece. 
Through widespread outright homeownership, housing historically remained rather 
decommodified and non-marketable in both countries. Linked to that is the immaturity of 
the Bulgarian and Greek housing markets, along with the fact that neither country 
developed 'social housing' and housing policy in terms of the western welfare states. Public 
housing was either insignificant (BG) or practically inexistent (GR), indicating that outright 
homeownership was a tool of 'housing welfare'. The socialist state included housing welfare 
for all citizens among their promises, while in Greece housing acquisition remains a 
constitutional obligation of the state. As a central sociocultural element of the 'Social 
Contract' homeownership has been a catalyst in helping contain social upheaval in both 
countries' turbulent socio-political and financial past.  
Although variably, there are with clear signs of housing pre-commodification since c. 1995. 
This is mainly the result of both states gradually reducing their statutory protectionism and 
financing post-1990, while housing became more exposed to marketization like the 
expansion of mortgage lending. Post-1990 housing became radically less accessible for 
lower incomes and outsiders, Existing owners had to self-provide for their family members 
housing needs becoming gradually more exposed to housing costs and bank loans. Housing 
familialism was reinforced in both countries as the result of welfare state insufficiency, 
even though this has been historically more intense in Greece pre-1990. Lastly, housing 
policy remained notably fragmented during all eras and unable to actively cover housing 
needs. It has also proved lacklustre in dealing with severe housing problems like stock 
condition, vacancies, construction informalities etc. 
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The analysis in this chapter has been based on the main body of existing literature 
dedicated to the case studies at hand, setting a solid theoretical basis. The focus was on the 
details regarding the Bulgarian and Greek housing systems, also within their wider 
geographic and socio-political context. This basis will be later compared to and combined 
with the research findings presented and discussed in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 6 – Case Studies Data Analysis 
 
6.1   Introduction: Approach of the analysis 
Having elaborated on the background of the selected case studies through the available 
literature, it is now necessary to present the results of the secondary and primary data 
analysis. The scope of this approach is to outline the framework describing the current 
housing 'reality' (secondary data part), and later explore, analyze and explain reason, 
dynamics and opinions (primary data analysis). Following the research design described in 
Chapter 4, secondary data are being presented and discussed first, despite their supportive 
role. This is to serve two different aims. On the one hand there is a number of indicators 
that need to be approached through quantitative data and properly analyzed (see Table 4.1). 
On the other hand, it makes easier to understand the qualitative data analysis in respect to 
the wider context to housing outcomes as depicted and recorded in existing statistics. 
Graphs produced and data discussed have been based on Eurostat EU-SILC
24
, Census
25
 and 
HYPOSTAT
26
 databases for reasons explained in Chapter 4 mainly related to utility, 
availability and reliability. Some graphs have been produced using the Eurobarometer
27
 
data regarding people's opinion on housing. The presentation and analysis of statistical data 
focuses on the selected case studies, but also within their wider context. So apart from 
Bulgaria and Greece, other countries included are: Romania, Serbia (when data available) 
from the Southeastern European Group, and Italy, Spain and Portugal from the Southern 
European group. Other European countries included are: France, Germany and UK as 
countries representing distinctive housing systems, very often present in housing studies, 
and therefore useful for comparative reasons. Lastly, EU-28/EU-27/EU-19 rates are also 
presented where available in order to visually position Bulgarian and Greece respective to 
European averages.  
The second major section of this chapter is dedicated to the interpretation and analysis of 
the interview findings from the interviews with the housing experts and people-citizens in 
Bulgaria and Greece. The analysis of the interview findings of the two groups i.e. housing 
experts and people has been kept separated for a number of reasons. The nature of the 
                                                 
24
 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-and-living-conditions/data/database 
25
 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-and-housing-census/census-data/database and  
26
 Hypostat 2016 Report at http://www.hypo.org/Content/Default.asp?PageID=524 
27
 http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/index  
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findings proved to be differentiated as initially expected. Housing specialists were able to 
provide information in a more structured way, as a result of rigorous occupation in the 
field, albeit each one from their own unique perspective. The info provided, even though 
not always or majorly divergent from their work or the mainstream literature review, 
provided a solid conceptualization in a coherent manner an often fragmented mosaic of 
relevant ideas. Figures produced visualize the connections emerged. It can be argued that 
Housing Experts interviews provided a much needed relevance of the literature reviewed. 
On the other hand, interviews with Bulgarian and Greek people were overall more chaotic 
in their development, and emotionally charged in some topics. The analysis of people 
interviews offered a more 'qualitative' point-of-view regarding targeted topics, even though 
some of them had to do with strictly quantitative issues like size of dwelling, mortgage 
loans etc. This allowed a complementary synergy both with the Housing Experts interviews 
and the analysis of secondary statistical data of the first chapter section. The chapter 
concludes with a combination of interviews and secondary data analysis findings. 
 
6.2 Statistical Data Presentation and Analysis   
The first major section of this chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the available statistical 
data. As discussed in chapter 4, this is directly related to the research methodology. More 
specifically, the available data will be used to comparatively assess housing outcomes in an 
absolute and relative manner to detect over and under-performance. Research Objective 1 
and  Research Question 1 are dependent on this analysis, for a quantitative and qualitative 
assessment. Hypothesis A is also dependent on housing market dynamics and housing 
property taxation changes, which are discussed in this chapter. Adopting a utilitarian 
framework, housing outcomes are discussed both in terms of quantity and quality. Not 
least, the statistical data are expected to reveal deviations from theorized country groupings. 
In most comparative tables and figures Except Bulgaria (BG) and Greece (GR) other 
countries used are Romania (RO), Italy (IT), Spain (ES) and Portugal (PT) as their 'cohorts' 
in most typologies. I have also included Germany (DE) and France (FR) as main 
representative of the central European welfare regimes. The United Kingdom (UK), and the 
Corporatist Sweden (SE) and Austria (AT), have also been included as relevant. Austria for 
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example presents similarities in high homeownership and housing familialism. Where there 
are data available, Serbia (RS) has been included as a close fit to Bulgaria and Romania 
(Southeastern European group). The following table shows the connection of selected 
housing indicators to research objectives (ROs), questions (RQs) and hypotheses as set in 
chapter 4. 
Housing Indicators ROs RQs Hypotheses 
Housing tenure mix 1 1, 3&4 A & B 
Stock Condition, volume, size, age and occupancy 1 1 & 4 A & B 
Financial burden of housing costs- overburden, % to 
disposable income , Arrears on mortgage/rent payments etc.) 
1 1 & 4 A 
Property taxation 1 & 2 3 & 4 A & B 
Outstanding residential loans to GDP - - A 
Housing market indices (supply, transactions, prices etc.) 1 -  A 
Overcrowding per tenure 1 & 3 3 & 4 - 
Social mobility per tenure 1 & 3 4 - 
Severe Housing deprivation 1 1 & 4 - 
Public opinion on housing affordability 1 1 & 4 B 
Public opinion on housing as an issue 1 4 B 
 
 
6.2.1   Housing Tenure Structure 
As already discussed repeatedly homeownership-bound tenure structure is characteristic of 
the Bulgarian and Greek housing system and the wider Southern and Southeastern 
European regions. Labelling systems solely based on their current tenure structure can be 
significantly flawed, as this cannot be deemed a defining factor solely by itself. Even more, 
it can be considered the result of past evolutionary paths rather and the outcome of 
preceding housing policies. Nevertheless, tenure structure is often the starting point of 
various housing studies. 
According to Eurostat data shown in Figure 6.1 regarding 2015 statistics, total 
homeownership rates in the 'traditional' Southern European group (Greece, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal) is around 75% (of total population) and not deviating significantly from EU-28 
average of ~69.5%. The Southeastern European group (Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia) stands 
significantly higher at ~87%. Bulgaria stands at around 82.5% and Greece at ~75%. The 
SEE group rates average is significantly elevated due to Romanian rates reaching almost 
96.5% of total population in homeownership.  
Table 6.1 - Link of the selected housing indicators with the research design 
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At first glance the Southern European average of ~75% does not seem enough to support 
the discussion of a 'differentiated' housing system cluster. The picture is different for 
Bulgaria and the Southeastern European cluster, as standing notably higher than the 
Southern European and EU-28 averages. 
 
 
  
Taking a closer look at the distribution of homeowners according to mortgage 
indebtedness, a different reading comes up. Limited exposure to housing mortgaging places 
Greece (~14%) on the verge of the Southern European group, and significantly higher than 
its average of ~27% in terms of total population under housing mortgage (EU-Silc, 
ilc_lvho02). This is also evident from the respective percentages of outright 
homeownership shown in Figure 6.1, placing Greece higher than its cohorts. According to 
Hypostat 2016 data (p. 107) total owner-occupation rates in Bulgaria decreased by ~3% 
from 2005 to 2015, while in Greece remained more or less unchanged with a slight 
decrease of ~1.6% from 2007 to 2014. 
 
Figure 6.1 - Tenure Structure in 2015 in % of total population (source: EU-SILC, ilc_lvho02) 
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6.2.2   Stock Volume, Age, Occupancy and Type 
According to Hypostat 2016 data (p. 112) the total dwelling stock in Bulgaria accounted for 
around 3.935.000 units in 2015, while in Greece for ~6.382.000 units. From Figure 6.2 it is 
evident that almost half of the Bulgarian housing stock is now more than 45-years old and 
only 15% newer and built post-socialism. In Greece the housing stock is significantly 
newer on average, mostly due to housing built post-1990 (~28%), while one third of the 
stock was built before 1970 i.e. older than 45 years. The two countries do not significantly 
differ in their 1971-1990 percentages. It is also shown that the Southern European cluster, 
except Italy, has an overall newer stock, also newer than the Southeastern European Group 
of Bulgaria and Romania. Within their regional grouping, Bulgaria more or less follows 
trends on newer stock, while Greece has a bit smaller newer post-1991 stock than Spain and 
Portugal, but almost double than Italy. Panel housing in Bulgaria accounts for around 
19.000 blocks of ~708.000 units accommodating more than 1.6 million people (Tsenkova, 
2009). 
Despite its newer stock in 2015 Portugal topped the Eurostat chart on population living in a 
dwelling with leaking, dampness or rot problems (ilc_mdho01) with a percentage of ~28%. 
From the SE group Italy followed with ~24%, while Spain and Greece over-performed with 
~15% next to EU-28 average. With the exception of Serbia (23.4%) the SEE was in a better 
standing of ~12.8 in Romania and 12.9% in Bulgaria. 
Figure 6.2  - Age of Dwellings Stock (Source: Eurostat Census 2011, HC53) 
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Figure 6.3 - Dwelling Occupancy rates (Source: Eurostat Census 2011, HC53) 
Dwellings Occupancy rates is an important factor of housing systems. Figure 6.3 based on 
Eurostat data offers a visualization of the respective trends. It is clear that in Southern 
Europe and especially Portugal (2nd) and Greece (1st), unoccupied dwellings rates are 
significantly high, with Bulgaria entering the cluster. In Bulgaria population decline and 
country houses, can largely explain the phenomenon. In Southern Europe - excluding Italy - 
it is also the result of post-2000 construction boom. Romania strongly differs from its 
neighbouring Bulgaria, following western and northern European trends. 
 
 
Vacancies in Greece account for around one quarter of the housing stock, with ~15% 
regarding secondary or holiday homes and ~5% stock available for renting (TenLaw, 
Greece). In Bulgaria vacancies in 2001 accounted for almost 16% of the housing stock, and 
had doubled since 1992 (http://www.nsi.bg/Census_e/Census_e.htm). 
 
An important indicator of housing sufficiency can be extracted combining Eurostat data 
regarding population size, average Household Size and Number of Conventional 
Dwellings, for 2011 (Figure 6.4). This graph shows two things through the ratio given. One 
the one hand the ratio of Occupied Dwellings per Household indicates the satisfaction of 
housing needs in terms of one housing unit per Household. Here, Bulgaria and Spain over-
perform, while Greece stands in the middle range. On the other hand, the ratio of Total 
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Figure 6.4 - Number of Dwellings per Household in 2011 (Sources: Eurostat demo_pjan, 
ilc_lvph01 & cens_11dwob_r3) 
Dwellings per Household may be an indicator of housing over-supply. Here, Bulgaria, 
Greece and Portugal lead, which is in accordance with Figure 6.3 levels of unoccupied 
dwellings. These of course are not to be considered without criticism. The former is not an 
indicator of overcrowding, while the latter may very well include housing units not fit or 
hard to use as primary residence. 
 
 
According to Eurostat data shown in Figure 6.5 for 2012, average size of dwellings in 
Bulgaria is ~73 sq.m. for the population total i.e. 24% lower than the EU-28 average of 96 
sq.m. In Greece, average size of dwellings is 88.6 sq.m. i.e. closer to the EU-28 size, 
however lower than its Southern European cohorts. EU-28 Homeowners with a mortgage 
loan have access to larger units of ~120 sq.m. i.e. ~24 sq.m. larger than the total average of 
the total EU-28 population. The difference in Bulgaria is less pronounced as Homeowners 
with mortgage or loan have an average of 76.3 sq.m. i.e. only 3.3 sq.m. higher than the total 
average. Greek homeowners with mortgage loan have access to notably larger units with an 
average space of 100.3 sq.m. i.e. ~12 sq.m. larger than their national total average. In all 
countries examined, outright homeowners live in houses with an average size higher than 
their national total average size. This is explained by the lower space regarding renters of 
all kinds, with the exception of Sweden where tenants in free or reduced rent live in larger 
units of an average 131.4 sq.m. versus a total average 103.3 sq.m. size. Compared to their 
total average for all tenures, renters at market price in Sweden, Portugal and Germany are 
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Figure 6.5 - Average Size of Dwelling (in sq.m.) by Tenure in 2012 (Source: EU-SILC, ilc_hcmh01) 
in worst condition as the average size of dwellings is 33.6, 28.8 and 25.1 sq.m. smaller 
respectively. Renters at reduced rent or free are in worse positioning in Portugal and 
Germany with 23.6 and 20 sq.m. less than their average size for tenure total. Overall, 
Greece over-performs comparing to Bulgaria but stays lower than all EU unit size averages. 
Greek renters are close to EU averages. Comparing to their groups, Greece is under-
performing compared to Southern European countries but closer to Italy, while Bulgaria 
cannot be compared to a severely lagging Romania. 
 
According to EU-SILC data (ilc_lvho01) for 2015, in Bulgaria ~34.4% of the total 
population lives in city flats, ~8.7% in suburban flats, and a mere ~0.9% in rural flats. For 
Greece the respective percentages are ~32.5%, 18.1% and 5.4%. the EU-27 averages are 
24.9% of the population in urban flats, 12.6% in suburban flats and 5% in rural flats. What 
is important to note is that in Greece ~34.5% of the population lives in flats belonging to 
buildings of less than ten dwelling i.e. smaller buildings, topping the list on a European 
level with EU-27 percentage at ~18.3%. For Bulgaria, only ~5.6% of the population lives in 
such buildings, and 38.4% in buildings of more than ten dwellings of which 30.7% is in 
cities. In Greece the respective percentage is ~21.8% of which 14.9% is in cities. 
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Figure 6.6 - % of Population under Housing Cost Overburden in 2015 (Source: EU-SILC, ilc_lvho07c) 
6.2.3   Housing Costs 
Indicators regarding the costs falling on or regarding housing are crucial in assessing 
affordability levels. Outright homeownership is often considered a vector of 
decommodification. While it is certainly a factor, the impact cannot be properly evaluated 
without considering housing costs, also regarding outright homeownership. Focusing on the 
changes in housing costs is may be an indication of shifts in housing systems dynamics, 
and often towards pre-commodification or commodification of housing. 
For example, Housing Cost Overburden has become a major problem for an increasing 
number of the population in Southeastern Europe. Figure 6.6 based on EU-SILC data 
shows the percentages of population overburdened by housing costs
28
 per tenure. It is 
evident that Greek Homeowners of both groups are far more overburdened compared to the 
other countries examined and the second one following i.e. Serbia. Tenants at market price 
in Greece are second after Serbia and highly overburdened. Bulgaria lies somewhere in the 
middle, with tenants of both groups being in worse position than Bulgarian homeowners. 
                                                 
28 According to http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Housing_cost_overburden_rate, 'The housing cost overburden 
rate is the percentage of the population living in households where the total housing costs ('net' of housing allowances) represent more than 40 % 
of disposable income ('net' of housing allowances)'. Housing costs include rent or mortgage interest payment, regular maintenance, repair, relevant 
taxes, and cost of all utilities (see also HH70 in http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1012329/6070906/Household+data+-
+housing+data%2Bchange+in+HH071.pdf/087d4911-ec67-4caf-802a-6ad442b7c012) 
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Figure 6.7 - % of Households with Heavy Financial Burden due to Housing Costs in 2015 
(Source: EU-SILC, ilc_mded04) 
Comparing the change in the percentage of the population under housing cost overburden 
from 2007 to 2014, Table 6.2 shows the % of its increase or decrease
29
. Greek population 
of all tenures is comparatively in the worst position, with the largest increase noted in 
tenants at reduced price (near tenfold) and homeowners with mortgage loan (near double). 
  
 Mortgaged 
Homeowners 
Outright 
Homeowners 
Tenants at Market 
Price 
Tenants at Red. 
Price or Free 
Greece 180.8% 139.5% 136.4% 979.5% 
Sweden 31.8% 107.4% -14.8% 239.1% 
Spain 7.1% 27.3% 32.3% 24.1% 
EU-27 -18.7% -4.2% 5.4% 5.0% 
Italy -16.7% -12.1% 14.5% 28.0% 
Romania 386.9% -18.2% -19.7% -25.0% 
Portugal -17.8% -20.8% 42.6% 123.3% 
UK -54.1% -37.9% -18.2% -30.7% 
Bulgaria -65.0% -42.9% -3.1% -37.4% 
France -31.3% -46.2% 1.3% 5.7% 
Figure 6.7 shows the percentage of households under heavy financial burden (subjectively 
judged
30
) due to housing costs in 2015. Here, there is a clear distinction of the Southern 
European cluster except Portugal, followed by Bulgaria and Romania. However, looking at 
Table 6.3 showing the change in the percentage of households under heavy financial burden 
due to housing costs, it is evident that Greece and Portugal present the highest increase i.e. 
more than half the 2007 percentage. 
                                                 
29 Calculated by dividing the difference between the 2007 and 2014 rates with the 2007 rates 
30 See HS140 in http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1012329/6070906/Household+data+-+material+deprivation.pdf/6f0726a5-4135-
48a3-bacd-d2a3b47cbbec. Costs include Rent, mortgage interest payment, utilities, maintenance and repairs as in HH70 
Table 6.2 - Variance in % of Population under Housing Cost Overburden per Tenure 2007 to 2014 (Source: ibid.) 
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Figure 6.8 - Share of Housing Costs in Disposable Income in 2015 (Source: EU-SILC, ilc_mded01) 
Another important indicator is the share of disposable income going to housing costs. 
Figure 6.8 shows the standing of selected countries in 2015, while Table 6.4 shows what 
percentage of the disposable income housing costs consume compared to 2007. Greece is 
topping the list and considerably higher than the next one i.e. Germany. Interesting enough 
Greece is on the opposite side of its Southern European group cohorts, while Bulgaria and 
Romania are significantly lower than Greece and closer to each other. Greece also shows 
the greatest 8-year change, with more than half rise compared to 2007 rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Greece 54.6% 
Spain 13.1% 
Portugal 9.2% 
Italy 0.6% 
Sweden 0.5% 
France -1.6% 
EU-27 -4.6% 
Romania -8.7% 
UK -13.2% 
Bulgaria -15.8% 
Germany -16.3% 
Greece 65,1% 
Portugal 62,7% 
Spain 17,2% 
UK 10,2% 
EU-27 6,3% 
Italy 2,1% 
France -1,9% 
Romania -13,0% 
Sweden -29,9% 
Bulgaria -30,2% 
Germany -31,1% 
Greece 93,2% 
Spain 77,1% 
Italy 45,9% 
Portugal 41,9% 
EU-27 17,6% 
Germany 0,0% 
France -3,4% 
UK -19,1% 
Sweden -25,0% 
Romania -28,6% 
Bulgaria -34,5% 
Table 6.5 - Variance in % of 
total population in Arrears on 
Mortgage or Rent payments 
from 2007 to 2015 (Source: 
ilc_mded06) 
Table 6.4 - Variance in 
Share of Housing Costs in 
Disposable Household 
Income from 2007 to 2015 
(Source: ilc_mded01) 
Table 6.3 - Variance in % of 
Households under Heavy 
Financial Burden due to 
Housing Costs from 2007 to 
2015 (Source: ilc_mded04) 
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Figure 6.9 - % of Total Population in Arrears on Mortgage or Rent Payments in 2015 
(Source: EU-SILC, ilc_mdes06) 
 
 
In keeping up with rent or mortgage payments, Greek population appears extremely over-
burdened as shown in Figure 6.9. In 2015 the percentage of the population with arrears on 
such payments was more than double the second one and more than three times the EU-27 
average. The Southern cluster shows comparatively more burdened even though slightly. 
The difference is greater when examining the change in the percentage of population in rent 
or mortgage payment arrears from 2007 to 2015 in Table 6.5. Here, the Southern European 
group is clearly differentiated with Greece leading the chart having almost doubled its rates. 
This of course cannot be considered unrelated to the effects of the global financial crisis on 
these countries. 
 
Housing Property Taxation 
Immovable property taxation is an important factor to analyze, especially for Southern and 
Southeastern Europe where the vast majority of owned assets regards housing. Overall, it is 
an indicator of commodification as tax reliefs have historically been used as a means to 
'decommodification' of housing (see theoretical analysis in 3.7.2). shifts in welfare regime 
and residential capitalism underlying mechanics are certainly dependent on taxation levels. 
Taxation adds up and increases housing costs, draining family resources in systems where 
housing welfare needs are insufficiently covered - if at all - by the state. 
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Hypostat report data gives an overview of taxation burdening immovable property across 
Europe
31
. Most important perhaps is the recurrent taxation on immovable property as it 
imposes a significant periodic (annual) costs on Households. Comparing taxation data for 
2007 and 2014 we get a picture on the recurrent property taxation as % of GDP and its 
fluctuation for that period, as shown in Figure 6.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Greece ranked 3rd in 2014 after France and UK, while having an extraordinary increase 
since 2007. Table 6.6 shows this increase reaching almost a double over the 2007 levels i.e. 
tripling the 2007 rate. Italy follows with a significant increase doubling its 2007 rates.  
Interesting enough, the increase is extended, albeit lower, to the Southern European group 
and Bulgaria. The latter increasing its 2007 rates by a half. From the above graph greatest 
increases are observed in Greece, Italy and Spain, with UK differing less but overall 
standing higher level. However, this graph does not take into account GDP fluctuations 
which have been extensive within this period due to the GFC. 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 Eurostat - Taxation Trends in the European Union, 2016, Taxation and Customs Union 
Figure 6.10 - Recurrent Property Taxation as % of GDP (Source: European Commission 2016) 
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Figure 6.11 - Recurrent Property Taxation as % of Total Taxation (Source: European Commission 
2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The rates of Recurrent Taxation on Immovable property as percentage of Total Taxation 
should also be noted. Figure 6.11 shows rates in 2007 and 2014 while Table 6.7 its change 
for the same period. Here, the Southern cluster along with Bulgaria show a dramatic 
increase ranging from ~90% in Spain to ~100% in Italy. Greece outstands with an increase 
of ~149%, and Bulgaria follows with ~140% increase i.e. almost one and a half time over. 
According to the last two tables, only Portugal appears somehow resistant to taxation 
increase.  
Greece 188,9% 
Italy 100,0% 
Spain 85,7% 
France 68,4% 
Bulgaria 50,0% 
Portugal 33,3% 
UK 3,3% 
Germany 0,0% 
Sweden 0,0% 
Romania -14,3% 
Table 6.6 - Variance 
in Recurrent 
property taxation as 
% of GDP from 
2007 to 2014 
(Source: EC 2016) 
Greece 144,8% 
Bulgaria 140,0% 
Italy 100,0% 
Spain 90,0% 
France 59,1% 
Portugal 41,2% 
Romania 15,0% 
UK 8,0% 
Sweden 5,6% 
Germany -8,3% 
Table 6.7 - Variance in 
Recurrent property 
taxation as % of total 
taxation from 2006 to 
2014 (Source: EC 2016) 
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This change in recurrent property taxation levels constitutes a serious factor of housing pre-
commodification, as low taxation has historically been an indirect measure to protect the 
social character of homeownership. For 2014, recurrent taxes on immovable property 
exceeded 50% of total property taxation as % of GDP, across EU with very few exceptions 
(Taxation Trends in the EU, 2016; Graph 21, p. 39). The impact of taxation on household 
wealth is significant when considering the percentage of building stock used for residential 
use. In Greece for example, ~73% of the buildings stock is exclusively dedicated to 
residential use according to 2011 census
32
. 
 
6.2.4   Housing Market Dynamics 
The dynamics of the housing market is an important factor to consider for two basic 
reasons.  The price levels and liquidability of housing assets directly defines the practical 
viability of asset-based welfare theorization (research Hypothesis A). Pension levels in both 
Bulgaria and Greece have become gradually weaker with time. Therefore the potential of 
using housing assets to make up for such welfare insufficiency - not excluding other kinds 
of welfare - needs to be debated. Moreover, price levels affect the wealth of households 
enclosed within owned housing assets - which is overall practically hard to estimate. 
Changes in the value of owned assets also affects the levels of housing welfare (RQ1).  
Greek housing market is subject to severe financial pressures since 2008 as direct result of 
the Greek debt crisis. As discussed in Chapter 4. This fact calls for extensive attention on 
reading relevant statistical data, as it may be particularly difficult to clarify trends due to 
crisis distortions. Looking at the Hypostat data there is a ~29%  increase in outstanding 
residential loans to GDP ratio in Greece from 2007 to 2015 as shown in Figure 6.12, which 
is often considered a factor of mortgage market expansion. In some cases this is 
circumstantial, when considering changes in financial performance. In Greece GDP 
dropped ~25% during that period (Hypostat, 2016, p. 124), so the aforementioned increase 
is essentially due to GDP drop rather than expansion of residential loans. Table 6.8 shows 
the variance in Total Outstanding Residential Loans from 2007 to 2015. Here the shrinking 
of mortgage exposure is evident in the Southern European cluster - except Italy - while 
Bulgaria and especially Romania are on the increase. 
                                                 
32
 http://www.statistics.gr/census-buildings-2011 
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Figure 6.12 - Variance of Outstanding Residential Loan to GDP Ratio from 2007 to 2015 
(Source: Hypostat 2016) 
 
 
It is important looking at the gross residential loans in end-2007 and end-2105 (Hypostat, 
2016, p. 100, in million Euros). There was a drop in Italy from 83,604 to 66,390 (~20%), 
the UK from 521,524 to 302,822 (~42%), Bulgaria from 1,783 to 973 (~45%), Spain from 
145,298 to 35,721 (~75%), Portugal from 19,630 to 4,013 (~80%), and Greece from 15,199 
to 475 (~97%). There was an increase in Romania from 2,256 to 2,516 (~10%), Germany 
from 132,000 to 208,600 (~37%) and Sweden from 43,895 to 60,761 (~28%).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Romania 173,6% 
Sweden 72,0% 
France 46,9% 
Italy 36,3% 
Bulgaria 26,0% 
EU-28 18,4% 
Germany 10,7% 
UK 10,4% 
Portugal -2,6% 
Greece -2,6% 
Spain -13,0% 
Sweden 52,2% 
UK 32,2% 
Germany 20,9% 
Bulgaria 8,9% 
EU 2,3% 
France 1,5% 
Italy -7,1% 
Portugal -12,8% 
Spain -25,1% 
Romania -26,4% 
Greece -35,3% 
Sweden 4,5% 
UK 3,0% 
Germany 0,5% 
Italy -10,9% 
France -14,1% 
Portugal -17,6% 
Greece -19,8% 
Spain -31,9% 
Bulgaria2013 -33,5% 
Romania -37,0% 
Table 6.8 - Variance in Total 
Outstanding Residential 
Loans from 2007 to 2015 
(Source: Hypostat 2016) 
Table 6.9 - Variance in 
Nominal House Price 
Indices from 2006 to 2015 
(Source: Hypostat 2016) 
Table 6.10 - Variance in 
Nominal House Price to 
Disposable Household 
Income from 2006 to 2015 
(Source: Hypostat 2016) 
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Likewise, significant increase of ~35% in outstanding residential loans to households 
disposable income from 2007 to 2015 is the result of shrinking household income ~28% for 
the same period in Greece (Hypostat, 2016; p. 105 & p. 125). In Bulgaria, the increasing 
GDP (~35%) is linked to the relapse of Mortgage-to-GDP ratios i.e. 8.5% to 10.2% in 2010 
and down to 8% from 2007-2015 (ibid. p. 104 & p. 124). Bulgarian mortgage market shows 
signs of expansion although rates are still behind, while it has dropped in Greece. In both 
countries credit persists as unattractive despite significant drop in interest rates, ~30% for 
Bulgaria and ~ 43.5% for Greece, from 2007-2015 (ibid. p. 101). The lower levels or 
mortgage borrowing seem to be reflected in overcrowding rates. In 2015, mortgaged 
homeowners in Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and Serbia lived in worse conditions of 
overcrowding compared to outright homeowners (ilc_lvho05c). This is due to the inability 
and unwillingness to undertake larger loans giving access to sufficient housing. 
The basic characteristic of the Greek housing market is the excessive supply resulting from 
a steep drop in demand due to financial hardship of Households. Nominal Housing Prices 
in Greece have dropped ~35% from 2006 to 2015 as shown in Table 6.9. Bulgarian housing 
prices in the other hand present an increase of ~9% for the same period. Greece is the 
leader in housing prices drop within the southern European cluster, followed by Spain. Due 
to radical drop in Greek Household incomes, the Nominal Housing Prices to Disposable 
income rates (ibid. p. 119 & p. 125) appear less reduced compared to the aforementioned as 
shown in Table 6.10. The latter is a useful - albeit not absolute - indicator of affordability. 
For example, although lower scores theoretically indicate more affordable houses, 
extremely low incomes will have no access to houses however low their price may drop. In 
Bulgaria, even though Nominal Housing prices went up from 2006 to 2015, when 
considering the change in Disposable Household Income the ratio is significantly dropping 
as showing in Table 6.10 i.e. due to the increase of household incomes.  
As a result of persistent financial instability in recent years and an excessive supply of 
unsold houses, construction of new units has severely shrunk. In 2015 only 17264 building 
permits were issued in Bulgaria, a ~73% drop compared to 2007. Respectively in Greece 
only 4618 permits were issued i.e. ~89% drop from 2007 levels and ~92% compared to 
2005 peak (Hypostat, 2016, p. 108). Housing starts in Greece followed the aforementioned 
trends with a ~91% drop, although in Bulgaria housing starts almost doubled from 2010-
2015 (ibid., p. 109). Housing completions in Bulgaria dropped ~58% since 2007 peak, 
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while in Greece drop was ~92.3% since 2007 and ~96.3% compared to 2005 high 
(Hypostat 2016, p.110). Regardless of newer units, transaction volume shrunk significantly 
in Greece, dropping ~80% compared to 2005 (ibid., p. 114).  
Housing market in both countries seems to be idle, as a result of different forces. Interesting 
enough, this is despite a significant drop in housing prices during the crisis. The financial 
crisis strongly affected incomes in both countries and severely hindered housing market 
expansion and stabilization. Long-lasting outright homeownership accommodated the 
shrinking of the housing market during the last decade as households had the opportunity to 
somehow cover their housing needs. While this had the positive aspect of limiting exposure 
to mortgage lending during the crisis, it also countered the positive effects of a thriving 
housing market. For example, renewal of the old stock, better use of underused dwellings, 
integration of poorer populations through cheaper housing, cohabitation decrease etc. are 
only some of the aspects affected by vibrant housing markets. Moreover, mobility remains 
limited in all types of homeowners while both countries present and oversupply of housing 
stock. With time, the effects become the reason of low market dynamics like for example, 
low demand for new housing. Causality is hard to establish in such cases, as housing 
market dynamics are severely affected by numerous non-housing factors like employment, 
income and property taxation, and overall macroeconomic climate. Perhaps that is why for 
the majority of the people housing-related problems are considered the result of non-
housing forces, while housing is not considered problematic overall. On the other hand, this 
may be also formed as the effect of lacking - at least in a pronounced and structured way - 
housing policies in Bulgaria and Greece. 
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6.2.5   Social Aspects  
There is a number of indirect indicators regarding the social impact of housing conditions 
and relevant issues. Firstly, an interesting factor of housing system effectiveness is mobility 
within the housing market. According to Eurostat tables, 5-year mobility in Greece and 
Italy is comparatively low in all tenure types, as shown in Figure 6.13, although there are 
signs of change. In Bulgaria and Romania mobility is extremely low. This pattern largely 
accords with tenure patters and more specifically marginal rental sectors being considered a 
temporary solution. In all countries, tenants at market prices present the most significant 
mobility potential, while outright homeowners appear overall less mobile. This links to low 
mobility regardless of housing over-supply as already mentioned. 
Secondly, for 2012 Overcrowding Rates show that Greece and Italy differ from their 
southern European group by more than half, but are in a better position than Bulgaria. 
Figure 6.14 illustrates these trends. In Bulgaria and Greece, rates for Homeowners with 
mortgage/loan and Tenants at market price are worse compared to outright homeowners. 
 Figure 6.13 - Share of Population having changed dwelling from 2007 to 2012 per Tenure 
(Source: EU-SILC, ilc_hcmp05) 
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Figure 6.15 - % of total population subject to severe housing deprivation, per tenure in 2015 ( Source: 
EU-SILC, ilc_mdho06c) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.14 - % of total population subject to overcrowding, per tenure in 2015 (Source: EU-SILC, 
ilc_lvho05c) 
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However, Table 6.11 on the change of percentages of the population subject to 
overcrowding from 2007 to 2015 does not offer any pronounced indication of a trend. 
Highest increases marked in the chart may be circumstantial. 
 
Another interesting indicator of housing system efficiency and sufficiency is the percentage 
of population subject to Housing Deprivation. Figure 6.15 shows these rates for 2015, 
while Table 6.12 illustrates their variance from 2007 to 2015. Romania and Bulgaria seem 
to have larger populations under severe housing deprivation. Italian tenants follow close to 
Bulgaria, while Greece is overall fifth. Looking at Table 6.12 it is evident that Bulgarian, 
Italian and Greek mortgaged homeowners under severe housing deprivation have 
significantly risen, which is partially due to mortgage loan exposure from 2007-2015. 
Table 6.11 - Variance in % of total population subject to overcrowding per tenure from 2007 to 2015 (Source: 
EU-SILC, ilc_lvho05c) 
  
Mortgaged 
Homeowners 
Outright 
Homeowners 
Tenants at 
Market Price  
Reduced or Free 
Price Tenants 
Spain -21,6% 18,2% -32,4% 29,5% 
Italy 26,1% 5,6% 14,8% 18,3% 
Greece 38,6% -5,2% -22,2% 4,7% 
Romania -46,6% -10,2% 5,1% -21,4% 
EU-27 8,5% -22,1% -20,1% -26,3% 
Bulgaria -2,0% -22,7% 11,4% -21,2% 
France -2,4% -38,7% -30,9% -14,8% 
Sweden 24,3% -41,2% 22,6% -73,8% 
Portugal -20,5% -46,8% -36,6% -31,4% 
UK -17,9% -58,3% 21,1% 11,1% 
Table 6.12 - Variance in % of total population subject to severe housing deprivation per tenure from 2006 to 2015 
(Source: EU-SILC, ilc_mdho06c) 
  
Mortgaged 
Homeowners 
Outright 
Homeowners 
Market Rent 
Tenants 
Reduced or free 
Price Tenants 
Italy 59,0% 11,3% 34,8% 26,4% 
Spain -52,4% -15,4% -65,1% -35,4% 
Greece 48,5% -26,2% -19,3% -31,5% 
Romania -83,7% -38,9% 38,4% -26,9% 
Portugal -5,9% -41,3% -47,7% -35,5% 
Bulgaria 70,2% -46,4% -30,7% -27,2% 
EU-27 5,6% -48,5% -29,2% -31,4% 
France 18,2% -50,0% -47,1% 1,8% 
UK -44,4% -75,0% 14,3% -10,8% 
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Figure 6.16 - % of people aged 25-34 living with their parents in 2015 (Source: Eu-SIlC, ilc_lvps08) 
Cohabitation levels can be used as an indirect indicator of housing familialism, although in 
a non-deterministic manner. Figure 6.16 refers to 2015 showing the southern and south-
eastern European clusters clearly differing. The percentage of people aged 25-34 living 
with their parents in Italy, Greece and Serbia exceeds 50%, while EU-27 average is ~28%. 
 
 
Familialist Transfers is a useful indicator of housing familialism as it may give evidence on 
actual monetary or other kinds of intra-family transfers regarding access to housing. 
Unfortunately relevant data have started being gathered only for recent years and do not yet 
include all countries. According to preliminary analysis of SHARE-Project wave 6 
(Börsch-Supan, 2017) valid responses ~25% of Greek respondents reported acquiring 
housing with family help, including bequests and gifts. 
Lastly, according to Eurostat Census 2011 data (cens_11hou_r2), Homelessness in Bulgaria 
and Greece concerned less than 0.005% of the population. However, recent non-
governmental organization reports show an increased rate of Homelessness since pre-
crisis
33
. Homelessness measuring discrepancies are related to definition parameters. 
Regardless, the phenomenon has now entered the public debate, and is a clear sign of 
homelessness gradually becoming an issue. 
                                                 
33
 Υποψήφιοι... άστεγοι 500.000 Αθηναίοι. (2017). Real.gr. Retrieved 17 March 2017, from 
http://www.real.gr/DefaultArthro.aspx?page=arthro&id=480384&catID=3 
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Figure 6.17 - Public Opinion on Housing Affordability in 2008 (Source: Eurobarometer, 2016) 
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This indicator is by default very subjective. Eurobarometer charts
34
 can offer an outline of 
public opinion on housing issues. As shown in Figure 6.17 most Greeks consider housing 
affordability rather bad and very bad, and are significantly more than the EU averages, 
while Bulgaria is in a much better standing. The situation appears overall worse for the 
Mediterranean cluster, with the UK and France following with small a difference. 
 
 
Figures 6.18 and 6.19 show the percentage of people considering social security, housing, 
pensions, taxation and unemployment among the most important issues on a national and 
personal level respectively. Only a very small percentage of the Eurobarometer respondents 
in Bulgaria (~1%) and Greece (~0.5%) included housing as one of the major issues on a 
national level. On a personal level respective percentages lie at ~2% for Bulgaria and 
~0.9% for Greece. In both figures the Mediterranean cluster is accompanied by Bulgaria. 
Rates shown should not be interpreted as more than an indication that people do not 
consider housing as an issue on a national and personal level. Many other issues are 
included in the Eurobarometer which could easily fill up the maximum of two answers. 
 
                                                 
34
 http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/index 
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Figure 6.18 - Percentage of Eurobarometer respondents including Social Security, Housing, 
Pensions, Taxation and Unemployment as one of the two major issues on a national level 
(Source: Eurobarometer, 2016) 
. 
 
 
By using the EU-SILC data on levels of overall satisfaction with the dwelling Figure 6.20 
is formed. Here Bulgaria and Greece along the south-eastern arc show comparatively 
higher percentage of population expressing high satisfaction with their dwelling, 
significantly exceeding EU averages. Bulgaria and Romania are also in a much better 
standing than Greece and Portugal. However, when swapping to very high satisfaction the 
picture is reversed with the south-eastern arc at the bottom ranks. Bulgaria and Greece top 
the chart on the percentage of people with low overall satisfaction with their dwelling. 
Figure 6.19 - Percentage of Eurobarometer respondents including Social Security, Housing, 
Pensions, Taxation and Unemployment as one of the two major issues on a personal level 
(Source: Eurobarometer, 2016) 
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Figure 6.20 - % of population according to the level of overall satisfaction with their dwelling (Source: EU-SILC, 
ilc_hcmp04) 
 
This becomes more interesting considering what was shown in 6.2.2 about the condition of 
the dwellings. It is important to note that between 2008 and 2012 Bulgaria increased its 
expenditure on housing from 1.42 to 5.19 million euro (~265% rise), while Greece 
decreased it from ~1.200 to ~478 million euro (~60% drop). In Greece almost half of them 
went to rent benefits, the rest to owner-occupiers benefits, and almost zero to social 
housing. In Bulgaria all benefits are summed as housing expenditure. In the following table 
total expenditure on housing is expressed as percentage of the total social protection 
expenditure for 2013.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UK 5,16% 
France 2,47% 
Germany 2,02% 
EU-27 1,96% 
Sweden 1,53% 
Spain 0,39% 
Romania 0,12% 
Italy 0,09% 
Bulgaria 0,07% 
Serbia 0,07% 
Greece 0,01% 
Portugal 0,01% 
Table 6.13 - % of total social protection expenditure for 
housing needs in 2013 (Source: EU-SILC , spr_exp_sum) 
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6.2.6   Interpreting the Statistics Relatively 
While reading and interpreting statistical data may often seem a pretty straightforward 
process, this is not always the case. Apart from what discussed on the complex character of 
housing as a multi-discipline filed, reported statistics are not always providing sufficient 
explanation of underlying dynamics. That said it is surely necessary to have some kind of 
'tangible' indication of persisting and shifting trends. Bringing together findings of this 
primary section on this chapter offers some interesting results. It is always necessary to 
keep in mind that comparable structured international statistics mostly consist of the crisis 
years, and distortions should be considered (see Chapter 4). 
Tables and figures shown earlier regarded comparison of absolute rates. In order to 
interpret the statistics in a relative manner one should make proper adjustments. Not all 
countries have the same financial basis and this is something which needs to be considered 
when comparing housing outcomes. In this section I adjust the main indicators to the 
country GDP per capita (Eurostat, nama_10_pc), to demonstrate the changes in rankings in 
relative performance. The GDP per capita used refers to 2011 so as to moderate the Greek 
crisis distortions while remaining relevant - except tables 6.14 and 6.18 where available 
data refer to 2012. This is especially important considering that the Greek GDP dropped 
more than 22% the last decade, while most countries have increased their respective rates. 
In order to assess the relative ranking of countries in terms of the indicators used before, the 
rates ('absolute') of previous tables regarding Average Size of Dwellings, Overcrowding, 
Dwellings Occupancy, Heavy Financial Burden due to Housing Costs, Severe Housing 
Deprivations and Overall Satisfaction with Dwelling, are now divided with the respective 
country GDP per capita for 2011 and the ratio ('relative') is then multiplied by ten thousand 
to moderate decimals.  
The change in ranking demonstrated in Table 6.14 is significant for Bulgaria, Romania, 
Greece, Germany, Austria and Sweden. This may be an indication that the first three 
perform relatively better in terms of average size of dwellings considering the discrepancy 
of their GDP with that of richer countries. Romania can be excluded here as the average 
size is rather low. Portugal and Spain retained their positions at the upper half of the 
spectrum. One should note though that average size of dwelling cannot keep increasing 
indefinitely, and will practically have decreased differences in the upper and bottom of the 
left and right column respectively. Table 6.15 shows the change in country rankings 
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according to the percentage of people subject to overcrowding. Here the only significant 
shift regard the relative performance of Portugal and Spain. Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and 
Italy retain their position, compared to other countries. However, the relative 
underperformance of Greece compared to Italy and Bulgaria compared to Greece rose 
dramatically. Here, differences will be less pronounced in the mid and lower levels of the 
left and right column. 
 
Ranking per Average Size (2012) 
Absolute (sq.m.) 
 
Relative 
Portugal 106.4 
 
128.1 Bulgaria 
Sweden 103.3 
 
66.5 Portugal 
Austria 99.7 
 
65.5 Romania 
Spain 99.1 
 
51.2 Greece 
EU-28 96.0 
 
44.6 Spain 
Germany 94.3 
 
36.1 EU-28 
France 93.7 
 
35.1 Italy 
Italy 93.6 
 
29.5 France 
Greece 88.6 
 
27.5 Germany 
Bulgaria 73.0 
 
26.5 Austria 
Romania 43.9 
 
23.2 Sweden 
 
 
 
 
Standing bellow EU averages, Greece and especially Bulgaria seem to fall behind on 
dwelling sizes. Such comparison cannot give any kind of definitive indication of space 
sufficiency as this is also related to social and family perception on what actually 
constitutes 'enough room per person'. What is can show though is a trend which may 
eventually lead to discrepancy between present and future household needs in terms of 
average space needed to characterize a house as appropriate and 'big enough', as 
requirements change. 
 
Ranking per Overcrowding (2011) 
Absolute   Relative 
Romania 51.4% 
 
84.6 Bulgaria 
Bulgaria 47.4% 
 
77.9 Romania 
Greece 25.9% 
 
13.9 Greece 
Italy 24.5% 
 
9.0 Italy 
EU-28 17.0% 
 
6.6 Portugal 
Austria 12.3% 
 
6.5 EU-28 
EU-19 11.6% 
 
4.0 EU-19 
Sweden 11.3% 
 
3.3 Austria 
Portugal 11.0% 
 
2.9 Spain 
France 8.0% 
 
2.6 Sweden 
UK 7.1% 
 
2.5 France 
Germany 6.7% 
 
2.4 UK 
Spain 6.6%   2.0 Germany 
Table 6.14 - Ranking according to Average size 
(sq.m.) of the dwelling (source: Eurostat, 
ilc_hcmh01 & nama_10_pc) 
 
Table 6.15 - Ranking according to % of the 
total population subject to Overcrowding 
(source: Eurostat, ilc_lcho05a & nama_10_pc) 
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Figure 6.21 - Percentage of Occupied housing stock to GDP per capita in 2011 (Source: 
Eurostat, HC53 & nama_10_pc) 
 
 
Figure 6.21 shows the positioning of the selected countries following the levels of occupied 
dwellings (permanently) to their GDP per capita. One may expect lower GDPs to relate 
with high occupancies as people have fewer resources to access second homes, but this 
does not appear to be the case. This is the case with Romania for example. This figures 
shows the intra-groups differences in this matter. Bulgaria is far lower than Romania and 
closer to Portugal and Greece, despite its significantly lower GDP per capita. Likewise, 
Greece differs from Spain and mostly Italy. Countries with similar rates of GDP per capita 
fluctuate in their occupancy rates like the UK, Germany and France. Overall as the GDP 
increases the rate of the occupied housing stock increases. 
Focusing on the Heavy Financial Burden due to Housing Costs relative rankings are as 
shown in Table 6.16, with Bulgaria and Romania swapping places with Italy and Spain. 
The relative difference between Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain is shrinking here, while 
Greece gains ground compared to Bulgaria. In Table 6.17 changes in relative Severe 
Housing Deprivation do not significantly change the positioning. Greece is topping the 
Southern European rates, while a sub-group of Greece and Italy is formed. Bulgaria 
relatively underperforms significantly compared to Greece, which is like in Table 6.16 also 
due the two countries strong difference in GDP per capita. 
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Heavy Financial Burden Ranking in 2011 
Absolute 
 
Relative 
Italy 54.7% 
 
78.8 Bulgaria 
Spain 52.4% 
 
67.7 Romania 
Romania 44.7% 
 
22.9 Spain 
Bulgaria 44.1% 
 
20.0 Italy 
EU-28 35.4% 
 
19.0 Greece 
Greece 35.3% 
 
18.4 Portugal 
EU-19 33.8% 
 
13.6 EU-28 
Portugal 30.8% 
 
11.6 EU-19 
UK 29.3% 
 
9.9 UK 
France 26.9% 
 
8.5 France 
Germany 19.8% 
 
5.9 Germany 
Austria 14.8% 
 
4.0 Austria 
Sweden 8.9% 
 
2.1 Sweden 
 
 
 
Housing costs offer an interesting picture of how affordable and decommodified housing is 
in practice. For countries like Bulgaria and Greece, where outright homeownership is often 
used to implicitly or explicitly 'prove' decommodification or even housing wealth, housing 
costs is an extremely important factor to consider. Overburdened Greek and Bulgarian 
population is comparatively larger, with Greece showing extreme increases in rates. In 
Greece, housing costs take up increasingly larger part of the household budget, while 
Bulgaria is more resistant albeit exceeding EU average. 
In Table 6.18 the relative ranking of countries according to the overall satisfaction with the 
dwelling (added High and Very High satisfaction) offers an interesting perspective. Despite 
high rates for all countries, when entering GDP per capita rates the ranking is reversed. 
This can be an indication that a standard of housing is maintained despite low GDP per 
capita rates. This is true for the clearly separated southeastern group, but also for Greece 
and Portugal which are differentiated than the other European ratios following. It should be 
kept in mind that satisfaction is a complex and strongly subjective matter and prone to 
cultural trends. Moreover Sweden, France, Austria and the UK had more than 50% very 
high satisfaction rates contrasting the rest of the list which had higher rates in high 
satisfaction. 
Ranking per Sev. Hous. Deprivation (2011) 
Absolute 
 
Relative 
Romania 24.0% 
 
36.4 Romania 
Bulgaria 14.3% 
 
25.5 Bulgaria 
Italy 8.7% 
 
3.9 Greece 
Greece 7.2% 
 
3.2 Italy 
EU-28 5.4% 
 
2.4 Portugal 
Portugal 4.0% 
 
2.1 EU-28 
Austria 3.8% 
 
1.3 EU-19 
EU-19 3.7% 
 
1.0 Austria 
UK 2.6% 
 
0.9 Spain 
France 2.5% 
 
0.9 UK 
Germany 2.1% 
 
0.8 France 
Spain 2.1% 
 
0.6 Germany 
Sweden 1.7%   0.4 Sweden 
Table 6.16 - Ranking according to % of the total 
population under Heavy Financial Burden due to 
Housing Costs (source: Eurostat, ilc_mded04 & 
nama_10_pc) 
 
Table 6.17 - Ranking according to % of the total 
population under Severe Housing Deprivation 
(source: Eurostat, ilc_mdho06a & nama_10_pc) 
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Ranking per High to Very High Overall 
Satisfaction with the Dwelling in 2012 
Absolute 
 
Relative 
Sweden 95.2% 
 
140.4 Bulgaria 
UK 94.3% 
 
130.6 Romania 
France 92.9% 
 
56.2 Portugal 
Austria 91.6% 
 
48.6 Greece 
EU-19 89.9% 
 
39.5 Spain 
Portugal 89.9% 
 
33.6 EU-28 
EU-28 89.3% 
 
33.3 Italy 
Italy 89.0% 
 
30.8 EU-19 
Germany 88.7% 
 
29.2 France 
Spain 87.7% 
 
29.1 UK 
Romania 87.5% 
 
25.9 Germany 
Greece 84.0% 
 
24.4 Austria 
Bulgaria 80.0% 
 
21.4 Sweden 
 
 
The following Figures (6.22 and 6.23) demonstrate the positioning of the selected countries 
based on their homeownership rates to GDP per Capita. The former relates the percentage 
of the total population owning their home with the levels of GDP per capita. Here, Bulgaria 
and Romania present some difference in their rates while having similar GDP per capita 
levels. Total homeownership rates are similar in the southern European group with Greece 
and Portugal being closer also in terms of GDP per capita. Other than that Germany and 
Austria stay together in homeownership rates, while Sweden escapes the trend having high 
homeownership with high GDP per capita levels. Overall, there seems to be a drop in 
homeownership rates as GDP per capita levels rise. When using outright homeownership 
rates (Figure 6.23) things differ. Bulgaria and Romania clear stand out as countries with 
high outright homeownership and low GDP per capita. The southern European groups is 
clearly disparate with Greece toping its cohorts and the other EU countries, despite the 
comparatively lower GDP per capita. There seems to be a slight trend of dropping outright 
homeownership as GDP per capita rises. Reading it backwards, outright homeownership 
seems to be higher in countries with lower GDP per capita. Portugal, Italy, Austria and the 
UK seem to deviate more or less from the trend.  
 
 
Table 6.18 - Ranking according to % of the total 
population declaring High and Very High Overall 
Satisfaction with their Dwelling (source: Eurostat, 
ilc_hcmp04 & nama_10_pc) 
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Figure 6.22 - Percentage of total Homeowners to GDP per capita in 2011 (Source: Eurostat, ilc_lvho02 
& nama_10_pc) 
Figure 6.23 - Percentage of Outright Homeowners to GDP per capita in 2011 (ibid.) 
 
 
According to Figure 6.23, Greece follows the leading southeastern European group 
surpassing other southern countries in outright homeownership. Nevertheless, this does not 
provide any kind of explanation for the reasons of such development over the years, it is 
more of a snapshot of an existing situation. Moreover, differentiation based on 
homeownership rates is not always clean-cut. Greece for example stands higher than the 
EU and Southern European averages and closer to Bulgaria, rather than closer to 
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southeastern European rates. So, it is often a matter of threshold definition whether to 
characterize some countries based on their homeownership rates. Outright homeownership 
is often a 'safer' albeit non-perfect indicator, as non-burdened homeownership can more 
easily be deemed as a defining factor of homeownership mentality concretization. In any 
case, universal labels of housing systems according to homeownership rates alone today 
seem insufficient even in terms of statistical data, and can only be used when comparing 
one country or system to another, at most. 
Indicators of absolute performance (outright homeownership, age of stock etc.), gain a 
different colouring when considering the in-house experience like e.g. amenities. In 2015 
Romania and Bulgaria presented the largest percentage of total population without indoor 
flushing toilet for household exclusive household use (ilc_mdho03) i.e. 32.8% and 18.6% 
respectively. These remarkably exceed the rest of SEE percentages i.e. Serbia with 4.2% 
and FYROM with 5.7%. Greece over-performed with 0.5% against a 2.4% of the EU-28, 
and being second in the SE group after Spain (0.1%). Similar trends are consistent 
regarding the percentage of total population with neither a bath, nor a shower in their 
dwelling. Romania (30.8%) is in significantly worse condition, while Bulgaria (11.6%) also 
exceeds SEE rates of Serbia (3.8%) and FYROM (4.2%). Greece again over-performs here 
with 0.5% against the 2.2% in EU-28, being only third in the SE group but better than 
Portugal with 1.5%. 
The overall relative performance of both systems is debatable. Greece seems to 
underperform in some key indicators compared to its traditional cohort, while over-
performing in others, but being overall closer to Italy. On the other hand, Bulgaria can be 
meaningfully juxtaposed to Romania and Serbia compared to which it often over performs. 
Absolute comparison with EU averages or western regimes one should tread lightly. 
Neither country had comparable industrialization to western realities. The following section 
focuses on housing experts and people opinions, trying to shed a light on seemingly 
'unclear' links. 
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6.3   Interview Findings and Analysis 
The present section is dedicated to presenting and analyzing the data and information 
produced during the interviews with Bulgarian and Greek housing experts and households, 
and from the respective recordings. The details on conducting and coding the interviews 
have already been discussed in Chapter 4. All sub-section have been thematically organized 
in a structured modular manner to improve comprehension and support relevant discussion. 
The reader should not seek for the same structure in the following sub-sections. Despite the 
topic guide - which undoubtedly kept things from straying off topic - each interview 
followed its own path and focused differently on various matters. What has been 
extensively discussed in some interviews has been less present in others. For this chapter 
the following symbols are encountered: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
word~ Semi-concluded thought. In cases, it replaces the semicolon use (;) 
word- Self-interrupted or unfinished thought or phrase 
-word       Continuation of previously self-interrupted thought or phrase 
(word) Necessary explanatory detail based on participant’s words elsewhere 
on the interview, transcribed or not 
((word)) Researcher’s best guess or clarification on meaning 
[interpreter]  Transcription of reply interpreted by a professional in real time 
[…] phrase/sentence Beginning of autonomous thought consisting part of a wider topic 
phrase/sentence […] End of autonomous thought consisting part of a wider topic 
sentence […] sentence Closely recorded linked thoughts complementing or expanding each 
other, interrupted by the participant, an external cause or by a follow-
up/probe question from the researcher, and should be read as a whole 
Word, word or word  Emphasized word or phrased, by the interviewee 
Table 6.19 - Transcription Symbolization (source: author) 
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6.3.1   Bulgarian Housing Experts 
This sub-section regards the professional opinion of housing experts in Bulgaria, and is 
mostly linked to research objective 3, Hypothesis B, and research questions 2 to 4. 
Categorization of topics follows a thematic classification. Housing policy is presented by a 
historical milestone and examining the situation before and after 1990. Housing familialism 
is discussed next and separately from contemporary housing issues which are the last part 
of this sub-section. From a research methodology perspective interviews with housing 
experts revolve around an ex post facto explanatory approach on the Bulgarian housing 
system and mostly regarding housing strategies and mentalities and housing policy 
evolutionary paths. 
 
1. Soviet-Socialist Housing Legacy 
Evidently one of the most obvious Soviet legacies is the housing-blocks stock of that era, 
dominating the whole areas in the Bulgaria large cities’ urban landscape. Thousands35 of 
these massive multi-apartment buildings were built during Communism with the 
prefabricated panel construction method; named as ‘Panel-blocks’, Panelka (Ivanova, 
2015)  or Panelki 
36
 in Bulgarian slang. This method of construction seemed to solve the 
acute urban housing issues of that era, mostly related to massive rural-to-urban migration 
and rapid urbanization. This way the Communist regimes had been able to fulfil its 
‘promise’ for decent housing provision, but led to buildings with a shorter ‘expiration date’ 
and serious quality issues in terms of thermal insulation and overall energy efficiency. 
Numerous Legacy housing blocks now present extensive structural problems and 
deterioration due to bad construction quality and poor maintenance during the years. Same 
goes for the marginal social housing still owned by municipalities. 
“[…]  the Communist regime was very dedicated to providing decent 
housing~ that was kind of part of the promise that they made, unlike I think, 
in countries that were not Communist, you know, whether they were in 
Europe or they were Latin America for example. […]” 
                                                 
35
 Probably more than ten thousand Housing-blocks in Bulgaria 
36
 Often bearing a pejorative colouring 
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On the private housing construction sector front, the Socialist era inactivity led post-1990 
to technically inexperienced and often academically non-qualified construction companies. 
This was mainly due to the fact that pre-1990 construction was undertaken directly or 
indirectly by the state, limiting the chances for the private sector to gain experience. As a 
consequence many of these then newly founded companies soon went bankrupt leaving 
semi-constructed stock. Buildings completed during these years
37
 were of better quality 
compared to panel-blocks but still sub-standard in modern quality terms. The contemporary 
urban landscape has been marked by the numerous multi-family Gated Communities, 
especially in Sofia. Leaving aside the discussion on the social and urban design effects of 
the Gated communities, they are also somehow linked to pre-1990 mentality of the Socialist 
Elite residing in better and secluded housing complexes, regardless of public or private 
ownership status. 
High homeownership rates are one of the dominant characteristics and structural elements 
of the Bulgarian housing system. What is more interesting is that the percentages of 
homeownership had been established before and were high during Communism – unlike 
other countries of the former soviet-bloc. In the Bulgarian Communist structure 
homeownership had a prevailing role, proven by the fact of newly-built housing units being 
sold almost immediately at discounted prices. Post-1990 already high homeownership rates 
were increased further with the privatization
38
 of the limited social rental housing sector
39
, 
and restitutions. Today, the marginal public housing stock is mostly located in big cities 
while the poorest population resides in the countryside where the lowest quality housing is 
located. 
The causes of the historically high homeownership are not always clear to define, and often 
too hard to set a starting point. The country’ strong agrarian past and the links to ‘small-
property’ seem to have definitively affected this development. During Communism 
homeownership had been reinforced both due to a societal direction and low need for 
mobility. For most people any kind of social or residential mobility was something 
irrelevant, as even the change of city was exceptional and limited to specific groups of 
                                                 
37
 1
st
 construction boom, 1992-1995; 2
nd
 boom after the hyperinflation crisis, 2001-2002; 3
rd
 boom, 2002-2008. In tourist areas 
construction boom took place between 2005 – 2009 exploiting the urban potential largely underused during Socialism  
38
 Transfers of former municipal housing stock is in some cases related to ownership issues i.e. people owning the house while 
the municipality retaining the ownership rights over the land 
39
 Public housing from ~15% pre-1990 to a current ~3%. Restitution in Bulgaria mainly concerned the retail sector (shops) and 
other property assets, rather than housing 
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people belonging to the Communist elite or to certain workforce. This eventually led to 
people establishing a strong connection to the land, area, neighbourhood city etc. they lived 
in. With time different aspects of homeownership were strengthened too, like its social 
status significance (mostly during the recent years). 
“Well, I do think that this is a very positive factor. The high rates of 
homeownership are very positive. This is not such a big advantage, but it is 
an advantage. One of the very few advantages we have, in our part of 
Europe I mean […]” 
 
“[…] So, definitely indebtedness in Bulgaria is very low. And I think that’s, 
you know, from my point of view, this is again related to the high 
homeownership rate- I think that’s actually a good thing.” 
 
 
Without a doubt today homeownership is considered a social good hedging against 
homelessness, and linked to the overall macroeconomic precarity of the population. Low 
family income levels and pensions render renting prohibitive, even where this could be 
considered as an option. While there has been an attempt to look into the rental sector and 
in comparison to homeownership, ‘Tenure’ and ‘mobility’ seem to have little to do with the 
Bulgarian case as most people reside in the same houses they and their parents lived pre-
1990. This clearly indicates a continuation of the pre-1990 low-mobility culture. Being 
presented dominantly as a necessity, it was hard to conclude on whether renting can be 
more attractive than homeownership – even exceptionally. The fact is that for low incomes 
renting does not seem to be financially viable for the time being. Higher income families 
will never consider renting, from a social status perspective, opting for a single-family 
house in the outskirts of big cities. 
Finally, the whole pro-homeownership mentality seems reinforced by the fact of societal 
perception of renters being a risk to leased houses. This drives many landlords not offering 
their house for rent, even when they go abroad for a long period of time. Same goes for 
newly-built better-quality stock left unsold due to the financial crisis effects. Renting does 
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not seem financially attractive neither for the renter
40
 nor the landlord
41
, and mainly 
remains as a marginal and temporary solution for specific types of people or low-income 
families. Moreover despite low mobility, with time homeownership has been socially 
solidified and institutionalized as a basic standard, linked to a psychological stability 
otherwise jeopardized. 
“[...] and I think it’s a kind of cultural element, I would say ontological 
connection with the fact that you want to own you place, especially in a time 
of social change when all the world around of you is falling apart, as it was 
the transition of the 1990s, and you want psychologically to think that you 
have a place which is safe, and at least you don’t go to street.” 
 
It has been made absolutely clear during the interviews that the South-eastern European 
homeownership has a fully different cultural meaning than in the USA and western Europe.  
 
2. Post-1990 Housing Policy 
One of the most dominant shifts which accompanied the transition from the Communist to 
the modern era was the full retrenchment of the state in many sectors including housing. 
The post-1990 period was in many aspects chaotic rather than trouble-free, especially 
during the early years. While the state radically retrenched and largely denounced its social 
role people got exposed to (liberal) market forces which eventually led to socio-economic 
inequalities. This ‘transition’ or rather ‘transformation’ of the state had a double impact on 
housing. Directly, it seriously affected housing provision as the state withdrew from its role 
as a direct provider – constructor and allocator – of new housing units. Indirectly, excessive 
interest rates and problematic motivation of the small-scale private initiative created an 
affordability and accessibility problem to medium and low income families. The 
aforementioned eventually led to high rates of immigration, extensive vacancies, 
cohabitation, low-quality self-building and an aged poorly maintained housing stock. 
                                                 
40
 Income precarity to cover rent payments, low protection against eviction 
41
 Rent precarity, low return, high misuse risk, slow eviction processes  
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During the first decade following the regime change, housing policy entered a deep laissez-
faire phase where housing evolution seemed to have no clear policy direction. After that 
period a hesitant national housing policy was attempted, but heavily impeded in terms of 
implementation due to lacklustre support leading to low fund absorption. After all, many 
promising policies were put and stayed on the shelf. During the last decade there was a 
notable shift with most housing-related programmes specifically targeting energy-
efficiency and upgrade of pre-fabricated Legacy housing stock, and involving EU funding 
one way or another. While some initial issues have gradually started being dealt with – like 
high homeowners’ financial contribution levels – policy implementation is still 
problematic. Convoluted bureaucratic processes constitute a great obstacle and deter most 
eligible citizens from participating, even when costs are fully covered. In many cases 
people are not even in position to fill in the necessary forms, also due to supporting 
mediating institutional structures being mostly inexistent. In turn, low participation leads to 
low absorption of EU funds that are wasted left unused. 
According to most housing experts it is not always clear and clean-cut whether the overall 
post-1990 state absenteeism was a conscious and planned political decision. Definitely 
some issues in housing were left to evolve themselves in a chaotic and unstructured way, 
but this had been made possible due to the state’s tolerance like for example informal or 
even illegal self-building. In any case, no policy is de facto a policy itself i.e. by default. 
During the socio-politically turbulent post-Communist years, withdrawing from the social 
housing sector seemed to be the ‘easiest way’ in terms of public-spending cut, and time and 
effort required to create a system that would succeed the previous one. This ‘withdrawal’ 
had been facilitated by the historically very limited social rental housing sector and a 
generalized social demand for less state in all aspects
42
. People did not expect nor wanted 
non homeownership-related state housing post-1990, within the ambient of an overall 
ideology shift. In any case, there was no pre-1990 socio-political culture of social rental 
sector nurtured, so as to be expected after the regime change. Most expectations revolve 
around protecting and promoting homeownership and lowering housing costs
43
. Municipal 
housing is usually deemed as a solution only for the poorest of the Bulgarian citizens. 
                                                 
42
 structural elements of (housing) privatism 
43
 Utility, maintenance, upgrade etc. 
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Currently, housing issues are not at the top of the agenda. Experts noted that peripheral 
matters like infrastructure only seem to focus some attention, and then again this is not 
consistent. Housing conditions are usually ignored or overlooked until the situation 
becomes critical. Recent years saw the energy upgrade of Legacy housing blocks returning 
at the forefront, but with a number of implementation problems of such programmes, as 
already discussed. Infrastructure is better in urban centres but still lacking, and is one of the 
reasons there is such a price discrepancy between urban (expensive) and rural houses. 
One kind of indirect state aid is the provision of incentives to young families wanting to 
acquire own housing. These kinds of financial support usually come in the form of tax 
reliefs
44
. This is not a solution for low income families having no access to the mortgage 
loan market and mainly concerns higher income strata. Additionally, young families 
usually cannot afford buying a property. 
Some marginal social housing policy is implemented in a fragmented fashion from 
municipalities. Local administration has total control over the very limited remaining 
owned stock. This stock is almost depleted being gradually transferred to beneficiaries 
fitting the eligibility profile, and resulting in more homeownership. However, such 
initiatives are extremely rudimentary in terms of horizontal and vertical coverage
45
 due to 
low available stock
46
 and consequent strict eligibility criteria
47
. Bigger municipalities tend 
to have stronger and more multifaceted housing policies as a lever to retain their urban 
population, also due to owning a comparatively larger stock of social housing. Obliged to 
carry out whatever housing policy in full, municipalities are closer to citizens and 
considered more responsible than the central state. Often, they are regarded as something 
completely separate, despite them just being at a different level of the same state 
mechanism. 
During the interviews there was no clear indication on whether there is some expectation or 
desire for the state to assume a part of its former active role as a direst sponsor of social 
housing units. The efficiency and reinforcement of its allocative and regulative role remains 
a key issue nevertheless. 
                                                 
44
 Deduction of mortgage  interest payment from taxable income etc. 
45
 People of the same social class and different social classes respectively 
46
 Most municipalities have few to none Social housing units 
47
 Duration of using the asset, acute housing needs etc. 
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3. Housing Familialism 
Bulgaria is described as one of the countries characterized by strong familialism. However, 
this label is too generic to say much on its own, and especially in housing issues. Instead 
housing familialism seems more proper for the task. What seems to have historically been a 
cultural element linked to the rural-agrarian past, expanded to housing due to recent 
decades’ shift in housing policy. 
According to Housing Experts interviews, despite its limited resources family’s role in 
housing remains strong, also due to the prolonged financial difficulties of the Bulgarian 
people
48
. Housing familialism appears to have been reinforced post-1990 with the radical 
change of the state’s role in housing. The wider family network and more specifically the 
family core tried to fully assume the burden of providing access to housing for younger 
members and their families. Intra-family transfers are the main means of supporting 
younger members and families. Inheritance and parental donations (in money or in kind
49
) 
are the most common routes for Bulgarians to access housing in Bulgaria. Those without 
such an opportunity will have to settle for very costly alternatives (renting, mortgage loan), 
or leave the country and work abroad trying to save money for housing acquisition. While 
inheritance and parental donations may be deemed to solve the housing problem in a ‘cost-
less’ manner, they often lead to overcrowding (under-sized assets) or increased 
maintenance costs (e.g. over-sized country houses). Of course the former also relates to a 
sometimes de facto cohabitation
50
 and low mobility
51
 which constitute pronounced cultural 
features of the Bulgarian reality, further reinforcing familialism bonds but also 
dependencies
52
. What has been kick-started due to a necessity, leads to a socio-cultural 
inertia. Even when young families leave the family nest they often stay in the vicinity 
ensuring an ‘intimacy at a distance’53.  A result of the aforementioned is the average 
Bulgarian household owning more than one house, where the secondary one is usually at 
the countryside, poorly maintained and underused.  
                                                 
48
 Low wages and pensions, precarious employment 
49
 Selling an owned asset giving the money to the children or donating it as a residence (if not inherited) 
50
 It’s not always a matter of choice but a lack of viable alternative 
51
 This is also closely related to an underdeveloped labour market. As a principle mobile people prefer to leave the country rather 
than roam in it 
52
 Like in-house welfare provision from parents to young families (child-care) and vice-versa (care of the elderly) 
53
 As stated by a Housing Expert  
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Overall, housing familialism is a way for the family to try and hedge against 
macroeconomic precarity and job insecurity. Towards this, informal Self-building
54
 mostly 
by input of own labour is one of the traditional familialist means to ensure housing for the 
family members. However, in practice this was and still is primarily limited to villages and 
concerns single-family houses. The existence of self-building is in most cases related to 
insufficient or lacking social housing policy and poor people not-having access to an 
alternative. Informal Self-building should be distinguished from self-promotion of housing 
which is about hiring professionals – with or without bypassing legal procedures – and 
concerns rich families. Peri-urban informal housing is also the lesser than two evils i.e. 
substandard housing and homelessness, for people migrating from rural to urban areas and 
linked to poor infrastructures.  
 
4. Contemporary Housing Challenges 
 
Housing Stock Issues 
As already discussed previously in this chapter, maintenance and upgrade of the existing 
Legacy housing stock pose as a great challenge. This kind of housing is prevalent and 
extensive in urban centres where the majority of the population resides; therefore, dealing 
with these issues is imperative. Repairing and upgrading the Legacy housing stock is 
expected to be costly, but deemed overall cheaper compared to demolishing and rebuilding. 
Extensive vacancies, mainly due to people leaving the country to work abroad and 
shrinking demographics, are a serious problem with a twofold effect. On the one hand these 
assets remain under-used and usually poorly maintained which eventually affects the 
building’s physical condition and financial value. On the other hand, departed owners are 
often too hard to locate and communicate, and even harder to participate e.g. in building-
upgrade programmes. This has led to numerous blocks not being able to make use of such 
kind of aid. 
Vacancies are not just an urban issue; whole settlements in the countryside are under-used 
leading to serious degradation problems. Despite ownership of housing assets – one or 
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more – these properties do not seem to have a viable investment perspective, both due to 
mentality and for reasons related to the assets’ marketability55. The lack of the viable 
possibility to sell their house and go elsewhere results in a gradual sociological tie to the 
primary residence, which is then presented as a reinforced cultural characteristic. What has 
been made sure during the interviews is that despite very few exceptions, housing cannot be 
regarded as an investment means in Bulgaria, at least for the time being. More than that, 
country-houses owned may pose a reason for increased family expenses in the near future, 
due to degradation. These assets supposing there is some demand, cannot cover for 
ensuring housing in a city, even a significantly smaller one. 
“[...] there will be physical change in the units themselves. First of all, a lot 
of these units that were built in the 60s and 70s they are not sustainable. 
There actually were built with a certain life expectancy of thirty years, and 
they are beyond that thirty-year period. So, eventually they cannot be 
occupied. [...] or the state has to invest much more significantly, and I don’t 
know where it’s gonna come from, to actually fix that. So, these physical 
characteristics that are inherited from Socialism, is definitely something that 
is- will contribute towards how things will change in the future.” 
 
Analyzing from a different perspective, Legacy housing stock constitutes a powerful 
catalyst per se. Its very existence, along with the problem it carries, is an ever-present and 
unquestionable pressure factor which will sooner or later lead to serious housing policy 
amendment and transformation, boosted by the generational changes and demands for 
better housing conditions. On the latter, Bulgarians seem to somehow prefer also an 
aesthetic upgrade of the urban landscape heavily indentified by high-rise massive Legacy 
housing blocks. Moreover, recent years saw the increase of a trend towards single-family 
houses which was previously insignificant, mainly due to practicality reasons like 
substandard infrastructure and unaffordable housing costs. 
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Institutional Mistrust 
The widespread social mistrust towards institutions, both regarding effectiveness and 
transparency
56
, has also been verified during the Housing Experts interviews. In housing 
clientelistic practices are mainly related to informalities with building permits, but such 
cases are overall rather limited. However, the overall scorn towards the political scene and 
the central state also affects expectations on the housing policy front. This reality seriously 
undermines the bottom-up dynamic of any given policy and in therefore its implementation. 
In Bulgaria, mistrust has been generated as an after-effect of the turbulent post-1990 
transition and built-up from there. In the following years it set itself as a reinforcing factor 
of a social individualism and political and financial privatism; also allowing for more state 
‘withdrawal’ in ‘costly’ sectors like social housing. For the same reasons, the Social Capital 
in Bulgaria is still weak but with some positive signs of self-empowerment
57
. Institutional 
mistrust is also one of the main reasons for low participation in state and EU funded 
housing upgrade programmes. 
“[...]But as a whole I would say that people get used to think that they should 
survive by themselves and that they cannot rely pretty much on the state […] 
yes, absolutely the trust towards institutions is very low, so- therefore the 
expectations to the state intervention are not that much~ [...]” 
 
“[…] I am very suspicious of the state- social policy is very good of course~ 
very good, but one disadvantage, one big disadvantage of social policy is that 
it is conducted by the state. And this is something I do not believe in […] So, 
I really think it is much better if something can be provided without the input 
of the state, it’s much better. So, the state should provide indeed housing only 
for the poorest (inaudible)- who are not able to buy, how do not have any 
access. So, I think that this is positive. […]” 
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The Banking Sector 
Despite gradual improvements the Bulgarian banking system remains inaccessible or 
unaffordable for the large part of the population. Money going to housing acquisition in 
Bulgaria is usually generated by working abroad and saving. This is also due to 
macroeconomic hardship leading to low wages and high mortgage loan interest rates. Apart 
from that, low state-regulation, low debtor protection and transparency issues lead to low 
trust and high aversion towards the banking system
58
. This in turn weakens participation in 
EU and national housing upgrade programmes passing through banks. Pre-2008 mortgage 
loans increase are now linked to serious repayment issues. As a result, the percentage of 
bad and restructured loans has dramatically increased during the last five years. Deadlock 
in the mortgage loan market is a serious issue affecting access to an otherwise inaccessible 
newer housing stock, and younger families becoming independent in housing term.  
Off-interviews note: There is an increased need for housing finance in both countries, and 
especially regarding the retrofitting and energy upgrade of the older housing units. 
However, the GFC has left the banking sector hesitant to grant new loans, also considering 
the macroeconomic instability in  Greece and low wages levels in Bulgaria. People on the 
other hand, facing severe income difficulties avoid banking lending as much as possible. 
 
European Union Policy 
There is an overall belief that the European Union has an important role to play in 
improving housing conditions. While the role of the EU remains subsidiary regarding 
national housing systems, indirect policies like energy and infrastructure upgrade of the 
building stock are seen as a very useful opportunity for Bulgaria. However, there are doubts 
on whether any part of these funds will go for the construction of social housing, as it is not 
expected for the national housing policy to follow such a direction. On top of all this, 
housing is not yet a priority sector on an EU level. EU funding effectiveness is still limited 
due to internal policy implementation obstacles like convoluted bureaucracy, slow state and 
municipalities reaction, and lacklustre information of the citizens; sometimes with 
phenomenal outcomes like piecemeal retrofitting of Legacy Estates’ facades. This kind of 
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fragmented implementation of upgrade programmes fails to improve the overall quality of 
the building blocks and the surrounding area, leading to resources being practically wasted. 
Apart from the national level bureaucracy, typicality and transparency required for the EU 
funding is not always compatible with people being used to dealing with housing issues in a 
rapid and semi-informal way; driving things back to privatistic approaches. Nevertheless, 
EU funds have the potential to kick-start a systemic restructuring and widening of joint
59
 
housing upgrade schemes, as EU programmes seem to improve with time in terms of 
planning and implementation. 
 
6.3.2   Greek Housing Experts 
Otherwise similar to the research approach in previous sub-section i.e. same connection 
with research objectives and questions, organization of topics follows a different form here. 
Historical evolution of the housing system is first, followed by the discussion on citizenship 
matters, housing familialism, housing financing, the rental sector standing and social 
housing. Discussion on contemporary challenges concludes this sub-section.  
 
1. Historical Evolution of Homeownership 
Being a strong structural element of the Greek housing system, pro-homeownership 
mentalities constitute an unquestionable sociocultural characteristic, despite lower owner-
occupancy rates (~76%) compared to Bulgaria. Policies favouring homeownership strongly 
supported and sought after on a civic level, while policies offending it are generally 
resisted. Notably, the protection of the primary residence is a long-lasting constant topic of 
the political rhetoric. 
“Small-ownership is also the poor man’s weapon, from a certain point of 
view~ thus, he stubbornly latches on it~ and ownership in general […]” 
“[...]Because owned housing absorbs a lot of money large capital, houses a 
small number of people, and eventually creates a property element but does 
not secure housing for large parts of the population which for me is the 
objective. [...]” 
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According to the Greek Housing Experts interviews homeownership prevailed in the Greek 
housing system due to post-1950 political decisions and state actions or inactions, 
combined with a strong civic initiative. The main driver which initially led to high 
homeownership levels can be located in the post World War II acute housing needs, 
especially in the urban areas. Urbanization in Greece was not related to industrialization
60
 
like in North European countries or the Communist bloc, but rather linked to immigration 
and internal rural-to-urban migration
61
. The agricultural tradition of owning the house was 
also carried over, with a parallel retention of the family house in the countryside, usually of 
low financial value. 
The post-war housing needs were sufficiently covered due to an overactive private 
construction sector In an otherwise precarious macroeconomic and production system, 
housing construction proved to be a thriving industry, boosting homeownership further 
with time, mainly by providing more and better housing, taking advantage of the conscious 
‘statelessness’ and being exceptionally flexible in financial and procedural terms. The 
housing construction sector boosted urban economy for many years serving as a tool for 
ensuring housing and employment alike.  
High homeownership rates could not have been achieved without two basic prerequisites, 
‘statelessness’ in housing and small-scale land ownership. In the post-war context ‘turning 
a blind eye’ seemed the best solution for the Greek state. Firstly, this route allowed for the 
private construction sector to have the initiative and eventually dominate housing 
production in any way possible – formal and informal. This in turn provided a partial 
solution to unemployment issues in the post-war decades boosting the GDP and 
contributing to sociopolitical normalization. Secondly, laxity in restrictive regulation and 
controls, along with homeownership promotion/protective policies, tacitly ‘allowed’ the 
state to deliberately never develop social rental housing sector and overall minimize social 
housing policy costs.  
“[...] it created a legislative framework which essentially allowed the private 
initiative to create and to run, to develop the entire Greek housing sector.” 
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Small-scale land ownership was a key factor in covering acute urban housing shortages 
post-war, serving land-owners and constructors alike. Mainly through the system of 
Antiparochi
62
, poor land-owners were able to trade their small-scale land for housing 
property
63
 with zero-cost. Constructors on the other hand, gained access to no-cost land 
allowing for lower capital cost and higher profit potential due to high built-to-surface ratios 
set by the urban planning agency. This kind of ‘fragmented’ land-ownership also 
significantly promoted self-building relieving people from land acquisition cost rendering 
house-building feasible. This included informal building as it was usually cheap or anyway 
accessible to buy some small parcel of land in a peri-urban unplanned area and start 
building there.  
The important issue with land-ownership and informal self-building is the fact that it was 
not about squatting as people had property rights on the land. It was more of allowing the 
private sector to covering acute housing needs with the tolerance and under the tacit or 
explicit protection of the municipalities and the central state. During the various stages, the 
role of the state was targeting the retro-legalization of informal
64
 and illegal
65
 building 
already completed, rather than the prevention of the phenomenon. 
With time, what was the consequence of a passive/absent state and a partial solution to 
acute housing needs, gradually became a lever for unregistered profit and speculative 
investment i.e. unrelated to covering housing needs. This was mainly linked to small-scale 
constructors and building informalities, but was allowed to thrive due to the state’s and 
society tacit tolerance. On the other hand, homeowners would get larger properties albeit 
with unregistered spaces, and the state would see the GDP boosted due to a thriving 
Construction industry. Any attempts to counter the phenomenon of illegal and informal 
construction during the years were too under-funded and fragmented to have an actual or 
lasting impact. 
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2. Citizenship matters 
According to the interviews with the Greek housing experts there was a clear link between 
aspects of citizenship and homeownership. Firstly, the long-lasting indirect but clear state 
protectionism and favouritism of homeownership, along with the state’s passivity, allowed 
the expansion of a laissez-faire housing system. Gradually, the private sector dominated 
housing provision, leading to a solidified housing Privatism. In this system any state action 
supposed to hinder or offend homeownership in any way would be automatically rejected 
and opposed.  Secondly, as a consequence people would have no other expectations from 
the state than to stand aside (no obstruction) and at most to provide some indirect aid 
(passive enhancement).  Thirdly, within this mentality informal and/or illegal housing 
gradually drove citizens farther away from the state regarding housing matters. Post-
legalization of informalities and illegalities had the additional effect of entering into the 
system i.e. a more normalized citizenship. Fourthly, homeownership of the previous eras – 
especially with its social element – was a way to effectively decommodify housing i.e. 
ensure its provision outside the labour-market and the state. Gradually, homeownership has 
been established as a key element of civic and political independence and ‘freedom’, 
contrary to renting which has always been deemed as a financial and even political
66
 
‘anchor’. This was of course related to the ‘liberty’ to build whatever wherever during the 
post-war years.  
“[…] Namely, all this part which is ‘outright ownership’ i.e. ‘You owe no 
money’, is somehow outside the market. It is use-value let’s say and it is not 
exchange-value; but potentially and if you want to put in on the market or 
you are pressed to put it on the market- […]” 
 
Fifthly, the aforementioned paths eventually led to a civic passivity and ‘indifference’ 
regarding claiming welfare rights. However, there are no evidence of a welfare trade-off i.e. 
decommodified homeownership for a weak welfare state. The weak welfare state led to 
gradual disappointment which given the high debt-free homeownership led to tolerance, 
allowing for a civic normality. Homeownership seemed to function as a socio-political 
stabilizing factor and catalyst.  
                                                 
66
 No clear link here 
186 
 
“[…] what you can say, and is a very sound hypothesis, is that the political 
radicalisation as it is expressed with the vote, of very wide meso-strata has to 
a very large degree been related to the threat of their property~ […]” 
“[…] making someone owner the logic is that you render him somehow 
bourgeois who starts having things to lose, and he is politically 
conservativised as an owner etc.[…] in parallel to the ownership a very big 
role was of course played by the fact that there was a great upward social 
mobility. One of the pillars of this upward social mobility was ownership too 
((especially post-war)).” 
“The citizen functions also like the state. He wanted the freedom to choose 
how his house will be, the constructor wanted the freedom build whatever he 
wanted, he wanted to take as high a loan he wanted without anyone telling 
him ‘you cannot get a loan’ centrally putting some limitations and barriers, 
he wanted all these. [...]”  
 
Lastly, homeownership is still a key factor of social integration. 
“[...] some groups, and especially the vulnerable groups are outside this 
protection net ((homeownership)), especially immigrants that only a small 
part of them has access to homeownership and in fact it gains this access 
after quite a lot of years of stay here~ and this is one of the main indications 
that it has been smoothly integrated into the- society within which it is 
found.” 
 
3. The Construction Sector 
During the Housing Experts interviews it became clear that the housing construction sector 
has been historically lacking in terms of a wider scope, failing to tap its broader potential 
and achieve higher turnover. Small-scale and fragmented housing constructions constitute 
the basic characteristics of the pre-crisis construction industry. Without a doubt, this has 
also been a result of small-scale land-ownership allowing local constructors’ activity – 
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often informal – also due to lax state planning regulation. Likewise, this did not allow for 
mass, large-scale housing developments – also with a social housing aspect. 
“[...] As the framework within which the construction evolved post-war was 
such as not to allow the entrance of big players~ neither large land owners 
nor large constructors. On the contrary, there were institutional provisions 
which rather protected the reproduction of small players inside the- they 
favoured i.e the fact- they favoured and protected both the small landowners 
and the small-scale constructors.” 
“[…] the background has always been the market; it is a prevailing 
framework within which the other two players play; Both the state and the 
family are actors only affecting to a certain degree the terms by which one 
can increase- decrease his effectiveness in managing the market 
mechanisms.”     
 
4. Housing Familialism 
Familialism in Greek housing system is more pervasive compared to Bulgaria, and a key 
factor boosting homeownership status and mentalities. In terms of duration Greek housing 
familialism has affected housing outcomes for far longer than in Bulgaria. 
Historically speaking housing familialism has been both an outcome and a homeownership-
boosting factor. On the one hand familialist practices like extended cohabitation, parental 
grants, inheritance, residence proximity etc. have always been used as a strong hedge 
towards macroeconomic and welfare precarity
67
, and in order to ensure housing to younger 
generations
68
. Inheritance has always been the most important factor of the transcending 
homeownership. 
“[...] the problem emerged when family became unable to offer this 
alternative solution to the second generation new family in order to start its 
life. For a certain period this had been veiled, but I do not think this can be 
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veiled anymore in the sense that the guest under the family house sees and 
understands very well that this is not a solution. And he understands that 
family does not offer a protective umbrella, it offers him an elementary cover 
regarding housing, but no it does not satisfy his housing needs, it does not 
ensure housing, it does not offer the opportunity to have a truly decent 
housing.” 
 
5. Extended Homeownership 
Extended homeownership mainly concerns owned assets beyond that used as a primary-
main residence and is mostly related to the following two phenomena: firstly, housing 
familialism led through inheritance to multiple-ownership of houses where the secondary or 
even tertiary is in the countryside there the family has its parental roots. These Secondary 
houses are usually of low marketability and financial profitability value, under-used and 
poorly maintained. Secondly, families in living in urban apartments and not having access 
to some country house, sought to acquire one covering their vacation needs. Housing 
experts noted the contribution of secondary houses to achieving a complete housing 
experience; deterioration of the urban housing quality drove many people to secondary 
vacation housing.  
 
6. Housing Financing 
The banking sector functioned as a homeownership booster in the 1995-2007 era, 
accompanied by the construction sector and a favourable pro-homeownership state 
protectionism and social housing policy ‘statelessness’. These three factors assumed the 
already high-momentum homeownership strongly driving its transformation from a social 
need to a solidified cultural characteristic. This systematic promotion of homeownership 
led to an over-consumerist mentality affecting ownership of multiple property including 
houses. Consequent of the favourable lending terms of that period was an uncontrollable 
construction boom resulting in a large housing stock. The perceived financial prosperity of 
the sector led to over-inflated loans and in some cases to housing bubbles. 
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“[…] to the easy access to borrowing, the low interest rates, and the change 
in the existing mentality i.e. this easy money also changed the way people 
was seeing borrowing, and the easiness to acquire an even bigger house even 
if it was beyond your capabilities, it gave you this opportunity- […] During 
that period, I think, no one was seeing the danger, and everyone was lax~ the 
borrowers were, the banks were, which obviously had interest in lending as 
much as possible” 
Post-2009 and mostly due to the Greek debt crisis, mortgage lending for housing has 
become notably stringent in all aspects i.e. terms, percentage of coverage, eligibility criteria 
etc. While this shift may be deemed as more efficient in terms of protecting both the 
borrower and the banking system, it does not provide a solution to mortgaged homeowners 
from the previous era, now facing serious repayment issues. 
Currently, mortgage lending does not constitute a viable option for the majority of the 
Greek people both due to austere procedures, low purchase price coverage, high interest 
rates and overall income precarity. The crisis has de facto led to a regression of the pre-
2000 strong anti-loan mentality
69
, and private arrangements with local constructors and 
technicians – usually outside the state’s control. 
Overall, the percentage of mortgaged Homeowners in Greece is fairly low, with most of 
them already owning a debt-free asset (see section 6.2 for detailed statistics). Unless for a 
significant improvement of the macroeconomic stability, taxation and employment rates the 
Greek mortgage loan market is expected to stagnate for some years to come; young people 
will have no incentive (due to high homeownership, cohabitation, inheritance etc.) or 
financial capability to assume a housing loan. 
 
Investment and Savings perspectives 
 Discussions with housing experts indicated idiosyncratic elements regarding investment 
perspective. On the one hand purchasing a house either for owner-occupation or as an 
income generator is rarely seen as an investment in the Greek context, outside the 
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construction sector
70
. In the first case primary residence is not destined to be sold or traded-
off for many years and especially when purchased through a mortgage loan. In the second 
case, low returns of the rental housing sector rendered such practice marginal and at most 
supplementary. Financial exploitation i.e. selling or renting owned housing assets, has 
historically been mostly linked to inherited units other than the primary residence, usually 
aged and poorly maintained. On the other hand, housing self-building and/or purchase have 
always been a safe haven for family savings – including those coming from undeclared 
work – and the family’s future.  
For many decades and within an overall precarious Greek macroeconomic context, lack of 
viable investment alternatives established property acquisition as dominant investment 
vehicle. Homeownership – anyway linked to prioritized housing needs – has been severely 
carried away by this trend, but with a strong focus on financial security. This of course was 
directly related to low taxation making the accumulation and retention costs of under-
exploited assets significantly low beyond the capital expenses. 
 
Taxation and pre-commodification 
Changes in real-estate taxation schemes during the last seven years have had a significant 
impact on a socio-political and financial level. There is strong turbulence as a result of the 
unilateral shift on the citizen-state social contract. The long-lasting and deep-seated 
significance of homeownership as a ‘social good’, ensured by the private sector with the 
tolerance of the state, solidified and institutionalized ‘social homeownership’ as something 
to be protected regardless of the historical context and circumstance.  Nevertheless, high 
homeownership offered the over-indebted Greek state a large and seemingly perpetual pool 
of money. Taxation is largely related – at least on a theoretical and rhetorical level –to the 
imputed rent theory, and constitutes a key commodification driver of the previous eras’ 
Greek social homeownership. 
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7. Private Rental Sector 
The private rental sector in Greece while disproportionate to homeownership it has never 
been marginal like in Bulgaria; almost one fourth of the Greek population are tenants 
according to Eurostat. Nevertheless, the rental sector remains nothing more than temporary 
solution for specific phases of life
71
 or in those few cases where homeownership is not 
available. Housing experts noted there is an overall social tolerance for a lower housing-
quality in the rental sector, mainly due to being perceived as transitional and marginal. 
“[…] however to start with, you had no societal appeal~ because it is 
belittlingly said ‘he lives on the rent’, a phrase very commonly used. You do 
not even have a chance as a future husband or companion. […]” 
 
Recent years’ real-estate tax over-burden has kick-started a wider discussion on whether 
homeownership is or continued to be financially meaningful. This works in combination 
with alleged drop in rent level during the crisis. That being said, there is a question on the 
quality of the assets the rents of which have significantly dropped. More than that, high 
unemployment and drop of incomes in most cases do not give access to affordable rental 
housing assets, despite the lower rents. 
“[…] there is a large number of assets available to rent, but the truth is that 
regarding quality I would say there as an issue. Because, to be completely 
honest, there is a difference between an asset managed or bought in order to 
be rented, and an asset where ‘my son lived in, who left as a student, or the 
grandmother lived in, and we were left with it eventually and have nothing to 
do with it’. Service provision in Greece, in rented assets, still needs much 
work i.e. the Greek market is not ready for what is being asked. [...]” 
Given the current trends regarding housing taxation and the macroeconomic turmoil not 
reversed, the rental sector may see some growth as an after-effect and result of the crisis. In 
the long term, this may lead to a mentality change towards homeownership i.e. it will be the 
cause rather than the outcome of a mentality change. However, this is fairly hypothetical at 
this point and no sign towards it exists. In any way, taxation will have to become at least 
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equal in terms of monthly costs with rent levels in order for a meaningful change of trends. 
Lastly, for a healthy private rental sector to be established employment stability will have 
to be solidified on a national level first. Even then it will take time for the existing 
homeowner generations to grow older and more assets to gradually be disposed for renting.  
 
8. Social Housing and Policies 
Social housing in Greece has only distantly been related to the Workers’ House 
Organization and its output the last seventy years until its abolishment in 2013. The main 
work of this organization was the construction of housing units and their allocation to 
beneficiaries. Priority was the promotion of access to homeownership for those outside the 
system. The WHO was funded through its members and their employers’ financial 
contribution with an extremely low state input. Apart from the construction and distribution 
of housing, bank lending support and rent allowances were alternative forms of housing 
support provided. Creation of a social rental housing sector does not seem to have been the 
case during the various phases of the organization’s activity. 
Other than that, indirect social housing policy has been made on a very fragmented fashion 
by various departments within Ministries and other state Institutions, targeting specific 
social and professional classes, always eventually leading to homeownership. Overall, 
housing development proposed or eventually realized by state Institutions was deemed of 
higher quality but costly compared to private development schemes and with time 
dismissed or shrunk significantly. 
 
9. Contemporary Challenges 
The historically predominant function of homeownership as a hedge against financial and 
welfare precarity is still the case, as it was decades ago. For Greece too, homeownership is 
the undeniable ‘wobbly’ pillar of the welfare state, constituting a necessity in view of 
consciously lacking and passive housing policies unable to provide a financially viable 
alternatives. Younger generations are generally considered easier to enter the rental sector. 
However, the eventual destination remains homeownership even for those who are not 
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already or not bound to become homeowners (heirs). Negative or positive extremes in 
financial development lead to homeownership-seeking sooner or later. Housing familialism 
has still an extremely strong inertia, further enhanced during the Greek crisis. However, the 
current meagre family income seriously questions the practical capabilities of familialism 
to ensure proper housing to newer generations. Given the current trends continue, the 
overall Greek familialist system is expected to somehow weaken. Taxation is a very 
sensitive issue touching both financial and socio-political matters. Implementation of 
housing asset taxation is likely to cause serious financial drain of the family income unless 
based on income and social criteria. An inflexible inheritance system often leads to 
homeownership by default, and to underused assets of low financial value. 
Following a post-1990 planned gradual weakening of the housing policy, stock issues have 
now started to emerge as central topic within the wider housing system reform discussion. 
Old stock is now becoming older while much of it has not been properly – if at all – 
maintained through the years. Moreover, large urban areas, especially in the Greek central 
metropolitan areas now present extended housing vacancies and depreciation. On the 
contrary, newly-built stock has largely been kept out of the market due to the crisis’ steep 
drop in purchase prices and ‘unprofitability’ of the rental sector. 
There seems to be an agreement on the defining role of the state in order for the housing 
system to overcome its deadlock. Practices of the past may have provided a partial solution 
to previous eras’ acute housing problems but have also left their mark in many ways. For 
example the system of Antiparochi and informal housing in many cases led to 
unsustainable architectural and aesthetic outputs mostly related to maximizing profit 
(constructors) and space exploitation (owners). This of course was made possible due to a 
decided political stance of ‘turning a blind eye’ allowing low public expenditure for 
housing by letting the private sector operate in a laissez-faire manner. Moreover, the state 
regulated in such way as to promote housing construction and maximize the private sector’s 
profit depending on the historical financial and political circumstance
72
. Apart from 
lowering public expenditure, unsustainably inflating the private sector initiative Through 
tax reliefs along with regulatory and legislative laxity,
 
 this political direction successfully 
hid the housing policy and welfare state insufficiency under the carpet for many decades. 
Currently the Greek housing construction sector is in deep slumber and unprepared to deal 
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with imminent stock challenges like building recycling, upgrade, maintenance and 
conservation. A stringent banking sector and the increasing taxation imposed on the Real 
Estate sector complicate things further, seriously hindering housing market development
73
.  
The Greek housing experts’ opinions concur in that the state’s role is catalytic in kick-
starting an evolutionary phase
74
 of the housing system, regarding homeownership and 
renting alike. While it seems a bit farfetched to anticipate a direct sponsorship state 
involvement, clear and realistic regulatory and supervision frameworks are crucial towards 
any route. The intermediary role of state mechanisms may for example lead to a solution 
regarding vacant and abandoned private and state owned assets which may as well be used 
for housing needs of specific parts of the population. Likewise, rational and targeted 
taxation and other kinds of incentives will drive the private initiative back into the game, 
which along with EU funding may have significantly beneficial effects on housing quality.  
 
 
6.3.3   Interviews with Bulgarian Households 
This sub-section regards the personal opinion of Bulgarian people, and is mostly linked to 
research objectives 2 and 3, and research questions 2 and 3. Organization of topics is less 
linear here, starting from the general housing experiences and moving on to more specific 
issues about the role of the state in housing and people's opinions on housing policy. 
Housing familialism is next, presented separately like in housing experts interviews. 
People's views on the social-era housing system are discussed, followed by their opinion on 
the major contemporary housing issues. Homeownership versus renting mentalities follow, 
before entering the discussion on socio-financial topics like welfare trade-off' and asset-
based welfare. Additional topics like mortgage borrowing mentalities, housing civic 
lobbying etc. close this sub-section. The research approach here is ideographic and 
exploratory, with a longitudinal flavour for the cases of people interviewed. 
 
 
                                                 
73
 Construction, mortgaging and purchase 
74
 Affecting both societal perspectives on housing, and the market’s modus operandi 
195 
 
1. General Housing Experience  
Overall, people in Bulgaria did not express strong dissatisfaction with their housing 
conditions regarding the asset per se, but rather focused on specific issues analyzed later in 
this chapter. Even in few cases with serious issues problems like severe overcrowding, the 
overall stance was that of compromise, and in few cases, frustration. On the counterpart, 
people did not seem optimistic regarding any possible improvement of their housing 
conditions. This observations may have various readings and causes. Firstly, it somehow 
seemed that most people have come to accept their housing conditions for what it is. As 
result, pronounced dissatisfaction may have been smoothed out. After all, the much 
important homeownership status and its social and financial impact, functions as a strong 
lever to compromise for a ‘lower’ quality, but nevertheless owned house.  
Moreover, few participants seemed somehow hesitant to disclose fully or accurately their 
housing conditions. Indications for such hesitation were present in a small number of 
interviews, but it is unclear if and how this affected accuracy or sincerity of statements. 
One of the reasons for such reluctance might have been the mistrust towards the scope of 
the research, as part of the wider omnipresent mistrust towards institutions. In any case, it 
was outside the researcher’s role to comment on people’s housing conditions as this had 
much to do with qualitative analysis and how people perceive their own situation, rather 
than a quantitative report e.g. based on number and size of rooms. 
Thirdly, people who participated in the interviews may indeed have had no pronounced 
housing problems. Of course this is also related to their co-citizens’ housing conditions i.e. 
people living in a slightly better house than their social circle (peers, neighbours etc.) is 
likely to tend towards understating and underrating their own issues.  
Lastly, the lack of state’s engagement with social housing and housing policy seems to 
have affected societal perceptions on the existence of housing issues – mainly due to 
disappointment. Homeownership notably affects this as having an apartment or house in 
many cases blankets the lack of any other housing issues. 
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2. Role of the State, Housing Policy and Social Housing 
Interviews findings regarding the role people want the state to have in housing matters, may 
seem controversial at first. In order to compose the seemingly fragmented opinions into a 
whole, it is necessary to start with people’s opinions on some very specific socio-political 
catalysts; bureaucracy, corruption and institutional mistrust. When discussing about state-
aid, perplexed bureaucracy was one of the first issues raised. An inaccessible bureaucratic 
system seems to deter people from pursuing and applying for housing-related programmes 
like retrofitting and upgrade subsidies. This is also worsened by lacking communication 
and institutional support on how the process works. 
The often obscure bureaucratic route to access state-programmes is followed by a legal 
system reported as slow-progressing regarding the protection of people’s rights. These to 
basic systemic socio-political elements make any kind of state-aid extremely susceptible to 
corruption, as they practically allow its formation, existence and increase. Indeed, one of 
people’s primary concerns is corruption related to state-aid selection-to-allocation criteria, 
including past and perspective social housing-aid programmes.  
“[Interpreter] She said that ‘I assume, without being certain, that these~ most 
(people) benefiting from these (welfare) provisions, in way they do this also in a 
third way (indirectly), i.e. through acquaintances or someone else […] that there 
is no transparency ((selection criteria)) […]but she has no tangible proof, no~ 
she assumes so, as a possibility according to her experience […] she supposes It 
would be better to expand the institution, as long as there was transparency 
[…]”                 (Female, Group D1) 
 
“[...] Of course to some degree there should be- people cannot be left without 
any social services. Of course there are some people that will probably misuse 
those privileges […] probably that’s why most people in Bulgaria will oppose 
even good ideas, because no matter how good an idea is if it’s not implemented 
properly it will fail or not work as it’s supposed to. And that happens most of the 
time so most tax-paying Bulgarians really will have a negative position around 
such (initiatives) […] in most social programmes there is some kind of problem. 
It’s not about housing only, it’s about (welfare) support (in general)- […]”       
                                (Male, Group C1) 
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Cementing the aforementioned, a generalized scorn for the political system due to related 
political clientelism, leads to an extensive and deeply-rooted mistrust for any kind of state-
related institution. Consequently, this affects people’s expectations regarding the role of the 
state in housing conditions and the housing system as a whole. 
“[...] Yes, I actually do not trust institutions at all. So, you can fight your way 
through institutions. But if you want to actually have your rights considered, even 
what’s legally right to you, you have to fight for it in most cases […] it shouldn’t 
be that way.”                  (Male, Group C1) 
 
Moving towards the exact role of the state and the intensity of state-intervention, things 
become somehow blurry. While most people openly desire and support a widening of the 
welfare state as to include housing, there was some ranging opposition to this as expressed 
by a number of participants. For some this was more of a hesitance towards the state being 
able to adopt an active and efficient role in housing matters and provision, while for others 
this is something to be avoided as an approach.  
“[...] there definitely needs to be some (state) involvement, although I do not 
know how much it should be. Because the state can provide some amount, but if 
there is too much of it I doubt the quality of living would be something anyone 
would want. Also, it’s interesting to consider where does the money for that 
comes from (taxes) […] taxes of course come from people who are working. And 
if that’s going to affect taxation, I am not actually sure how much of a good idea 
this will be. [...]”                  (Male, Group C1) 
 
The seemingly controversial approaches cannot be examined without considering the 
Socialist past in Bulgaria. Strong aversion towards a potential return to any kind of 
Socialist-like state intervention was the case in almost every interview.  
[Interpreter] – “Yes, there is this historical truth; there was a limitation of 
freedom (along) with Social Justice. Now, there is no limitation of freedom, but 
there is also no social justice, regardless to what is proclaimed. But the one is 
not incompatible to the other; there should be a compromise of freedom with 
social justice.”                   (Male, Group E1) 
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“[Interpreter] there was an order and there was kind of a respect or fear even 
towards institutions. Now there is no respect to anybody […] she says that she’s 
not a witness and she doesn’t know, but of course there were those camps in the 
Communist time where people were sent […]”            (Female, Group E1) 
For the above reasons people expressed a desire to have a regulatory intervention of the 
state in all welfare matters, including housing. Involvement of the state is preferred to be 
‘indirect’ and target all peripheral issues related to housing like infrastructure development 
and improvement, mortgage loan backup, principal residence (primary home) protection, 
simplification of processes etc. Direct financing of housing construction was rarely 
mentioned as desired or feasible, but a balance between state-intervention and free-market 
is seen as best.  
“[Interpreter]  The other thing she said is that for example if the land belongs to 
the private investor (or privatized) and he wants to build on it, there should be a 
law for some apartments to be given (in return) to the state, for people with large 
families and no place to live. [...]”            (Female, Group B1) 
 
Direct state-intervention was mostly related to cases of ‘acute' housing problems, point 
towards an ‘ambulance service’ social housing. This excludes young families’ access to 
homeownership, which is considered a top priority for the Bulgarian society. People expect 
immediate and strong intervention in this; otherwise, housing issues – albeit a welfare 
service – are regarded as of a somehow lower priority compared to the other welfare pillars. 
Housing is heavily considered a family, rather than a state affair
75
. Despite the widely 
accepted withdrawn role of the state, during recent years’ housing-upgrade programmes a 
significant state intervention (statism) has been recorded in terms of approval criteria, 
percentage of cost coverage and supervision.  
 
Social Housing 
Social housing experiences and perceptions are overall positive. While people recognize 
and openly discuss the Socialist housing-estates’ quality issues, social housing support 
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would be welcome. People hope, desire and think necessary the state becoming active 
regarding housing, but optimism and expectations on it being realized are extremely low. 
Social rental housing stock currently accounts for about 3% of the total housing stock, and 
still shrinking due to a post-1990 privatization process still ongoing. Access to this very 
limited municipal stock passes through strict very criteria, concerning a very small 
percentage of the population. It is important to note that almost all kind of state-aid 
mentioned by the interviewees had as a main goal to promote – maintain or expand – 
homeownership. Even when discussing about rent allowances, this was also related to the 
potential of saving to access homeownership as soon as possible. Discussing alternative 
kinds of state-aid instead of promoting homeownership, some interviewees expressed 
concerns regarding the beneficiaries selection criteria and process, and especially on 
whether this will actually affect their lives. 
“[Interpreter] Maybe that’s because they see very well that whatever social 
privileges and programmes the state offers, there is a very low percentage of 
Bulgarians using it. It’s generally the minorities who can use these social 
privileges.”                (Female, Group C1) 
One of the most interesting findings during the interviews was the different way people 
regard municipalities and the (central) state. While clearly municipalities are part-branches 
of the state, people consider them completely different from the central-government. Any 
social housing policy expectations target municipalities, and are indeed high, compared to 
the central-state for which they are null. The former are seen as something close to the 
people, while the latter as being practically out-of-reach thus not worthwhile to consider. 
This is of course closely related to mistrust towards the state as a central institution. 
 
3. Familialism in housing 
Participants verified and analyzed on the significantly omnipresent family-aid regarding 
access to housing. Family-aid was a prevailing lever in accessing primary housing, for 
younger and older Households alike. Dominant modes of familialist-aid were cash-
transfers, parental-donation, inheritance, self-building
76
 and contribution to utility costs. 
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Overall, family network has been recorded as prevailing in linking younger families to 
homeownership, mainly through inheritance. In some modern-era cases and where possible, 
cash-transfers had to do with ensuring access to a housing purchase-loan. 
“[Interpreter] I would not mind so much because I did not make/purchase that 
house, but because I would not have something to give my children to.”  
                   (Male, Group A1) 
“[Interpreter] She says that in the Bulgarian mentality it is very strongly 
implanted that the person should give a house to his children, so he has to have a 
house to give to the children.”             (Female, Group E1) 
 
Continuing this trend, newer families-households feel obliged to provide for the children 
and support them by ensuring them access to owned-housing. In absence of inheritance 
potential, or when parents’ fortune is insufficient, new households will have to seek for a 
housing-purchase mortgage loan. Inheritance seems to be the dominant lever of 
transitioning homeownership from one era to another; however, in most cases regards 
older, poorly-maintained assets of insufficient market-value, belonging to buildings in a 
similar condition. Inherited secondary houses are often the older generations’ houses in the 
countryside and unsuitable to be used on a regular basis, or provide some kind of income – 
even seasonal. These underused and gradually degrading assets are a potential source of 
financial burden for the families, if not already.  
Inversely, there were no extensive reports on significant and systematic in-house welfare-
aid being provided by children to parents. This has mainly to do with in-house nursing of 
older family members and financial complement of meagre pensions. The limited reporting 
of such cases may be also due to people considering this a very standard and systemic 
familialist procedure.   
“[Interpreter] you can see the difference e.g. Back then our fathers were saying 
“yes, we raised our children because one day they will help us. We trust them 
and they will honour us and respect us. But now the situation is that you are 
trying to work all your life to support your kid because he cannot afford raising 
their own children.”               (Female, Group E1) 
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4. Socialist-era Housing system and Transformation dynamics 
Related to family-aid, older pre-1990 families gained access to homeownership – almost 
exclusively – through dominant state-mechanisms and support77, with the exception of self-
build
78
. Through familialism, younger families became Homeowners of Socialist-era 
housing-block apartments, which still consist the dominant housing unit for the social 
classes interviewed
79
. 
During the Socialist-era strong state-controlled support and access to homeownership 
passed through strict selection and unit-allocation criteria like building-age, accumulated 
points, etc. Loans and rents were kept to a minimum ensuring maximum affordability and 
accessibility; people had little say in asset-selection. People being on queue to access 
housing circa 1990 lost their right after the change of Regime, along with their priority and 
any kind of money they had put in, going practically poor. Right after the change, those 
involved in systems where privatizations took place e.g. company-owned housing stocks, 
were easy to acquire housing.  
As an overview, people having experienced the Socialist-era housing policy regard it as 
more trouble-free and effective compared to the post-1990s era. This has to do with 
housing per se and not with the overall sociopolitical situation of that era, with few 
exceptions.  However, this more or less easy access to housing – especially for young 
families – it was not recorded as having been accompanied by sufficient quality. The 
retrospective people’s opinion and housing experience refers to relatively low building 
standards of the panel-housing blocks
80
, insufficient space
81
 of allocated housing units, and 
very poor maintenance and upgrade processes. Generally speaking, the overwhelming 
opinion is of a withdrawn and absent state, which is not something welcome. However, 
people do not provide a clear picture on whether this has been the result of a conscious and 
planned political decision, or the outcome of a post-1990 impromptu policy evolution. 
“[Interpreter] She says that the system worked in a way that the only chance you 
could get something bigger or do something else, back at that time, you had to 
have connections. You had to be connected to someone important so he could 
                                                 
77
 State-enterprises, State-granted or state-backed loans etc. 
78
 limited mainly to rural and peri-urban areas 
79
 For further details, please refer to Methodology chapter 
80
 Thermal insulation, soundproofing, building materials, panel joints, infrastructure, building services system etc. 
81
 m
2
 and rooms per person 
202 
 
give you a recommendation or something like that. So there was a way but you 
had to have connection […] there was no free market […] all those panel 
buildings belonged to the state which sold them to people […] even back at that 
time those apartment buildings (in Mladost) were built for young families with 
children and there were many many families applying. That’s why she says it was 
almost not possible to get what you really wanted. You were classified with so 
many people waiting on queue- so whatever you were given that was what you 
took.”                (Female, Group B1) 
 
On the architectural front, when probed, people more or less expressed some dislike 
towards the aesthetic outcome and the Socialist housing-blocks’ effect on the urban 
landscape; with special mention regarding the great height and dispersion of these housing-
estates. People living in houses in or outside the city, were more judgmental of this urban 
form.  
For many people, actual transition from Socialism to the modern-era, never truly happened. 
Some interviewees stated that the same lobbies and socialites ruling during the Socialist-
era, dominated the post-Communist years monopolizing the political power. Same people 
abruptly acquired wealth post-1990. These opinions strongly support the transformation 
over the transition doctrine. 
 
“[Interpreter] She said that ‘I am not really the person who would vote for the 
Communist Regime, even though there were some good times. The worst thing I 
see now and is influencing people is dishonesty and corruption, and things that 
are set in people’s minds there’ […] she said ‘I could not be a person who would 
vote for then and even for now, because what actually happened is that the sons 
and daughters of the people who were in power then, were kind of painted in 
different colour and are now rulings as- they are the people who just got wealthy, 
accumulated a lot of wealth, did the things that are good for them, and so I 
cannot vote for them even now. So nothing was practically really changed in the 
very heart of the problem’ […]”             (Female, Group E1) 
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5. Prevalent housing issues 
One of the main issues has to do with the physical condition of the assets, the both on a unit 
and on a housing-block level. Most participants mentioned an extensive need for 
renovations due to ageing and overall condition of the houses. Most young families had to 
proceed with these interventions, mostly through bank loans.  
Another significant issue stated, has to do with maintenance of the housing-Blocks as a 
whole, and the coordination between numerous Homeowners. These panel-block housing-
estates are the total of a large number of apartments-units, most if-not-all of which are used 
by their owners. The complicated process of so many people coming together and 
coordinate is further encumbered by the fact of an increasing number of owners going 
abroad. These people are often hard to find and contribute towards the building expenses, 
while the assets are underused and left to be taken care of relatives or close friends. Apart 
from the above, financial problems render many of the existing Homeowners unable to pay 
for buildings’ utility-costs and maintenance. Upgrade interventions and participation in 
subsidized programmes, is strongly hindered by vacant-apartment owners absence and/or 
unwillingness. Moreover, only few people seem to recognize a links between proper 
housing maintenance and improvement, and the asset’s financial value; which is also 
related to the low investment perspective – especially on primary residence houses. 
“[Interpreter] but she said that for example in their apartment building there are 
at least 4-5 apartments staying empty because people went aboard but never 
rented their apartments. Some of those people were very close friends of them 
and e.g. could give them the apartment so they could rent theirs. But the 
Bulgarians maybe do not want to let another person enter their home, so these 
apartments stay locked without anyone using them. Once a year some 
grandmother comes to check on bills etc. […] one of their friends’ apartment is 
empty for 20 years. They live in the states but never let anybody live there.” 
                (Female, Group B1) 
 
The number of owners in the massive Socialist-era housing-blocks is one of the main 
reasons people express strong preference for (semi)detached houses over apartments.  
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“[Interpreter] (all) Sacrifices are absolutely justified because you live in your 
own house, you depend on no one […] you do not have the problems of people 
living in apartment-block […] and of people who divide, share something with 
strangers, relatives etc. (cohabitation)”               (Male, Group C1) 
These multi-storey blocks in almost every case include a number of different ‘entrances’82 
where each of them gives access to a large number of apartments. Each entrance can 
unilaterally decide and proceed to maintenance and upgrade interventions concerning only 
its own spaces. However, whatever related to shared systems-services (cables, pipes etc.) 
requires the approval and participation of all ‘entrances’ they run through. This often leads 
to buildings-blocks being partially upgraded or retrofitted with the consequent quality and 
aesthetic outcome
83
, due to the number of owners involved and the inability to coordinate. 
“[Interpreter] (there is a) maintenance issue, because the building is old. The 
problem is that where she lives- where they live, there are many people who have 
died and their heirs do not live there, so there are many closed (empty) houses. 
So you cannot coordinate with (others)- you cannot renovate. The common 
expenses- gathering (money) for the common areas and having a renovation 
etc.”                (Female, Group B1) 
 
6. Renting versus Homeowning, and Housing mentalities 
Homeownership has a dominant role in the Bulgarian people mentality without any notable 
changing trends; the interviews reflected this strongly. It is best to break-down this renting 
versus Homeowning approach in its elements, as discussed by the participants. 
 
Flexibility and Stability 
Despite the overwhelming preference over renting, homeownership has been widely 
reported as a tenure offering significantly less flexibility in terms of locale, asset quality, 
and work mobility.  This has also been verified by the renting-interviewees, who also 
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expressed a weaker tie with a specific place. Homeowners tend to express far stronger ties 
to their house and as a consequence to the locale and overall region.  
In terms of tenure security and stability, renting is considered strongly precarious, being 
exposed to landlords’ disposition, combined with weak regulatory and legal protective 
framework for the renter. Moreover, rent levels and fluctuation paired with income and 
employment precarity, make renting pretty non-affordable for the participants interviewed.  
On a social and financial level, renters with no owned-house feel somehow disadvantaged 
relatively to homeowners. Rent is considered as wasted money, while societal perceptions 
on renting are somehow linked to exclusion from homeownership. The latter is also 
enhanced by the practical inability of the majority of renters to get a mortgage loan due to 
low incomes. People choosing to rent are almost always more or less ‘forced’ by 
circumstances to do so.  
“[Interpreter] No, she does not think this is a stigma (being a Renter vs. 
Homeowner, or living in social housing); she does not think there is a stigma; 
this just happened in these peoples’ life and they arrived at where they are now.” 
                (Female, Group C1) 
 
“[Interpreter] She generally thinks that society’ regard/opinion on such a man 
(long-term or permanent Renter) will be that ‘yes, he has not succeeded’ or that 
‘he has failed’, overall. Her opinion is that this is a personal choice and that the 
man believed that he wants to live this way.”             (Female, Group D1) 
 
Despite a generalized loan-aversion mainly due to related liabilities, a mortgage-loan will 
almost always be preferred over renting, when accessible and seemingly affordable. 
Overall, the rental housing sector seems a solution better avoided, and only used as a last 
resort and only as a temporary or transitional tenure. As a consequence and a recurring 
cause, renters are considered damaging to one’s owned-house. However, it is important 
noting that people’s opinion on renting seems specifically tied to the Bulgarian context and 
reality. Comparing to foreign countries and systems, disposition towards renting seems far 
more lax and tolerant. 
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“[Interpreter] It is possible, she says, that if she went to England or America 
where people live mostly on rent, she would not have this goal. But here the 
situation is such that she has to set it (as a goal).”           (Female, Group C1) 
 
“[Interpreter] She said that probably here in Bulgaria it’s kind of a 
psychological motive. She says that “for me, it’s safer to be in my own place” 
[...]she said ‘for example I do not have a problem to rent an apartment when I 
live abroad. If I live abroad and not in Bulgaria I will rent an apartment without 
any psychological barrier for me.’ [...]”            (Female, Group B1) 
 
The weak legal and regulatory protection reported by the participants, is also a result of an 
extremely marginal rental housing sector. The low percentage of renters in Bulgaria (~14% 
on free market rent – Eurostat 2014) is one of the factors rendering them weak in having 
their voice heard and claiming their housing-related rights. It should be noted that there was 
no clear or undivided view on whether current rent levels are in accordance to the offered 
assets’ quality i.e. if there a value-for-money relation. This is also part of the wider 
mentality not linking housing assets a financial rationale – as an investment or savings’ 
means. 
 
7. Asset-based welfare and Trade-off 
Bulgarian asset-based welfare theoretical and practical dynamics seem especially meagre 
according to the interview findings. This is mainly due to almost inexistent links between 
housing-asset liquidation and partial or full welfare services self-provision. Even in cases 
where selling has been mentioned as a thought or perspective, this was always related to the 
purchase of a new house. The latter may also signify that people consider homeownership 
as a welfare-means; however, this link has not been verified by the interviews. 
Asset-value, which is central in asset-based welfare doctrine, has been recorded as 
insignificant in almost every interview. Bulgarian homeowners believe and report their 
housing assets to be of low capital value and financial potential. In any case, the – often 
doubted – possibility to sell the asset seems insufficient to provide more than a limited 
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amount of money, able only to cover a percentage of the purchase-cost for a new house. 
Selling owned apartments or houses in most cases does not ensure affordable or debt-free 
access to better quality housing
84
. For this, complementary financial levers like family-aid, 
mortgage loans or selling of more than one property, will have to be used. In cases where 
these routes are nonexistent or feasible, people are locked in the specific Socialist-era 
owned assets. This market fact deters people from even thinking of selling their houses and 
cements or further strengthens homeownership mentalities. 
“[Interpreter] They were thinking of many combinations to sell the apartment 
and buy something different, but the thing is that you are stuck with these panel 
buildings because if you sell it (the apartment) the money you would get would 
not be able to buy you anything. So you would have the worse situation of having 
to buy something of lower quality.”             (Female, Group E1) 
 
The next point is related to the disposition and will of people to actually liquidate their 
property. The interviews showed a strong inclination against this due to sentimental 
reasons, in addition to the aforementioned financial unprofitability and/or unfeasibility of 
such a decision. This mentality also expands to renting owned-house when abroad. 
“[Interpreter] He does not need- does not consider- does not think you should 
mess with your house~ he considers it to be a cardinal value and not an 
investment. He used the word ‘fundamental value’, and that (it) should not be 
messed with.”                   (Male, Group C1) 
 
[Interpreter] – "yes, it is also an investment, but I have no intention of selling it”. It 
is an investment from the aspect of the security it provides (psychological, 
financial and physical).”              (Female, Group B1) 
 
“[Interpreter] – they considered it an investment, but for life. So, they do plan on 
selling it. They bought it in a relatively low price, and they believe that in this area 
it will gain value with time.”              (Female, Group B1) 
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Views like the latter were rare during the interviews, as housing assets are of low financial 
value, and there is a general lack of an investment mentality regarding this sector. Even 
when present, investment aspect takes a backseat over other functions (accommodation, 
hearth, social status etc.). Financially, acquiring or maintaining a house is an atypical way 
to ‘hedge’ against income and employment instability. While difficult, moving up the 
housing market ladder is more of a social status achievement than an investment. 
Linking high homeownership rates with a weaker welfare state, there was no evidence or 
even indication of Bulgarian people implying, accepting or desiring any kind of such a 
trade-off. On the contrary, there is a strong perception of the state being responsible for 
ensuring young families’ access to homeownership, and protection of citizens’ primary 
housing-assets. This is also a direct way for the state to counter strong population declines 
in terms of dropping birth-rates and emigration.  
 
“[Interpreter] She said that if the state wants to keep young and other people from 
leaving Bulgaria, the first thing it should start doing is taking care of people’s 
homes. [...] She said that if people really had good homes and places they would 
just give up everything else- but if they had a home here they would stay here and 
raise their children here- but she thinks the main reason for people emigrating is 
not being happy with their homes.”  
(Female, Group B1) 
 
8. Mortgage Loan market realities and perspectives 
Bulgaria is one of the countries with very low percentages of homeownership mortgage 
loan indebtedness. Most loans reported concerned renovation of old housing, rather than 
purchase of newly-build one. Often, consumer loans have been partly or wholly used for 
housing renovations and improvement, thus avoiding mortgage of the property at the 
expense of higher interest rates. Most people expressed a high loan-aversion due to income 
insecurity, high interest rates and lack of state-protection in case of emergency; and this is 
especially the case with mortgage loans. Even people having the typical requirements to 
access and be granted a mortgage loan, state their strong desire to avoid this at all costs. 
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Any help from the wider family and friend network is usually exhausted before even 
thinking of a mortgage loan, and again, only when this is absolutely necessary. The overall 
perspective is of loans being more of a necessary evil rather than a useful tool to access or 
improve housing. For those in need and search of a loan, gathering the necessary initial and 
complementary amount is one of the most serious burdens. During the interviews labels 
such as “mistake”, “slavery” and “filthy word” highlight Bulgarians’ overall perception 
regarding mortgage loans. 
 
9. Lobbying for housing issues and Civic Engagement 
Most people feel extremely disappointed in the political system which in turn affects civic 
action intensity. Organized civic movements are considered destined to fail as politicians 
are expected to pay lip-service at best. Civic action emerges when things cannot get worse, 
and usually last just for a few days.  Younger citizens do not seem to escape this pattern, 
with a however noticeable but hesitant change-momentum.   
“[Interpreter] If it is about taking down the government or doing something for a 
very short period of time, people can come together, but otherwise no […] No, 
even if people come together every change- we have a saying in Bulgaria ‘every 
miracle lasts three days’ then things will go back the old way […] the way of 
politics in Bulgaria is the same for quite a long time now.”          (Male, Group A1) 
 
In one of the interviews there was a recorded opinion about young homeowners actually 
being more passive and less-motivated regarding civic engagement. While debateable, this 
observation may have some basis; having secured homeownership – mainly due to 
inheritance or family provision – somehow explains slow and/or low civic responsiveness, 
regardless of the housing conditions. Mortgaged homeowners expressed the belief that most 
of their debt-free home-owning co-citizens are less politically active due to a perceived 
security and lack of emergency, indirectly contributing to the aforementioned approach. 
However, during the interviews only some indications and no definite answer emerged 
concerning the link between tenure, housing conditions and civic action intensity. 
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Interesting was the opinion of House-dwellers (especially outside the cities) concerning the 
political and civic attitude of apartment-dwellers in cities. This may very well have to do 
with the recorded fact that House-owners spend considerably more time and money for 
their houses – mainly for maintenance and upgrade. Moreover, house-dwellers have 
outright ownership and feel the total control over their house and land, which is not the case 
for apartment-owners; the latter have only a very limited control over the building issues 
(vote-system). While this view may be unilateral and criticized as biased, is worth 
considering but avoiding generalizations. This should not be confused with a ‘I do not care 
(to fight) for my house’ mentality, as it is more of a ‘I do care, but what can I do about it?’ 
resignation. Likewise, it is not about the sense of danger and necessity, but of sense of 
power and capacity to influence things. Active citizens are usually generally active and not 
only on housing matters, which also reinforces the idea of acting due the belief of it having 
an actual impact. 
“Of course; hope (for state aid) is the last thing to remain. So surely there is 
(some) […] but reality is totally different.”               (Male, Group A1) 
“Of course I would like some state policy, but what can I do? I can do nothing. 
How can I influence something like this?”            (Female, Group E1) 
As an overall observation, there seems to be a seemingly unbreakable and self-reproducing 
vicious circle of political bureaucracy, corruption, disappointment, civic inactivity and 
weak civic lobbying to counter political opacity. Eurobarometer data verify this, showing a 
~60% of the Bulgarian respondents tending not to trust the public administration (2017). 
Rarely, the EU institutions are mentioned as a solution to this problem, a safeguard of 
people receiving help regarding their problems, and a supranational-to-national control 
mechanism. However, more than half (~54%) of the Bulgarian respondents overall tend to 
trust the EU overall (Eurobarometer interactive, 2017). 
 
10. Other issues 
Strong and long-lasting homeownership in conjunction with familialism and mainly 
inheritance, led to a significant number of secondary homes in the Bulgarian countryside. 
In few cases these secondary housing assets have the potential to be used as a source of 
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income. Secondary or additional houses are not always considered as vacation homes, as 
they are not used as such. Purchase of newer secondary homes is in some cases considered 
a way to cover various needs like complementing the overall housing experience 
(vacation), securing savings or even investing (income source or future sell). Older housing 
in the countryside was mainly linked to self-building in the form of self-labour combined 
with wider family and social network contribution. Today this is overall limited and 
concerns self-hiring of professional builders and technicians, rather than own-labour input. 
The overall salient preference for returning to the countryside, varied in its intensity and 
feasibility potential. On the one hand, there are basic infrastructure shortage and quality 
issues, like piping and sewage systems; with many older owned-properties (inherited) in the 
countryside being unfit to live-in. Renovating these houses is pretty expensive 
proportionally to the average Bulgarian income standards. On the other hand, limited 
employment opportunities in smaller towns and villages strongly hinder this counter-
urbanization dynamic from developing to something more than a vacation house.  
The homeownership – hearth link appeared far stronger than the house – hearth one. 
Owning one’s house is considered a prerequisite for family formation and prosperity, worth 
of any financial and social compromise. This is also for younger or to-be families, while 
recognizing the some of its downsides like reduced mobility and flexibility. More 
importantly, there was no reported strong sentimental attachment with the physical asset 
(house) but rather with the status of house-ownership. However, in young people the 
urgency to become homeowners varies from one case to another.  
 
6.3.4   Interviews with Greek Households 
With a similar approach as in the previous sub-section, the overall housing experience topic 
open the analysis, with the opinions on the role of the state in housing policy following. 
Taxation of housing assets is a very significant topic in the contemporary Greek reality and 
emerged as a separate topic during most interviews. Housing familialism is assessed next, 
followed by homeownership versus renting debate. Socio-financial topics like welfare 
trade-off' and asset-based welfare continue the sub-section which ends with additional 
topics, like mortgage borrowing mentalities, civic lobbying etc. being discussed last. 
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1. Overall Housing Experience 
During the interviews, Greek people did not express any pronounced dissatisfaction with 
their housing conditions per se. Of course there were cases of a clearly expressed desire for 
a more adequate housing especially in terms of one or two more rooms, better 
soundproofing, better finishing quality etc. In hardly any cases were there housing issues 
stated so pronounced as to disrupt everyday life flow. This might very well be explained 
using the reasoning presented in the Bulgarian case. However, even from a rough visual 
overview – also backed up by statistical data - is somehow obvious that most housing-
related problems have not so much to do with the assets’ condition and maintenance, unlike 
Bulgaria. Overall, most interviews stated that their current housing condition and quality 
are significantly better compared to where they grew up in. The following issues were 
reported in a limited manner during the interviews: 
 Bureaucracy discourages people from pursuing any housing-upgrade programmes, 
but is not the main reason – which is mistrust towards the state85 
 
 Apartment-dwellers look forward to a House or moving into an apartment building 
with fewer apartments and floors 
 
 Emotional attachment is in most cases related to the homeownership status rather 
than specific assets, unlike neighbourhoods which seem a prevailing selection 
factor. Often, emotional attachment concerns some and not the total of assets owned 
 
 The system of ‘Antiparochi’ has been mentioned in few cases as an older system for 
urban land-owners to access urban housing, cost-free 
 
However political and financial housing issues took precedence over other topics, and were 
extensively discussed, as it will be analyzed later in this section. Taxation on the primary 
residence (or 1
st
 home) had an exceptional position in the interviews and proved to be an 
emotionally charged topic.  
                                                 
85
 ~78% of the Greek respondents tend not to trust public administration (Eurobarometer Interactive, 2017). Greece leads the 
southern and southeastern European area in the mistrust towards public administration 
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2. Role of the State in housing and Housing Policy 
Greek people opinions are dominated by a sentiment of mistrust towards anything related to 
the central state and the municipalities; due to state-mechanisms opacity, clientelism, 
opportunism and eventually corruption. In many cases, even commencing the discussion 
about state-aid was some kind of a challenge due to a very negative predisposition; 
discussing about housing policy and the state help was in several occasions – implicitly or 
explicitly – seen as a joke. Even expressed hopes and desires, they rarely coincided with a 
sincere expectation of something actually happening in the foreseeable future. Expectations 
have been further lowered due to the ongoing Greek debt crisis.  
“[...] No matter what the state does it tricks you afterwards […] This state is not 
to be trusted. Wherever the state directs you to- no matter where the state pushes 
you towards, you should go the opposite way, running […]”     (Male, Group B2) 
 
Increase in housing-imposed taxes has seriously offended social homeownership and 
contributed to a view of the state as a bottom-less barrel, where any financial sacrifices 
gives nothing in return and so is meaningless. 
Focusing on housing the majority of participants did not have some specific idea on how 
the state could help with their housing conditions, apart from lowering housing-taxation. 
For most people housing policy is something inexistent and unclear how it could affect 
their housing conditions. However, it is a prevailing belief that the state should somehow 
help with housing (extended welfare state). Of course this does not include those expressed 
against state intervention and extended social housing programmes. 
“In a (country like) Greece where ‘Home, Sweet Home’ is a ‘gospel’, the state 
cannot abstain. So, in a society having shaped a (certain) culture but because it 
learned it this way, but I don’t know for what reason, but because it suited some 
people- that ‘get a house to put your head in, and we see about the rest 
afterwards’; which is not bad. But it is not a ‘Gospel’ either. We have it- it is not 
a ‘Gospel’, but it is not bad either. It has to help; to be helping […]”   
                   (Male, Group B2) 
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One of the opinions often mentioned was the desire for the state to make use of its under-
used real estate property assets for covering housing needs; likewise, to create a favourable 
framework for under-used asset owners to participate in such schemes e.g. to be able to 
provide low or rent-free assets but be exempt from income and real estate taxation. Also, 
for the majority of the interviewees a significant level of intervention regarding the banking 
system was deemed of high importance. 
 
Social Housing outcomes and policies 
Greek people opinions on social housing policies appeared divided.  Overall, most people 
expressed a positive to ‘I do not mind’ opinion about social housing programmes. However, 
the opinions against social housing programmes – and especially the extended ones – were 
so intense that outbalanced the neutral-to-positive opinions, qualitatively speaking. During 
the interviews it has been observed that people having personally experienced social 
housing consider it extremely positive and are willing to make use of such programmes.  
Participants’ opinions point towards an overall rudimentary (as last resort) social housing 
system and limited direct intervention from the state. In some case this was related to bad – 
mostly visual – experiences and negative opinions on past social housing programmes and 
outcomes. This may perhaps be one of the main reasons why some participants appeared 
reluctant or even negative towards the scenario making use of state-provided housing 
programmes
86
. This had mainly to do with an assumed lack of control and choice over the 
asset and the area. It is extremely noteworthy that even participants being extremely in 
favour of social housing programmes of any sort, concluded in the need for people 
supported becoming homeowners, one way or another. 
“[…] the term ‘Worker’s Residence’ (social housing), at least as it is in (our) 
mind, the way we know ‘Workers’ Houses’, is very negative; because what they 
were building as workers’ houses were boxes, so you are talking about the 
absolute degradation […] but on the other hand when you reach a point of losing 
everything for whatever the reason, instead of being on the streets, this is a good 
option. […] but OK, (it) should be decent […]”              (Male, Group B2) 
                                                 
86
 Question posed in a hypothetical manner as social housing programmes are not currently running 
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Homelessness was also discussed as something of low severity in Greece mostly regarding 
massive immigrant waves, rather than related to the country’s housing system. The 
rudimentary character of social housing is mostly linked to providing shelter and basic 
services, and avoiding public health issues. 
Almost every interviewee expressed a strong concern about the selection criteria defining 
all kinds of state support in housing. Key problems have mainly to do with allocation 
process transparency issues and deficient state control (background check) of the 
beneficiaries leading to system abuse and excluding those in real need. Even interviewees 
with an extremely positive stance towards social housing strongly voted for an 
improvement of the whole planning and management process. Another key issue has to do 
with these programmes’ limited coverage. Most interviewees seemed to consider the 
welfare state something very distant to their everyday lives, and concerning minorities and 
immigrants fitting the eligibility profile. Thus, talking about a rudimentary and extremely 
bureaucratic welfare state deterring people from aid-seeking.  
“I am not against this, as long as there is some transparency and the right 
selection criteria […] Yes, but under conditions. And it is not- without- it does 
not mean that the selection criteria have to always be the place of origin, or I 
don’t know what, ok? (Referring to refugees) […]”           (Female, Group C2) 
 
“I cannot be more in favour […] Yes, I would go […] if there was a problem, yes 
[...] I do not think it’s bad, I do not look askance at it at all. What I was looking 
askance at was the favours done, to get in there. Only this I mind. Nor I consider 
someone (living there) inferior […] No, because I have heard the line ‘Come on 
now, am I (seriously) going to live in workers’ houses?’, that’s the sense I am 
saying it.”                   (Male, Group Α2) 
 
3. Taxation of housing assets 
As mentioned before, taxation burdening on housing assets was one of the major and most 
extensively discussed topics. There is a far wider debate regarding the levels and 
methodology of Real Estate taxation in Greece, which has escalated during recent years.  
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While opinions may vary regarding the philosophy and the implementation of a tax applied 
over the total of the real estate property and its value, there are strong objections concerning 
the primary residence. First homes are considered a kind of a social good in need of 
absolute state protection, including tax-exemption.  Overall increase of the real estate 
taxation levels has proportionally impacted primary housing assets and consequently the 
vast majority of the Greek people, due to high homeownership rates. Another effect is the 
rapidly increasing socio-political upheaval as people feel one of the structural societal 
elements being deeply offended. While it would not be safe to separate the financial from 
the socio-political effect of primary residence taxation, interviews clearly showed a much 
deeper impact on the latter. 
“[…] We are accustomed to it in Greece; we have this sense of ownership very 
intensely. And especially with the House- governments change if you touch the 
Greek’s House […] Abroad, I do not believe they have this sense of ownership so 
much. They clearly see it as a place to stay- to be of good quality and cover their 
needs. Here we have kept this sense of ownership, the ‘Home, Sweet Home” […] 
I do not know if this as a holdover from the past, I have no idea. The Greek feels 
the need to keep something her own, ‘to have my House’ […] it is psychological, 
it is not something else. But you should not have- so someone living on rent for 
ten years, isn’t this her house anyway? Doesn’t she live there? Doesn’t she grow 
up there?”                   (Male, Group C2) 
Firstly, on a financial level real estate property taxation in Greece has imposed an increased 
burden on households. As expected, things are far worse for households with additional 
assets apart from the family’s primary residence. Moreover, the tax system high instability 
during the last decade has seriously disrupted the family costs budgeting and – in addition 
to other factors like income precarity – deters young people from trying to access 
homeownership, prolonging cohabitation.  Apart from instability, tax system issues criteria 
issues leads to a large number of people paying recurrent taxes on non-used and non-
exploited inherited and/or purchased assets which is clearly shrinking the family budget. 
Another systemic problem is the allocation of the tax burden. For example housing assets 
purchased with a mortgage loan during the last fifteen years, are almost always newly-built 
houses which according to current tax criteria are heavily taxed; imposing another heavy 
burden on already indebted households.  
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“[…] Yes, it’s about paying- paying rent inside my own house; I became a renter 
all over again- if you see me for example, you know I have to pay (kind of) a rent 
on top of it now […]”                  (Male, Group B2) 
 
Currently, real estate property taxes are calculated based on a state-defined list of 
objective/book real estate property values (‘antikeimenikes aksies’) which are not kept up-
to-date and not related to real market values. Post-2009 and during the Greek sovereign 
debt crisis these values ended up being far higher than market values – in many cases and 
according to area reaching a one to five ratio deviation. Keeping the tax system anchored to 
this kind of fixed pricing further enhances the sense of social injustice. 
In numerous cases where additional assets are owned, interviewees expressed a strong 
sense of injustice due to them being inherited and thus under-used and/or practically unfit 
to live in. Including inherited assets, housing and non-housing
87
 assets purchased but 
without returning income are also taxed further promoting the sense of social injustice. 
Many home-owning interviewees expressed a strong feeling of being punished for their 
tenure status, including heirs who also feel this burden inherited along with the asset(s). 
This is one of the main links between the financial and the socio-political effects of real 
estate property tax. 
On a socio-political level, Greek interviewees expressed a sense of being deeply offended 
as citizens due to primary residence taxation. Homeownership is considered a social norm, 
cultural element and prerequisite for personal and family survival and a chance on success. 
Therefore, taxing the stature rather than the incomes generated is social unacceptable and 
likely to cause strong civic opposition. This is clearly related to imputed rent theory 
analyzed earlier in the thesis, and there were some indirect links reported during the 
interviews i.e. linking primary residence taxation with imputed rent. Regardless of being a 
renter or an – outright or mortgaged – homeowner there was no variation regarding the 
primary residence taxation; while recognizing attributing financial benefits on owning 
versus renting. Overall, primary residence ownership was linked to hedging against housing 
expenses rather than a financial gain and income generation. 
                                                 
87
 Shops, offices, warehouses, land etc. purchased either as an investment effort or financial hedging method 
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“I wouldn’t want to- it bothers me very much […] it bothers me as a citizen 
mostly […] also financially […] the amount is not significant […] but it is not 
negligible either, as you said. And why pay it? it is my primary residence […] 
you know what one feels? You feel like it (the state) tells you ‘do not get a house, 
do not own a house, stay a Nomad’, let’s say or like the Roma, here and there 
[…] oh yes, as a punishment, it certainly is punishment; it certainly is a 
punishment; What else?”              (Female, Group E2) 
 
Real estate property tax aversion has strongly to do with another issue discussed later in 
this section – political opacity and tax-evasion, along with clientelism and corruption. 
People seemed far more open and positive to increased taxation if those problems were 
dealt with, and it was clear what the money are used for. However, this did not seem to 
affect primary residence taxation which in almost every case was deemed in need of strong 
state-protection. Any kind of taxation is considered by many interviewees as ending up on a 
bottomless barrel. Thus, there is a loss of link between money paid and social/welfare 
services improvement. 
In any case, there was no overall objection on real estate property being taxed. Objections 
had mostly to do with housing which is considered a social good in need of protection – 
especially the primary and secondary residences – and no-return vacant assets. Also, real 
estate property tax system fairness and implementation are causes of civic objection. In 
some cases interviewees stated that the property tax on their primary residence was not so 
significant financially, the psychological and socio-political burden was more or less the 
same nevertheless. On this matter, few people seemed to focus more on the financial aspect 
of Primary Residence taxation. 
“[...] I did mind both, but mostly I personally mind the practical part; the 
financial part that is. I am a practical man and I was bothered by the practical. I 
think it is money wasted, and I think that it is not possible buying something and 
being taxed for it, given it is yours- as a definition. But most of all, I was annoyed 
by the practical. So, if they set a tax of 1 Euro, while it would still be unethical, 
OK I wouldn’t mind.”                  (Male, Group D2) 
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What was strongly reported is that the type of real estate property tax in effect during the 
period the interviewees were conducted (Unified Real Estate Property Tax) insulted Greek 
people both on a financial (varying) and on an ethical/civic (almost uniform) level. Words 
like ‘Roguery’ and 'Big injustice’, where characteristic during the interviews and linked to 
Primary Residence taxation. 
“Big roguery […] I think (the state) puts its hand on my pocket and taking my 
money, it robs me off- [...]”                 (Male, Group Α2) 
 
 
4. Familialism in housing 
The wider family network has been reported as significantly impactful on housing 
acquisition. This was especially the case until the financial crisis where family was the 
main of not the sole pillar of housing access support. Modes of family-aid in Greece 
revolved mainly around providing money for access to mortgage loans allowing for a 
smaller amount borrowed and better loaning terms. This kind of aid allowed newer families 
to climb-up the housing market ladder and gain access to newer – and theoretically better – 
houses. However, it significantly commodified housing. Most interviewees reported living 
in a better house compared to that they grew up in. 
Family help touches a wide array of directly and indirectly housing related issues like in-
house child-care, supplementing young families’ income (e.g. food provision, loan 
repayment) etc. In some cases, interviewees reported a higher monthly family income due 
to included almost ‘standard’ parents’ in-cash monthly aid. In-house health care of older 
family members while present in case of need was not widely reported as a standard 
procedure. While the role of the family remains central on a theoretical level, on a practical 
level the potential of the family to provide housing for newer members has been 
significantly limited due to the country’s overall financial turbulences strongly affecting 
family income sources like parents’ pensions. Shrinking in family help seems to be 
specifically due to the crisis effects. 
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The role of the family was extremely crucial in further reproducing, reinforcing and 
institutionalizing homeownership and relevant mentalities. Proof of this was most 
participants stating they have been nurtured to exceptionally value and safeguard 
homeownership. However, having something to pass down to the children did not seem to 
prevail as a main factor supporting homeownership expenses, over e.g. education; though it 
was often mentioned.  
“[…] That is how we learned it. Our house is the first we can get; that will be left 
with us forever; that will be left to our children. We value it as something sacred, 
like family; that’s also what our house being our own is […]”    
                   (Male, Group Α2) 
 
“[…] Struggling, sweating to acquire a house and say, OK- which is how the 
Greek society is structured; that’s what they taught us; that we have to get a 
house- and I think it is right, its not wrong. Abroad let’s say, they do not have 
this mentality. When you strive, everybody strives for this; our parents, our 
parents’ parents, so we have a house, somewhere to live etc. and you go and hit 
there, it is at least roguery […]”                 (Male, Group Α2) 
 
“For me it is security. That if I have children I will help them as my parents 
helped me and secured me whatever each of them could~ I would like to secure 
the best I can for my children. So they do not have the stress of paying a rent, of 
finding a job- to live their life much more easily than knowing there have to be 
each month additional expenses […] maybe they will never live in this houses 
[…] at least rent it and have an income.”           (Female, Group A2) 
 
Inheritance and other kinds of family-asset transfers 
Inheritance and any kind of family-asset transfer
88
, constitute extremely important elements 
of the Greek housing system and especially Housing Familialism. Inheritance is a key route 
of accessing homeownership and a main gear of its reproduction on a societal and a market 
                                                 
88
 Parental donation, selling an asset and offer the money to the children, grant use and income of another owned asset etc. 
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level
89
. People having inherited a house themselves seem strongly more inclined to pass a 
house down to their children. This may signify that people having bought a house through 
their own savings may have a bit weaker attachment to inheritance and an ‘obligation’ to 
make their children homeowners. Although inheritance offers an immediate relief to 
housing needs, it has slowly started to be considered in some cases a burden; this especially 
the case with inherited or donated secondary homes. Indeed, inheritance and parental 
donations explain to a significant part the large number of second-house owners in Greece, 
especially in the countryside. Additional housing assets (holiday/vacation homes, 
secondary homes etc.) impose an increasing financial burden on households, due to latest 
years’ across-the-board (horizontal) increase or real estate property taxation – including 
under-used and/or vacant assets – and the country’s financial instability. On this topic, a 
number of interviewees reported being stuck with inherited or donated assets which they 
cannot sell, lease, renovate and use, or in any way dispose of them; due to low demand, 
deficient maintenance, bad condition of the asset etc. Apart from being taxed without 
generating an income, under-used dwellings relate to deadlocked capital.  
 
5. Renting versus Homeowning, and Housing mentalities 
Greek interviewees underlined the significant advantage of flexibility when renting a house. 
Often stated as the sole advantage over homeownership, flexibility is mainly linked to the 
‘privilege’ of choice. Renters are generally considered and consider themselves far less tied 
to a specific asset and/or locale, having the ‘freedom’ of leaving a specific rented house at 
practically any time and for any reason they want. That being said, this is often no more 
than an imaginary potential as it is heavily dependent on the quality of the accessible
90
 
offered stock and the level and stability of the family income. While rents have 
significantly dropped when compared to pre-crisis levels, so do family incomes, while there 
is a debate on the quality of the stock this drop refers to. Also, according to most 
interviewees there is a negative discord between the quality of rental housing offered and 
the respective rent prices. In any case, Renters are uniformly – but for a few exceptions – 
described as having more ‘freedom’ – at least in terms of (geographical) mobility. 
                                                 
89
 For the analysis of the mechanisms’ interaction, please refer to the literature review part of the thesis 
90
 'Affordable' cannot be used here. If someone has the financial capability to acquire something, then it is affordable to them 
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Inversely, this ‘mobility’ of renters is in many cases considered an element of insecurity 
and therefore is not welcome. 
“I was always of the opinion that- both me and my husband- we were always of 
the opinion that we should be somewhere having the safety of our own house, and 
not being like gypsies ((pejoratively))- you know what I mean, I do not disdain 
anyone- in a gypsy-like situation in the sense of being here and there [...]”  
                (Female, Group E2) 
On a financial level homeownership is considered incomparably less costly than renting, 
with the exception of heavily indebted homeowners. Renters are in most cases considered 
more advantageous than heavily indebted homeowners (mortgage loans in arrears).  
“Well, I think people on rent are better off people having a house on a 
(mortgage) loan, ok? From those having a house without a loan, no; I think the 
latter are better off. But (compared) to those having their own owned house on 
loan, it is better being a renter.”                (Male, Group Β2) 
 
“If you have no money, if you are unemployed, you cannot pay the rent; so are 
much more stressed; while a house, they can at most cut the power. That is, no 
one will take it from you […] It is safety ((low assertive voice)) […]”   
                (Female, Group A2) 
This however seems to be a clear effect of the financial crisis effects and the increased real 
estate taxation. Increased real estate property taxation, has introduced the majority of 
people into a reasoning of reassessing how trouble-free homeownership actually is. During 
the Greek sovereign debt crisis renters – and especially those with the financial capacity – 
seem to have improved their bargaining position on rent levels and use restrictions. 
Nevertheless, due to low Greek mortgage-loan indebtedness of homeowners (less than 20% 
of the total homeowners and  16% of the total population) and high homeownership rates, 
this change in mentality seems to have little impact on making renting more attractive. 
Primary residences and inherited assets are even less affected by this trend. Despite all 
these during an interview a former renter described herself as ‘wiser’ due his renting 
experience which helped making better choices when purchasing her own house. And this 
is an important point to consider. 
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Renting a house but not a home? 
Despite this uniformly acknowledged advantage of flexibility and the disadvantages 
attributed to homeownership, renting is considered a temporary/transitional option 
identified with specific life phases and conditions i.e. students, off-hometown and military 
employees, immigrants, people in hardship etc. There is a number for reasons for this 
homeownership preference over renting.  
Firstly, there is a uniform mentality and strong belief that money paid as a rent are 
generally ‘wasted money’. The same amount could be used either as a monthly mortgage 
loan instalment which would eventually lead to the outright ownership of the housing asset. 
Alternatively, people can extend cohabitation with the parents so as to ensure monthly 
savings until they gather the upfront amount necessary to access a mortgage loan, or until 
inheritance ‘solves’ the housing problem. Previous decades saw the comparatively ‘trouble-
free’ homeownership prevailing and dominating as the ultimate financial security, while 
renting was and still is regarded as a money-waster; albeit few exceptions. 
“I think not (many years rents did not go to waste), and I think my mother too. As 
we owned no house we somehow had to- it is absolutely normal staying in rent if 
you do not have your own house […] no, you rent a service offered. I think it’s 
very normal.”                  (Male, Group D2) 
 
 Recent years’ rise in housing asset taxation, housing price rapid over-inflation and radical 
depreciation, and the overall country-wide financial turbulence have somehow shaken and 
stained the ‘trouble-free’ profile of homeownership. Still, this is not impactful enough to 
trigger a housing system change or even near to make renting seem competitive compared 
to homeownership, yet. Without a doubt this is related to the next point. 
Secondly, there are quality issues related to the rental housing sector. There seems to be a 
perpetuating vicious circle of mistrust between Renters and Landlords/Owners and vice 
versa. Both Renters and Homeowners
91
 seem to find the rental housing sector of 
considerably lower quality in terms of value-for-money
92
 i.e. what a mortgage loan could 
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 With or without any kind of prior renting experience 
92
 On course this cannot be generalized for the total for the rental housing stock as higher-rent assets tend to be of far better 
quality. However, this does not concern the majority of people and surely not the specific interviewees 
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provide for the same or slightly higher monthly payment. From the renters’ point of view 
during the interviews landlords were mainly presented as indifferent regarding the 
condition of the asset and negligent. This was noted regardless of the case described and 
throughout the rental period. From the owners-landlords’ point of view Renters will in most 
cases be (assumingly) neglectful and damaging to the asset so there is no sense in investing 
to improve it. After leaving renters are expected to have damaged the house, so any money 
will go to properly restoring rather than upgrading it. So, landlords spend the minimum 
possible believing it is financially meaningless to do otherwise and Renters have no 
motivation to upgrade an asset it is not theirs and in many cases of a lower-than-expected 
quality. 
“As a building manager- […] the maintenance, lousy; the building maintenance, 
lousy; they do not even respect common areas. I think- not ‘think’- you think they 
have a hatred with owners; they go in and destroy everything they can, they care 
about nothing […] I think you mind (take care of) your own thing more.” 
                (Female, Group E2) 
 
Thirdly, there are issues with the legal framework on renting. On the one hand, participants 
interviewed (Renters and Homeowners) link renting to a low level of legislative protection. 
This leads to renters being susceptible to the landlords’ disposition regarding rent levels, 
maintenance and upgrade, limitations on use, eviction for owner-occupancy etc., and an 
often ‘forced’ change of house. On the other hand, Landlords describe a precarious 
situation regarding stable monthly rent payment, post-leave damages and utility bill arrears, 
bureaucratic and slow eviction processes etc. 
“[…] On the other hand there is this mentality of- regarding maintenance let’s 
say, or from a cost perspective, you do not care if it is not yours, in having some- 
or you do not have the concern of doing some improvement, some upgrade. On 
the other hand, you may have wanted to do something and thinking ‘Not being 
mine, putting some money in doing something and leave after two years; and the 
money will go to waste’ […]”                 (Male, Group D2) 
 
225 
 
The above outline and largely explain the perpetuating and self-enhancing pro-
homeownership mentality in Greece. Renters seem only able to rent just a house rather than 
a Home – despite most of them acknowledging there is no need to link home with 
ownership. Landlords’ do not seem to have any incentive to invest on and improve their 
assets under such precarious conditions. In most cases this kind of income is mostly 
supplementary and volatile. Increased taxation on rental income has made its limited 
contribution to the monthly family income even smaller, further discouraging the 
development and improvement of a private rental housing sector. 
Closing this section, for a few landlords wanting to rent assets on a more systematic 
manner and to attract a reliable but more demanding renting clientele, there is a change of 
approach that should be noted. However, housing upgrade financing programmes now in 
hibernation and an overall problematic financial context this trend has still to realize its full 
potential. 
 
6. Asset-based Welfare and Trade-off 
For most participants ownership of the primary residence is mostly a kind of welfare/social 
service covering the basic need of accommodation. The enclosed capital of the housing 
assets – with very few exceptions – is not (seriously) considered as being anytime and 
anyway available to tap into. This in turn, strongly hinders and kind of investment 
perspective linked to housing assets. The recent years’ dramatic drop of housing prices has 
a lot to do with this mentality but mostly as a reinforcing or hindering factor. The ongoing 
crisis made Greek people realize the financial risk accompanying housing asset acquisition, 
and question its hedging capacity as a savings strategy and/or an always ready-to-liquidate 
capital in case of need. Nevertheless, primary residence ownership seems far less affected 
by this indicated change in mentality mostly due to its ‘social service’ attribute.   
Apart from that, people seems willing to sell (or rent) their housing assets only to get a 
newer and better one, rather than to ensure any kind of better welfare services. Pre-crisis 
trend for more asset acquisition (land, houses etc.) was not accompanied by a clear 
management and investment risk vision. In turn, this lead to deadlocked capital value and 
assets 
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During the interviews there were no direct or indirect indications regarding the necessary 
preconditions to support the welfare trade-off theory. Homeownership appears to be 
strongly reinforced due to its potential role as a hedging mechanism. However, the specifics 
of this approach are far from defined i.e. there seems to be no specific way to do that apart 
from ensuring accommodation. Homeownership mentality is presented as being reinforced 
due to an insufficient and lacking welfare provision system, rather the other way round. 
There was no evidence or indication that people would settle for a lesser welfare state to 
ensure homeownership, which is however taken for granted.  
“If the state had made sure I would have a good wage, that I would have the 
nanny to take care of my baby, that I would have the option of going to the 
hospital without paying […] that I would have welfare provisions in general, I 
would not want to have neither a country house nor a (primary) house. this sense 
of ownership I have developed, I think is demonstrated through what I told you 
[…] it is a fail-safe because at least you know you will not end up on the streets.”
                (Female, Group E2) 
 
Housing for the majority of the participants – with few exceptions – is considered a social 
good and within the wider boundaries of the welfare state and thus in need for protection 
and promotion incentives. That being said health system, pensions, social security, 
employment and education are prioritized over housing regarding the responsibilities of the 
welfare state.  
“[…] if you told me ‘you would lose something in housing but you would gain 
something in health care, hospitals, education’, I would prefer health care.” 
                (Female, Group A2) 
 
Housing functions as the ‘wobbly pillar’ of the welfare state and in the Greek case it has 
indeed been used as a stabilizing factor in an otherwise unstable welfare provision system. 
Focusing mainly and almost exclusively to the primary residence, this was especially valid 
in the past and seems to keep much of its ‘social hue’ today, despite the recent years’ 
radical reforms of the welfare state. 
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Compared to other welfare state services housing seems to have been the most accessible 
for the family network combined with market forces, to affect and influence. Thus, despite 
an otherwise ‘insufficient’ welfare system housing seemed to somehow work. Today, 
Greek people consider housing a responsibility of the state to a large part and especially 
about the primary residence protection and promotion. However, hopes for improvement in 
the immediate future are extremely low. 
 
7. Mortgage Loan market realities and perspectives 
Greek people are more exposed to mortgage loans compared to Bulgarian people, and this 
had also been reflected in the interviews. Mortgaged homeowners participating in the 
research did not express any specific complaints about the level of the monthly instalment, 
with some exceptions mainly related to an abrupt drop in the family income. People’ stories 
verify the bank’s openness and carelessness in granting higher and more loans during the 
2000-2010 decade
93, with little attention to borrower’s actual repaying capacity. Despite 
criticism there has been not specific negative stance towards mortgage loans. However, 
people interviewed and having almost repaid their loan are not willing to re-engaged with 
some similar process – either to get a better and newer house or purchase another type of 
real estate property. What seems to deter active and prospective borrowers is mostly related 
to an overall employment and income precarity, rather than bank-specific issues like 
interest rates. Debt-free homeowner interviewees consider themselves lucky, regardless of a 
mortgage loan offering the chance to gain access to or improve housing. 
Banks have been seriously criticizes regarding their stance on credit provision. Easy loans 
led to an over-inflation of house prices
94
, suppression of the rental housing sector 
development and a society-wide consumerist mentality which affected housing in multiple 
ways. Most participants seemed to agree with stricter lending criteria, both as bank and 
social protection measure. Same goes for participants indifferent to the social aspect; banks 
are no charity institutions so less and healthier loans will be good for the business. Most 
mortgaged homeowners somehow expected banks to be more sensitive to their hardship 
                                                 
93
 Before that mortgage loans were hard to get (criteria) and limited in coverage (percentage of the total amount needed). Even 
loans granted by the former Workers House Organization (favourable terms) were not enough to cover the whole amount and an 
additional bank loan would be necessary 
94
 Which is considered by many as the 2000-2010 Greek Housing bubble. For a discussion on this issue please refer to the 
literature review section 
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and examine on a case-by-case basis. This view seems especially reinforced by the fact that 
most Greeks hold the banking system – even partially – responsible for their indebtedness. 
For most interviewees a significant level of state intervention in the banking system has 
been stated as desired and necessary. 
It should be noted that given the low percentage of mortgaged homeowners, some 
participants’ negative opinion towards banks should have been largely formed due to the 
overall loan indebtedness and not housing loans specifically. Pre-2000 and back, mortgage-
based lending was inaccessible for a large part of the society. Often, construction 
transactions mainly involved some kind of agreement between the constructor and the 
buyer, land-owner or employer
95. According to the interviewees’ experiences the pre-2000 
era provided better chances for savings and borrowing-repaying loans, especially through 
state-promoted incentives and reliefs. Nevertheless, older generations are considered 
having been more accustomed to a financially restrained’ life which led them to 
homeownership. 
 
8. Lobbying for housing issues and Civic Engagement 
The general outcome of the Greek interviews regarding civic Engagement – albeit some 
exceptions – is the overall positive alignment of people towards civic movements and 
initiatives. Claiming the rights to better housing condition is considered extremely 
important and necessary in almost every case, and especially regarding the primary 
residence. Regardless of age, participants expressed the desire for an expansion and 
intensification of civic engagement. However, the positive disposition towards civic 
movements in the majority of cases is exhausted on a theoretical discussion rather than 
some actual participation. In fact, few interviewees mentioned involvement – past or 
current – in any kind of civic initiative of any kind and scope. One of the main hindrances 
is people’s fear of political parties and their mechanisms always permeating all kinds of 
citizen movement, rendering them ‘impure’96 in scope and approach. Therefore, even 
people with a strong participation dynamic expressed extreme reluctance to step up and be 
involved. Even at the slightest indication or suspicion concerning political clientelism 
                                                 
95
 Indicating some kind of ‘bank-less’ market 
96
 Clientelistic, corrupted etc. 
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people will refrain from or quit participating, as only a small minority of the participants 
has some actually gain. 
“[…] I am generally annoyed with things being directed by political offices- […] 
if it wasn’t under such a logic and fixed mentalities, yes gladly; it would be a 
very pleasant, i.e. a very good approach, but I do not know if something like that 
could exist in Greece.”                 (Male, Group D2) 
 
 Secondly, regardless of political interference there is a common belief that civic 
movements – even ‘pure’ ones – are doomed to fail. However, young people feel slightly 
more optimistic about the future of such movements. Linking weak civic engagement to 
expectations, it seems that low participation levels further reinforce disappointment and 
suppress expectation regarding the role of the state in housing. 
“[…] I would participate, simply having in the back of my mind that we are not 
going to do anything through this […] I am very disappointed. I would just- only 
to- not to revolt- only to say that ‘Yes, I (tried) too’ […]”          (Male, Group A2) 
 
 
6.4   Conclusion: Discussion Highlights 
The present chapter has been rather extensive on its scope covering both quantitative and 
qualitative data analysis. As the final and detailed juxtaposition and combination of the 
results will take place in the final chapter, I prefer to visualize some data-generated 
highlights. Referring to figure 3.1 (Chapter 3) I argue that homeownership in both countries 
has moved away from its 'social' character and gradually towards a more 'market-based' 
homeownership. This is on the one hand due to seriously weakened state support and 
protection in Bulgaria, and a radical increase in housing costs in Greece, post-1990 but 
especially during the last ten years. Putting together Housing Experts and People opinions 
the following two diagrams emerge, showing the housing systems evolution as perceived 
by them and also based on their housing experiences.  
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Figure 6.24 - Evolution and Consolidation of Homeownership in Bulgaria and Greece, according to Housing 
Experts (source: Author) 
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Figure 6.25 - Links between different housing related concepts, according to People Interviews in Bulgaria and 
Greece (source: Author) 
232 
 
Table 6.20 has been based on Bulgarian and Greek people opinions on various risks and 
dependencies related to homeownership and renting. 'Guests' refer to people cohabitating 
with the homeowners, mainly adult children. From this table is evident that dependency on 
income is very high regardless of existing mortgage. Due to severe drop in house prices 
during the last 5 years, Greek Homeowners are subject to capital value loss should they 
decide or need to sell their home. Bulgarian Homeowners on the other hand feel more 
exposed to quality issues, which agrees with the overall discussion on the housing quality 
issues in Bulgaria. Concurring with observations on increased property taxation, Greek 
Homeowners are subject to taxation burden, which is overall high except very old and 
comparatively smaller houses. For Bulgarian and Greek Guests, inheritance seems the main 
means to access better housing conditions. Table 6.20 relates to some of the points 
mentioned in the following Table 6.21, which is obviously far more extensive, including all 
themes discussed.  
According to the above diagrams it is clear that there is a connection between housing-
homeownership and welfare. Weak social housing and welfare state seem to enhance the 
role of homeownership as a welfare backup. This is also supported by section C in Table 
6.21. Homeownership is strongly perceived as social good that should be protected and 
allowed to be provided, although the ways this should be done are rarely clear and defined. 
People in both countries have low expectations on state-aid regarding housing. Desired 
intervention dominantly regard ensured access to homeownership for those without and 
strong protective framework for existing homeowners (Table 6.21, Section E). and weak 
civic dynamics do not help towards claiming such interventions from the public sector 
(Table 6.21, section F). 
The modern era has certainly moved housing provision closer to pre-commodification in 
both countries but for different reasons. Bulgarian citizens are exposed to risks related to 
costs regarding the maintenance and upgrade of their homes. This is strongly dependent on 
their income and usually out of reach for the average citizen. Greek citizens face severe 
housing costs burdens mostly related to rapidly increased taxation during the crisis' years. 
With low incomes and increasing needs in terms of housing maintenance, outright 
homeownership has already started to show its limitations as a factor of housing 
decommodification. 
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Table 6.20 - Risks and Dependencies per Tenure, as understood by Bulgarian and Greek People (source: author) 
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Table 6.21 - Comparative Thematic Table based on Bulgarian and Greek People Interviews (source: author) 
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Closing Remarks 
Regarding the Bulgarian housing policy the strongest driver for change (evolutionary) is the 
Socialist-Communist era housing legacy stock with its pronounced and fairly obvious 
physical issues. For Greece it is more proper to talk about a transition phase to a 
significantly more commodified homeownership, losing much of its former function as a 
social welfare provision. With such high homeownership rates, real estate taxation seems 
the key catalyst in transforming the debt-free social homeownership imputed rent (as a kind 
of social housing allowance) to taxable capital. For both countries a strong and effective 
new housing policy will be undoubtedly required; in Bulgaria to promote, coordinate and 
optimise physical interventions coordinating the private and the public sectors, and in 
Greece to create responsive and effective systemic absorbers like bolstering an attractive 
private rental sector, and making use of the available and underused housing assets. 
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Chapter 7 – Conclusions and Discussion 
 
7.1   Introduction  
In this final chapter elements from different parts of the thesis are brought together in a 
dialectic manner in order to give coherent and clear answers on questions set according to 
the Research Design phase. Moreover, topics of interest that emerged during the research 
are likewise discussed herein. Aggregating findings and data from the whole research will 
often make hard to discern whether discussed conclusions or opinions have been based on 
quantitative statistics or qualitative data, in a clean-cut manner. The chapter is divided in 
three conceptual parts. Research hypotheses, objectives and questions set in chapter 4 are 
being analyzed first. Secondly, I discuss on the themes which emerged during the research 
as a result of the Research Design (see Chapter 4). For the conclusion, I argue on certain 
issues keeping a forward-looking approach. 
 
7.2   Assessment on Research Objectives 
1. Assess absolute (compared to EU) and relative “under-performance” or “over-
performance”, in terms of housing outcomes  
When assessing housing outcomes it is hardly possible or even appropriate to seek giving a 
single answer including all aspects of a housing system. This is also the case for Bulgaria 
and Greece. Housing outcomes regard multiple aspects of the housing realities, having 
different driving forces and repercussions. In some matters personal opinions and 
experiences seem to shape what is 'good', 'bad', 'preferred', 'sufficient', 'satisfactory' etc. For 
example people in a society may very well consider satisfactory housing of smaller or 
larger space than standards set in international data collection processes. Moreover, what is 
considered sufficient in one country may not be so in another. Mainly drawing from the 
analysis in Chapter 6 there is a number of conclusions that can be drawn. 
Outright homeownership persists as the main means of protection against homelessness 
risks. It also functions as a counter against a practically non-existent welfare state regarding 
housing provision and newer households' access to housing. High outright homeownership 
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keeps the Bulgarian and Greek housing systems relatively more 'decommodified' when 
compared to other European countries. That being said, more Greek people are exposed to 
mortgage loans than in Bulgaria. 
In terms of housing stock condition, both Bulgaria and Greece have lower percentages of 
older buildings compared to other European countries examined. The age of the stock does 
not appear to be an issue in the two countries. However, Bulgaria has serious issues with 
the condition of the dwellings due to construction quality during the Soviet era. This is 
something that repeatedly came up during the interviews with housing experts and people 
in Bulgaria. There is a constant unrest, concern and insecurity related to the housing 
conditions of people residing in housing units belonging to large housing estates, legacy of 
the Socialist times. These are linked to issues with maintenance and upgrade of the stock, 
heating costs, communication and agreement with other apartment owners.  
In Greece on the other hand do not seem concerned with issues relating to the physical 
condition of their assets. This of course is linked to the overall better condition of 
condominium housing built during the last decades, compared to Bulgaria. That being said, 
based on personal observation and experience, the overview of the housing stock is urban 
areas does not excuse such an absence of this issues from interviews. Not all dwellings are 
in top condition, and there is a certain need for maintenance and upgrade of the majority of 
the occupied stock, albeit not even comparable to the Bulgarian case. Greek people heavily 
preoccupied with financial issues burdening their housing condition. This is clearly 
reflected on statistical data presented in Chapter 6 describing the radically increased 
financial burden imposed on housing during the Greek financial crisis. This of course is due 
to a radically increased property taxation, combined with severe drop in GDP per capita 
and household incomes and wealth. 
In both countries the feeling of disappointment with the involvement of the state in housing 
matters is especially intense and had been expressed in almost every interview and 
occasion. However, I discerned an underlying difference between the two countries. 
Bulgarian people, however disappointed with the 'absence' of the state post-1990 in housing 
provision, seem to actually expect the state to step in at some point. Moreover, there is a 
more or less dormant demand from Bulgarians for state intervention. On the other hand, 
Greeks seem to avoid any involvement with the state whatever the case, of course including 
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housing. Even in the few cases Greek people expressed their desire for the state to do 
something, this seemed somehow driven by the flow of the discussion rather than anything 
more. This has also been reflected in answers regarding the willingness to participate in 
civic movements related to improving housing conditions in any way. I discerned a slightly 
stronger dynamic within the Bulgarian society. Housing experts followed this trend as in 
Bulgaria experts seem more engaged and willing to speak up and actively participate. 
Greek experts on the other hand seem to support state involvement mostly based on their 
professional or academic knowledge and rationality supporting such opinions. I have no 
doubt this is strongly related to the way the housing systems were formed during the years, 
despite some common elements like high outright homeownership. The Bulgarian system 
has been permeated by the Socialist state, where the role and presence of the state 
mechanisms was explicit and mostly unavoidable. Housing was of course included in this 
system, even though homeownership became dominant even since the 50's. This past 
experience is still persistent in middle and older ages of interviewees. This in no way 
signifies Bulgarian people desire any kind of return to Socialist patterns, and Bulgarians 
want to have full control over their housing conditions. 
The Greek housing system on the other hand has been allowed to form setting its own rules 
regulating the mechanisms of housing self-provision early post-War and later on with the 
increasing involvement of a gradually more active but small construction sector. During 
this evolution the ever-present state - albeit away from direct involvement - offered a 
framework which allowed self-provision mechanisms to function. This way, early post-War 
acute housing needs were more or less covered. Till today the Greek state has not been able 
to deal with housing construction informalities carried forward from previous eras. 
Drawing from the interviews with Greek people, discussing about involvement of the state 
in housing was borderline mocked and certainly unwelcome.  
In both countries, housing is considered as a deeply personal and family matter, but in a 
different way. Bulgarians expect the state to fulfil its obligation by ensuring a framework 
which allows housing familialist provision, and protect homeownership thereafter. Greek 
people expect the state to keep off anything that may disrupt the way the housing system 
has functioned all these decades through the interaction of family and market. 
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The assumption that the previous functioning of the housing market and system in Greece 
was more or less sustainable can to a certain degree be understood but remains a dangerous 
one. Indeed the pre-crisis housing system seemed to have reached equilibrium and a certain 
degree of efficiency. After all the large part of the population had its own owned house, and 
the overall housing conditions were far from abysmal. The average Bulgarian and Greek 
household owns almost one and a half dwelling, higher than the other European countries 
examined. 
When compared to the EU-28 average and the rest of the EU countries examined, Bulgaria 
and Greece seem to lack overall dwelling space, with the latter faring clearly better. This 
dwelling space under-performance also regards Bulgarian and Greek homeowners with 
mortgage or loan who do not occupy significantly larger space compared to the respective 
outright homeowners (Fig. 6.5). This can be attributed to the fact that credit for housing 
came at a time of increased housing prices, limiting access to larger units. 
Interesting enough Bulgaria and Greece present high rates of unoccupied and under-
occupied dwellings, as examined in Chapter 6. In statistical terms, this may at a first glance 
be deemed as sign of housing over-supply. Again, this is a case where such overview 
statistics cannot perfectly serve each housing system differences and details. In Bulgaria 
under-occupancy is linked to serious demographic shifts. Bulgarian people and housing 
experts repeatedly expressed their concern for the significant demographic shrinkage due to 
emigration, and its effects on housing conditions. Large numbers of housing units are now 
left vacant as their owners leave the country to seek better life chances in foreign countries. 
This affects the degradation of under-occupied and under-maintained housing units. 
Especially in Legacy housing estates, vacancies create problems to other owners trying to 
reach an agreement regarding common areas and the building as a whole. In Greece, under-
occupancy mostly relates to secondary housing in the countryside, due to inheritance or 
bought for holiday use. However, vacancies become an increasing problem also in the 
Athens centre (Kanellis, 2017b). Countryside houses are also a strong factor of vacancies in 
Bulgaria. What is not clear is whether the excessive stock is able to enter the market, and 
under which conditions. According to the interview findings for example, most countryside 
and vacation homes either due to their physical condition or location, are deemed unfit to 
enter the market and be offered for first time buyers. The same goes for owner-occupiers 
who may want to move.  
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However, and especially in urban areas, there is a significant part of newly-built stock in 
multi-family buildings which remains out-of-reach for the majority of the average 
Bulgarian and Greek citizen. Due to lower and unstable incomes, working and middle class 
people cannot afford these better homes. On the other hand, upper-class people prefer lower 
densities in suburb housing areas. Therefore, large part of the post-2000 housing stock now 
remains 'unwanted' and de facto out-of-market, contributing to vacancy rates. 
As shown in chapter 6, relatively analyzed it can be said that both systems 'succeeded' in 
preventing homelessness in its classic sense i.e. have people in the streets, while 
establishing socio-political order which could not be otherwise ensured in a weak welfare 
state. The big question here is ‘at what cost’? Overcrowding and extended intergenerational 
cohabitation and low mobility provide some evidence on that. Even though mobility cannot 
be directly linked to housing system performance, it may indicate a lower chance of 
experiencing better housing conditions. From this point of view both Bulgaria and Greece 
underperform compared to EU-28 mobility averages (see Fig. 6.13). However, this is 
somehow expected in countries with high homeownership rates and is further hindered by 
underdeveloped housing credit systems and market. Bulgaria is overall more overcrowded 
than Greece; and both of them compared to EU-28 and the rest of the selected EU countries 
(Fig. 6.14). When compared to other tenures in Bulgaria, outright homeowners fare better. 
In both countries, very low rates of homelessness have significantly contributed to the low 
dynamic on discussions concerning the improvement of the housing system. Even the 
Financial crisis has slightly affected homelessness in Bulgaria and Greece. Although in the 
latter, NGOs and newspaper articles refer to gradually increasing numbers of homeless 
people and far more in precarious housing (Sotirchou, 2016), albeit not comparable to other 
European countries. Moreover, homelessness has historically been linked to cases of 
extremely marginalized poor people with serious health problems, and no family to take 
care of them. In terms of housing affordability, price-to-income ratio is often used. As 
shown on table 6.10 (Chapter 6), Bulgaria and Greece are in good standing compared to 
other European countries. However, the situation in Greece is a bit different that what this 
ratio can tell. Radically increased recurrent property taxation costs during the last five 
years, have severely affected the cost of ownership.  
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2. Present evidence on State-Market-Family triangle interactions, shifts and 
transformations regarding housing welfare  
When examining the interactions of actors and institutions within the state-market-triangle 
regarding housing welfare, the time factor needs to be seriously taken into consideration. In 
both Bulgaria and Greece, the dominant player in the housing provision is the family 
network. From a historical retrospective Bulgaria has seen this housing familialism 
radically rise mostly since few years before 1990, while in Greece this goes back to almost 
immediately post-War. Nevertheless, it would be false to equate the two housing systems 
based on family-based housing provision. On the one hand, characterization does not say 
much about the mixture of various actors' participation in housing provision. Even though 
the family remains central, its strategy varies and tries adapting to shifting dynamics. As 
shown in previous chapters, the role of the state and the market has changed during the 
decades, and in turn caused the change in family housing strategies. Since 1990s the role of 
the market was mostly that of the 'constructor'. Small-scale constructors covered local 
housing needs, mainly driven by family housing demands. In early post-War decades the 
family network contributed not only in money but also in labour. Post-1995 with the 
gradual expansion of the housing credit, market's role changed providing access to housing 
through purchase from the available stock. In Bulgaria the main difference concerned the 
construction of urban housing which led to a legacy of massive housing estates from the 
Socialist era. Inheritance and Parental Grants and Donations, have historically persisted as 
the key-tool in ensuring housing for younger generations, regardless of construction trends. 
Today, there seems to be a strengthening of housing familialism as a reaction to the global 
financial crisis effects on incomes. That being said, there are indications of changing trends, 
especially in Greece, and remains to be seen if and how family strategies will adapt and 
evolve. While in previous decades housing familialism was strongly characterized by 
transfer of any available assets, such dynamics have been severely hindered and almost put 
on hold, due to rapid increase in property taxation. Increase in one-time asset-donation tax 
render such transfers unattractive amid a seriously unstable Greek financial climate. 
Moreover, recurrent property taxation makes ownership to-be-avoided for younger 
generations struggling with unemployment, underpayment and unstable income. So, 
housing asset transfers mostly regard inheritance due to parents passing out, or houses that 
'worth it' and younger owners can pay to keep. In the majority of cases though, cohabitation 
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tries to absorb system shocks affecting younger people accessing proper housing. 
Nevertheless, it should noted that cohabitation levels are high across Europe, with 
increasing trends during the crisis. Therefore, it is not exclusive to southern European 
countries (Malik, 2014). 
In Bulgaria, the picture is somehow different as the lack of tax burden has still to become 
heavy. The main issue there regards younger people leaving the country to find better 
employment and improve income levels. Family houses are either left vacant or used by the 
family left behind. The low capital value of the majority of outright owned houses, seems 
to be the main force keeping them from being sold. As most secondary houses are not 
viable option for primary housing, Bulgarians own underused houses that are in no 
condition to cover basic family housing needs. Simply put, accessing newer and better 
housing will require savings combined with selling existing owned house. The role of the 
state in housing provision and System has also changed during the decades in the two 
countries. This is actually a major point of discrepancy between Bulgarian and Greek case, 
albeit some similarities. Strongly driven by the communist political ideology, the Bulgarian 
Socialist state tried to deal with and cover housing needs by undertaking massive housing 
estate construction until 1975 when it gradually started diminishing its direct involvement 
and expenditure, but retaining strong control over housing production and market operation 
until 1990. The decade that followed the Bulgarian state completely retreated from housing 
provision, under the internal and external pressure for facilitating laissez-faire market 
operation on every financial field. Today, the Bulgarian state shows some reluctant signs of 
reaction to an extremely active community of housing academics and professionals. This is 
mainly fuelled by a long-lasting concern regarding the physical condition of legacy housing 
assets, and society demands for improvement of housing conditions overall. Housing policy 
is still considered lacking, and at best fragmented. There is a hesitantly increasing effort to 
absorb European energy upgrade funds more effectively, which is has yet to find a pace. 
Lack of institutional framework to support participation in building upgrade programmes, 
extended vacancies, and bureaucratic perplexities deter sufficient use of available funds. 
Until 2016, very few buildings had been improved using such funds.  
The Greek state followed a different path. Bolstering outright homeownership through 
family own means early post-War, and consistently protecting its status the following 
decades. The construction sector as key player of the housing market, supported family 
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strategies for housing acquisition, especially since 1995. This if course, was allowed based 
on favourable regulatory and taxation framework, which was the case until few years 
before the 2010 Greek debt crisis. 
In Bulgaria and Greece housing has historically consisted key element - a term - of the 
'Social Contract'. This was directly and deterministically tied to outright homeownership, 
which became a cornerstone of these housing systems since the early post-War era. Today, 
both countries seem to lack a structured, coherent and in many cases evident housing 
policy. This is very much due to extended outright homeownership, which largely covers 
up underlying housing system and welfare issues. Without significant homelessness rates 
compared to other western European countries, housing has until recently been generally 
deemed as 'not a problem'. The main concern regarded how soon younger people would 
become owners and create their own family, as the two are very much linked. Nevertheless, 
interest in housing matters is bound to expand in both countries but for different reasons. 
That being said, I do not expect radical changes in housing policy anytime soon, but rather 
reactive ad-hoc policies when situation reaches a critical point. Eventually, housing policy 
will emerge as something coherent in both systems, but it is almost impossible to predict 
when and how, as political and financial macro-status is currently extremely volatile. 
The housing market in both Bulgaria and Greece has entered and deep slumber since 2008, 
as the combined effect of extended outright homeownership, unstable income flows even 
before the financial crisis rendering housing credit unattractive, and the eventual drop in 
demand. Despite low housing prices, internal demand remains persistently low. Even in 
Greece where price have on average dropped three to fivefold, transactions keep declining. 
With grim perspective for financial growth so as to trigger a housing market reboot, foreign 
capital is presented as an obvious way out. Nevertheless, such demand will most probably 
target high-profile housing assets and especially in vacation destinations (Smith, 2014). 
Bolstering the growth of the relatively small Greek and extremely small Bulgarian rental 
sector could in theory absorb large part of the housing assets now left unwanted. However, 
this will required strong state-driven incentives and a wider shift in societal perceptions, 
which currently are strongly against renting. 
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3.   Decode the institutional particularities in these two countries in terms of mode and 
function (e.g. clientelistic & familialist networks, homeownership, secondary houses) linked 
to housing welfare 
When applying the theory analyzed in Chapter 2 regarding institutional interaction, some 
interesting conclusions can be drawn for the countries examined. During the Socialist 
times, the Bulgarian state was the dominant housing provider until c. 1980 where it 
gradually started its retrenchment. During that era the state institutions were dominating 
housing provision either directly or indirectly, with the familialist provision functioning as 
a supplement covering needs not satisfied otherwise. This mainly regarded housing outside 
the urban context and unrelated to Socialist employment schemes. After 1990 the state 
evidently abandoned housing provision, leaving the housing system in a flux. Soon, 
housing familialism became dominant and worked in Synergy with the newly re-born 
housing market. The state mechanism wherever still present contributed to institutional 
compatibility with the utmost goal to preserve socio-political stability. 
In Greece institutional interaction followed a different path. Family, market and the state 
through its institutions reached an 'equilibrium' early on by establishing compatibility. With 
the state in the background setting the framework, family and the market worked in strong 
Synergy early post-War and since the 1970 where they gradually transitioned to Coherence.  
Whether such paths led to increased efficiency is certainly open to debate, still 
inconclusive. Considering efficiency in terms of covering basic housing needs, regardless 
of quality, then yes, both Systems have historically performed. But whether the systems 
will still be able to perform given the changing requirements is seriously contested. Even 
though it is not fair using modern standards to assess housing systems with such deep roots 
in history, their capacity to perform is something worth examining. With only the family 
remaining as the main player in both systems, institutional interaction is severely hindered. 
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4.  Explain Housing Policy and the State’s role by employing the Esping-Andersen Welfare 
Regimes, Housing Corporatism and Varieties of Capitalism frameworks (multi-approach) 
Employing the extended welfare regime framework, some interesting case-specific 
conclusions can be drawn, regarding housing policy and the role of the state. To begin with, 
housing policy has always been present in one way or another. I do not agree with the 
statement that housing policy is 'absent' in Bulgaria and Greece. This is just the perceived 
effect of the official state deciding the ways and level of involvement in housing. 
Homeownership in its various modes, has been and still constitutes a potent political tool 
and social peace moderator.  
Both Bulgaria and Greece followed paths towards outright homeownership, and certainly 
sooner than their typically set country-groups. In Bulgaria this path bore the Socialist 
ideology and served the respective socio-political goals. In Greece people where allowed 
and indirectly empowered to build and own. In both cases, housing was not regarded or 
treated as a commodity, regardless of the regulatory framework and the kind of rights it 
offered. That being said housing was adding to the household property, but in most cases 
this was just a matter of accounting and written numbers. Household wealth, was rarely 
improved through this process, even after the initial financial burden had been overcome. 
This is pretty much the situation still today. Even in cases of secondary houses owned, 
enclosed wealth is not easy to release, and when necessary usually sold with value loss. 
Housing was intended to be de-commodified until circa 1995, and had been always treated 
as such. In Bulgaria this was being ensured through heavy state regulation controlling 
market interactions. This gradually loosened from 1980 and on, leading to the 
'liberalization' of the market post-1990. In Greece, the family was at the core of covering 
housing needs and almost certainly linked to financial 'sacrifices'. The available resources 
were not unlimited and soon tied to the housing asset. This led to a kind of 'sanctification' 
of the house as a token of family efforts and symbol of social achievement. Of course the 
historically turbulent macro-economy in Greece, did not help younger generations escape 
the pattern. In both countries, post-1990 generations had an overall difficulty acquiring 
their own house, regardless of family resources available. Therefore, familialism became 
severely limited to inheritance and any mode of the kind.  
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In both countries, homeownership was linked to wealth distribution in all social classes, 
nevertheless preserving inequalities. Homeownership in lower-to-middle classes was far 
less liquefiable and outside the market. Moving up the ladder, decommodification 
weakened and assets were easier to hold their value. For the state, promoting 
homeownership in both countries had multiple advantages. Apart from covering housing 
needs, homeownership has worked as a great booster of the construction industry. Even 
though this happened differently in Bulgaria (state control) and Greece (family-market 
initiative), the growth fuelled by construction was equally significant. Housing construction 
involved a high number of professions to which it provided employment and income. 
Protecting and further promoting outright homeownership allowed to keep people off the 
streets, therefore preserve social peace which could otherwise be seriously jeopardized. It 
also allowed family resource pooling towards covering welfare needs for its financially 
weaker members.  
The Bulgaria and Greek housing systems developed distant to their welfare regimes, and 
mostly as a counter to lacklustre welfare state provision. While the latter can be deemed 
fitting the 'Mediterranean' and 'Post-socialist' types, housing regimes deviate in two major 
issues. Decommodification of Housing has historically been and still is high compared to 
EU levels. Even though this has not been achieved through 'western Europe' means, it was 
such nonetheless. High regulatory protection until few years before the GFC has supported 
this model pretty effectively. In Greece also pension schemes have historically been used at 
least partially as a means to housing self-provision for younger family members. Even 
shadow economy has historically supported the same goal in both countries. Pension 
schemes are currently weak in both countries and expected to go on down this path. This is 
also deviates from the Esping-Andersen typology bringing Bulgaria and Greece closer in 
terms of ideal-types.  
Attempting to juxtapose housing systems with welfare regimes, while showing the change 
from the pre-1990s status towards the modern era, the following table comes up. For this, I 
am referring to Hoekstra's table (2003, p.62; also see Appendix I, Figure I.1). Interpreting 
the table, it is clear that Bulgaria made a significant leap from a largely Social-democratic 
direction towards a Liberal ideology and practice. Greece on the other hand presented a 
more mixed Corporatist-Liberal profile since post-War and pre-1990 and thus transition 
towards a Liberal-heavy profile does not theoretically seem so pronounced. Similarities 
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pre-1990 became significant in state and price regulation, housing policy and subsidies 
mostly the 1980-1990 decade. Decommodification remains a common element of the two 
housing systems throughout the years. Post-1990 the similarities between the two systems 
increased in number and clarity. It is pretty safe to conclude that we are talking about two 
very similar housing systems with different housing outcomes.  
 
 Pre-1990 Post-1990 
Bulgaria 
Decommodification Social Democratic Corporatist 
Stratification 
Social-Democratic (wide 
population), Corporatist (elite) 
Liberal (newer stock)  
State-Market-
Family 
Social-democratic 
Corporatist (old stock), Liberal 
(newer stock) 
State regulation 
Social-democratic early post-
War, Corporatist later 
Corporatist in ideology, Liberal 
in practice 
Housing Policy 
Social-democratic in theory, 
Corporatist in practice 
Corporatist in ideology, Liberal 
in practice 
Subsidization 
Social-democratic early post-
War, Corporatist later 
Liberal 
Price regulation 
Social-democratic early post-
War, Corporatist later 
Liberal 
Allocation 
Social-democratic in theory, 
Corporatist in practice 
Liberal 
Housing Provision Social-democratic Liberal 
 
Greece 
Decommodification Social Democratic Corporatist 
Stratification Liberal 
Liberal for newly-built stock and 
homeownership outsiders 
State-Market-
Family  
Corporatist 
Corporatist (old stock), Liberal 
(newer stock) 
State regulation Corporatist Liberal 
Housing Policy  Corporatist 
Corporatist in ideology, Liberal 
in practice 
Subsidization Corporatist Liberal 
Price regulation Liberal Liberal 
Allocation Liberal Liberal 
Housing Provision Corporatist Liberal 
 
 
Table 7.1 - Bulgarian and Greek Housing System Typology Transition (source: author) 
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Both countries seem problematic regarding the consistency between theory and practice in 
their housing policy. Without a doubt this is related to the discontinuity and fragmentation 
of housing policy, resembling a mosaic of uncoordinated housing-affecting regulations 
from numerous policy spheres – often hard to trace, operating mostly in an ambulance 
intervention fashion. Moreover this is also related to the importance of housing in the 
Social Contract and the severe effects in terms of political cost (see chapter 3). Moreover, 
stratification is not exactly copying occupational status, and is fairly blurred in middle to 
lower social classes. However, housing familialism remains the linking element with such 
classifications. Nevertheless, looking beyond that a big question is whether society is ready 
to change such patters i.e. if familialism has reached a dead-end. Welfare state has been 
absent from housing for many decades, which seem to have forced housing familialism to 
develop and later become institutionalized as a housing provision channel. The welfare 
regimes of Bulgaria and Greece seem also to have entered a similar typology spectrum, 
with observed convergence trends. The overall liberalization of their market and the 
continuous search for public revenue, have moved the Greek housing system towards pre-
commodification. Even though not still there, if the macro-economic status and the housing 
policy in Bulgaria do not change, I expect a similar development. Overall though, one of 
the major issues is that past typologies seemed to explain what i.e. status, rather than why 
i.e. underlying mechanics. Path-dependency for example is often invoked as the 
explanation while the roots of the issue lie even deeper. 
Housing Corporatism in Bulgaria could not be present in the Socialist context and 
especially regarding housing which was centrally controlled. Post-1990, I could not deduce 
a concrete picture on lobbying around housing system evolution. The overall laxity of the 
state and the marketization of housing can be attributed to an overall social demand - also 
reinforced by extra-national forces - towards favouring neo-liberalism on all fronts. During 
Socialist times housing did not enter bargains, even though political elite often enjoyed 
better housing options, but as a collateral gain of political influence. 
Housing Corporatism in Greece has been characterized by the strong pressing forces both 
from the family and the market poles. During the early post-War era combined lobbying of 
the two poles, contributed to the state allowing laxity in construction modes and urban 
planning regulation. As the System transitioned to a more stable phase, normalization of 
irregularities was also formed under the pressure of electorate will and construction sector 
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as a great contributor in national financial growth. Post-1990 the market forces did not help 
the creation of a proper regulatory framework regarding mortgage lending, as it would be 
then considered against l' esprit du temps. This eventually led to over-exposure of 
mortgaged homeowners which currently consists one of the biggest problems of the Greek 
housing and banking System. Nevertheless, it would be too farfetched claiming the 
lobbying was targeting housing in a conscious manner and following a plan. On a small 
local authority scale and during older times, pressure from local constructors and the 
community had been direct and immediate, and often through clientelistic channels. On a 
national level pressure was mostly related to electorate satisfaction and financial growth 
through the construction sector. 
In the VoRC Bulgaria and Greece do not currently seem to tick all the boxes. Familialism 
and low mortgaging are valid indicators still, but it would be wrong to blindly classify these 
countries. On the one hand the mortgage market had a significant momentum from 2000 
and since the GFC spill-over effects, which showed a transition towards liberal routes on 
that matter. This was mainly the case with Greece, but also Bulgaria showed similar signs. 
It is rather safe to assume that such momentum will eventually recover. This will also 
increase exposure to mortgage loans moving the system out widespread decommodification 
towards pre-commodification and perhaps even further. From a typology perspective (see 
Appendix I, Figure I.2) both the Bulgarian and Greek housing systems seem to fit the 
Familialist VoRC type, things are somehow complicated though. For example, housing is 
strongly considered a social right by the society as a whole. Interesting enough, this 
emerges even more pronounced in phases where housing security is jeopardized. Apart 
from that, homeowners and renters uncoordinated and often antagonistic, with system 
outsiders have issues entering accessing housing. Therefore, and if classification is of the 
essence, Bulgaria moved from Statist-developmentalist towards the Familial ideal-type, but 
keeping the 'social right' element of housing and low property tax revenue. Greece still lies 
somewhere between the Corporatist and Familial ideal-typical model, currently adding 
high property taxation as a Liberal element having moved the system strongly towards pre-
commodification and high tax returns. Admittedly, the only strong connection with the 
Liberal Market type is high property taxation which only recently emerged. However this is 
a significant change with severe foreseeable impact in the housing systems, and therefore is 
important to consider. 
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Regarding the additional indicators on the VoRC analysis, owner-occupation indeed offers 
some differentiation but more specifically outright homeownership, which is key to both 
countries. Ownership as a total of both mortgaged and outright owners is also high in other 
European countries, therefore not of specific analytical and explanatory value. House prices 
trends, while an important indicator are not always easy to track in previous years. The 
global financial crisis severely affected prices in both countries. Before that, increased 
demand for newer or vacation housing led prices to high levels also due to expansion of 
mortgage lending available from 1995 and on. Still, family remained at the core of this 
change towards mortgage-based housing acquisition, as younger members rarely had the 
income stability required to ensure enough - or even at all - purchase credit. What the 
VoRC approach offers is highlighting the importance of housing as a hub where different 
forces meet and interact. Indeed in both countries housing stands central as a systemic 
stability regulator.  
 
7.3   Answering Research Questions and Concluding on Hypotheses 
1.  What is the level and distribution of housing welfare in Bulgaria and Greece? 
Answering about the level and distribution of housing welfare, requires clarification on its 
different aspects. Assessing Bulgaria and Greece in terms of housing welfare, is not a 
straightforward process. As presented in Chapter 6, expenditure on housing is meagre in 
both countries, even though still higher in Bulgaria. Therefore, from a social expenditure 
perspective, level of housing welfare is notably low and limited to a small number of 
beneficiaries. According to Eurostat data (spr_exp_sum data series) since 2013 the amount 
per inhabitant dedicated to housing needs was less than 1 and 0.5 Euro in Bulgaria and 
Greece respectively. This housing welfare support from the state operates in a kind of 
'Ambulance Service' (see Chapter 2).  
When considering housing welfare as the access on a minimum level of housing, things 
may be analyzed differently. The widespread reach of outright homeownership, can be 
regarded as a means to ensuring low-cost housing. Indeed both housing systems during 
their evolution successfully countered pronounced homelessness phenomena. This of 
course could not be possible without the family backup and all related social and financial 
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compromises this may have incurred. From that point of view, housing welfare can be 
argued as constant and equal to the value of rent the homeowner would pay on a monthly 
basis to rent a house of comparable status, minus property tax for that particular asset. 
Thus, housing welfare regards the majority of the population i.e. having remarkably wide 
coverage. 
While this theorization appears arguable, there are some important issues to consider. 
Primarily, the level of the housing welfare in this case is far from easy to quantify. In 
extremely underdeveloped and marginalized rental housing markets, it is precarious to 
attempt setting reliable benchmark rents. Moreover, it may be problematic to have an 
accurate estimation of the true beneficiaries, especially in cases of multi-generational 
cohabitation. For example, using an average Household size would give a picture of 
reduced coverage. The level of housing welfare dependent on outright homeownership is 
directly related to taxation imposed on housing assets. As current trends indicate, the 
Bulgarian System remains somehow better in terms of housing welfare. 
Lastly, the inheritance element should be seriously considered in any case. The fact that 
family resources allow for housing assets to be transferred from one generation to another, 
is not a rational excuse for the absence of housing allowances and benefits. 
 
2.   What are the sources of housing welfare? 
Since the beginning of the global financial crisis and its effect on mortgage credit and 
household incomes, the sources of housing welfare have significantly weakened. Until then 
a combination of family resources along with construction sector responsiveness operated 
towards such goals in a fairly sufficient manner, even though depending on and according 
to the financial dynamics of the respective era. Financial resources have been traditionally 
channelled to housing welfare through the family movable and immovable property, 
pension income, and employment of its members. In Greece, such channelling of family 
resources to housing can be significantly considered a major factor for pursuing the stable 
wage income of the public-sector employment and relevant rent-seeking. Today the picture 
is evidently different, as income sources have been limited and remain stagnant. Inheritance 
is the main carrier of housing welfare backed-up during earlier times, but realized only 
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upon death. Transfer-donation of housing parental assets has become limited due to the lack 
of resources able to cover older and younger households housing needs, usually leading to 
cohabitation. Lastly, transfers in money from other family members have diminished due to 
shrinking pension incomes (see Chapter 6), and reduction of family wealth. 
Banking credit however limited played an increasingly active role since mid-1990s, but its 
evolution on both countries has been abruptly halted due to the GFC effects. Housing 
welfare has been boosted by banking credit of any kind, and not only mortgage-related. In 
both countries the phenomenon of borrowing money for consumption, rather than housing 
needs, has always been extended. On the one hand, mortgage significantly raises the sense 
of uncertainty. This led many people borrowing money with higher interest rates compared 
to mortgage loans, just to avoid the long-term mortgage exposure of their house. On the 
other hand - and related to the aforementioned - employment precarity did not offer neither 
the security nor the eligibility to pursue a mortgage loan. This has often been the reason of 
lacking credit to seek or create improved housing conditions, and perhaps wasted capital 
and financial exposure.  
State-related resources usable for housing welfare are extremely limited in the modern era. 
In Bulgaria the state institutions were a major player in housing welfare, but quickly 
withdrew. In Greece the favourable legal and taxation framework allowing resources from 
other channels to improve housing welfare are a thing of the past. It is safe to conclude that 
in both countries housing welfare has nothing to do with the state in terms of financing. 
 
3.   What are the types and function of institutional interaction mechanisms in the State-
Market-Family triangle, in relation to housing welfare structuring or hindrance? 
The specifics of institutional interactions have been thoroughly discussed earlier in 7.2.3. 
What is important noting is the current state of interaction between the family and market 
institutions. Due to the financial crisis effects the two poles appear uncoordinated in both 
countries, with their institutional functioning  in terms of Complementarity and Synergy, 
remaining problematic in providing housing welfare. Moreover, their Supplementarity 
related to making up for state insufficiency in housing welfare, has severely weakened 
during the last decade. 
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4.  What are the key-drivers of the Bulgarian and Greek housing systems and the possible 
reform paths? 
Housing policy change in Bulgaria will be related to the physical condition of the assets. 
Significant part of the Legacy Housing Estates is considered structurally dangerous, while 
almost the total of these assets require extensive repairs and upgrade. Given that access to 
newer and better housing is still unaffordable to most Bulgarians, this is an issue that will 
soon call for an official 'answer'. As things go, the channelling of European funds will 
eventually improve and if handled optimally will lead to nation-wide housing policy 
schemes.  
In Greece it may be driven by strong market shifts, as the housing market is perhaps the 
sector affected the most by the Greek depression. This not only due to GDP and Household 
income drop, but also due to inherent systemic problems. Extremely perplexed bureaucratic 
process still keep the sector from reviving, even though house prices have dropped at least 
threefold since the crisis. Groups of professionals related to housing, like constructors, 
notaries and bankers, consider modernization of processes a prerequisite in order to revive 
the housing market. However, the purchase power of households is not currently adding to 
this dynamic. The Greek state, is currently dealing with housing as a never-ending resource 
pool for taxation, disregarding any repercussion or the sustainability of such an approach. 
The main problem regards the way tax is calculated which does not allow for housing-
related expenses deductions. 
From such point of view, I think that the Bulgarian housing system has a better chance to 
develop a structured housing policy, compared to Greece. The condition of the assets is 
visible and ever-present, while the Greek housing issues are open to debate and therefore 
open to delays. As analyzed earlier in this chapter the active and dynamic engagement of 
the Bulgarian housing experts and professionals is per se an important driver of change. 
While it has yet to be utilized by the state, this core of academics and professionals appears 
persistent, growing, evolving and self-sustaining. It will certainly boost change towards a 
better direction when time comes and its potential and services are appreciated. In Greece 
things look grim on that front, as housing as a topic now remains uninteresting to engage 
with, outside its financial implications.  
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In all fairness, the Socialist past in Bulgaria can be very much considered a reason for this 
dynamic in Bulgaria. Previous experience of how things were i.e. state involvement in 
housing provision is strong factor to pursue improvement. Moreover, international 
academic and professional interest in post-socialist countries and their systemic functioning 
has also affected the housing studies in countries relatively under-represented like Bulgaria. 
This goes hand-to-hand with the openness of the Bulgarian housing experts community. In 
Greece, the systemic functioning of housing is considered 'decoded' many years now. 
Therefore interest for new research entrants is limited, also linked to meagre housing 
research funding. International interest remains limited. This is due to Greece being long-
time classifies as a 'typical' Southern European case. Thus it is analyzed along with Italy, 
Spain and Portugal, often being applied attributes not exactly accurate for the Geek case. 
Moreover, there is only a handful of researchers with a contemporary outward-looking 
output, which does not help promote discussion on an international level. 
Apart from the experts, Bulgarian people interviewed seemed more willing to participate in 
civic movements and somehow demand improvements on housing policy and conditions. 
Even though disappointment with the public sector is equally strong in both countries, there 
is a slightly stronger basis for a bottom-up housing movement in Bulgaria. Greek people 
seem more set on what and they want in terms of housing policy, therefore less willing to 
enter a wider bargaining process with the state. I expect the housing policy in Bulgaria to 
move towards schemes of cooperation with the national and international private sector 
players in construction. This new era will deal with management of the legacy housing 
estates. It is highly possible for PPI schemes to develop with the scope of mixed uses 
blocks, including social housing of some sort even public rental housing.  
In Greece, housing policy will eventually get some form of structured policy, albeit 
fragmented between different public sectors. The main goals will be safeguarding the 
primary and single housing asset, while any asset on top will be significantly taxed. 
Therefore, ownership of any additional assets will be severely commodified. This will 
radically and permanently change the modes and level of housing welfare. Nevertheless, 
the protection of the primary and single residence will somehow preserve the sense of 
'social homeownership' analyzed in this thesis. 
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5.  Hypothesis A: Bulgarian and Greek Residential Capitalism types cannot properly 
fit the current classification - typology 
The VoRC theorization is based on setting ideal-types which renders classification of 
complex systems rather problematic. In any case, the VoRC conceptual framework remains 
relevant and under consideration. Major typology issues indeed regard to Bulgarian and 
Greek housing systems, as subject to strong transformation forces. These typically 
considered ‘Familialist Residential Capitalisms’ seem now moving closer to a neo-liberalist 
amalgam, mixing extreme Capitalist with Statist elements. The former is related to the 
overall macro-economic condition which certainly affect housing, and especially assets not 
used as primary residence. The latter regards the marginal safeguarding of a historically 
empowered 'Social Contract' related to homeownership. This will keep owned assets more 
or less de-commodified, with access to different kind of housing becoming increasingly 
commodified as familialist resources weaken (Kalimeri, 2017).  
The asset-based welfare debate does not seem to have any practical application in the two 
countries. There is no realistic expectation of housing assets to serve old-age or any kind of 
welfare needs. This is mostly related to problematic operation of these housing markets,  
oversized low-demand housing stocks, inflexible legal frameworks, and slowly-adapting 
and path-dependent policies. With the exception of secondary housing assets which may be 
conditionally
97
 liquefied at low price to serve primary residence needs, or uncovered 
emergency health care costs, typical welfare needs remain dominantly irrelevant to housing 
assets. Most importantly, there is no societal support for a transformation of housing assets 
to welfare backup. In most cases owned housing assets are not numerous, of lower-than-
needed capital value and mostly destined to cover housing needs of younger family 
members. Forcing the system towards asset-based welfare may have disastrous effects 
without considering and counterbalancing the after-effects. 
 
 
 
                                                 
97
 Depending on age, location and physical condition 
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6. Hypothesis B: Housing Policy path-dependency an especially influential factor in 
both countries 
Housing policy path-dependency mostly relates to the institutionalization of 
homeownership as the only viable tenure. With this concept at the core, any reforms not 
serving or threatening this status are bound to strong social opposition through institutional 
inertia and actors’ resistance to change. In both countries, the safeguarding of primary 
residence homeownership still constitutes a sacred keystone of the wider socio-political 
balance and peace. Therefore, despite any pressure for change governments remain bound 
to the established tenure status. 
Systemic changes will have to respect the key role of homeownership in order to preserve 
stability and enjoy widespread societal acceptance. Towards this goal it would be better fit 
to attempt multi-partite agreement where housing reforms are incorporated in wider 
bargaining between renters, homeowners, landlords, constructors, bankers and policy-
makers. This way compromises in other policy sectors may be balanced in terms of housing 
provisions. The state with its dominant role as a regulator of interests and power-balance 
will remain key-player in housing policy reforms.  
 
 
7.4   Concluding and Expanding the Discussion 
7.4.1   Homeownership as welfare 
As extensively discussed, the asset-based welfare doctrine seems to have very limited 
application in Bulgaria and Greece, for reasons analyzed in detail within the thesis. 
Nevertheless the link between homeownership and welfare is evident even though not 
always direct. Foremost and with no doubt outright homeownership is a very practical and 
direct hedge against homelessness. Even though in-home poverty cannot be excluded, 
people in financial hardship are kept off the streets. At the same time, this is very 
financially convenient for the Bulgarian and Greek state and local authorities as it radically 
limits the number of people in urgent need of shelter which would otherwise require 
immediate response and extensive resources. 
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In welfare systems where health, and elderly and child care are not sufficient in terms of 
coverage, the home becomes an informal 'shell' where such services are being provided. 
This is done by family members either with or without the aid of an external professional. 
In any case, the use of the house allows for lowering such welfare costs, often sheltering 
informal employment of nurses, babysitters etc., which would otherwise be impossible. 
According to my research I solidified the opinion that we need to question and answer the 
sustainability of such an approach.  
In both countries outright homeownership is the wobbly pillar of the welfare state. Without 
it the welfare state would crumble under the weight of dramatically increased welfare 
needs. This does not only concern homelessness but also a large number of welfare services 
offered in-house which would otherwise need to be fully offered by the state as people 
could not spread life costs so as to absorb the increased costs. At the same time 
homeownership is the cornerstone of household housing welfare and (enclosed) wealth. 
Outright homeownership had historically identified as a welfare good which should be 
acquired by everyone at all costs and the soonest possible. The state has the undoubted 
obligation to stay out of the way by all means, if not to safeguard such status once acquired. 
In such a manner, 'social homeownership' of the primary residence has always and still is 
valid for both countries. Any persisting change strong enough to shake this basis - without 
counterbalance and social bargaining - will severely risk social upheaval on many levels 
which are pretty hard to predict.  
In cases of utter emergency, secondary housing can be sold at lower market prices to make 
up for welfare needs, and especially health care. As an underlying basis the aforementioned 
give homeownership its welfare colouring and 'social good' aspect. Outright 
homeownership presents such aspects in a far more dominant manner compared to 
mortgaged ownership. Nevertheless, the latter is extensively tied to such traits due to 
societal aspirations especially regarding the primary residence, and welfare self-provision. 
In both countries there is a de facto 'trade-off' between high outright homeownership and 
weak welfare state. The divergence from the theoretical model regards the element of 
'choice'. At no point in time was the Bulgarian and Greek society to choose such a path. 
Instead, the flexible family core along with the construction sector made up for the 
problematic (BG) or widely lacking (GR) state-led housing provision. Even in Bulgaria 
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where the state controlled housing production and allocation since mid 1970s, the burden 
was soon transferred to the people in the form of granted homeownership status. From mid 
1980s and on Bulgaria followed a similar path to Greece with family being radically 
burdened with covering housing needs. It seems that tolerance for a weak state has been 
'exchanged' for lax regulations against housing informalities, and favorable taxation. 
However this was mostly the case for previous decades but still echoes today. Even in such 
a context where homeownership is heavily established in people's hearts and minds, there is 
a strong underlying desire for welfare state - even if that means lowering homeownership. 
And maybe that has been stated with the safety of outright homeownership, but it is still 
there. 
There is big question lingering here. Will Bulgaria and Greek housing systems keep 
homeownership bound to housing welfare expectations? I truly doubt on the sustainability 
of such a path for a multitude of reasons which have been analyzed within the thesis. Even 
if that is the conscious or de facto choice, this will eventually have to be incorporated in a 
wider framework. This will be able to consider the extended social and welfare 
implications. Should for example different scales for primary and secondary residence 
taxation be established? Should the state mechanisms favour indirect aid to people wanting 
to improve their housing when their current status is deemed insufficient? Should there be a 
differentiation of aid according to income? And there is much more to consider on that. 
 
7.4.2   The Role of the Private and Public Rental Sector 
Much discussion has concerned homeownership in this thesis and in relevant literature 
reviewed, while private and public rental sector have been left on the margin. This is not by 
choice or preference, but a reflection of the tenure structure reality in Bulgaria and Greece. 
With that being said, I deem important to consider the wider implications of the 
underdeveloped private rental sector and inexistent social housing in these housing systems. 
For Bulgaria and Greece homeownership seems to persist as a 'one-way road', excusing all 
kinds of sacrifices on a personal level in order to achieve or safeguard it. Even tenants and 
guests are deeply driven by this mentality. Homeownership seems to primarily outstand as 
an institution, rather than a matter of tenure. It goes without saying that the former cannot 
easily persist and be reinforced without the latter as time passes. As discussed, 
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homeownership concerns society-wide mentalities and goals regarding what is 'acceptable', 
'sustainable' and 'successful' living. In Bulgaria and Greece high rates reflect long-lasting 
societal aspirations going back in these countries' historical paths. 
During the evolution of the Bulgarian and Greek housing systems, the rental sector became 
rather unwanted, and certainly linked to feelings of 'incompleteness', 'insecurity' and often 
'failure'. In both cases the rental sector has been used as a transitional tenure until accessing 
homeownership, which had to be as temporary as possible. For the family renting meant the 
incompetence to provide family member with the necessary resources to 'escape rental 
slavery' and enter 'homeowning freedom'. This is more or less still the case, despite for 
example the severe overburdening of homeownership due to taxation. This serves as a 
grand proof of the persistent effect of deep-seated mentalities and the need for well-thought 
policy interventions. During the research I became convinced that 'anti-rental' mentality is 
responsible to a certain degree for systemic inflexibility in Bulgarian and Greek housing. 
From a market operation perspective, the 'unattractiveness' of the rental tenure keeps a large 
part of the newer stock outside the market waiting for purchase. This became more 
pronounced during the recent and still ongoing financial crisis affecting internal and 
external demand. The stock remaining non-available to rent is left unsold for prolonged 
periods due to stagnated market operation. Newer and better stock is not entering the rental 
market and therefore no incentive is given to people who may potentially seek to rent these 
assets. This also limits mobility within the rental sector. Furthermore, lack of newer assets, 
gives no incentive to landlords improving their assets, which in turn does not help changing 
attitudes in favour of renting. It would be utopian to think the rental sector can escape its 
marginal positioning without state intervention. Establishing a system of housing 
allowances for low incomes, and tax incentives for renters will be required to boost the 
expansion of the Bulgarian and Greek rental housing sectors. Sufficient and adequate rental 
stock along with a stable favourable legislative framework will also have significant impact 
(Papadimitriou, 2017). That being said, with weak wage bases, weakened welfare state 
provision and lack of sociopolitical momentum, I do not expect this to become something 
more anytime soon. The only exception regards specifically selected urban neighbourhoods 
for highly-paid elite mainly from multinationals once macro-economy somehow settles 
down. 
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With time, outright homeownership became institutionalized and kept people off the 
streets, even though their situation may have been otherwise problematic.  With such a 
socio-political and financial 'burden', hard and long-lasting efforts will be required to 
change this stance. The high levels of investment and taxation that will be required by the 
state towards creating public rental housing, render it unlikely to be considered anytime 
soon. With that being said, the need to for some kind of stably running social housing 
programme will come sooner than later whatever its spread, given that financial trends 
persist. This is mainly related to poverty levels increase and staying irrelevant to 
homeownership status. 
Outright homeownership is extremely institutionalized in both countries, with an inertia 
which seems 'unbreakable' for the foreseeable future. This is further enhanced by the lack 
of incentives to enter or remain in the rental market. I never embraced the idea of socio-
cultural - or even "genetic' - predisposition towards homeownership. What is certain is the 
reaction of people to housing uncertainty as a result of the combined effects of long-lasting 
precarious employment, lacklustre welfare state and problematic rental sectors. I do 
however believe in the power of self-reinforcing societal imperatives transferred from 
generation to generation. Rental sector should be allowed to function as a viable alternative, 
whatever its size, and not as a secondary market for unwanted, obsolete housing assets, or 
for an extremely wealthy elite. It is my opinion that the existence of alternatives can reduce 
the risk of systemic failure during periods of socio-financial stress. The rental sector will 
need a supportive framework like stable allowances and regulatory protection for both 
landlords and tenants. Society will not embrace renting if it remains a 'last resort' before 
homelessness. It should become something more like for example a chance to reallocate 
expenses.  
Social housing in its classic sense is strongly unwanted in both countries and has always 
related to marginalized social and living conditions. During the Communist times, not 
having own home in Bulgaria meant not having employment, which was near to impossible 
with the Socialist Regime central allocation control. Limited public housing was reserved 
to people outside the system and the sector became heavily stigmatized. In Greece, social 
housing meant social failure, as the framework provided more or less affordable ways to 
self-access homeownership until 1980-1990. Even the Workers House Organization which 
remained outside the official state mechanism as de facto semi-private entity, since early 
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post-1950 focused its efforts in providing direct access to homeownership. Admittedly, 
changing widespread and historically reinforced societal mentalities takes effort, time and 
initiative from all civil parties in a continuous social bargaining. The state will have to 
assume its expected role and responsibility in a consistent and effective manner.  
 
7.4.3   Housing Policy and Outcomes: on the verge of a new era? 
What is beyond doubt is the need for a consistent, coherent and focused housing policy in 
both countries. This will be sooner or later forced by rapid changes in the housing system, 
and the need to respond to modern challenges. In Bulgaria this is mostly related to the 
physical standing of the Legacy housing estates, while in Greece to the financial 
overburden of Homeowners. The issue is not so much whether such housing policy is 
centralized or dispersed to various institutions, ministries, local authorities etc., but the 
decision to put forward an active and pro-active policy. The schemes forming such wider 
policy will have to be forward-looking but also taking into account the historical evolution 
the Bulgaria and Greek housing system. There is a great need to leave behind laissez-faire 
mentalities, and search for a dynamic approach. Citizens along with NGOs and the official 
state have to seriously discuss and decide on the direction, capacity and ways of systemic 
evolution. The Bulgarian and Greek housing system require deep structural reforms so as to 
allow flexibility and adaptability. According to my research I am convinced that any reform 
scheme disregarding homeownership as key-element of citizenship is bound to have no 
significant impact. And here lies the perhaps biggest challenge policy-wise i.e. the 
implementation of various programmes. Making things happen will certainly require a 
bottom-up communication and acceptance. 
Unlike other socio-political areas, I found that Bulgarian people expect the state to 
intervene and improve their housing conditions. This is certainly related to echoes of the 
Socialist era, further maintained and boosted by lack of viable housing alternatives. The 
required intervention revolves around homeownership status than anything else, while 
ensuring people have full control over their housing conditions. In Greece state interference 
in housing matters is strongly unwanted overall. This due to a historically dominant 'non-
interference' of the state in housing acquisition in terms of direct provision or financing. 
Moreover, the market pole - mainly constructors - along with the family network have 
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proven to be flexible and effective in covering housing needs, since before the financial 
crisis. In best cases, the state is expected to stop interfering with the family-market dipole 
so it can resume its operation halted by the crisis and the governments failing to tackle with 
its effects on housing. 
Housing policy is not confined to social housing. It is often implied that lack of social 
housing and relevant policies signifies lack of housing policy. I disagree with this stance, 
which admittedly has slowly started to weaken. This perception has more or less been an 
'alibi' for meagre political initiative to form and support a structured housing policy. As an 
'oxymoron' homeownership has historically been used to serve political party convenience, 
especially during pre-electoral campaigns.  
In terms of housing outcomes issues, Bulgaria and Greece present strong differentiation. 
The former struggles with the Legacy housing stock physical condition, while the latter has 
to deal with strong forces of commodification and financial overburden of housing. What is 
common in both countries though is the severe problem of accessing newer and better 
housing. In these countries where incomes are low and drop, the discussion cannot be 
solely based on vague affordability terms. Every asset will be affordable to someone. The 
main issue is how much housing exists for the specific income reality, and of what quality. 
In Bulgaria the large number of problematic stock will require radical housing policy 
interventions
98
. This will most probably include the promotion of new housing 
construction. Whether the homeownership pattern will be followed is a crucial question 
putting the housing system at a cross-road. As things are, there is little evidence to support 
the widespread allocation of outright homeownership like what happened during socialism. 
The Bulgarian state does not seem to have any momentum of the kind, while the family 
network is financially weak to undertake such a heavy burden. Moreover, the banking 
sector appears hesitant - if not contrary - to return back to risky patterns of the pre-GFC era. 
Simply put there is a lack of proper structures. A calculated estimation is the promotion of a 
new housing construction era with mixed-used building blocks, and extended mortgaging. 
The state will ensure the 'safety net' along the lines of a watered down housing intervention 
flirting socialist ideology from a very safe and far distance. 
                                                 
98
 As an indication of urgency, just recently the Government of Bulgaria asked the aid of the World Bank with the new National 
Housing Strategy (The World Bank, 2017) 
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In Greece now, it is pretty safe to assume that homeownership will keep down towards its 
pre-commodification path. It is fairly unlikely for the financially challenged Greek state to 
support homeownership either directly or indirectly. Primary residence will be somehow 
protected against foreclosure, which along familialist resources and inheritance will not 
become fully commodified in the foreseeable future. Mortgage lending will recover at some 
point but it is unlikely to reach liberal extremes mainly due to stricter lending framework 
within a precarious employment environment.   
 
7.5   Future research paths and suggestions 
Despite diligent efforts, the reader may discern some spots or theory 'vagueness', which is 
due to a number of reasons. Most of them relate to issues and limitations analyzed in the 
Research Methodology chapter. As already discussed in Chapter 4, qualitative research 
(interviews conducted) had no scope of representativeness. Despite dominant patterns 
emerging during these interviews, generalization of results to whole nations remains 
debateable. In order to verify such patterns or discover new ones, future research would 
certainly help. This may expand on more cities and examined themes. Qualitative in-depth 
interviews can hardly reach sampling numbers equal to survey or quantitative research 
methods. 
In my opinion two points need thorough consideration for further research in the future. 
First, the revisiting of these housing systems in the 'post-crisis' era where the catalytic 
forces may have settled or at least shown a clearer path. This time may vary for Bulgaria 
and Greece. Admittedly at the time this thesis is being written, Greece seems to have a 
longer way to exit its systemic and financial hardship. Bulgarian can be even claimed being 
off the crisis spiral. So, let me rephrase 'post-crisis' to 'post-transformation'. Both countries 
are subject to severe transformation forces, affecting not only their housing systems but the 
overall structure and functioning of the society and the state as a whole. Predicting their 
evolution - or devolution - is often based on assumptions and possible 'scenarios'. 
Therefore, it will be necessary to revisit discussed themes when some new 'normalized 
phase' will seem to have been established. Secondly, the extension of qualitative research in 
these countries and also within their vicinity. It would be extremely useful to examine 
Bulgaria along with Romania and Greece along Italy, in similar manner. Relative to this, is 
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the need to gather some significant volume of quantitative and qualitative data on housing 
familialism, and more precisely its modes, level, mechanisms and underlying incentives. 
From my research I could only conclude that it is the collateral result of the wider 
familialism trying to make up of state and market insufficiencies in every welfare field, 
rather than something specifically linked to housing. 
Mostly drawing from the second half of the thesis, I find it necessary to focus on specific 
pronounced themes of suggested systemic change intervention. What is presented in Table 
7.2 functions also as a 'map' for further indicated research. 'Greyed' squares signify the 
institutional pillars involved in the respective intervention, while dots mark their varying 
weight. Filled and void dots mark primary and secondary significance respectively. Lastly, 
the suggested approach is shown on the right, ranging from almost purely quantitative to 
qualitative perspective. This relates to the suggested corresponding academic and/or 
professional approach of the relevant intervention. Some of the points made in this table are 
more generic than others, especially when moving towards qualitative-heavy themes. With 
no doubt the need to break them down into examinable themes is imperative. However, the 
final assessment should be focused on the wider picture. 
Starting from more 'easily' quantifiable matters, it is necessary to have an as precise as 
possible account of which housing units are in a state of urgent need for repairs, retrofitting 
and physical intervention of any kind. This does not only refer to the exact number of such 
units, but also to the exact nature of such repairs. Even though this may seem more relevant 
to Bulgaria due to the physical quality issues of the Legacy housing estates, it is actually 
necessary to both countries. Such a process may seem daunting and indeed require time and 
resources, but is nevertheless necessary. It can give an accurate estimation of the stock in 
need of specific tailor-cut approaches. During this process housing units now rendered 
obsolete, or beyond repair can also be identified. Towards this goal the technical 
knowledge of the construction sector and the professional and academic input of non-
governmental bodies can ensure success and impartiality. This can also work as stepping 
stone for approaching the actual market-real wealth enclosed in owned housing assets. 
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Table 7.2 - Areas of Suggested Intervention and Research (source: author) 
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Incentivize vacant housing disposal to the rental market ●       
Detect and manage non-usable and non-repairable 
housing assets 
    ● ○ 
Evaluate Market-real Housing-enclosed wealth   ○ ●   
Incentivize rational FDI attraction in the housing Market ●       
Rationalize primary residence taxation ●       
Protect sole residence from foreclosure ● ○     
Benchmark housing performance against modern 
international standards 
○     ● 
Q
u
a
n
t. - Q
u
a
l. 
Benchmark housing performance compared to modern 
national needs 
    ○ ● 
Support the rental sector as an affordable and viable 
alternative 
●       
Promote upgrade/retrofitting of buildings as a viable 
alternative for growth 
  ○ ●   
Create adequate Social housing to counter-balance 
imminent homelessness  
●   ○   
Accurately assess 2nd residences viability as permanent 
or back-up homes 
      ● Q
u
a
l. - Q
u
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n
t. 
Counter Housing Welfare Familialism polarization ●     ○ 
Support continuous academic and professional interest in 
Housing improvement 
○ 
    
● 
Focus on the implications of the investment aspects 
of Housing 
  ● ○   
Bolster an equal institutional representation of tenants 
and homeowners 
●     ○ 
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Weaken the Homeownership - (good) Citizenship link       ● 
Integrate Rental sector as non-marginalized housing choice     ○ ● 
Disengage Housing from electoral leverage ○     ● 
State includes central and local authorities, public bodies and quasi-public financial institutions;                                                                                                                                                 
Financial Institutions include any kind of private body financing housing directly or indirectly;                                                                                                                                                
Construction Sector includes anyone even remotely related to the construction of Housing;                                                                                                                                                                 
Civil Society includes Housing-related academics & professionals, NGOs & non-public bodies, and the wider 
family network. 
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As discussed, the evaluation of the true value of owned housing assets is currently 
problematic, inaccurate and based on extremely rough estimations (Koukakis, 2016; 
Brunwasser, 2006). Having a clear picture on the households' wealth enclosed in housing is 
necessary both for fair taxation reasons, and assessment of asset-based self-funded welfare 
dynamics. It is also an important element to go into more detail about the welfare aspect of 
homeownership, especially when compared to other countries. In Greece, the long overdue 
cadastre (Taylor & Papadimas, 2015) would greatly contribute to this. Adding the value of 
owned assets, may give a completely different picture on the provision of welfare in 
countries which have been historically tagged as 'underdeveloped' in terms of welfare state 
coverage. For this, financial institutions will play an important role to the construction 
sector estimations, mainly through the real estate sector professionals. 
Vacant assets kept outside the market are serious issue in both countries. This regards either 
older and under-maintained housing which was left unoccupied during the crisis years, or 
newly built stock becoming victim of radical drop in purchase demand. Financial 
projections are not optimistic on seeing incomes significantly rising anytime soon so as to 
refuel a thriving internal purchase market. This means that some part of the former will be 
left under-maintained and unwanted, eventually becoming unusable. At the same time, the 
latter will mostly remain unaffordable to lower-income social classes for which should be 
also destined, and perhaps start losing market value. Currently there are no notable 
incentives to repair and enter the rental market for the former, especially given the financial 
hardship of most landlords. Establishing a land bank (Kanellis, 2013) could provide 
solutions to 'unmarketable' stock issue through the exchange of building rights freeing up 
larger land plots and allowing for development of greater scale. Existing, newly-built stock 
is kept 'on hold' for better days waiting for the potential buyer. It would be notably useful 
for the larger part of this stock to enter the private rental market, thus boosting it and 
perhaps offering better options to those not able to purchase. The revenue raised will 
eventually have accumulating gains for the housing market and the overall economy. Given 
the strong 'anti-rental' mentality in Bulgaria and Greece, such major turn cannot happen 
without taxation incentives and regulatory framework set by the state. Financial institutions 
will also have a role, especially regarding financing the upgrade of older stock, and offering 
incentives to landlords-constructors under mortgage debt when renting owned assets. 
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Attracting foreign direct investment can breathe life to the stall housing market if done 
properly and under set framework with the public benefit at its centre. Despite the residual 
'colouring' of Socialist practices (Giannangeli, 2013), Bulgaria is admittedly making 
stronger efforts to attract and keep investors (Brunwasser, 2007) especially regarding 
housing in vacation destinations (Gregor, 2014), targeting buyers from western and 
northern European countries. However, FDI can offer larger opportunities for developments 
which can include large numbers of housing units. That being said, such investments will 
be part of wider projects and require bargaining on adequately elaborate scales. Planning 
agreements including construction of housing units in mixed-use buildings is just one 
option where FDI can be useful to promote the housing agenda. Establishing a land bank 
could be a useful tool towards systemic evolution and tackling with complexities.  
Regarding homeownership and its persisting significance as 'social good', it is imperative to 
set a stable taxation framework considering the effects of tax burden affecting primary 
residence. Proper tax imposed will have to take a number of factors into account like the 
true market value of the asset, its condition and age, whether it is the sole owned house, the 
overall property wealth of the owner, social vulnerabilities of the owner and size of the 
household. Following this rationale, primary and sole residence under mortgage loan or 
subject to foreclosure procedure may have to enjoy statutory protection, given the fact of 
almost inexistent public housing and anti-homelessness systems in both Bulgaria and 
Greece. In the latter pressures for the modernization and expansion the foreclosure 
mechanism is becoming increasingly stronger (Tzortzi, 2017), slowly expanding to include 
primary residence (Sourelis, 2017), even though still meeting strong resistance by 
professional groups like notaries and civil protest. 
Moving on to quantitative issues in need of additional qualitative input, housing 
performance will have to be benchmarked against international - mainly European - and 
national standards. Eurostat offers data on dwelling size, age etc. But needs further input to 
render an international comparison more scientifically robust. The qualitative input can 
show how different societies perceive and experience housing by living in the compared 
units. It is very likely and expected to find difference between housing experiences in 
similar housing from one country to another. On a national level, it is necessary to examine 
the ways housing is being experienced in terms of modern needs. This is especially relevant 
considering the age of the stock occupied in both countries, and Bulgaria mostly. With the 
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civil society leading the way, the state will have a saying in the interaction on a EU level, 
while the national construction sector can contribute more in setting national 'standards'. 
Regardless of how dominant homeownership inertia is the rental sector will have to be 
widened and improved in both countries. In order to do that, landlords will have to be 
incentivized to dispose their assets in the rental market in a proper manner. At the same 
time, civil society will have a role in changing societal perceptions away from the 
marginalization of the rental sector. The growth of the rental sector will eventually improve 
its affordability through competition and more available options in the market. The state 
will have to ensure stable and favourable legislative framework in order to support the 
establishment of a viable rental sector. Bulgaria is inclined to a pro-landlord framework, 
while Greece is closer to a neutral standing
99
. 
As qualitative aspects enter the discussion more dedicated interventions and mentalities are 
required to achieve systemic shift. This is mainly due to the fact that such aspects are often 
hard to support by 'hard evidence' and therefore open to debate. While based on 'numbers' 
the shift of the construction industry towards reuse and recycle of the existing stock, 
certainly has some qualitative elements. In Bulgaria and Greece the thriving of the 
construction industry and the overall economy has been significantly based on development 
of new units. The recent and ongoing financial crisis put this norm into test. Nevertheless, 
construction sector revival is still regarded closely related to a new development boom 
which seems rather unlikely to happen in the near future. Through the retrofitting and 
overall optimization of use in the existing housing stock there can be room to develop some 
kind of social housing. Radical changes in the financial status of the two countries and the 
shift away from homeownership state protectionism, is deemed to imply imminent 
homelessness for those most financial and social exposed. Some of the vacant stock, 
especially those units underused or in areas of low demand can be utilized to provide 
shelter under the management of public bodies. However, the contribution of all 
institutional pillars will be required towards such an important change. This is reflected in 
recent discussion raised in Bulgaria regarding social housing Fund with the joint 
contribution of shareholders from all institutional pillars
100
. In Greece there is some vague 
                                                 
99
 http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Europe/landlord-tenant-law [Accessed 17 March 2017] 
100
 http://www.novinite.com/articles/158908/Bulgaria+Mulls+Setting+Up+Social+Housing+Fund [Accessed 18 March 2017] 
 
269 
 
discussion regarding the scheme which could replace the former Workers Home 
Organization (Goudis, 2014), but something more concrete has yet to be achieved. 
Further towards the bottom of Table 7.2, housing welfare should be kept away from 
polarization around the family. It is rational to assume that family contribution will keep its 
central role for many years to come, but a more balanced way needs to be supported. For 
this, the state will need to improve welfare provision in other sectors and also offer the 
chance to cover housing needs by e.g. countering precarious employment conditions and 
supporting the proper operation of the mortgage market. The civil society will have to 
pressure towards this direction while at the same time changing societal mentalities on the 
'omnipotent' family and its capacity to properly cover housing needs of every member. The 
aforementioned can be significantly aided by continuous support of the academic and 
professional interest in housing systems and their improvement. This way housing will 
gradually be understood as a matter worthy of attention per se and not as something 
collateral to 'more important' policies. In Bulgaria the situation regarding the dynamic of 
the academic and professional sector dedicated to housing issues is far better compared to 
Greece. However, in both countries housing is something raising interest only in cases of 
extreme emergency and served by reactive and usually poorly planned interventions. 
Research resources will have to be channelled towards housing research which will be 
boosted by the civil society.  
Understanding the investment aspect of housing is crucial in both Bulgaria and Greece. 
Long-lasting entanglement with homeownership and its ties with housing welfare and 
citizenship have significantly neglected its investment and overall financial implications. 
As concluded according to this research, the vast majority of homeowners does not 
consider the financial repercussions died to ownership of a housing asset. Interesting 
enough, this does not only regard outright homeowners but also those under mortgage loan. 
The sentimental ties with the owned house and its overarching identity as the family hearth, 
overshadows financial aspects, often completely. Admittedly, the financial crisis has 
brought the discussion of household budgets being overburdened due to housing costs, 
especially in Greece (Kollias, 2015). Nevertheless, no significant mentality change can be 
supported. As general rule people in both countries rarely weigh the financial benefits and 
disadvantages of the homeownership status, and of the specific assets owned. Even when 
considered, profit and loss is interpreted in terms of psychological gain, and often distorted. 
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This is one of the key reasons why the rental sector has been historically left unwanted and 
marginalized. The disregard of financial repercussions even extend to secondary houses, 
most of which are kept underused for seasonal-vacation occupancy. And while doing the 
math may give a positive result for primary residences considering all factors, for 
secondary home things look grimmer due to occasional use. The latter have slowly started 
to overburden households with maintenance costs and taxation. Therefore is necessary to 
assess their capacity as permanent homes. This will give a clear picture on their perspective 
as income source i.e. through renting, and/or inheritance asset to cover younger or older 
members housing needs. For primary residences a rational approach would be to compare 
in terms of imputed rent, however practically daunting and challenging it may seem 
especially related to deductible costs (Bartlett, 2013). The lower half of the penultimate 
section on Table 7.2 needs a delicate approach, as to even discuss such mentality matters 
with the public numbers alone will not suffice - however 'self-explanatory' they may seem. 
On the almost purely qualitative approach section of Table 7.2, there is a need for tenants 
and homeowners interests to be represented in policy-making. 'Lobbying' is extremely 
weak in both countries for reasons related to social cohesion, trust in state-related 
institutions, and weak support for NGO action. However, participation in movements 
regarding improvement of housing conditions is imperative at this stage, and I cannot see 
any possible breakthrough in such matters without it. Participation has to be kept outside 
political party influence and electoral leverage. It is often the case that during pre-electoral 
campaigns candidates make housing-related promises to cash-in on the societal significance 
of homeownership in Bulgaria and Greece. Housing has always been a tool for political 
leverage, however indirect. The belief for one party to support homeownership by for 
example not dealing with irregularities or providing favourable framework, was an 
underlying but potent booster. For these patterns to change, strong pressure from the civil 
society will be required. Lastly, the de-marginalization of the rental sector has notable 
qualitative elements and will take time. The disengagement of citizenship from 
homeownership is absolutely necessary for this to happen. As analyzed before, the informal 
link between good and successful citizenship and homeownership is persistent and strong. 
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